One of the most important reasons why the Japan-Korea conference had taken so long time for 14 years until the conclusion of the treaty, was that both sides had the very different stance about the property claim problems. It was the Ikeda Hayato administration (1960-1964) that led the property claim problems to an agreement. But in those days, nobody thought that it was Ikeda administration's achievement, even though it was criticized as a suspicion.
Post Cold War globalization politics has extended the definition of security to include more than just that of government and military matters to incorporate environmental issues, drugs, refugee problems, as well as economic, resource, energy, and food policy matters. Security, in a word, has become to be defined as comprehensive concept. An examination of postwar Japanese diplomatic policies, however, demonstrates a previous use of this “Post Cold War” phenomenon. During the Ikeda Administration, the prime minister's income doubling plan, for example, represented an attempt to ensure the Japanese Cold War security through increasing the wealth of Japan's citizens.
This paper examines Ikeda administration's security policy regarding the Japan-Korea Conference, in particular the negotiations over the property claim problems. Firstly, it focuses on the administration's setting of the defense budget under its second defense plan to present a survey of Ikeda's security plan. It argues the logic behind compiling of this defense budget to be alignment of defense matters with those of economic concerns.
Secondly, this paper tries to clarify the relations between Japanese security and Korean peninsula, through examining arguments about the situation of Korean peninsula in the National Defense Meeting and contents of Mitsuya Kenkyu.
Thirdly, this paper considers how the United States foreign policy based on the viewpoint of security strategy in the Far East commits to the Japan-Korea conference.
Contrary to previous studies that Ikeda administration's foreign policy toward Korea was developed by pressure of the United States, this paper argues that the Ikeda administration carried out a policy sufficiently taking into consideration Japanese security, and in opposition to pressure by the United States for the earlier resolution of the Japan-Korea conference suggesting limits to U. S. influence on Japan at that time.
Finally, this paper examines this issue in terms of the on-going negotiations for diplomatic normalization between Japan and Korea, in particular the negotiations over the property claim problems, as an example of the role of economic issues in security matters.
Ikeda said that if Korean peninsula is occupied by communist, its circumstances give fatal influence to the Japanese security as indicating her history so far. As indicating Ikeda' speaks, it is not hard to understand that the agreement of the property claim problems had the very important implication to the Japanese security.
抄録全体を表示