国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2001 巻 , 126 号
選択された号の論文の17件中1~17を表示しています
  • 菅 英輝
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 1-22,L5
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Nineteen sixty-eight was a year of global crisis, marking a major turning point not only in the history of the Cold War but also in the development of the world economy. It was in the year 1968 that we witnessed both the beginning of the era of détente and “the end of the feast” (Eric Hobsbawm) in the capitalist world. The dramatic events that happened throughout the world in 1968 had profound repercussions on the subsequent configurations and trends of world politics. The events of 1968 suggest that some profound changes were taking place throughout the 1960s. By looking into the dynamics of ideas, policies, movements and forces that had culminated in the events of 1968, not only will we be able to gain an important insight into why we have witnessed the end of the Cold War but also form a better historical perspective with which to analyze the current challenges of globalization and liberalization as well as the proliferation of civil wars that have befallen many of the developing countries.
    The 1960s were characterized by four increasingly salient features of post-World War Two world politics. Firstly, the most striking feature of the period from 1965 to 1973 was the interconnectedness of events in world politics and the links between domestic and international affairs. The events that took place within national contexts spread across borders and impacted on the domestic and foreign policies of other countries. Secondly, the major transformation of world politics that we witnessed during this period was accompanied by the gradual erosion of the Cold War regime dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States. This in turn impelled the two superpowers to lean toward cooperation in order to maintain their reign over each bloc. Thirdly, the 1960s also witnessed the surge of nationalism almost everywhere, whether in the third world or industrialized countries, the western bloc or the communist bloc. Nationalism found varying expressions in each country—decolonization and nation-building in the third world, and regional integration in Western Europe and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific led by the United States and Japan. These competing forces of nationalist aspirations and regional integration interacted with the Cold War imperatives, often challenging and undermining the Cold War structure. Lastly, it was a time when a liberal mood was on the upsurge with social and cultural movements often led by students and intellectuals but also involving workers, women and ethnic minorities. These “grass-roots” movements developed formal and informal transnational networks of communications and collaboration, revolting against the existing domestic and international arrangements that appeared repressive, authoritarian, hierarchical and alienating. At the same time, the experiments of liberalism came to a deadlock by 1968. The gridlock of the liberal experiments, together with the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression that shocked the western world in early 1968 not only frustrated President Lyndon Johnson's “Great Society” program but also paved a way for the counterattack with privatization and deregulation programs led by the “neo-conservatives” in the late 1970s.
    The following ten articles are written with the common concern with what the 1960s represented in the context of world politics. Each contributor attempts to provide new historical findings and perspectives which will allow us to have a better understanding of the interconnectedness of domestic and international affairs as well as why we are here and where we are now in the postwar history of world politics.
  • 横手 慎二
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 23-36,L6
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper I will analyze the domestic aspects of Khrushchev's foreign policy with a special attention to the Far Eastern states: Communist China, North Korea and to some extent Japan. (I am preparing a more detailed study on the post-W. W. II Japan-Soviet relations in another form.)
    Many scholars including G. Richter pointed out the existence of the different opinions among the Soviet leaders in the post-Stalin years. However, these studies are overly concerned with the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and less attentive to the impact on the Soviet leaders of the other new line which Khrushchev forwarded forcefully, the denunciation of Stalin and his policy. It was the July 1955 plenum of the CC of the KPSS where Foreign Minister Molotov and the First Party Secretary Khrushchev collided over the problem for the first time. Molotov asserted that the Soviet delegation led by Khrushchev should not have accepted the argument of the Yugoslavia party that it was no other than Stalin who was responsible for the rupture of the relations between the two countries. Khrushchev was skillful enough not to make a direct criticism against Stalin at this time only by making long citations from Lenin's writings and ascribing Molotov's objection to his face saving deeds. After Khrushchev's secret speech on the cult of Stalin at the 20th KPSS congress in 1956, Molotov, clearly realizing that both the Chinese and the Korean party leader-ships were bitterly critical against Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist position, was determined together with Malenkov and Kaganovich to relieve Khrushchev of his post of the First Party Secretary. But again Khrushchev displayed great shrewdness by convening the CC plenum and sweepingly dismissing them from their posts as the anti—party group in June 1957.
    The important point is that Molotov, having faithfully supported the Soviet-China collaboration policy during the past years, claimed at this plenum that Khrushchev's foreign policy of putting the first priority on the US-Soviet Relations would make the policy of the cohesion of the communist camp difficult. The deterioration of relations between the USSR and the two communist countries of North East Asia, which clearly contrasted with the gradual progress in the US-USSR relations in the following years, fully demonstrated the sharpness of Molotov's argument. By the end of the 1950s, Communist China grew far apart from the USSR. At the same time, North Korea, though moving to conclude its alliance treaty with the USSR, went its separate way with its own unique ideology. (And Japan started to strengthen its security relations with the US.) With these developments in the background, some of the party leaders, who were discontented with Khrushchev's policy, came to realize the validity of Molotov's arguments. We know now that Polianskii, who took the lead in pushing Khrushchev out from the top of the party in the October plenum in 1964, made a party report to the effect that the Khrushchev's US-first policy did damage to the policy of cohesion of the communist camp: especially, to Soviet-China relations. Some of the naive politicians in Moscow thought that they could make use of the dismissal of Khrushchev in order to repair the relations with Communist China. Polianskii, Shelepin, Trapeznikov and others faithful to the communist ideology strongly supported the policy of rapprochement with China. But they met vehement opposition from Andropov, Zymyanin and others who were in charge of the foreign affairs in the CC departments and the Foreign Ministry. These opponents were concerned with the negative effects on the peaceful coexistence policy by adopting the policy of collaboration with Mao Ze-tong, who looked fanatically anti-capitalist in their eyes
    Thus, Moscow's foreign policy choices in the 1960s were constrained as either a detente policy with the US or that of collaboration with China because of the domestic ideological situation created after
  • 吉次 公介
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 37-51,L8
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the early 1960s the new leaders of Japan and the United States, Hayato Ikeda and John F. Kennedy, managed US-Japan security relations under the previously signed 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. This paper attempts to examine the development of that relations.
    Following the conclusion of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, US-USSR relations stabilized. Western European countries, especially France, increased their sphere of action due to the decreased threat from the USSR. In the Eastern bloc, the conflict between the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC) grew more serious. Simultaneous détente in some areas, and multipolarization in other regions rendered Cold War alliances unstable.
    In Asia, the situation was quite different. The United States felt exposed to the menace of the PRC, and the United States government believed that the crises in Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam, were being instigated by the PRC. In addition, the PRC was in the process of building an atomic bomb. In such a situation, JFK felt the need to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, and urged Japan to help defend Asia from communism, not only economically but militarily as well. The president stated that for Japan to increase its military budget and strengthen its Self Defense Force (SDF) was of paramout importance.
    The Japanese government believed that the United States exaggerated the threat from the PRC. However, Ikeda did try to meet the US demands because he believed the United States and Japan should cooperate very closely in order to counter communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
    In defining the new defense build-up plan, Ikeda decided to increase the SDF faster than earlier envisaged. Within the new plan the goal for Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) would be 170, 000 troops. However, some in Ikeda's cabinet opined that GSDF troops should be increased to 180, 000 or the United States would complain. In the end the Ikeda Administration decided to increase troops to 180, 000. In short, this new scheme was initiated to deal with the demands the US placed on Japan in terms of “burden sharing.”
    The Japanese government contributed in other ways as well. Within the military sphere, the United States reduced its own military assistance and introduced a “cost-sharing” system. Under this system, the Japanese government was obliged to increase its defense expenditures to procure new weapons form the United States. Moreover, the Japanese government supported the United States economically, by increasing financial assistance to Southeast Asia to prevent communist expansion in the region.
    The Cold War in East Asia affected the development of the US-Japan Security System during the Ikeda-Kennedy era. In contrast to the European alliance, the foundations of the system were not shaken. While the rest of the world was in the process of multipolarizing, the US-Japan Security relations, fortified itself.
  • 橋口 豊
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 52-64,L10
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article attempts to examine the cooperation and friction among the Western allies with the focus on the Skybolt Crisis and the Nassau Agreement. The Skybolt Crisis arose from the inability to supply Skybolt missile by the United States (U. S.) to the United Kingdom (U. K.) in 1962. And the Nassau Agreement was signed for the solution of this crisis.
    The Skybolt crisis was an affair that caused intense friction between the U. S. and the U. K. following the Suez War. There was the unique British nuclear policy behind the crisis. The policy was based on the logic, so-called ‘dependence for independence.’ This means that the U. K. kept its autonomy in using missiles in order to maintain the independent status as a great power while accepting their supply from the U. S. The problem the Macmillan administration faced over the Skybolt affair was how the U. K. should coordinate independence with dependence on the U. S. That is to say, the Skybolt crisis was the crisis on the logic of ‘dependence for independence’ in British nuclear policy, thus the status of the U. K. as a great power was threatened.
    The restoration of the Skybolt crisis was made at the Nassau Conference. The Macmillan administration could obtain Polaris missiles instead of Skybolt missiles based on the Agreement signed at the Nassau Conference. However, for the British government, the Nassau Conference was not the symbol of ‘Pax Anglo-Saxonica’ among the Western allies, but the place to realize that ‘Pax Russo-Americana’ in the Cold War world had been strengthening. At the same time, the Kennedy administration started to force the Western allies to comply with the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) concept of NATO after the Nassau Agreement. The U. S. government sought the integration of the independent British and French nuclear forces under the U. S. ruling, while also curbing the feared nuclear ambitions of West Germany.
    In addition, the Nassau Agreement gave the impression of ‘Pax Anglo-Saxonica’ on the other allies, especially France. As a result, French President de Gaulle finally decided to deny the first application for EEC membership by the U. K.
    At the beginning of the 1960s, in the midst of U. S. -Soviet ‘collaboration’ toward ‘Pax Russo-Americana, ’ the friction among the Western allies had been developed in the complex form over the MLF concept and the British EEC application problem. That is the friction in Anglo-American relations, Anglo-French relations and French-American relations.
  • 奥薗 秀樹
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 65-80,L11
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the outbreak of the Korean War, South Korean government had heavily depended on the U. S. government for their military and economic security as a frontline state during the Cold War. Park Chung Hee and his Revolutionary Government, which emerged as a bearer of Korean nationalism through the 1961 military coup d'état, faced a difficult question: how to strike a balance between its self-reliance as an independent nation and excessive dependence on the U. S. government as a junior partner within the Cold War regime. The purpose of this paper is to examine how Park and his government struggled for Korean self-reliance while avoiding total dependence on the U. S.. To this end this paper focuses on the following three points.
    First, this paper examines Korean nationalism as a causal element of the 1961 Coup and an ideological basis of the Revolutionary Government there-after. Analysis of remarks which Park and the graduates of the Korean Military Academy, the main actors of the Revolutionary Government, made before and immediately after the coup, shows that their independence-orientedness and distrust of the big powers became the keynote when they formulated its foreign policy, at least for some time.
    Second, this paper examines how the Park Administration's perception of the U. S. at the beginning and how the perception transformed as time went on. The Revolutionary Government, in spite of their distrust of the U. S. government, came to conclude that the presence of the U. S. Forces in Korea and their economic assistance were important for preserving Korean independence amid the Cold War conflict. Because of the dilemma they faced, Park and his government had to re-define the balance between its self-reliance as an independent nation and dependence on the U. S. in terms of the reality surrounded them.
    Finally, this paper examines actual policy steps which the Park Administration took as attempts to achieve Korean self-reliance. Among them, the Revolutionary Government regarded, as the most important steps, its developments in social-economic dimension and improvements of people's everyday life in addition to the build-up of its military power and completing of anti-communism. However, Park's attempts to achieve these things by itself reached a dead end after a while and they realized there was no way other than “temporary dependence” on the U. S. to preserve Korean independence.
    In the end, Park's struggle for self-reliance resulted in “temporary dependence” on the U. S. However, we have to notice that Park's quest for self-reliance did not end in spite of the acceptance of “temporary dependence.” His endeavour at acquiring Korean self-reliance carried on at all occasions and with his full energy. In this sense, the “temporary dependence” was literally temporal and did not mean “overall dependence” or “subordination” to the U. S. government.
  • 半澤 朝彦
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 81-101,L12
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper reveals the ‘hidden’ United Nations' role in bringing about the ultimate demise of the Britain's formal Empire. The UN from the late 1950s onwards, with a significant increase in African membership, became a stronghold of international critics of colonialism. Contrary to the conventional image that the UN did not play much role in Britain's decolonization, newly-released archival evidence clearly shows that the dramatic downfall of international legitimacy of colonialism and the ever imminent possibility of UN intervention into UK's most sensitive colonial possessions such as Kenya and Central African Federation were constantly a real source of concern for Britain's top policy makers during the early 1960s. Though UK's sensitivity was not admitted openly, the UN anti-colonialism should be considered as one of the most decisive factors that precipitated Britain's sweeping decolonisation after 1960.
    The article starts with the review of postwar UK-UN relations with particular reference to the British attitude towards the rising anti-colonialism at the UN. Britain's basic policy to keep the UN hands off her colonies did not have to change until the end of the 1950s largely because Article 2 (7) of the UN charter, the domestic jurisdiction clause, effectively barred interference into the affairs of her dependent territories. The static picture changed dramatically in 1960, when the South African racial problem shook the traditional, strict interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction clause and the famous UN Resolution 1514 on colonialism was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The British then recognized the need to seriously cope with the unwelcome development at the UN and tried to secure as much cooperation as possible from her major allies such as the US. However, the prospect of UN intervention into UK's most sensitive colonies was so imminent that the only viable course left to Britain was to inevitably ‘jettison’ her remaining colonies, small or large, as quickly as possible. The episode illustrates how strong Britain's desire was to remain in the mainstream of international politics. The possibility of a break-up of the Commonwealth was a major reason why the British did not want to antagonize the anti-colonial camp at the UN. Fortunately for the British, the pressure for an ever faster decolonization receded when most of the sizable British colonies had attained independence by 1963 (Kenya). Nevertheless, the British continued to be fearful lest the issues such as Aden should be given undue attention in the UN and were no longer able to pursue a policy of an ‘orderly decolonisation’, which had characterised Britain's imperial policy up to the previous decade.
  • 定形 衛
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 102-116,L14
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to consider Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy in the 1960s. After the conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia rejected not only Soviet domination but also the Soviet model of socialism and opted for self-management socialism in the 1950s. Yugoslav socialism did not concentrate decision-making in the hands of bureaucratic structures but developed a system which was neither Western nor Soviet inspired.
    In the late 1960s, the Yugoslav leadership carried out a series of changes by which they altered the fundamental characteristics of the political and economical process in both the state and the party in an effort to resolve policy conflicts among themselves and control rising levels of internationality hostility and conflict among the masses. During this decade a series of reforms partially decentralized the organization and operation of the economy and partially democratized the political system. These reforms increased dramatically both the ability of regional leadership in the party and state to represent the economic interests of their respective regions in decision-making processes at the center.
    In foreign policy, on the other hand, Yugoslavia adopted nonalignment as the leading doctrine of the foundation for intenational activities. Yugoslavia's nonaligned foreign policy led to a strengthening of the Yugoslav's international position but contributed to the struggle for the construction of self-management society in the country.
    There were also compelling domestic reasons for adherence to nonalignment: it was the only foreign policy that proved acceptable to all factions of the party, to the different republics within the Yugoslav federation, and to the main strata of the population-serving as a compromise policy both for those who at various periods favored closer ties with the Soviet camp and for those who generally preferred a more West European orientation.
    In the sixties Yugoslavia obtained good results in economic development and political decentralization, but, at the same time, yielded and accumulated many contradictions in the country. In this sense it may safely be said that the sixties for Yugoslavia cut a path to the crisis of the seventies and moreover to the disintegration of the Federation in the eighties after-wards.
  • 鄭 敬娥
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 117-131,L15
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the Japanese Asian development policy and regionalism in the late 1960s, especially focussing on the “The Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in Southeast Asia” and the Idea of “Asia Pacific Area”. The former was promoted by the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister Sato, and the latter was worked out by the Foreign Minister Miki in December 1966. Until now these political meanings have been understood not so differently because they were proposed by the same cabinet. But these two frameworks for regional cooperation contained the diversities and shades of meaning on the concept of Southeast Asian Development. In 1960s, Japan has developed economically so greatly that she was tested in its ability to lead Southeast Asian regional cooperation.
    We can be permitted to say approximately that in this period, Southeast Asian countries gave economic realism rather than political idealism priority in domestic policy. Political leaders of these countries adopted a slogan generally called “Developmentalism”, and pushed forward with economic development policy to create a nation-state. The “Development” was used by them as a tool for achieving national integration and obtaining development funds from advanced countries. At the same time, a regional organization boom was provoked in the Southeast Asian region.
    I would like to point out that Japan was expected to play a leading part in Asian regional cooperation not only because of her economic power, but also because of Asian nationalism that largely has gained power. Japan took advantage of the opportunity to attempt to organize Southeast Asia as she chose.
    Prime Minister Sato thought that the Okinawa reversion negotiation would be promoted and the Japanese International position would be also improved by taking the initiative in Southeast Asian development. In regional conference Japan emphasized chiefly on agricultural development in Southeast Asian countries, thereby disappointing those governments that had hoped to develop their industries harmoniously.
    On the other hand Foreign Minister Miki proposed a new regional conception, “Asia-Pacific”. Claming that this regional policy is to solve the North-South problem in Asia, he surely wanted to prepare the coming international situation that would be brought by the end of Vietnam War. His regional idea was mainly made up of two aspects; one was concerned with Asian development cooperation for the developing countries, the other in trade liberalization especially among the pacific developed countries. He expected that Japan could be the “Bridge” between two sides and resolve the questions. But when examining in detail his this idea, we can notice that he failed to show how to solve the questions. Although his purpose was not realized during his term, non-governmental networks that he had wanted to utilize were growing in the Asia-Pacific region.
  • 鈴木 陽一
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 132-149,L16
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this article is to rethink why the twin nation of Malaysia and Singapore, emerged. Malaysia is a nation that the Malay-Muslims dominate, Singapore is a nation the Chinese make its core part, but both have strong transnational linkages in Maritime Southeast Asia and the global economy. This article reviews the emergence, focusing on transformation of collaborative relationship between the British government, the Federal government (Malaya, later Malaysia) and Singapore government, which made the formal and the informal British Empire in Southeast Asia.
    Malaysia and Singapore emerged at the end of Empire. What moved the Metropole and the local collaborators to make Greater Malaysia —Malaysia including Singapore— was an impulse to restructure the British Empire. Against communism in Southeast Asia, they tried to build a new united nation, which would become a new imperial collaborator. However the attempt to embed the conventional collaborator in a new federation led to conflicts among them. The Federal government and the Singapore government both had similar industrialization plans which competed with each other. However, Britain paid little attention to the old collaborators such as Singaporean, because they put more importance in the stability of a new junior partner. Therefore, Singaporean could do nothing but leave the Federation, and without the non-Muslim Singaporeans, Malaysia became more and more Malay-Muslim- oriented. The old Empire fell and a new order emerged. After the failure of Greater Malaysia, the British lost their will and power to maintain their Empire. The new rising power, the United States, did not make an empire, unlike the former imperial powers. She encouraged an anti-communism regionalism, and tried to organize people into a global economy. The Southeast Asians accepted the new power and became local collaborators of the imperialism without empire
    Nationalism played little role in the formation of two nations. Rather, the Federal government and Singapore government worked for their preservation of imperial privileges as imperial collaborators. They worked for the colonial grand design for the reorganization of Empire. Singapore left the Federation to defend its economic autonomy rather than their multiethnic policy. The divided Southeast Asians decided to live as different nations in the new order supported by the new power, to utilize regionalism and globalism.
    Decolonization saw its peak in 1960s. In many cases, empires advanced to decolonize with collaboration between the metroples and the local collaborators. Therefore, it was not necessarily accompanied by nation-building. The collaborators conflicted with each other. Irresponsible imperialists renounced their burden, and invented a situation of so-called quasi-states. those left engaged in nation-building and globalization, which sometimes contradict.
  • 柄谷 利恵子
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 150-168,L18
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines British race relations policies during the so-called “liberal hours” between 1965 and 1968 when the legal and policy framework in the field was established. Thirty-five years have passed since the first Race Relations Act was enacted in 1965. A recently published report on race relations in Britain, the largest of this kind under the present Labour government, nonetheless still found that racism is prevalent. It even claimed that Britishness has unspoken, racial connotations, and thus has to be redefined in a multi-ethnic way.
    My study claims that the race relations policies during the “liberal hours” contributed to today's confusion of what Britishness consists of and represents. It also argues that they reflected the then harsh international situation surrounding Britain, such as the decline of its political and economic power, decolonisation in Africa, and world-wide anti-racism movements. Given that the number of non-white immigrants to Britain increased since 1949, the pre-war Britishness, which disregarded the non-white British, was unsuitable by the 1960s.
    With Britain's international status declining, the British government in the 1950s and the 60s wanted to maintain the link with the Commonwealth of its former colonies. Citizens of the Commonwealth countries had a legal right to enter into Britain freely and this arrangement signified the unity of the Commonwealth. Yet, at the same time, the government attributed a mounting social tension to the large-scale non-white immigration flows from the Commonwealth countries. In the face of a world-wide anti-racism movement, nonetheless, it had to avoid criticism of being racist and further damage Britain's international status by introducing immigration control. The promoters of the “liberal hours” thus established their race relations policies, which dealt with those non-white British already inside the country, in parallel with immigration policies, which aimed to stop non-white immigration flows.
    The race relations policies then aimed at “integration”, by which both “equal opportunities” and “cultural diversity” were to be achieved. Accordingly, the ethnic minorities were allowed to maintain their own cultures in the “private” domain of the family and community as long as they observed a shared body of values and institutions in the “public” domain. Under this so-called two-domains thesis, it was unclear whether Britishness represents the public and private domains altogether or only the values and institutions in the public domain. Here, this paper points out, “cultural Englishness”, which should belong to the private domain, became confused with Britishness. The immigration act in 1968 accepted “belongers” in Britain only if they, or at least one of their parents or grandparents, were born, adopted, registered or naturalised in Britain. Since those “belongers” were predominantly white-British, however emphatically race relations policies denied the division of white and non-white British as the first and second citizens, their effects were greatly undermined.
  • 井関 正久
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 169-184,L19
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    East and West Germany were in a turbulent period in the 1960s. On the one hand the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 determined the division of both German states and symbolized East-West tensions. On the other hand the first postwar generation that criticized the Nazi generation began protest actions against the establishment. “1968” was a symbolic date for the protest movements of the 1960s in both German states.
    Today, “1968” is the focus of public attention again because the parties of the “sixty-eighters”, the “Greens”, have become the ruling parties as partners of the Social Democrats. The protagonists of “1968” seized the authority and are now on the side of the establishment. But some young people of the post cold war generation tend to look for an alternative to the “sixty-eighters” and call themselves the “eighty-niners”.
    In the 1960s the generation conflict became a social phenomena and caused the student revolt in West Germany. Students pursued not only the reform of the universities but also the democratization of society as a whole. They were the main actors in the extra parliamentary opposition and sought out political coalitions with labor unions and pacifists to oppose the passing of the Emergency Law. The antiauthoritarian movement formed a new political public space in which everyday life was politicized. The sixty-eighters in West Germany were the main actors of the “new social movements” in the 1970s and initiators of the “Greens”. They brought the idea of grass-roots democracy, feminism and ecology to parliaments and constantly changed the political culture.
    In East Germany there were also protest activities in the 1960s, in spite of suppression by the state. Under the influence of western subculture and student movements in West Germany the postwar generation opposed the cultural policies of the SED. During the ‘Prague Spring’ in 1968, hopes of democratization of socialism rose in East Germany also. The Soviet repression of the Prague Spring brought about different protest activities, which were immediately put down by the police. The sixty-eighters in East Germany organized political alternative movements through the 1980s and formed several civic groups like New Forum in the autumn of 1989. They were also the initiators of Round Table as a dialogue forum, which symbolized the “peaceful revolution”.
    The German protest movements in the 1960s contributed to forming the current democratic political culture. Since then public space has been made the place of political participation and social learning. Therefore, “1968” can be regarded as the beginning of the long democratization and emancipation process of German society.
  • 樋口 秀実
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 185-198,L20
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had a great influence on Japan's diplomatic policy during the Sino-Japanese War era. After the two countries concluded the Pact on October 23, 1939, the Japanese Army was forced to abandon its policy for the settlement of hostilities in China by strengthening the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact. So far the Army had considered that the strengthened Pact would have led to the settlement of hostilities, while would have made the Japanese national defense against the Soviet Union more secure. On the other hand, the Japanese Navy tried to play a leading role in Japan's policy-making towards foreign countries, especially towards China, after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact. The Navy, which had taken steps to advance southward, had been apprehensive over that it would increasingly lose a voice over policy-making following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and the Chang-Ku-Feng and Nomonhan incidents between Japan and the Soviet Union. It had functioned as a brake to control the Army and then had searched for an opportunity to get a powerful voice back. The German-Soviet Pact gave the Navy such a golden opportunity. And Japan took advantage of the new phase of the international political situation that resulted from the signature of the German-Soviet Pact. Britain and France carried out their appeasement policy towards Japan in Asia, while they confronted Germany and the Soviet Union in Europe. The Chinese National Government at Chungking was deeply shocked that the Britain and France considered stopping the Sino-Japanese War once the Wang Jing-Wei regime at Nanking had come into existence. The formation of a united government by Chungking, Nanking and the Chinese Provisional Government at Peking seemed to be possible. What measures Japan took to settle hostilities after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact is the matter to be examined in this article, which focuses on the activities of the Navy for the establishment of the Wang regime.
    In order to end the War, the Abe Nobuyuki Cabinet, which was formed shortly after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact, began to grope for détente with the United States. In those days, the United States was the only country that could intervene in the China problem, while all other counries, such as Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, had to grapple with the issues of Europe. Both the Navy and the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which also had a voice in policy-making after the signature of the Pact, prompted this moderate policy towards the United States. The Navy, however, did not agree with the Foreign Ministry as to what measures Japan should take to settle the hostilities in China. The latter had the idea to use the Wang Jing-Wei regime as an intermediary with Chungking Government with a view to the settlement of hostilities. It seemed that Japan's strong measures towards the Wang regime would force him to be Japanese puppet and prevent an intervention by him or the United States with the Chungking Government. The former had a strategic plan that the Wang regime would be obliged to closely cooperate with Japan in a war against the United States. In fact, the United States criticized the Japanese hard-line policy towards the Wang regime and reckoned that there was no use in entering into further negotiations with Japan over th China problem.
  • スガナミ H
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 199-210
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 戸部 良一
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 211-214
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 遠藤 誠治
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 214-217
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 河野 勝
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 218-221
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 菅 英輝
    2001 年 2001 巻 126 号 p. 222
    発行日: 2001/02/23
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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