This article discusses the process of formation of the two “nation-states” in South Asia of India and Pakistan, taking into account two different points of view. One concerns how nation or sovereignty was formed, and the other is to view this process in the context of the collapse of British colonial rule or decolonisation. The two processes are closely intertwined, and while the existing literature has developed their respective perspective, they have not fully clarified the relationship between the two. For example, Indian historiography, which generally views India's independence as a victory of the freedom struggle led by the Congress, holds that the Muslim League, supported by the British “divide and rule” policy, led to the formation of Pakistan. On the other hand, mainstream British scholarship, for example the work of the historian K. O. Morgan, sees the transfer of power as a result of a long process of planning and preparation. He maintains that the outcome was a victory for the British Labour Party, especially Prime Minister Attlee, and that the separation was made inevitable because of the failure on the part of Hindus and Muslims to agree on the terms, rather than by British policy.
The present article attempts to examine this difference in interpretation by tracing the period from 1945 to 1946 when the “breakdown plan” developed into the Cabinet Mission Plan. By so doing it will be possible to clarify how the process of decolonisation, initiated by Britain, shaped the other process, that is, the formation of “nation states”.
By the early twentieth century the Congress, which was formed in 1885, had acquired the status of the main political force, which demanded self-determination on the assumption of the existence of a “nation”, even through doubts could be expressed as to whether an “Indian nation” actually existed. By the 1930s they believed that they could secure legitimacy by creating a “nation state” called India, through erecting a constituent assembly, enacting a constitution and forming a central government. However, during the second half of the 1930s a minority group, the Muslims, emerged to question the assumption which the Congress had made on the content of “nation”. The Muslims League (formed in 1906) advocated a “two nation theory”.
When the Second World War began, the Congress rejected cooperating with the British war effort, and organised the anti-British movement. This led to the imprisonment of their leaders, and made room for the emergence of Muslims as a political force, as they were willing to support the war effort. They maintained power in some provincial governments, held a disproportionately large share in the ranks of the British Indian Army, and remained loyal to Britain.
After the war Britain offered India dominion status, on the condition that she could maintain her military and economic interests in the subcontinent. Dissatisfied by that offer, however, a massive anti-British movement took place during the second half of 1945. It was at that point that a “breakdown plan” was formulated, according to which, in the event of failing to suppress the anti-British movement, Britain was to leave India to the hands of the Congress and retreat to Pakistan, a dominion, with which Britain would by then have formed a defensive alliance. The Attlee Cabinet kept this plan secret, but quickened the dispatch of a cabinet mission. The resulting “Cabinet Mission Plan” suggested the establishment of a united federation of India and Pakistan (and what presently is Bangladesh). This plan could be interpreted as an effort to mend Britain's relations with the Congress, as it enables them to interpret it as a plan which allows them to incorporate Pakistan to Congress rule. At the same time, it could also be interpreted by the Muslims as a plan which offers
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