国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2001 巻, 127 号
選択された号の論文の15件中1~15を表示しています
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    広瀬 崇子
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 1-11,L5
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    South Asian politics can be analysed from three different angles: in terms of global politics, at the regional level and within the nation-states.
    The end of the Cold War has not brought peace to the Indian sub-continent, but further complicated the conflict situation with the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the Kargil crisis and ever intensifying ethnic conflicts. A major difference between South Asia and other parts of the world that were affected by the Cold War rivalry is that in the sub-continent the conflict between India and Pakistan was an independent variable, and the Cold War a dependent one. The autonomy of the region still prevails in the post-Cold War period.
    The regional politics is characterised by conflicts between India and Pakistan and between India and its smaller neighbours. Whereas Pakistan seeks parity with India, smaller states are forced to accept their subordinate position. India and Pakistan, which defined their nation-states as a secular state and a Muslim state respectively at the time of partition, are complimentary to each other in the sense that both can establish their national identities by denying the other. The Kashmir conflict is a symbol of such a struggle.
    Recurring ethnic conflicts further threaten the integrity of the nationstates. The ethnic boundaries that do not coincide with the state borders enable neighbouring countries to intervene with ethnic conflicts for their own national security and interest. However, they are bound to face the repercussions to their own states.
    The third dimension deals with problems of democracy. An institutional approach, i. e. the dichotomy between military regime and civilian democratic rule is misleading, as both regimes often belong to a gray zone. Although democracy seems the only viable discourse at the moment, democracy is sometimes dysfunctional for the development of the political system. Democracy itself can be a major cause for ethnic conflicts when political leaders resort to identity politics and populism.
    One of the effective ways to overshadow the internal and external contradictions is to raise strong nationalism. Nationalism like ethnicity emerges when a group of people become conscious of differences between “us” and “them.” The “them” often becomes a common enemy of that group. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which was a strong protagonist of Hindutva or Hindu nationalism, switched the target of Indian nationalism from the Muslims within India to Pakistan in the mid-1990s in order to generate pan-India nationalism.
    Under such conditions, the tension between India and Pakistan is likely to persist. The first step to solve the Indo-Pakistan conflict is that the two brother nations recognize each other as a foreign country. Only then will the two countries be able to normalize the relationship based on rational calculation. When they do, however, the state borders will be considerably lowered and the “nation-state” might loose its original meaning.
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    伊豆山 真理
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 12-32,L6
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the origins of Pakistan's alliance with the United States. Diplomatic historians have dealt with the United States-Pakistan alliance under the framework of Cold War history. They presume that the United States' unilateral decision was resilient and that Pakistan was the passive actor. However, the United States did not have a completely free hand in South Asia as is revealed by recent works in British Imperial history. This paper reconstructs the process of Pakistan's entry into the Cold War alliance as her shift away from British sphere to United States sphere. It aims to show that this process was the trilateral (US-Pakistan-UK) agreement for the Pakistan's role in the juncture of Imperial retreat and the Cold War.
    In and after the transfer of power, Britain was not so keen in pursuing defense arrangement with either India or Pakistan because she believed that the Commonwealth tie would naturally serve the defense purpose. South Asia was understood to be under the British realm before the Korean War. Fearing that the United States containment policy might antagonize China, British expected India to play a greater role in the United Nations. Dislike of Indian leadership led the United States to review her South Asian policy.
    United States relations with Pakistan were reflections of her intensifying engagement in South Asia. Two turning points can be observed. The first one was connected to the Korean War. It culminated in NSC 98/1, which set forth more vigorous policy objectives in South Asia. However, this bilateral defense arrangement did not materialize because Pakistan was demanding security assurance vis-à-vis India. Britain was against the idea of the United States cooperating only with Pakistan as it was damaging the unity of the Commonwealth.
    The second turning point was connected to Middle East defense, in which the United States allocated the pivotal role to Pakistan, despite British reluctance. Dulles, who was the author of “Northern Tier”, highly evaluated Pakistan's potential contribution. However, before working out the detailed plan in the Middle East strategy, Pakistan was nominated as the alliance partner in NSC 5409. The final decision was hastily made in the mindset of competition with India's “neutralism”.
    Pakistan had more clear and consistent strategic purposes for the alliance. It was to build up its defense in order to secure “parity” with India. There were two different approaches for achieving it. Political leaders sought security assurance and political interference by Britain and/or the United States to settle conflict with India. They also sought association with Muslim countries, who represented anti-Imperialism such as Egypt and Iran. The military did not expect to settle the Kashmir conflict and chose to challenge India in the longer run by way of defense procurement and getting support for training. After the assassination of prominent political leader Liaquat Ali Khan, the military's approach became the mainstream. The “Communist” threat was only symbolic, both externally and internally, but the military displayed it as if there were domestic communist threats in Pakistan.
    The concurrence of Cold War policy between Pakistan and the United States was not so much on defense of Middle East or Southeast Asia. It was to build a strong Pakistan state, which allowed different interpretations among Pakistan, the United States and Britain. Because of this equivocal stipulation, Britain also reluctantly agreed to transfer her responsibility in Pakistan to the United States.
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    吉田 修
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 33-49,L8
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Facing an acute politico-economic crisis in the mid-60's, India embarked on change in its strategy for self-reliance toward the end of that decade. It was a change from the strategy introduced by the late Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. His government had contemplated massive economic liberalization in order to attract foreign money, which might keep the Central Government's superiority in terms of distribution of the resources to the States, while accepting more participation by the State bosses in central affairs. The process of strategic change started in 1966 with the infamous devaluation of the Rupee, and ended up with more isolation from technological development by international standards. The inability of the Aid-India Consortium to raise aid money to meet the Indian need to import the necessary goods for structural reform was the main reason for India to change course.
    Indian reaction was to balance its imports and exports so as to accumulate its foreign exchange reserves high enough to be a cushion against the lever of the donors. In this context it began to stress import substitution through which some reduction of imports could be expected. India also promoted more exports of traditional goods and raw materials. But what was central in its modification of self-reliance strategy was the role of East European countries and especially of the Soviet Union. The Indian government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi found its way out in its comparative advantage in the export of light manufactured goods to that region, which was established through the import substitution by having imported capital goods from the developed world till the mid-60's. East Europeans on their side needed to import consumer goods of a certain standard that India was now proud of attaining and did not lag very far behind the international standard at the time of late-1960's. Getting sufficiently confident of its export prospects to them, and finding the availability there of the items India most acutely needed, military weapons, when it decided to save foreign exchange as much as possible, there was established a complementary interdependence between India and East Europe.
    This modification could not be a long-term strategy as it was inherently static because it was based on the technological level at certain point of time and attained through its import substitution strategy till the mid-60's. Although India tried to keep up the international standard, there was a limitation to seek them in the open market. The international standards were kept up by the multinational corporations, from which India decisively departed as a result of failed devaluation incidents. In fact, the oil crisis made all efforts at diminishing the trade deficit come to nothing, and India could not help relying on some external means like the export of laborers to the oil-producing countries in the Middle East or accepting the Soviet offer to add crude oil to the list of Soviet exports of barter trade agreement, thus accumulating a contradiction till the collapse of the Soviet Union.
    The split of the Congress Party occurred in the same year as the change in strategy started. For most of the State bosses, or the Old Guard or the Syndicate, who had lost their seats in the 1967 elections, the split completed the process of the strategic change, as after all their way back by relying on the central government would be blocked by this change. Their criticism against Indira Gandhi and her supporters as Russian agents was off the point as the new strategy was based on the interdependence between India and the Socialist countries. This can also explain India's non-alignment status after its signing of the alliance treaty with the Soviet Union two years later.
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    堀本 武功
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 50-64,L9
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    A series of atomic bomb tests by India in May 1998 was the biggest regional incident that had impact on world affairs in the past five decades. In South Asia there occurred major happenings such as the three Indo-Pakistani wars until 70's and Indo-China border conflict in 1962. But these happenings did not have direct bearings on the international situation at each occasion. Because of their regional characters, US and the Soviet Union did not have any hand in them.
    But the tests have been a major international shock. The US was affected severely, as shown by Clinton's remarks that it was the worst event in the 20-century. For the international nuclear control regime which has been promoted by US as the sole super-power in the post cold war period has been challenged and shaken by India, the regional power of South Asia.
    The basic objective of this paper is to examine Indo-US relations in the post cold war period. In order to understand the relations between the two countries, it is necessary to check three levels, viz., level of perceptions towards the international system as understood by India and US, level of security and nuclear policy pursued by the two, and level of direct negotiations between the two countries.
    The paper will analyze the three levels by turn. Firstly, there is the big divergence between India's “multi-polar system” orientation and US's “unipolar system” preoccupation. Secondly, in the level of policy matters, India has neglected the development of security policy, whereas US has pursued the monopolized nuclear control regime. Thirdly, they have negotiated the main issue, viz., the “credible minimum deterrence, ” from their respective angles. In conclusion, the paper predicts that, though in the post cold war period India and US has dramatically improved their economic relations, the perception gap will persist for a long time, which may jeopardize real improvement in the field of security and political relations.
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    長崎 〓子
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 65-78,L10
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article discusses the process of formation of the two “nation-states” in South Asia of India and Pakistan, taking into account two different points of view. One concerns how nation or sovereignty was formed, and the other is to view this process in the context of the collapse of British colonial rule or decolonisation. The two processes are closely intertwined, and while the existing literature has developed their respective perspective, they have not fully clarified the relationship between the two. For example, Indian historiography, which generally views India's independence as a victory of the freedom struggle led by the Congress, holds that the Muslim League, supported by the British “divide and rule” policy, led to the formation of Pakistan. On the other hand, mainstream British scholarship, for example the work of the historian K. O. Morgan, sees the transfer of power as a result of a long process of planning and preparation. He maintains that the outcome was a victory for the British Labour Party, especially Prime Minister Attlee, and that the separation was made inevitable because of the failure on the part of Hindus and Muslims to agree on the terms, rather than by British policy.
    The present article attempts to examine this difference in interpretation by tracing the period from 1945 to 1946 when the “breakdown plan” developed into the Cabinet Mission Plan. By so doing it will be possible to clarify how the process of decolonisation, initiated by Britain, shaped the other process, that is, the formation of “nation states”.
    By the early twentieth century the Congress, which was formed in 1885, had acquired the status of the main political force, which demanded self-determination on the assumption of the existence of a “nation”, even through doubts could be expressed as to whether an “Indian nation” actually existed. By the 1930s they believed that they could secure legitimacy by creating a “nation state” called India, through erecting a constituent assembly, enacting a constitution and forming a central government. However, during the second half of the 1930s a minority group, the Muslims, emerged to question the assumption which the Congress had made on the content of “nation”. The Muslims League (formed in 1906) advocated a “two nation theory”.
    When the Second World War began, the Congress rejected cooperating with the British war effort, and organised the anti-British movement. This led to the imprisonment of their leaders, and made room for the emergence of Muslims as a political force, as they were willing to support the war effort. They maintained power in some provincial governments, held a disproportionately large share in the ranks of the British Indian Army, and remained loyal to Britain.
    After the war Britain offered India dominion status, on the condition that she could maintain her military and economic interests in the subcontinent. Dissatisfied by that offer, however, a massive anti-British movement took place during the second half of 1945. It was at that point that a “breakdown plan” was formulated, according to which, in the event of failing to suppress the anti-British movement, Britain was to leave India to the hands of the Congress and retreat to Pakistan, a dominion, with which Britain would by then have formed a defensive alliance. The Attlee Cabinet kept this plan secret, but quickened the dispatch of a cabinet mission. The resulting “Cabinet Mission Plan” suggested the establishment of a united federation of India and Pakistan (and what presently is Bangladesh). This plan could be interpreted as an effort to mend Britain's relations with the Congress, as it enables them to interpret it as a plan which allows them to incorporate Pakistan to Congress rule. At the same time, it could also be interpreted by the Muslims as a plan which offers
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    伊藤 融
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 79-94,L12
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this essay is to describe ethnic conflicts in South Asia, which have challenged existing ‘nation-states, ’ in terms of international relations. I will focus exclusively on the international dimensions of three protracted ethnic conflicts—Punjab, Kashmir and Sri Lanka conflicts.
    Firstly, the impact of global structural changes on each conflict will be examined. The idea is generally accepted that the end of the Cold War and the development of globalization either have caused ethnic conflict or escalated such issues. In South Asia, however, it is impossible to find such a definite correlation between the global changes and ethnic conflicts, for the three conflicts have their roots before 1990, and the conflicts in Punjab and Sri Lanka had already escalated in 1980's. In the case of Kashmir, although we began to see the terrible violence after 1990, we cannot indicate the direct causal relationship to the escalation of the Kashmir conflict.
    Secondly, I will analyze the impact of inter-state relationships in South Asia. The asymmetry of power and antagonism between India and Pakistan in the region have certainly affected the evolution of the three ethnic conflicts. On the one hand, India, seeking its status as a regional hegemonic power, has intervened strategically in the Sri Lankan domestic conflict. For instance, the Government of India dispatched the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1987, only to intensify the conflict. On the other hand, Pakistan, trying to fill the power gap, has intervened in Punjab and Kashmir conflicts. It is widely known that Pakistan has assisted as well as fostered some militant rebels against the Government of India. In every case, the intervention of a neighboring country has escalated the conflict.
    Thirdly, the impact of transnational identity is evaluated. Foreign policy on ethnic conflict in another country depends not only on instrumental factors but also on affective factors. While Pakistan has been obliged to support Kashmir Muslims because of its raison d'être as an Islamic state, the Government of India has been placed under great pressure to help Sri Lankan Tamils by ethnonationalism in Tamil Nadu state. Moreover, ethnic diasporas of Sikhs and Tamils in Western countries have provided their enthusiastic material and non-material support for ethnic separatist movements. These affective links have also reinforced every ethnic conflict.
    Needless to say, these three ethnic conflicts were not caused by international factors, but by their own domestic factors. We should say that international factors have affected the development process of ethnic conflicts, not the occurrence process. In South Asia, it is regional inter-state relationships and transnational ethnic identity rather than global structural changes that have escalated each ethnic conflict.
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    井上 恭子
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 95-110,L13
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of international relations in the Himalayan region. Being land-locked between India and China but bordered on the north by the huge, arid Tibetan plateau in China, Nepal has had an easier access to the outside world through India. This geographical position and exposure to India have made Nepal heavily dependent on India. At the same time, Nepal has played a role of buffer state between India and China. From the perspective of India's security, Nepal has held a strategic importance. India has developed a strong sense of insecurity over years in the relationship with China. The importance of Nepal arises from Nepal's geographical position between India and China.
    In order to keep the border area favorable to India or at least undisturbed, India needed to keep close relations with Nepal. For this purpose India maintained a calculated policy with respect to Nepal. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by India and Nepal in 1950 laid the foundation for the relationship between the two countries. In the political and economic sphere, articles 6 and 7 are significant as both countries agreed to treat the citizens of each other's countries as their own with regard to economic matters. Provision for this reciprocal national treatment grew as one of the sources of irritation from Nepal to India. Nepal started to feel that it was playing a loser's part and feared the dominance of India.
    In such circumstances, Nepal looked towards China as an effective means of leverage vis-à-vis India. The policy worked to some extent, but, on the whole, India's political and economic presence in Nepal did not allow Nepal to act independently. The trade “impasse” imposed by India in 1989 was one of the cases. The reason India took this step was that it uncovered evidence of the purchase of arms by Nepal from China and the presence of a Chinese technical team in a National Highway construction project along the Indo-Nepali border. India took these issues very seriously. Consequently, the supply of essential commodities to Nepal was virtually suspended and life came to a standstill.
    The economic crisis caused by the trade “impasse” was solved by political changes in Nepal and India and by the gradual improvement in the India-China relations. The relationship between Nepal and India started to show signs of change in the 1990s. Negotiations between the governments have grown more transparent and straightforward. For example, Nepal began to press for changes in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950, especially the parts which Nepal felt to be unfavorable and India has agreed to look into the matter. Despite frequent changes in governments in both countries, there is a hint that a kind of consensus in bilateral relations is being established and shared by both countries.
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    大石 高志
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 111-131,L15
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the 1990s, India has experienced an unprecedented tightening of its relations with some African and Gulf countries. The amount of trade with them has considerably increased. Joint ventures with foreign capital in India and abroad were newly set up. Political missions on the presidential or ministerial level often visited each other. This phenomenon is impressive, especially when we compare it with the situation until the 1980s. In the 1990s India has changed its economic as well as political regime and its overall foreign relationship has been drastically transforming itself. Though the enlarging relation with East and South-East Asian countries, and with North America is more striking, for example in terms of amount of trade, the expansion of relationship with African and some other Indian Ocean region countries is also substantial and no less important in quality and novelty. In fact, since 1990s India has been making strategic access to the Indian Ocean region, and searched for a new position within it. Moreover, this development has been encouraged by the corresponding movement on the part of some countries in the region, like South Africa and Mauritius, which see the framework of Indian Ocean region advantageous for their own economic and political strategy.
    This essay has multiple aims. One is to situate this new phase in the long time history of Indian Ocean region, and thereby illuminate the novelty of this contemporary situation. The second is to map out the detailed aspects of this economic as well as political change between India and some countries around the Indian Ocean since 1990s. The third is to direct our attention to the non-governmental entities like private companies and migrants so as to re-evaluate the macro change of economy and politics.
    Major findings can be summarized as follows. The drastic change of situation between India and the Indian Ocean region has been brought out mainly by the co-incidence of three events, namely the end of the Cold War, India's turn into the open economy and South Africa's return to the world economy with leanings to the Asian area. This co-incidence led to the emergence of an economy-oriented strategy among countries in the region, which consciously downplay the memory of historical opposition and minimize the gap of political or ideological differences.; Though the Indian Ocean region saw the establishment of a regional cooperative association IOR-ARC (Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation), several economically potential countries like India, South Africa and the Gulf countries are unmistakably dominant players. The relationship between these countries and other marginal countries stand on some hierarchical order, which dates back to the colonial period.; While the tightening of relations among countries in this region has been dominantly led by the logic of economic benefit, it has not been untouched by political and social paradox. In fact, it tends to alienate some countries like Pakistan and some social groups including the minority businessmen.
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    近藤 則夫
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 132-152,L16
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since her Independence in 1947, the election system has been the most important pillar supporting India's democracy. The legitimacy of the election system is high because of its fairness and efficiency. Therefore, the election which has a basic cycle of five years has important meanings for political parties who want to maximise political benefits. Political parties use elections as a focus that determines the strategy and way that should operate.
    In this paper, it is shown that the role of the electoral system in India is very important for its integrative effect to the party system. Such integrative effect is wielded through the pressure of converging the party system into two party system, which is examined in three levels, that is, constituency, State and Federal level. Factors like single-member constituency system, people's wide-spread perception against the performance of the ruling party, together with the politician's benefit-maximising-behaviour, are the bases for such pressure to work. On the other hand, the party representing socio-economic cleavages has a tendency to disturb the converging pressure because the ascriptive nature of the party is likely to work against the process of political compromise, which is essential for parties to converge. But the disturbing influence of the socio-economic cleavages is, by and large, latent in most of the States.
    There is a very close political linkage between candidate in the constituency and the State level party system. Because of it, the converging pressure can penetrate effectively into both constituency and State level party system and make the party system a competitive but integrative two-party system within the State. But it is different in the case of the relation between the State and Federal level party system, because the political linkage is becoming fluid since the 1980s. The decay of the Congress Party and the emergence of strong State-based parties are factors weakening the political linkage between the State and Federal political system. This is the basic reason that the converging effects of State and Federal political system are rather difficult to be linked with each other, though they work separately in each level.
    The party system in the Federal level is often said to be a “multiple bi-polar system” in the 1990s. It is “bi-polar” because most of the States now have a two-party system. It is “multiple” because the federal political system is multiple aggregation of the bi-polarity of States. But such “multiple bi-polar system” is always under the converging pressure, which is the basic reason for the stability of democracy in India.
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    三輪 博樹
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 153-168,L17
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, I will examine the factors which have caused the fragmentation of the party system in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) in India. In UP, the Indian National Congress (Congress Party) was the dominant power until the middle of 1980's. Since the end of 1980s, however, the power of the Congress Party has declined. In 1990's, the party system in UP has been fragmenting.
    In general, it is said that there are two factors which determine the characteristics of the party system, namely, the “electoral system” and the “social structure.” From the analyses of the results of the general elections to the Lok Sabha (the Lower House of the Parliament), it has been proved that the impact of the electoral system on the fragmentation of the party system in UP is limited. The fragmentation of the party system in UP is related more strongly to the social structure of UP than the electoral system.
    In order to explain how and why the social structure relates to the party system in UP, it is important to turn our attention to the “strategies of the political parties.” The fragmentation of the party system in UP can be interpreted as the result of the interaction of three kinds of strategies adopted by the political parties. (1) Mobilization of the electorate by means of the Hindu nationalist ideology by the Bharatiya Janata Party and its associated organizations. (2) Decision to implement the reservation policy for the backward classes by the central government. (3) Mobilization of the Scheduled Castes by the Bahujan Samaj Party. In consequence, while the Congress Party has lost its traditional support base, other parties could deprive the support base from the Congress Party, and consolidate their own support base.
    The conclusion of this paper does not deny the importance of the electoral system and social structure. In order to explain “how” and “why” these two factors have an impact on the party system, however, it is important to turn our attention to the “strategies of the political parties.” The strategies of the political parties can be interpreted as the “mediating factor” between the above two factors and the party system.
    The framework of the analysis adopted in this paper can be applicable not only to the case of UP, but also to the cases of the other states in India and the other countries. In order to expand this framework, we will have to do two things. (1) Include other factors than the strategies of the political parties. (2) Comparative analysis of many cases using this framework.
  • 南アジアの国家と国際関係
    井上 貴子
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 169-184,L18
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Television viewing has become a part of everyday life in India since the early 1990s. The development of mass media has made new patriotism pervasive in the popular culture of India. It is quite usual that political parties appropriate popular culture for legitimizing their ideology. I especially focus on the video clip shot by G. Bharat, a commercial film producer for the album Vande Mataram (Mother, I salute you) by A. R. Rahman, a popular musician, released in 1997 to celebrate India's fifty years of independence.
    Vande Mataram composed by a Bengali poet, Bankimchandra Chatterjee was first set to music and sung by Rabindranath Tagore at the 1896 session of the Indian National Congress. The song became a symbol of patriotism during the Swadeshi movement opposed to the partition of Bengal in 1905, though it caused the communal tension between Hindus and Muslims during the freedom struggle, as it was anti-Muslim in its content and context.
    The video clip of Vande Mataram revived in a new version made patriotism the popular boom in spite of heavy criticism. Patriotism described in the video clip is love of Mother India, a country of “Unity in Diversity”, where the diverse people live happily and tradition and modernity coexist. This concept totally agrees with the program code of laws relating to broadcasting, which made the video clip possible to be broadcast widely.
    Bharatiya Janata Party appropriated this boom. The Uttar Pradesh Government tried to make the singing of Vande Mataram in schools, the meetings for mourning victims of Kargil War were held all over the country, and the Millennium Vande Mataram Campaign was launched for arousing patriotism among the youth. These events reminded them of the national enthusiasm for calling for freedom though it caused communal tension and was criticized bitterly.
    Those who belong to the urban middle class of Chennai in Tamil Nadu, Rahman and Bharat's native city, have well accepted the new patriotism according to my survey. The result shows that the difference of social background little affects their perception. Though caste and gender difference cannnot be recognized, the elder generation, non-Hindu and non-Tamil, are somewhat more critical of the new patriotism. Tamil Hindus seem no longer to be satisfied with Tamil Nationalism propelled by regional parties but to identify themselves with the Nation of India.
    This phenomenon is a reaction to globalization. Both anti-globalization and yeaning for American culture in producers' mind crystallized as a new patriotic music. Though its description of India suggests no border and enemy, anti-globalization is often expressed by the hostility to neighbors. That is why BJP can easily appropriate this boom for legitimizing their ideology and policy based on anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim themes.
  • 潘 亮
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 185-205,L20
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Due to the East-West and South-North conflicts, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has been unable to efficiently discharge its peaceful mission for nearly five decades. Many major member states, in particular big powers, have frequently expressed their discontent with the performance of the organization and some have even withdrawn their memberships. In contrast with these states, Japan has pursued a coherently constructive policy toward UNESCO since its admission despite bearing an increasing financial burden. Moreover, Japan is possibly the only state to voluntarily embark on UNESCO cooperation activities while not a member of the organization. This article throws light on the formation of Japan's UNESCO movement during the occupation era so as to provide a historical base for our understanding of such a cooperative attitude. By scrutinizing the roles of civic activists, the Japanese government, and the occupation authorities (known as “GHQ”), this article elucidates that the origin of Japan's UNESCO cooperation was not only derived from the aspiration toward the organization's peaceful thoughts but also shaped by a variety of expectations with domestic implications.
    The UNESCO movement in Japan was inaugurated under the initiatives of civic cultural groups and eminent figures, many of whom stated that they were willing to cooperate with UNESCO so as to echo the peaceful ideals illustrated in the organization's constitution. Two more pragmatic goals —enhancing the resurrection of cultural communication with the international society, and utilizing UNESCO's pacifist image for the sake of domestic political interests— also served as important short-term reasons for the emergence of the movement.
    Fully aware of the vulnerability of UNESCO's mission under the Cold War international setting, the Japanese government (especially the Foreign Office and later, the Ministry of Education) began to use UNESCO cooperation as a convenient pretext to revitalize its domestic cultural enterprises rather than just as a method for maintaining international peace. Government officials also regarded the movement as an optimal tool to pave the way for Japan's return to postwar international arena.
    As the initial ruler of the defeated Japan, GHQ was bewildered by the complex background of the Japanese UNESCO movement. But it gradually became supportive, albeit without losing cautiousness, to the development of UNESCO-related activities in Japan when U. S. officers gradually realized that such activities might be helpful in smoothing their efforts at reforming Japan through cultural methods.
    The UNESCO movement thrived upon such complicated expectations of various actors, and has left two important legacies: (1) a complex interministerial policy-making system regarding UNESCO; (2) the existence of civic UNESCO groups whose representatives are permanently present in the government's decision-making body. The interactions of these elements could exert strong influence on Japanese cooperation with UNESCO after its affiliation.
  • 坂元一哉著『日米同盟の絆』
    河野 康子
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 206-215
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高原 明生
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 216-219
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 広瀬 崇子
    2001 年 2001 巻 127 号 p. 220
    発行日: 2001/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
feedback
Top