It has been quite some time since Peter Gourvitch, among others, had indicated that the interaction between international relations and domestic political change might have a more dynamic and theoretically interesting character than previously believed. A lot of water under the bridge since then, but not much has changed: the linkage between international politics and comparative politics has yet to be established. As a preface to the featured articles, this paper illustrates both the origins of this divide, as well as the important attempts that have been made to fill the gap.
There are two sources for the conceptual divide between domestic politics and international politics. The first is the legacy that has been carried over from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which not only ended religious wars in Europe but also established a world composed of secular sovereign states. Such transition to a world divided into secular states, however, was always limited and was placed under various challenges against that division. The Westphalian legacy, in many ways, has been elevated from history into a simplified myth.
A more academic source that established the domestic-international divide will be the works of Kenneth Waltz and his distinction of three analytical levels in international studies, one that effectively ruled out the search for domestic determinants of foreign policy as reductionist. But in effect, Waltz may have been working on a reductionism of his own, where domestic political priorities are reduced to that of a monolithic state, state priorities reduced to a mere outcome of anarchy, where patterns of power distribution appears as the only viable arenas for inquiry.
For students of international political economy, in their studies of the interactions between the international market and individual governments, Waltz's rigid category appeared too narrow and inadequate. Thus started a stream of academic works that aimed to move away from Waltz's third image, first studying the second image in reverse, and then directly castingdoubts on his dismissal of the second image. In this paper, I trace such theoretical developments, first in the field of international political economy, then on regional integration and international sociology, and finally on more regime-level transitions and the role played by international factors in such transition.

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In the past two decades, there has been a growing consensus that international relations theories must pay due attention to the process and institutions of domestic politics.
The purpose of this paper is to summarize and evaluate the emerging literature that attempts to link the international system and domestic politics. The direction of recent research can be divided into two categories. The so-called “Second Image Reversed” perspective focuses on the domestic consequences of international phenomenon. The “Second Image” perspective, on the other hand, deals with the international consequences of domestic institutions and domestic political process. In my view, the latter is particularly promising for the future development of international relations theories because it has been successful in incorporating innovative insights of informational economics, formalizing the arguments, exploring the microfoundations of individual political actors, and presenting itself as a framework for both international cooperation and international conflicts.

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This paper tries to explore the possibilities of cutting across the boundaries between international politics and comparative politics under the challenges of the extensive changes caused by globalization. Globalization is an essentially contested concept. It broadly covers the processes of change in the organization of social spaces under the intensification and heightening speed of international and transnational transactions. The process of globalization urges us to think thoroughly again about the basis and the basic entities of social analysis. For the study of international political economy, we would need to rethink the boundaries between the domestic politics and international politics and those between politics and economy. It is much easier to speak of the necessity of going beyond the division of labor between international and comparative politics than to really do so. Actually there are so many methodological and analytical obstacles.
Thus, this article starts with identifying those obstacles. Section one criticizes the recent literatures for their skeptical assessments of the impacts of the globalization. The author argues that these assessments come more from the problematic methodology and simplistic assumption about the impacts of globalization. Section two takes up the level-of-the-analysis problem in international relations from a critical perspective. Section three delineates the real world background for dividing the domestic sphere and international level of politics with some historical analyses. After the critical analyses of the obstacles for bridging the gap between international and domestic politics and building a theory of the politics of globalization, section four introduces the two levels of interaction between the state and the market. By distinguishing those two levels of politics, we would be able to see complex interaction between politics and economy. Section four also offers some insights into the multi-level and multi-functional processes of globalization and the roles of the state in it. Concluding section summerize the argument and suggests some possible directions for creating a positive interaction between the domestic and international political researches in order to understand the process of global change in a more sophisticated

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The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, especially its strong dispute-settlement mechanism (DSM), has given rise to a growing interest in one specific type of international regime development among international institution scholars: “Legalization”. However, the implication of this particular institutionalization on regime itself and the relation-ship between regime and domestic politics remains not examined enough.
This article discusses the dynamics of GATT/WTO DSM legalization and its implication, focusing on the nation-states' “gate-keeping” function and the notion of “optimal legalization” for the regime stability.
In the article, a theoretical consideration is given by comparing three different models of the GATT/WTO legalization, following by an examination of the U. S. experience in the legalization process as an empirical case study.
From what has been discussed in the article, the following results were obtained:
(1) The essential feature of DSM “legalization” seems to be its “endogenous expansion” dynamism, which would result from a substantial increase in access to the DSM, and also by a growing requirement for checking the “democratic deficit” in regime by transnational actors. In addition, the American case suggests that the trade regime legalization facilitates creating pro-free trade domestic institutions, and these domestic institutions would become another endogenous expansion dynamics of legalization.
(2) Giving above feature, it is appropriate to suppose that “legalization” has a potential power to change a substantial nature of regime: from “international” regime to “transnational” regime. In respect of the multilateral trade regime, it is quite likely to suppose that this change has already started.
From now on, a comparative study of other major members in the regime, such as the EC and Japan, in terms of the relationship between regime legalization and its domestic institution development will be needed to strengthen these propositions.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Danish-EU relations, paying attention to domestic politics in Denmark, and to show developments of the interaction between domestic and international politics in European integration.
Denmark is only a small country in the EU, but, when her successive governments coordinated their policy towards the EU with sceptical sentiments of the people, they faced many difficulties, which sometimes resulted in crises of domestic politics and of the EU itself, for example, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93. This is based on the political system in Denmark, which makes it possible to give impacts to European integration, i. e., democratic control of the government's policy towards the EU by the Danish parliament, especially the European Committee (Europaudvalget), and by referendum, which has been held seven times on European integration since 1972. This democratic control helps political parties and the people to participate in the European integration process.
There are two important cases in the Danish-EU relations to examine the interaction between domestic and international politics. They are the political processes of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93 and of joining the single currency “Euro” in 2000. The outcomes of the referendums, which were held in June 1992 and in September 2000, were “No” in both cases, but the impacts on the EU contrasted sharply. The former resulted in delaying the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty for 10 months. In this process, domestic politics was closely connected with negotiations between the Danish government on the one hand and other member states and the EC Commission on the other hand. However, the latter did not give rise to any serious problem for the EU, because the referendum in 2000 decided whether Denmark would join the single currency or not, which had been started by most of the member states since 1999. Denmark was not eligible to exercise the veto over this project. This concept of promoting integration is called “variable geometry” or “multi-speed integration.” It is stipulated in the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999, as “closer cooperation” and “the principle of flexibility.” The Nice Treaty, which was signed in 2001, also emphasizes this concept and it is aiming to change the weighting of votes for a “qualified majority” in the Council of Ministers, with the result that small member states like Denmark might diminish their power in the EU decision-making.
The concept of “variable geometry” could lead to two groups of member states in the EU: a group which is willing to accelerate integration and the other group which is reluctant to do so because of domestic problems. In this case, domestic politics of the reluctant group cannot have a great influence on the EU decision-making. However, each member state even in the willing group has difficulties with a perception gap between the elite and the people. This might deteriorate rapidly by further integration and domestic politics of member states could change to a stumbling block to integration. Therefore, it is indispensable to pay attention to domestic politics of member states in the EU.

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The comparative politics and the international (transnational) politics are competitive in interpreting, but each of these two approaches are not successful in interpreting consistently some contemporary issues. The EU member countries' immigration policies and the acceptance of human rights of foreigners are good examples. Concerning this theme, there are already two eminent interpretations. The one is the human rights regime proposed by Yasemn N. Soysal and Saskia Sassen. The other is the nation's “cultural idioms” and types of nation-states proposed by Rogers Brubaker and others.
The political and sociological situations of foreigners in each EU member countries are always changing and this theme becomes extremely hot issue. I categorize these interpretations into three. First is “(slight) modifications of citizenship model.” The encouragement of returning home, simplification of naturalization process are examples. However the dual nationality is always in debate. Second is the “deviation from citizenship model.” This is proposed by Thomas Hammar, whose keywords are “denizen” and “denizenship”. He proposed “triad model” composed by citizens, denizens and aliens instead of “dyad model” composed by citizens and aliens. This is the leading theory for European advanced countries like Sweden and Netherlands to promote the human rights policies. Nevertheless, this position is proposed on precondition of the citizenship model. Moreover its logical justification is rooted in “residence”. But this right of “residence” becomes vulnerable because of globalization (global media and internet etc.). Third is the “alternative of citizenship model, ” proposed by Yasemn N. Soysal, Saskia Sassen and David Jacobson.
They say that the “devaluation of citizenship” is occurring in the advanced countries, and they use the keyword “personhood” au lieu de “nationhood” and “citizenship.” “denizenship” and “personhood” hold in common the post-national situation. Today, this human rights regime becomes dominant, and there are many voluntary associations who maintain and strengthen this regime. However Soysal and others do not succeed in explaining how this human rights regime was accepted or “embedded” in each country.
Brubaker intends to explain the differences of immigration policies of France and Germany by using the concept of nation's “cultural idioms.” However, recently, in Germany, there occurred an enormous amendment of nationality law under the new alliance between the social-democratic party and the “greens.” Concerning the citizenship, France and Germany are not opposite, but very close. In sum, “cultural idioms” are not always the same and they change according to the international relations.
Here we are “third position.” The embedment of human rights regime by each national country is the principal cause of the expansion of human rights regime. In this third position, the national/transnational connection is essential. Therefore, both comparative politics and international (transnational) relation theory are not persuasive. This national/transnational two-step model is suggested by the arguments of Christian Joppke and James F. Hollifield. In the case of the immigration policy issue, family unification right was (is) always central in judging the “embedment” of human rights regime. In this paper, three main cases in Europe (Germany, Great Britain and France) are examined partially according the analysis of Joppke, Hollifield, Patrick Weil, Adrian Favell and so on. The “turning point” is critical in each country. Sometimes these causes are internal and national. Sometimes these are external but “national.” Italy's immigration policy is the best

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In studies of international politics, foreign policy decision-making has been one of the important research areas. However, domestic politics in which policy decision-making is done has not received much attention in traditional studies, even though foreign policy is a point of contact between international relations and domestic politics. With the progress of international economic interdependence, theories that focus on a decision-making process in domestic politics have become important to investigate a foreign policy. In this article, theories of foreign policy decision-making are reexamined.
There are several approaches to theorize foreign policy decision-making. Traditional and orthodox analysis of foreign policy in studies of international politics saw domestic politics as a “black box” and explained nation's policy at the level of international system. Next attempt of theorization was to grasp a whole foreign policy-making process as a system. Then Allison's second and third model, which analyzed decision-making process in domestic politics, got attention by many scholars in the 1970s. After that, cognition of policy-maker was focused on in the academic circle of international politics. In the 1980s, importance of “idea” in foreign policy decision-making was pointed out in several studies and the “two-level games” model was proposed as another framework.
In the study of international political economy, domestic politics attracted scholars' attention as an important factor to analyze decision-making of foreign economic policy in the late 1980s. There are two types of studies. One focuses on preference or power resource distribution of societal actors in domestic politics. The other sees socioeconomic and/or political institutions as an important factor in policy decision-making.
There is another approach that makes models of decision-making and applies them to foreign policies of developed democratic countries in various issue areas. Goldmann's study investigates Sweden's foreign policies and tries to find relations between democracy and foreign policy. It examines and compares foreign policy decision-making in four issue areas (defense, internationalist, foreign economic, diplomatic security) using three criteria (representation, participation, information). Other study by Goldmann presents nine models of decision-making and applies them to Swedish foreign policies in several issue areas. These studies indicate that the analysis of domestic politics is important for foreign policy study and that plural models based on policy areas will be useful.
For better understanding on foreign policy decision-making, it is not sufficient to analyze foreign policy only at the level of international system or of individual decision-maker in domestic politics. We need to investigate domestic political process with the consideration to the influence of international relation on domestic politics. Therefore, approaches and methods of the study of international relations and comparative politics should be utilized and merged for analysis of foreign policy.

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In what situation does a chief of government regard international public opinion as important, and how does he use it?
Like U. S. foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis/War, when a country forms an international coalition to threaten an enemy in a coercive way, the chief of government of that country has to rally international public opinion among coalition partners to unite the coalition. This serves to bolster the credibility of the coalition's will and capability to use coercive measures against the enemy.
One way to lead international public opinion can be referred to as “symbolic appeal strategy”, which is basically the same concept as “reverberation tactics” in the logic of two-level games. This stratagem allows one to use political symbols to appeal directly to domestic public opinion in coalition countries in order to pressure coalition governments to maintain their coalition policy. During the Gulf Crisis/War, the United States-the leader of the anti-Iraqi coalition-used the United Nations Security Council, Syria's participation in the anti-Iraqi coalition and so on, as symbols to appeal to public opinion in coalition countries, particularly in the Arab world, Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan.
Decision-makers' perception of international public opinion and public opinion in foreign countries is the basis for influencing international sentiment toward a given cause. Decision-makers tend to recognize the international situation based on their own stereotypes and conceptual lenses, and under high uncertainty they tend to be oversensitive to potential changes in the international community. During the Gulf Crisis/War, partly out of fear that Arab nationalists would unite and pressure Arab governments to split from the coalition, U. S. decision-makers were eager to directly engage the Arab public with political symbols and rhetoric to rally Arab opinion in support of U. S military intervention against Iraq.

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Basic understanding about the effectiveness of economic sanctions is that the greater economic costs are imposed on targets, the more easily senders can achieve their goals. Economic costs alone, however, are not sufficient to explain outcomes. So, domestic conditions of targets have been discussed, e. g. the “rally round the flag” effect of increased political integration. These conditions imply that targets can resist sanctions if their costs are economically large but politically small. But, there has been no argument about reverse cases.
I argue it is political, not economic, costs that are crucial for targets' decision to resist or surrender to senders. Economic costs are firstly understood as “sensitivity, ” measured by the degree of external dependence of target economic sectors within a policy framework, and secondly as “economic vulnerability, ” which is a state's liability to suffer economic costs after policy changes. This vulnerability rests on availability and costliness of alternatives, and state capacity to adjust damage.
Political costs are understood as “political vulnerability, ” defined as a state's weakness to responses of domestic groups to economic loss. Some may demand action to reduce the loss, and others may withdraw support for the state. “Political vulnerability” is analyzed with “exit” and “voice.” Additionally a new concept of “solidarity” is proposed to explain why domestic groups endure without “exit” and “voice.”
My argument is verified by comparative case studies: the U. S. embargo for Cuban democratization and international sanctions against apartheid South Africa. Cuban economy was deeply dependent on the U. S. Although alternatives were supplied by the USSR, and Castro government achieved economic growth, economic costs remained high. After the Cold War, Cuba has not yet recovered economy. By contrast, South Africa's sensitivity was low in trade, since sanctions targeted on a small part of trade goods. She found even alternative trade partners. Although alternatives of foreign capital were not fully provided, and state capacity could not successfully work, whole economic costs were much less than Cuban loss.
Despite severe economic damage, Cuban political costs were small. “Exit” and “voice” were minimized by “solidarity”: that is, people endured pain for historic anti-U. S. resentment and revolutionary nationalism. Consequently, the embargo was ineffective. In South Africa, even small economic costs produced intense political ones. While big companies felt pain and “voiced” strong demand for apartheid reform, anti-government movements like the African National Congress resorted to demonstrations and riots. Because of the severe political costs, Pretoria could not maintain apartheid.
Thus, the two cases show that not economic but political costs explain targets' behavior toward economic sanctions. These are contrasting cases in the scale and purpose of sanctions, political regime, and international environment. These differences, however, converge on the contrast of political and economic costs.

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The international dimension has been central to democratization in the late twenty century. International factors have usually played a major role in transitions from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy. Although these trends have become obvious, so far works which deal with democratic transition have surprisingly neglected this important dimension.
Geoffrey Pridham who insisted importance of the international dimension of democratization pointed out that international context is the forgotten dimension in the study of democratic transition. The comparative literature on democratic transitions has tended to conclude that international factors have been essentially secondary in importance, for regime change is primarily a dynamic process which is internally motivated.
For instance, in 1986 Philippe C. Schmitter who is one of leading scholars of the democratization concluded that “external actors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role, with the obvious exception of those instances in which a foreign occupying power was present”.
While international factors toward the democratization have not paid much attention, the democratic support from the international organizations and NGOs have contributed to establish democracy in the third wave democracies. It is now commonly felt among students of democratic transition that the international dimension has been far more decisive and probably more profound in the regime change in recent democratization.
The international factors have taken many forms, the role of national governments as well as international organizations, the behaviour of nonstate actors such as NGOs. There have been unilateral as well as multilateral actions. Democracy aid is the most common and often most significant tool for promoting democracy.
Aiding democracy abroad has emerged as a major growth in recent years. Not only the United States but many other Western countries, international institutions, and private foundations as well as Germany's party foundations today use aid to support democratic transition in Eastern Europe, the former USSR, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The last ten years have seen a significant expansion of international aid for democratization in respect of emerging and prospective new democracies.
International factors have been a principal component of democratization in recent years. Based on these points, this paper examines aspects of international factors in the democratization. Through this work I briefly refer to the relation with the comparative politics and the international politics.

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Despite the commonly held notion that the political life of non-democratic forces becomes growingly harder in the post-Cold-War era, the military's presence in politics remained quite visible in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines even after the end of the Cold War. What accounts for the persistent involvement of the Southeast Asian military in the political arena? With particular emphasis on the international context of political change, this article argues that the key to the question is how the military dealt with the recession of the Cold War from the region after Vietnam.
During the 1960's, a highly confrontational milieu in Southeast Asia more or less affected the political development of the countries in the region. It was under this condition that the Cold War was embedded in their domestic political structure. This influence was usually observed in the increasing importance of counterinsurgency and the resultant expansion of state power, often accompanied by growth in the political functions of the military. The salience of Maoist insurgency was another typical characteristic of the embedded Cold War in this region.
With the dramatic change of the regional environment after the Sino-American détente in the early 1970's, the military in the Southeast Asian countries had to cope with the new situation while managing the legacy from the intense period of the Cold War implanted in both the state and society of the countries. Depending on the specific situation they faced, the generals in different nations came up with different solutions to their relationship with politics, which later resulted in the diversity among them in their domestic responses to the end of the Cold War.
The Indonesian military brutally terminated its confrontation with communists and rapidly established its penetrating rule over the country, taking advantage of the American strategic interests in supporting an anti-communist regime. The reinforcement of its political base during the 1970's created a political system invulnerable to changes in international environment. In the case of Thailand, the U. S. -supported military regime collapsed in 1973 and the military underwent an era of a serious reappraisal of its political role. The intra-military groups that had developed out of this period led successful operations of “political offensive” against communists and opened the way for the later sharing of political power between the military and democratic forces. The Philippine military has never developed a clear vision of political involvement despite its conspicuous political functions under the Marcos regime. Thanks to the country's “special relationship” with the United States, the military hardly perceived the communist insurgency to be a serious threat to the nation. The military's influence on politics without instigation by civilian leaders only occurred during the unordinary period of frequent coup attempts in the late 1980's.

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After Russo-Japanese War, relations between Japan and the United States had been strained due to such issues; naval armament, Japanese immigration exclusion, and the Open Door policy toward Manchuria. In particular, so-called Japanese immigration issue had the singularity, because it might had isolated Japan who had acknowledged herself to be a major power as European nations. In October 1906, the decision of San Francisco School Board to segregrate all Japanese, Chinese, and Korean children from other students to a special Oriental Pulic School had extended a serious diplomatic problem between two Nations, and given rise to the War Scare in the U. S. by yellow journalism.
At that time, by not any treaty but the Gentleman's Agreement, Japanese government self-restricted of issuing the passport to it's labors for the U. S. and concluded Root-Takahira Agreement in order to soothe this War Scare.
Otherwise, While President Theodore Roosevelt had solved Japanese immigration issue peacefully through enacting new Immigration Law in 1907 and negotiating with Japanese government, he had made use of this crisis to his policy of increasing naval power. For example, although world cruise of U. S. White Fleet was evidently the militalistic demonstration to Japan, the necessity of strong navy in the emergency was impressed certainly to the American citizen. The analysis by Japanese navy that the cruise would had reinforced the U. S. naval power came true. In December 1907, Roosevelt recomended to construct four battleships to the Congress, the Naval Appropriation Act of next year authorized his plan in part, and appropriated $900, 000 to establish a naval station at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Next administration of William H. Taft made progress of laying down dreadnaught or super-dreadnaught type battleships more vigorously than the former. As well, Kincho-Aigun railway project and the suggestion to neutralization of railways in Manchuria, in other words “Diplomatic Policy by Dollors” was the challenge to Japanese special interests.
In the Imperial Defence Policy of 1907, although it seems to be not imagined that Japanese immigration issue would caused to be the war against the United States, the U. S. was stood first in it's main enemies for Japanese navy, this viewpoint led to the grand military designs of establishing the ambitious 8:8 Naval Ratio. But, Japanese naval power was declined extreemly by the above completion of U. S. navy, Japanese navy regarded it's decline and U. S. expansion toward Manchuria as the crisis of it's national security and special interests. Thus, Japanese navy had aimed to reconstruct of itself, required Japanese cabinet to the appropriation for laying down battleships and naval installations.

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One of the most important reasons why the Japan-Korea conference had taken so long time for 14 years until the conclusion of the treaty, was that both sides had the very different stance about the property claim problems. It was the Ikeda Hayato administration (1960-1964) that led the property claim problems to an agreement. But in those days, nobody thought that it was Ikeda administration's achievement, even though it was criticized as a suspicion.
Post Cold War globalization politics has extended the definition of security to include more than just that of government and military matters to incorporate environmental issues, drugs, refugee problems, as well as economic, resource, energy, and food policy matters. Security, in a word, has become to be defined as comprehensive concept. An examination of postwar Japanese diplomatic policies, however, demonstrates a previous use of this “Post Cold War” phenomenon. During the Ikeda Administration, the prime minister's income doubling plan, for example, represented an attempt to ensure the Japanese Cold War security through increasing the wealth of Japan's citizens.
This paper examines Ikeda administration's security policy regarding the Japan-Korea Conference, in particular the negotiations over the property claim problems. Firstly, it focuses on the administration's setting of the defense budget under its second defense plan to present a survey of Ikeda's security plan. It argues the logic behind compiling of this defense budget to be alignment of defense matters with those of economic concerns.
Secondly, this paper tries to clarify the relations between Japanese security and Korean peninsula, through examining arguments about the situation of Korean peninsula in the National Defense Meeting and contents of Mitsuya Kenkyu.
Thirdly, this paper considers how the United States foreign policy based on the viewpoint of security strategy in the Far East commits to the Japan-Korea conference.
Contrary to previous studies that Ikeda administration's foreign policy toward Korea was developed by pressure of the United States, this paper argues that the Ikeda administration carried out a policy sufficiently taking into consideration Japanese security, and in opposition to pressure by the United States for the earlier resolution of the Japan-Korea conference suggesting limits to U. S. influence on Japan at that time.
Finally, this paper examines this issue in terms of the on-going negotiations for diplomatic normalization between Japan and Korea, in particular the negotiations over the property claim problems, as an example of the role of economic issues in security matters.
Ikeda said that if Korean peninsula is occupied by communist, its circumstances give fatal influence to the Japanese security as indicating her history so far. As indicating Ikeda' speaks, it is not hard to understand that the agreement of the property claim problems had the very important implication to the Japanese security.

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