In this volume, there are ten specially selected articles, written by authors who, based on their research experience, are very likely to agree on the significance of cultural perspectives in International Relations (IR) Studies. The reason for the publication of this volume was to facilitate IR Studies, especially from various cultural points of views in Japan. So far, it has been occasionally pointed out, there have been only a few Japanese researchers seriously doing IR studies based on cultural perspectives. This is mainly because of the dominance of research activities strongly influenced by the Realist and Neo-realist paradigms, which tended to exclude cultural explanations from IR studies after World War II.
However, since the end of Cold War era, there have emerged several events, which force us to look again at the importance of cultural factors in IR studies in the world. They are as follows; the resurgence of ethnic conflicts and cultural wars after the end of Cold War; the economic globalization and regional economic integrations, including EU and APEC; the increase in the number of migrants, refugees and foreign workers who are likely to stay longer than expected in industrialized countries including Japan; and the rapid development of global communications, facilitating transnational cultural exchanges among regions. These events finally have produced multicultural state-nations in the world as well as new theoretical perspectives on cultures in IR studies.
Ten articles are of course written from various cultural perspectives, including one by Prof. Kenichiro Hirano who has been the strong advocator of IR studies from cultural perspectives for more than forty years. The readers of this volume can realize his uninterrupted effort to promote cultural perspectives in IR studies in Japan. Readers also can understand the historical (poor) development of IR studies based on cultural perspectives in Japan as well as in the United States by reading an article written by Mr. Shibazaki. Prof. Hatsuse is trying to develop a new perspective on cultures of daily lives under the strong influence of transnational affairs. Other articles, including Prof. Haba, are trying to develop case studies from various cultural points of views. They are, of course, valuable contributions to the development of IR studies based on the cultural perspectives. The editor of this volume sincerely hopes that these articles will promote IR researchers' awareness of cultural perspectives in Japan.

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In August-September 1880, Huang Zun-xian (1848-1905) had been stationed in Japan for almost four years as a secretary of the first Chinese embassy, when he drafted a booklet titled “Chao-xian ce-lüe” (Korean strategy) and presented it to Kim Hong-Jip who was paying an official visit to Japan as the second “susinsa” (a special diplomatic envoy) from the Korean court. In the booklet, Huang, a young diplomat of China, which held suzerainty over Korea, recommended that Korea adopt diplomatic policies of “keeping close to China, creating ties with Japan and allying with the United States” and domestic policies of “self-strengthening.” Upon his return, Kim presented it for deliberations at the Korean court which finally decided to open up and reform the country. It can be said that “Chao-xian ce-lüe”, whose contents will be summarized below, was a crucial document that played a decisive role in determining the course of East Asian international politics from then on.
The author of this article has seen five different texts of Huang's “Chao-xian ce-lüe”. They are:(A) a print version published in Susinsa kirok: Han'gok saryo ch'ongso (Materials for Korean History), edited by the Korean Committee for Editing the National History, which is often regarded as the standard version, (B) a photocopy of a written copy left by Kim Hong-Jip, (C) a photocopy of a written copy collected and annotated by Professor Cho I1-Mun, (D) a print version published in the Volume 13 of Nihon Gaiko Monjo compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and (E) a written copy (original) left by Mr. Nakamura Shojiro who was an employee of the Japanese Consulate in Wonsan around 1880. The first half of this paper is a summary of the author's attempts at collating these five texts. These five texts are not the same and in fact they have some differences from one another in 466 of the total 1, 047 phrases. The largest number of differences (in 397 phrases) is found between texts C and D, while the fewest differences (in 32 phrases) exist between texts A and B. Texts A and B were assumingly the closest to the original draft by Huang and yet they are not the original; even text A has some errors. The collation leads us to a temporary assumption that the mysterious text E was a manuscript for the text D, which is a kind of the Japanese official version of the “Chao-xian ce-lüe”, but unfortunately it is also the furthest away from the original due to many added errors.
In his bold policy proposal, Huang put utmost emphasis on the danger of Tsarist Russia's swallowing up all of Asia. It was on the premise of the Russian threat that he urged Korea to open up and form alliances with all the major powers, including Japan and the United States. Quite interestingly, he based his policy recommendation on the balance of power theory. As he understood it, just like the ancient Chinese warring states, the Western powers behaved according to the theorem of a chandelier type balance of power and they did not want Korea to be isolated prey for Russian expansion. This was the logic behind why all the powers and even Japan wanted Korea to strengthen itself by opening up the country; they all wanted to be friendly to Korea and would not invade it, and if Japan ever had a malignant intent, China would come to the paternal rescue of Korea.
Until the Russo-Japanese war, classical written Chinese was the lingua franca of East Asia. International documents were all written in classical Chinese. Moreover, to be circulated, they had to be hand-copied many times, often producing different versions. Huang's booklet was brought over to Korea and was fervently read among Korean intellectuals. Huang drafted his policy paper in full anticipation of resistance that would arise from Korean culture. In attempting to break up Korea's hesitation

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This paper addresses the theoretical significance of discourses on everyday life in international relations for IR studies. Strictly speaking, the concept “everyday life” is not an academic term that is utilized for analytical purposes. But it can be used in two ways even in academic discussions. One way is to direct us to a specific research project, and the other is to help us to find out missing points in a research design. We call the former a guiding concept, and the latter a “catalyst” concept.
The first section of the paper sums those discussions of a French historian, three Japanese social scientists (economic history, politics, and society), and a Japanese man of letter on the significance that the term “everyday life” conveys to academic discussions. The findings are: (a) the term has temporal and spatial dimensions, individually or collectively, (b) it is value-free, (c) it binds our mind or sets it free, depending upon the situations, and (d) the discussions, done by those five, are oriented toward two opposing directions (emancipation from it, and fixation on it).
The second section treats cases of research (mostly done by Japanese scholars) that address aspects of everyday life from the perspective of international relations. Those cases are classified into three categories: the North-South problem, the world system, and human security. All of those researches concern human security in a very broad sense. Interest in everyday life mainly guides us to projects of research on human security.
Finally, the paper probes the implications of feelings of everyday life for IR studies. The major subjects are everyday life as social experiences (overlooked and/or adhered to), its intermixture with extraordinary facts and feelings (mingling and/or perversion), and its interchangeability with them (distraction from or return to routines). Here the concept “everyday life” acts as a catalyst, with which we are able to improve academic discussions.
The concluding part makes a very brief summary of these discussions.

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This article aims at introducing a brief overview of the theoretical perspective of International Cultural Relations (ICR, Kokusai Bunka Ron). ICR employs two meanings of “culture”, one is culture sensu stricto (CSS), the other is culture sensu lato (CSL). In order to understand ICR as one of the new fields of study in International Relations, one would have to elucidate how CSS and CSL are applied into international relations respectively and how these two analyses could be integrated as ICR.
The study of ICR based on CSS has two traditions. Both regard ‘culture’ as elements from which the actor or some relations (composed of these actors) are constructed. Students of ICR use CSS in order to examine how ‘culture’ is used inside the reality of international relations.
One tradition generated by the study of diplomatic history in the United States from 1970s, was conducted by Akira Iriye and his successors. They insisted on the need to interpret international relations as intercultural relations, rejecting the realist, power oriented approaches which dominated the field. They also tried to change diplomatic history into ‘international history’, which seeks to overcome the somewhat narrow-minded nationalistic view of diplomatic history.
The other tradition was initiated in the study of International Relations in Japan from 1970s, launched by Kenichiro Hirano and his disciples. They borrowed their approach from anthropology, especially acculturation theory, which captures culture's dynamic changes and reconstructing processes. Basically they perceive international relations as cultural relations, which implies that international relations need not only to be interstate relations, and international relations are only one part of many cultural relations. They seek to establish ‘mobile International Relations’, which opposes traditional ‘immobile International Relations’.
CSL studies consists of two parts. One is ‘international relations (ir) as culture’; the other is ‘International Relations (IR) as culture’. Students of ICR use CSL when they want to understand how ir or IR would look like from outside of the IR discipline, from the historical point of view. Unfortunately, the research stock is not so abundant in the study of ICR based on CSL. However, some recent studies indicate that CSL will be one of the most important future fields of study.
Thus, ICR students have to deal with two notions of cultures. Sometimes they apply CSS, which focuses on how international relations could be explained by culture as elements of actors or groups of actors. Sometimes they adopt CSL, which explicates how and why international relations are generated in the history of mankind and International Relations invented in the history of ideas. ICR must deal with these two tasks, which could be accomplished both by the work of a single individual or though collaboration.

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In the late 1990s, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism had reached the top of the agenda in counter-terrorism communities. Since a Japanese terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo sprinkled nerve gas in Tokyo subways in March 1995, Japan and the United States, with other G8 members, have agreed with many antiterrorism measures including exchange of information about WMD terrorism, and at least superficially must have shared common threat perception of WMD terrorism.
The question here is why the United States has enthusiastically prepared for WMD terrorism in its homeland in spite of no record of genuine WMD terrorism, in contrast to Japan who tackled Aum Shinrikyo but has been ill prepared for terrorism in general. Since rational actor models may not explain the sharp contrast, this paper examines it from the strategic cultures' point of view.
The term strategic cultures can be defined as collective beliefs, lessons of the past, attitudes and values shared in one country or in a national strategic community that influence the way of thinking, problem-solving and use of force in national security issues.
The concept of terrorism has been socially constructed in communities; accordingly, it is until now not easy to share definitions of terrorism in the United Nations, even in one country like the United States whose agencies have its own definition. That is to say, we must pay attention to cultural dimensions in order to grasp the perception of terrorism and the antiterrorism policy in any one country.
Strategic cultures of the United States are deeply reflected in the preparedness of CBRN terrorism. The first is the worldview to interpret terrorism as a kind of totalitarianism. The second is clarity of enemy in the national security policy, which is manifest in the designation of countries supporting terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). The third is U. S.' traditional sensitivity to homeland defense, which takes over the Domestic Preparedness Program in the Clinton Administration.
Japan also has national ideas of terrorism. First, antiterrorism is a taboo in peacetime because of human rights norm. No antiterrrorism acts have been passed. Second, a risk-averse policy is viewed as the best choice, which is made explicit in behavior during hostage-taking incidents, and in vague attitudes toward terrorist organizations, unlike the United States. Third, the preference is a so-called root-cause theory; unless poverty, suppression and/or inequality are eradicated, terrorism will not disappear on earth. These ideas prevent Japan from promoting counter-terrorism policies.
The examples of U. S. and Japan indicate that cultural ideas can be represented in the way of thinking about terrorism and counter-terrorism policy. It is debatable, however, how and to what degree particular culture causes each measure and decision-making. It needs further investigation.

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The Euro currency was circulated from January 2002 by the EU 11 member countries. The EU and NATO's enlargement policy towards Central European countries are also progressing very swiftly. In the EU summit meeting in Brussels in the middle of December 2001, it declared that almost 10 EU Applicants in Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Cyprus, Slovenia, Czech, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Malta) may join to the EU in 2004. NATO will also decide it's enlargement towards some Central European countries in the NATO summit of Prague in the autumn of 2002. According to these two enlargement, much of “Eastern-half” of Europe will be included to ‘Europe’ virtually (Most successor countries of the old Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are already included to the OSCE, EAPC and Partnership for Peace groups).
In accordance with the evaluation of the EU integration and the coming into effect of Schengen Convention, the free movement of people, goods, currency and information is guaranteed in Europe, and such “liberty and wealth” of Europe will be enjoyed by 450 million people in the near future.
In this process of EU enlargement, however, the words ‘wall of the EU’ or ‘wall of the Schengen’ came to be heard by the ethnicities and minorities ‘outside’ of Integration. By the EU enlargement, “European borders” are moving to the East until they reach the Russian border, and it influences and causes frictions to people who lived and co-existed in the eastern-part of Europe historically. Now that the border will be drawn the middle of Central and Eastern Europe, people ‘outside’ of Integration will feel estranged by the ‘wall’ of the Schengen.
The author investigates the gravity of that invisible defending ‘wall’ against the outsiders of integration for insider's security and comfort, and how we can solve these problems in the coming years in order they will not feel estranged from the EU free world. She concentrates especially that Hungarian Minority's Law in June 2001 towards the so called 3 million Hungarians who live outside the border, and its problems with neighboring countries.
The author also investigates the Kaliningrad case of Russia's detached estate, surrounding by the Polish and Lithuanian border. Poland is already a member of NATO and if Lithuania will join to NATO or EU in the near future, Kaliningrad will be completely isolated by the two countries' border, even though it has strong connections with Baltic and East European countries economically, politically, and in people's every day's life.
By researching such cases, we can consider the contradictions or one-sided utopia of the free movement, co-existence and comfort ‘inside’ the EU, which is guaranteed by making higher walls: more severe controls for security against the ‘outsiders’ of the EU.

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The EU attached importance to cultural policy in 1990s, although the EC/EU originated and developped through economic integration. The reason for this new dimension is that the formation of European identity and culture was inevitable for the advance of the European federation. The Council of Europe, of which little is known in the history of European integration because it lacks supranational authority, was founded on the common political cultural character of western Europe. This work sets out to consider the cultural viewpoint in the beginnings of the European integration through analysis of the Council of Europe.
One of the foundations of the Council of Europe was the “European Movement”, which has been the association of the European integration movements and was mainly composed of eminent politicians. The “European Movement” regarded the European common culture as the core of the rebirth and unity of Europe. The aim of the Council of Europe reflecting this consideration, is to safeguard and realise the spiritual and moral values, which are the European common heritage.
These crystalized in the clauses of the Statutes (individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law) and constituted the condition of membership. Greece and Turkey seemed very dubious with regard to religion and democracy, their admission was, however, approved because of strategic considaration of the cold war, required defense against the Soviet Union.
The most important achievement of the Council of Europe has been the conclusion of th European Convention on Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms. The Councll of Europe has additionally suggested that a multilateral convention should be concluded to regulate the status on the equality of treatment, and has promoted the European co-operation especialy in cultural and educational fields. Furethermore, its aim is to achieve greater unity between its members, for this purpose, the Council of Europe has propagandized the idea of “Europe”, particularly in the 1950s.
The Council of Europe and its supporters pursued the formation of European conscience and identity and its cultural policy is indispensable for unity. With its political cultural interpretation on “Europe”, the Council of Europe has functioned as democratic security.

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In the study of international relations, culture has normally been interpreted to mean national culture or the “Clash of Civilizations.” However, in the twentieth century the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations created an “international culture.” To be sure, both the League and the U. N. are international governmental organizations which were established for political purposes, to establish a stable international order, but these organizations were most importantly designed to promote international understanding and cooperation.
Intellectuals, political activists and statesmen had long dreamed of a permanent international organization. Woodrow Wilson and General Smuts, for instance, made the goal of their efforts to found an international organization for the benefit of the whole of humanity, not just the creation of an organ for international settlement. The beliefs and hopes behind the League were carried on into the United Nations. When, in 1956, the U. N. was facing its crisis in the wake of the Suez Conflict, a leading Canadian statesman, Lester B. Pearson, and Dag Hammarskjöld created the Peace Keeping Operations to demonstrate the U. N.'s presence worldwide with a truly international neutral force. Both Pearson and Hammarskjöld were strong advocates of the idea of the international community. On the basis of these ideals and practices, the League and the U. N., taken together, have emrged as a symbol of international community.
As soon as the League was founded, it began publicizing its aims and activities through the publication of books and other materials such as films and slides. In the late 1920s, the Committee on International Cooperation, under the auspices of the League, recommended the publication of materials to educate young people and schoolchildren about the League. The Committee clearly stated that the broadening of knowledge about the League would lead to international cooperation. In addition, the League initiated its policy of informing the general public about its design and its activities. It started producing such publications as Essential Facts about the League of Nations. The U. N. carried on the League's policy, creating the Department of Public Information to take care of its public relations.
The League and the U. N.'s public information policies seem to have been successful. At present, not only the general public but also young people and children all over the world accept the existence, aims and activities of the U. N. very readily. Intellectual or academic discussions of the U. N. in general agree that the organization is important both in terms of its actual functions and its symbolic aspects. Textbooks in Japan, the United States and Great Britain deal with the League and the U. N. rather extensively. Furthermore, volunteers and those working in NGO activities regard the U. N. an an organ which provides them with opportunities to fulfill their mission.
The League and the United Nations, then, have acquired symbolic value through their association with the idea of an international community of harmony, peace and justice that transcends national boundaries. While we all necessarily realize that the U. N. has its limits under the present circumstances, we are also well aware of that the essential significance of the U. N. lies in its symbolism.

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Aboriginal people in the Yirrkala community organised a campaign against a boxcite mine project at Gove Peninsula in the 1960s by claiming that the mine would destroy their sacred sites. The movement encouraged nation-wide Aboriginal land rights movements and led to the introduction of the Aboriginal Land Right (Northern Territory) Act 1976. The Aboriginal way of land ownership was translated into the European-based legal system, and the existence of sacred sites became important to claim land rights under the legislation. It was also the case for native title claims under the Native Title Act 1993. Furthermore various laws were introduced to legalise the protection of sacred sites.
Since the 1990s, Mirrar-Gundjehmi Aborigines have been cooperating with various environmental organisations against the uranium mine project in Jabilka. They also argued that the land was a source of their culture and living tradition, and urged the campaign as a fight for cultural survival. Campaigning for inscription of the Kakadu National Park on ‘the List of World Heritage in Danger’ became a crucial strategy in order to stop the project. The campaign at the World Heritage Committee brought out the concept of ‘cultural landscape’ as ‘combined works of nature and of man’, and Mirrar people were recoginised as legitimate ‘actors’ for intervening and maintaining the landscape. The committee requested the Australian government to promote dialogue with the Mirrar people.
The paper argues that discourse on protecting Aboriginal sacred sites against mine projects has been the catalyst for political dialogues in Australian society. Every sacred site has a very local and specific nature in maintaining the tradition and culture of the Aboriginal groups responsible for the site. But the discourse could forge pan-Aboriginal movements by mobilising even ‘non-traditional’ Aborigines, because the concept of ‘sacred site’ is uniquely Aboriginal and symbolises genuineness of Aboriginality. Accommodating the concept of sacred sites and Aboriginal culture in Australian political and legal institutions has provided a basis for Aboriginal people to claim indigenous rights and political power. It also implies that land has not only economic but cultural values. Claims for protecting sacred sites should be understood, therefore, as the pursuance of Aboriginal rights for political, economic, social, and cultural self-determination.
The recognition of sacred sites in non-Aboriginal institutions has raised problems as well. The secretiveness of authentic sacred sites sometimes contradicts the recognition because it requires scientific evidence of the sites for the public. The feeling of unfairness has been growing among ‘non-traditional’ Aborigines who cannot claim land. Furthermore, due to the political power of Australian Aboriginal people, their claims for self-determination tend to be internalised and separated from the international movements for ensuring indigenous rights.

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Singapore's multiracial policy has been one of the most important planks in its post-Independence approach to national management. The survival of the small Chinese city-state surrounded by big Malay neighbors has always depended on its good relations with these countries. In this geo-political context, ethnic relations within Singapore, i. e., the relationship between its majority Chinese and minority Malay communities has long been linked to the island Republic's relations with the Malay world. The protection of Malay rights in the Singapore Constitution and introduction of multiracialism as an ethnic management policy to highlight equal treatment of the Chinese, Malay, Indian, Eurasian and other ethnic groups was to show that Singapore was not a pro-China state or a Third China. This concern was especially strong in the Cold War period when Southeast Asian Chinese were often perceived as agents of Chinese communist influence. The Singapore government's erosion and containment of many aspects of Chinese-ness have also been used to tone down the island's explicit Chinese character and boost its multiracial appearance. However, rapid economic development fuelled by internationalization has in effect wiped out the original consideration for Malay rights. The meritocracy system has marginalized the Malays and the social gap between the Chinese and Malays has widened. However, the island's vulnerability, including its dependence on water supply from Malaysia still looms large in Singapore's geo-political environment. The government stance towards the Malays has been coloured by the cultural deficit thesis which views Malay culture as lazy or lacking competitiveness. This has been put forward as an explanation for the Malay community's entrapment in the lower socio-economic stratum. The continuing questioning of the Malay-Singaporeans' national loyalty by senior government ministers has upset the Malays as it justifies discrimination against them in the armed forces. However, the Malay neighbors do see Singapore's Malays as brothers and often consider their own Chinese minorities as an extension of Chinese Singapore. China's emergence as an economic power from the late 1970s and the Singapore government's attempt to counter the spread of Western cultural and political values led to the introduciton of a series of ‘Sinicisation’ programs aimed at promoting aspects of Chinese culture among Chinese-Singaporeans. Although sinicisation has been carefully implemented in recognition of multiracialism and sensitive relations with Malay neighbors, the Malay and other communities have been concerned about this movement. The recent immigration of Chinese from China and elsewhere to maintain the Chinese majority has the potential of straining the delicate ethnic balance further. These new Chinese settlers and the rise of China as a dominant economic and political power have introduced a new element in Singapore's evolving international relations with countries in the region and beyond.

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In the nineteenth century, the development of transnational movements owing to the invention of steam ships and the extending web of railways brought European countries closer to the endemic sources of cholera. The necessity of collective, uniform, international efforts to coordinate preventive measures led to the first international sanitary conference that was convened in 1851. Fourteen conferences in total took place upto 1938.
The purpose of this paper is to explain how the international quarantine system was culturally formed by examining the international sanitary conferences from the first (1851) to the sixth (1885).
The points of this paper are below. First, in each country, what are the principles of reconciling public health with the smooth movement of ships, people, and merchandise? Basically, there are three: the spatial or geographical prevention (national quarantine measures), prevention in advance (hygienic measures), and the rationality of choice of methods to aims (scientific knowledge and experiences).
The second is how are these principles above combined and transformed into new ones in the conferences? In the third conference (1866), based on the knowledge of the origin and the mode of transmission of cholera, the restrictive measures (quarantines included) to the primary epidemic areas (mainly ports in the Red Sea and the Caspian Sea) were decided. In the forth (1874), the different experiences between the northern and the southern European counties were taken into consideration, and the two systems, that is, diminished quarantine measures and medical inspection (depending on disinfection on arrival and public hygiene measures) were approved. In the sixth (1885), it was determined that by adopting disinfecting and hygienic measures on departure and during the voyage, medical inspection would replace quarantine measures on arrival.
Thirdly, how did the resolutions of the conferences influence the policies of each country? The conferences, except the first and the second, did not succeed in leading to the required results until the seventh convention. Practically, they exerted their considerable effects on the policymakers, who adopted the resolutions, though partially, in their sanitary reforms according to their needs and conditions. And also, these resolutions became the basis of the conventions in the later conferences.
Finally, the results of these conferences were also attributed to the fact that they reflected technical opinions, successfully coordinated them and made them known to the public.

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In January 1955, Prime Minister HATOYAMA Ichiro emphasized that Japan's primary objective is to attain for Japan full independence and self-reliance by pursuing as “independent diplomacy”, while at the same time Japan will adhere its basic principle of close cooperation with the United States. And HATOYAMA sought to adjust its relations with countries with which Japan still does not have diplomatic relations. So, He began Japanese-Soviet negotiations. U. S. Government took the position with the Japanese Government that the United States did not oppose establishment of diplomatic ralations with USSR, because they thought Japan was already an independent nation.
But, U. S government feared that Japan chose the Neutral policy or Anti-American policy. And they are discontented with Japan's attitude toward the national security problems. They thought that Japan did not regard the threat of communism as seriously as did the United States and NATO countries. U. S. Government was irritated by the fact that Japan lacked self-knowledge of their position and responsibility.
U. S. Government suspected whether HATOYAMA cabinet understood the importance and significance of mutual security systems or not. Moreover, they understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was so weak that difference of foreign policy between HATOYAMA and the Foreign ministry became very serious. HATOYAMA's directions to the Foreign ministry was sometimes not transmitted, and HATOYAMA's action did not sometimes coincide with the policy of Foreign ministry.
There were two typical examples. One is Japanese-Soviet negotiations, and the other is Japanese-SouthKorea negotiations. Japanese Government and LDP also understood that HATOYAMA's leadership was very weak and unreliable.
But, U. S. Government could not censure HATOYAMA publicly for his independent diplomacy, because in Japan, the anti-American feeling was growing rapidly by reason of U. S. troops and bases. In March 1956, when Secretary John F. Dulles visited Tokyo, MIKI Bukichi, who was the member of proxy committee of Liberal Democratic Party, said to Dulles, “even a mountain can be undermined and crumble because of ant holes”. MIKI warned Dulles against Japanese anti-American feeling. Indeed, HATOYAMA's independent diplomacy came to a deadlock. Japan failed to negotiate with USSR, South korea. The abuse of veto by USSR and Chinese Taipei prevented Japan from admitting to the United Nations in the 10^th session, December 1955.
So, it was very important for the U. S. Government to make HATOYAMA succeed in his Independent diplomacy. U. S. Government thought that HATOYAMA should resign honourably when Japanese-Soviet negotiation was concluded. It was called “Hanamichiron” in LDP. MIKI Bukichi once said to KISHI Nobusuke, who became Prime Minister in 1957, as follows.
“What is most important is to make HATOAMA resign without injuring his political reputation”.
The cognition of U. S Government was coincided with Japanese one.

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In the early stage of the Pacific War, the British army suffered a humiliating defeat in Malaya, and the Royal Navy lost its capital ships. These events really shocked policy makers in Whitehall. Before the war, they did not believe that Japan would wage a war against Britain and the United States in spite of an ample evidence of Japanese intentions to expand toward South East Asia. British intelligence organization, such as the SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) and the intelligence divisions of each military service also failed to grasp Japanese military capabilities and her exact intentions. Policy makers and intelligence officers underestimated Japanese military performance and her intention toward Malaya and Singapore. Therefore this thesis will follow the reason why Britain failed to estimate Japanese capabilities properly.
As far as military intelligence concerned, such as NID (Naval Intelligence Division) and MI2c (Military Intelligence Section dealing with Asia) underestimated Japanese military capabilities, while they overestimated British troops in South East Asia. The military intelligence faced difficulties to collect information in Japan, mainly because of a Japanese counter intelligence. As a result, they constructed an image of Japanese troops that Japan was the second-class force compared with the British.
It was also difficult for SIS and FECB (Far Eastern Combined Bureau) to operate in the East Asia. They were suffered from lack of funds and personnel and it is said that the SIS Far East could not get useful information in this area. The FECB, code-breaking organization in Asia, succeeded in breaking several Japanese diplomatic and naval cipher. The FECB could estimate the Japanese potential capabilities and intentions to some extent, but unfortunately, reports from FECB were called ‘alarmist’ or ‘defeatist’ by staff officers and decision-makers in Whitehall.
However, there is a fundamental problem, why neither staff officers nor decision-makers in Whitehall and Singapore doubted that most of reports from intelligence services referred to only the deficiencies of Japanese troops. In fact, there were several reports, which stressed positive aspects of Japanese troops, but finally these reports were rejected as ‘unrealistic’. There appeared several reasons as follows why officers did not believe the positive reports; difficulties of two frontal wars in Europe and Asia, British ethnocentrism related with racial prejudice, and lack of specialists of Far Eastern affairs.
Finally not only decision-makers, but also intelligence officers did not believe that Japan would wage a war against Britain in 1941. Intelligence officers sent so many useless reports to Whitehall, and politicians did accept these incorrect reports undoubtedly and formed the Far Eastern strategy, which would lead the disaster of Singapore.

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