The end of the Cold War created the most profound impacts upon not only the world politics, but also the trends of historical research of the international political period which had lasted for more than forty years since the end of the Second World War. The vast amount of top secret documents of the former member states of the communist bloc have been declassified since the 1990s and now avail the Cold War historians. This has paved the way to writing histories of the Cold War as more empirical international histories and resulted in attracting more attentions of historians to regional diversity of the Cold War and in generating the tendency for them to produce more about intra-alliance international political process among the central actors of the Cold War world politics. This expanding interest to the regional diversity also has led many to the studies on historical roles of the actors located at the peripheries of the Cold War, such as the third world countries. Simultaneously, the end of the Cold War has stimulated the historians to turn their eyes to its multidimensional nature. A notable trend to shift the focus onto interrelations between transformation of societies and the development of the high political dimensions of the Cold War has saliently emerged particularly within the British and American circles of the Cold War historians. According to the abovementioned emerging trends, this volume is divided into the following three parts. The first part contains four papers covering historical developments of intra-alliance international politics, the second consists of detailed accounts on the involvements of ‘peripheral’ actors, and the third part covers the Cold War international politics related to societal dimensions. All of the papers are the results of extensive research of newly declassified documents, and many of them can be characterized as precursors of new Cold War histories. We are still struggling to grasp a clearer picture of the post-Cold War world politics, and, if so, the Cold War history has now a new academic mission. As far as the transformation process of the previous age usually prepares initial conditions of the following new one, the Cold War historians are now faced with the difficult but essential tasks to find how the initial conditions of the post-Cold War world had been generated and what dynamisms had operated in the transformation of the Cold War. As an editor, I hope that this volume could be a significant initial step to meet this new mission.
The purpose of this article is to analyze how the Soviet Union resolved territorial problems among Eastern European countries and transformed its relations with them. After the Second World War the Soviets took the initiative in solving the issues of Eastern Europe's boundaries in the process of redrawing post-war territorial frontiers to secure the so-called security belt along its western frontiers, in which Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland played key roles. Considering this environment, in this article the author presents two case studies—the Romanian-Hungarian conflict over Transylvania and the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict over Teschen. In Soviet leadership on 10th January, 1944, I. M. Maiskii, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to V. M. Molotov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, laying out the post-war Soviet foreign policy and its possible position in relation to the Eastern European countries. When it comes to the Romanian-Hungarian conflict over Transylvania, Maiskii proposed that this problem should be resolved in Romania's favor; that is, the northern parts of Transylvania, which Hungary annexed from Romania before the war, should be returned to the latter. On the Teschen problem, Maiskii emphasized that in his judgment Czechoslovakia should be reestablished along its previous borders that existed before the Munich conference, 1938, with the parts of Teschen Poland absorbed after Munich being returned to Czechoslovakia. Based on this proposal of Maiskii, generally, the Soviet Union supported the Romanian and Czechoslovak positions on reestablishing national territory according to the pre-Munich and pre-war borders, but resolving territorial problems among these countries was subordinated to the Soviet foreign policy and was vulnerable to the situation in each country. First, the Soviet Union supported Romania on recovering Transylvania as far as the latter would recognize the annexation by the former of Bessarabia. In Romania, P. Groza formed a government, receiving the support from the Soviet. The Groza government needed the recognition of its possession of the northern parts of Transylvania by the international community, especially by the United States and Great Britain, because Hungary would not give up its claim over Transylvania. Finally, on 7th May, 1946, at the Paris conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Union succeeded in having both the United States and the Britain recognize including the article that formulates the possession by Romania of Transylvania in the peace treaty between Romania and the United Nations. Second, the Soviet Union generally favored Czechoslovak over Teschen, but it did not make its position clear. The Teschen problem was connected with the recognition of the Polish Communist government. The west would not recognize Communist Poland; only the Soviet Union and its allies did. In addition, the internal situation in Poland was instable. Considering this, the Soviet Union set about strengthening the political and social system of Poland and refrained from urgently resolving the Teschen problem. Both the Czechoslovaks and the Poles, however, demanded possession of Teschen; the former in particular proposed the recognition of the latter under the condition that the Poles made a compromise on the Teschen problem. After the Communists won the election on 19th January 1947, in Poland, the Soviet Union considered that the situation of Poland was stable and demanded that Czechoslovakia recognize the latter. Eventually, the Soviets decided to pend the Teschen problem. In the process of resolving the territorial problems, the Soviet Union urged the parties concerned to improve their relations. These Soviet indications led the countries to become intimately related with each other and improved Romanian-Hungarian and the Polish-Czechoslovak relations. The Soviets tried to influence the Eastern Europe through its initiatives in
On August 23, 1958, the People's Liberation Army of China began a heavy bombardment against the Quemoy Island, an island still under the control of the Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan. This action escalated tensions across the Taiwan Strait, leading to the direct military confrontation between China and the United States. In fact, the conflict was so serious that the United States considered using tactical nuclear weapons against the Communist China. This paper explores why China chose to conduct such military activities despite risks of direct military engagement with the United States. China's decision to bombard the Quemoy is puzzling because it was fairly predictable that China's use of force would prompt the United States to respond militarily, bringing the two countries to the brink of a nuclear war. Why did China dare to take such risks and what were they trying to accomplish? There are two schools of thought that attempt to explain China's behavior leading to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The first focuses on an external factor, that is, China's security environments. According to this view, China's decision to conduct bombardment against the Quemoy was driven by Chinese leaders' concerns about increasing military threats posed by the United States. The second school of thought, the so-called “domestic mobilization” school, argues that the main reason for China's use of force was the necessity to mobilize domestic support for “the Great Leap Forward, ” a radical communization program that Mao Tse-dong tried to promote. Recently, researchers who utilized new documentary evidence from China and the former Soviet Union emphasize the role of Mao's radical communist ideology, and they claim that the “domestic mobilization” argument combined with an explanation based on Mao's ideology, provides a better explanation for China's behavior. Chen Jian, for instance, argues that Mao, who was committed to radical communist internationalism, was concerned about the slow speed of communization in China, and tried to accelerate the speed by creating an external crisis. While recognizing the importance of Mao's radical ideology, I argue that the importance of Mao's ideology was exaggerated because many of his radical statements were interpreted without analyzing contexts in which they were made. Furthermore, I point out evidence that shows that the Chinese leaders' decisions were driven by their concerns about China's security, not only because of increasing US threats but also because of the Soviet Union's pursuit for the “peaceful coexistence” with the West. In this sense, China's use of force was designed to serve two political purposes: warning the United States against increasing support for Taiwan and damaging what Chinese leaders considered to be Moscow's “appeacement” policy toward the United States. In making the argument stated above, I analyze the Chinese leaders' statements and decisions from 1954 to 1958 by examining Chinese and Soviet primary documents made available through the Cold War International History Project. Special attention is paid to analyzing Chinese leaders' diplomatic decisions within the context of China's strategic environments, because doing so provides a more complete picture of how China decided to bombard the Quemoy. In conclusion, I not only summarize the research findings, but also attempt to derive some theoretical implications from this case study by utilizing the notion of a “building block approach” to theorizing international relations.
This article discusses the development of the Junktim between East-West disarmament/arms control negotiations and German reunification and the changes in American policies regarding the Junktim under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. It argues that the United States government at that time changed the Junktim in order to make current disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union possible. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration did not enforce the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to abandon the latter's objection to the issues relating to European security and to accept the US policy changes in these matters. The Junktim was established as a US policy and as a common Western policy in 1955-56. The Eisenhower administration had inherited a policy of the Junktim from the previous administration. Discussions about US disarmament/arms control policies before and after the Geneva four-power summit meeting in July 1955 reconfirmed this policy with the support of all major members of the administration, including Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. The major Western allies had agreed to a Junktim between European security and German reunification before the Geneva summit meeting, but the British, the French and the West Germans soon found themselves divided regarding the definition of this Junktim. US efforts to close the gap among Europeans led to agree another Junktim between German reunification and arms reduction by stages as an allied position in May 1956. The Eisenhower administration tried to change the Junktim in order to widen the range of discussions with the Soviets. First, Stassen tried to define the first stage of an arms reduction proposal which would be implemented without progress toward German reunification. After Stassen's failure in 1957 and departure in the next year, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opened a way to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviets and the British without discussing German reunification. After a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin in November 1958, President Eisenhower and the newly appointed Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, connected nuclear test ban negotiations with Berlin negotiations in order to improve prospects of the latter. These US efforts upset Bonn, but Washington did not totally neglect Bonn's concerns. First, Washington modified the Junktim but did not abandon its principle. Second, Bonn's objection against accepting European security measures without progress toward reunification was recognized by the Eisenhower administration. Washington's effort to modify the Junktim indicates its willingness to negotiate with the Soviets and its desire not to destroy the alliance with the FRG. This study shows the second half of the 1950s as a dynamic period of the Cold War and gives a hint that can explain the developments in the following decades.
This article attempts to examine development of relationship between France and West Germany (FRG) in 1959-1963. The Cold War was transformed in the 1960s. The so-called ‘bipolar system’ was consolidated as well as challenged by various attempts, i. e. “Neue Ostpolitik” of Willy Brandt. On the other hand, Franco-German relations were also transformed. Since his return to the Presidency of the French Republic, Charles de Gaulle had started his “Grand Design” which was designed to reorganize the European-Atlantic dual order based upon the European Integration and the Atlantic Alliance. In this article, firstly, the negotiations in the European Economic Community (EEC) about the European Political Union, the so-called “Fouchet Plan Negotiation” would be analyzed. Secondly, I shall examine the significance of reactions by the French and the FRG governments to the European policy of the USA during the Kennedy's presidency. In 1959, de Gaulle launched a political consultation project in the EEC and then presented a more sophisticated concept of “Political Union” during Franco-German conversations in 1960. The basic idea was accepted by all of the six members as the next step to further integration and they agreed to organize a special committee to deal with this issue. In this negotiation, however, the main problem was the relationship between the Political Union designed to have competences of military defense and NATO. In fact, de Gaulle regarded the Political Union as an effective instrument for re-shaping the structure of European-Atlantic politics. The French government therefore insisted that the Political Union should have a function of military defense, but the other member states did not concur. This difference was finally to lead the negotiations for the Fouchet Plan to a deadlock in April 1962. There was another “Grand Design” on the other side of the Atlantic: the Atlantic Community by John F. Kennedy. He sought to consolidate the Atlantic alliance, by maintaining the European unity through the admission of United Kingdom to the EEC, by reinforcing the liberal trade system between USA and the Common Market through the Trade Expansion Act, and by integrating the chain of military command in the NATO under the new posture of American nuclear strategy; “Flexible Response” and the multilateral nuclear forces (hereafter, MLF). It is this American policy toward Europe that arise dynamics of Franco-German relations. Paris and Bonn shared anti-American strategy because Kennedy's Flexible Response strategy denied the nuclear power within American's Allies. In the FRG, this American strategy was interpreted as decline of US commitment to European security. Franco-German relations were, however, disrupted over the MLF questions. In December 1962, after Anglo-American conversations at Nassau, France and the FRG were both invited to participate in the MLF, which the USA and UK took the initiative to start. On the same day when the Germans accepted this invitation, January 14, 1963, the French government rejected MLF project. The two ‘Grand Designs’ finally failed to realize because of complicated connections between cooperation and confrontation in Franco-German relations. They could never successfully escape from the restriction of the transatlantic relations. Franco-German relationship was a connecting point between the transatlantic framework and the Gaullist vision.
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the Cold War in the light of thinking and perceptions of political leaders in France and the United States toward the Algerian War. The author tries to seize rhetorical aspects of the Cold War, showing how the leaders made use of Cold War rhetorics in order to seek for the aimed national interests in the sphere where communist threats did not matter. Here the study is focused mainly on the years 1956-1958, from the birth of the Socialist-led government to the return to power of Charles de Gaulle, during which this war, enlarged and internationalized, seriously damaged relations between the two countries. The nationalist movements in North Africa were embodied and dominated almost exclusively by non-communist Moslems. The communist influence there was very limited and weak. Both French and American administrators knew it well. After the WWII, French authorities sought to keep at any cost their presence in the region, while the US chose the “middle-road-of-policy”, which opposed both to an endless continuation of colonial domination and to radical and revolutionary changes involved in immediate independence of colonies. From the beginning of the Algerian War, the French government asked the US for diplomatic support and cooperation concerning the conflict, which the former affirmed officially was a domestic affair. The Mollet government used a Cold War rhetoric according to which the French retreat from Algeria would lead to a Soviet penetration and communist domination there. The US supported French war efforts for fear that the loss of French presence in North Africa should bring about too heavy a burden for the US to carry for the need of security in the region. But, as the war continued, intensified and internationalized since 1956, the US found it more and more difficult to support the French who were unable to defeat the nationalist rebellion and to realize a “liberal solution”. At last, by the beginning of 1958, the US came to think of its commitment to an international solution to the conflict in order to keep Western influence in North Africa.
The purpose of this paper is to examine Australian attitudes towards international relations of South East Asia in the late 1960s. In this period, the British government under Harold Wilson began reviewing its defence commitment East of Suez, having in mind a drastic reduction or complete withdrawal of British troops. With domestic pressure to keep defence expenditure down increasing and uncertainty over the tenure of bases in Singapore becoming looming, Britain was leaning in the direction of relinquishing its military hold over Singapore/Malaysia region, which had long been a symbol of the British Empire. Separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, in particular, brought policy makers in the UK home to the vulnerability of the British military positions under the fluctuating Asian political scene. The US commitment to the region was also experiencing drastic changes. Prospect of the Vietnam War obscured the future United States attitudes towards its commitments in South East Asia. Since Britain expressed its intention to pull out its forces from Singapore/Malaysia, the concerned powers, Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and the United States held quadripartite talks on several occasions, which gave the Australians to express their views on the issue. Australia, on the brink of losing ‘security blanket’ the British had provided in the South East Asian region, had strong concerns about the developments in the British thinking about their defence role in the region. Contending that Britain had and would play an important role in the security of the region, and that any British decision to withdraw would have a destabilising effect in the region, Australia argued that Britain should stay as long as possible. Moreover, Australians feared that the British withdrawal would precipitate American disengagement from the region. On the other hand, Australia sought to keep its options flexible and open as to its commitment in the region as long as possible. Although the Australians fully understood that the long-term security of Australia rested in the stability of the areas South East Asia, in the circumstances filled with unknown factors, Australia was not able to make a move forward. In this paper, a particular attention would be paid to the development of Australia's thinking as to its role in the security of the region for the 1970s. We would focus on the period between the British enunciation of its intention to review its defence posture in the region and the Australian government's announcement of its intention to maintain its forces beyond the British withdrawal.
The Bikini incident of 1954, ushering in a new era of atomic plenty, aggravated nuclear fear and a danger of neutralism among the Japanese public. This article examines how the Japanese and U. S. governments tackled a problem of antinuclear sentiment which emerged as a hotbed for neutralism in 1954-1957. Focusing on a unique nature of Japanese antinuclear sentiment as a form of nationalism, this article sheds light upon a role of diplomacy as a communication tool to address antinuclear sentiment and nationalism. This study argues that the Yoshida administration succeeded in settling an immediate problem of the Bikini incident but failed to address the question of nationalism deeply rooted in spreading antinuclear sentiment among the public. Worried about a weak leadership of the Japanese conservative government, the Eisenhower administration could not simply overlook this failure. Then it tried to directly confront the growing antinuclear sentiment through a coordinated public relations diplomacy it regarded as “education.” With “education, ” it intended to lead Japan to embrace continued nuclear-testing. This “education” failed, however, when Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi embarked upon anti-nuclear-testing diplomacy. By positively responding to the growing nationalism embedded in the antinuclear sentiment, Kishi thought, he could win popularity for pro-American conservative LDP and therefore contain a danger of neutralism. Containment of neutralism was, ironically, exactly what the Eisenhower administration had envisaged. Kishi's diplomacy, therefore, shared the goal with U. S. educational efforts, but adopted a different approach. His diplomacy finally nullified “education, ” which raised a voice inside the Eisenhower administration calling for changing U .S. policy on nuclear testing rather than changing Japan through “education.” The eventual course of antinuclear nationalism in U. S. -Japan relations once again remained to be seen.
The purpose of this paper is to explore Britain's clandestine cultural activities in the USSR conducted by the British Council's Soviet Relations Committee (SRC). Established in 1955 in response to Foreign Office requests for a body that would be responsible for ‘the promotion of closer relations between Great Britain and the U. S. S. R.’, it is argued that, in reality, the government wanted the SRC to act as a bulwark against the activities of domestic Communist ‘friendly societies’. The paper seeks to identify and evaluate the attitude adopted by the British Government towards cultural interchange with the USSR by elucidating upon the value given by contemporaries to cultural propaganda in the political forum, and then moves forward to address the question as to what the government hoped to gain from a cultural-intercourse with the USSR, or rather, how abstention from official cultural commitments was the strategic aim of the government. The SRC was well aware of the dangers and benefits associated with cultural penetration, and, from the outset, was anxious to avoid getting involved in protracted negotiations over a binding cultural agreement. Whilst resisting Soviet advances to create a formalised agreement, the SRC acted as a stent, keeping open a channel of communication with the Soviet authorities, and implanting—in Soviet eyes—the corruptive seeds of democracy. The paper concludes by suggesting that the politics of international cultural, relations being conducted behind the Iron Curtain changed rapidly with events in world affairs during the 1950s, such as the Hungarian Crisis. Whilst the policy of the British Government initially appeared beneficial to British interests, it soon became clear that the Soviets were gaining more from these cultural exchanges in terms of the technical expertise that they acquired, and the propaganda they could attach to them. They endorsed cultural relations, but cultural relations had to be on their terms. The ambivalence of the SRC's status presented an obstacle to the Soviet authorities that initially held them at bay, but in the end, proved to be counterproductive and ultimately ineffective, resulting in its disbandment in 1959. However, the achievement of the SRC was that it helped to increase the volume of western representations of ‘democratic’ ideals both at home and in the USSR, and fostered a relationship with the USSR that was far from being merely ‘passive’-rather, Britain's cultural diplomacy in this period was a raft of unique and subtle strategies, which, though it ultimately failed, attempted to conduct cultural propaganda at arms-length, in order to pursue Britain's own world-view. It must be emphasised that some of the materials used in this article are, to date, still categorised as being ‘closed files’ in the National Archives, London. For this reason, permission to access and make use of the material contained in these files was granted by the British Council on the signed undertaking that the names of individuals mentioned would not be published.
In this paper, I reflect on the correlation between the formation of Korean Worker's Party (KWP) and KIM Il-sung's maneuver to wage the Korean War. For a long time, it was believed that KWP was formed through the merging of South Korean Worker's Party (SKWP) and North Korean Worker's Party (NKWP) from June to July in 1949 with KIM Il-sung as the chairman of the Central Committee. However, new materials prove that the formation of KWP just meant the integration of the Central Committee of both KWPs and had a close connection with the tactical defferences between PAK Honyong, the top leader of SKWP, and KIM Il-sung who had been pointed out the leader of Korean Communist Movement by Stalin in 1946. PAK pursued the overturn of Rhee Syng-man's regime by guerrilla conflict of SKWP in South Korea and tried to avoid the civil war between South and North regimes by appealing for a ‘peaceful unification plan’ which the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF) proposed. DFUF was established under PAK's initiative in June 1949. In this tactics it seems that SKWP and NKWP formed a ‘Joint Central Committee’ to manage activities of DFUF between June 28 and July 7 in 1949, when KIM Il-sung failed to take up the chairmanship of the Central Committee since the appeal of DFUF was not only one to withstand invasion of South Korea but also to contain KIM Il-sung's tactics. His tactics had dual purposes to achieve Korean unification and to seize the actual initiative of Korean Communist Movement with KIM's head position of KWP through advancing Korean People's Army into South Korea. KIM opened up his tactics in a conversation with T. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassadar to North Korea, in August 1949 after his agreement to the ‘peaceful unification plan’ of DFUF. Although in September 1949 the Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party rejected this military option and ordered KIM and PAK to develop the latter's tactics with alerting KWP to the intervention of U. S. forces into the civil war, KIM Il-sung made a use of an opportunity of the favorable turn of Sino-Soviet relation. Finally, KIM gained his end in January 1950 that Stalin allowed him to prepare to open the war on condition that Mao Tse-zung should agree with KIM's tactics. Before the agreement of Stalin and Mao to open the civil war in Korean Peninsula, PAK had no other choice but to cooperate with KIM's tactics. Therefore the Korean War broke out in June 1950 and KIM began a purging of KWP after failing to accomplish his purposes through the war.