Much has been written about “multilateralism” in international relations theory, particularly since John G. Ruggie and James A. Kaporaso of the neo-liberal/constructivisit school sought to conceptualize “multilateralism” in 1993. They offered a critique of the American neo-realist school of both Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin and challenged the American neo-liberal institutionalist school of Robert O. Keohane. Neo-realism stresses the importance of international system based on international anarchy/self-help and hegemonic cycle, while neo-liberal institutionalism puts emphasis upon the institutionalization of multilateral frameworks underpinned by the innovative concept “international regime.”
The neo-liberal institutionalist school of multilateralism has been guided by the following events and developments: the end of the Cold War and the United States' victory over the Soviet block; the United Nations' expanded role in international peace-keeping; the Gulf War and the US-led multilateral forces; the US economy and globalization; European integration and the emergence of Asia-Pacific regionalism.
This special edition focuses on multilateralism and has two main objectives. The first is to critically reexamine the conceptualization of multilateralism in the context of the US foreign policy and diplomatic history. The second is to shed more light on multilateralism from perspectives in regions outside the United States: Europe and NATO/OSCE; East Asia (Japan/China/Korea) and APEC/ARF/ASEAN+3; Southeast Asia and ASEAN/ARF; South Pacific and Pacific Islands Forum; and Africa and AU/EU.
Although the concept of multilateralism has been highly advanced, much of the work remains influenced or dominated by the US academic culture and global presence. It is, therefore, important that we rethink the concept of multilateralism from non-American perspectives, including those advanced in Japan and middle powers, such as Australia and Canada.

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Unilateralism has been widely considered a coordinate concept of multilateralism, mainly because an element of cooperation in multilateralism has been emphasized by John Ruggie who has influenced, to a great extent, the development of the study of multilateralism. However, the former represents an attitude or posture in conducting diplomacy and its coordinate concept is “cooperativism, ” while the latter express a number of players participating in a game of diplomacy and a framework for the game and its coordinate concept is bilateralism.
David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, editors of “Unilateralism & U. S. Foreign Policy, ” insist that unilateralism refers to a tendency to opt out of a multilateral framework or to act alone in addressing a particular global or regional challenge, rather than choosing to participate in collective actions. That states do so because they do not wish to subject themselves to “generalized principles of conduct” (John Ruggie) being negotiated or enforced, or they may find such principles inimical to their national interests.
Therefore, when we attempt to analyze diplomatic approaches of a specific state, we have to take account of two dimensions: the dimension of diplomatic attitude (unilateralism/“cooperativism”) and the dimension of a number of diplomatic players (bilateralism/multilateralism).
If these two dimensions are taken together, we can make up a coordinate axis. Approaches of U. S. departed from isolationism, vigorously engaged in intervention policy (bilateral unilateralism) especially in the area of the Caribbean Sea and Central America. After responding to World War I with multilateral unilateralism, which can be thought equal to Wilsonianism labeled “internationalism of crisis” (Frank Ninkovich), the U. S. conducted foreign policies of multilateral unilateralism “cooperativism” among great powers. The U. S., which hesitated to adopt Wilsonianism as “internationalism of crisis” in response to the Manchurian Incident caused by Japan, carefully came to introduce Wilsonianism after the outbreak of the Sino-Japan War (July of 1937) and World War II.
The U. S. having led World War II by fully applying Wilsonianism made the utmost efforts to create a new world order on the basis of multilateralism cooperativism. he United Nations System and Bretton-Woods System symbolize the U. S. -led multilateralist cooperativism. But C. Hemmer and P. J. Katzenstein criticize the U. S. foreign policy of multilateralism (which naturally contains an element of cooperation according to Ruggie), saying that the U. S. applied these global principles differently in different regions, and projects its norms onto the global scene in a highly selective fashion that itself needs to be explained.

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“Does the United States deal with international problems alone, or with others?” The world is concerned over America's diplomatic course of action, unilateral or multilateral. Now that America, the only super power in the world, has parted from traditional “isolationism, ” the question at issue is not whether it “will” or “will not” make commitments to international affairs, but “how” it will.
America's insistence on multilateralism is relatively new in American diplomatic history. The Atlantic Charter is claimed to be one of the first documents that revealed its preference for multilateralism. The Atlantic Charter is a joint statement by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill made in August 1941, which expressed their will to cooperate for the “better future for the world.” Some of the articles in the charter referred to the realization of a liberal trade system and international organizations, hence the understanding of the charter as a document on economic and political multilateralism. The charter's incorporation in the Declaration by the United Nations in 1942 also contributed toward the understanding of such a document.
Multilateralism, seen in the Atlantic Charter, has relevance to the original study in the United States on world peace and America's role in international politics, proceeded since the 1930's. For example, its groping for social stability by enhancing economic cooperation, and also for world leadership from its own standpoint as seen in the Reciprocal Trade Treaty Act in 1934 and Wells Mission in 1940, were signs of America's positive commitments to world affairs. These kinds of diplomatic activities were seen both before and after America's entrance to the Second World War. This paper aims to examine multilateralism in the Atlantic Charter by analyzing American preference for the idea of multilateral cooperation before and after the announcement of the Atlantic Charter.

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The debate about multilateralism and unilateralism in international security field has recently intensified. An obvious ground for this is the inclination of the United States to use force unilaterally, especially with regard to Iraq. Apparent dominance of the U. S. power may make multilateralism seem irrelevant, but actually, what has been achieved in multilateralism in the field of international security since the 1990s is quite considerable.
First, the role of the United Nations Security Council has been expanded since the end of the cold war. The expectation may not have quite lived up to that of Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace.” The experiences of the 90s have brought about a consensus that the U. N. is not a suitable means for enforcement actions. It is now widely recognized that enforcement actions are better carried out by coalition of the willing member states. But at the same time, the importance of the Security Council in authorizing and giving legitimacy to the international use of force has become established. The Security Council now authorizes wide range of military actions, including humanitarian intervention.
The usefulness of the United Nations has also been proved in the area of so-called “multi-functional” or “second-generation” peacekeeping. One of the biggest features of the post Cold War world is the increase in civil wars, regional conflicts and ethnic conflicts. In many places, there are acute needs of post-conflict “peace building.” The U. N. has proved itself useful in cases like Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor.
Humanitarian intervention is one topic which was acutely debated during the past decade. The tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica especially focused attention on this problem. Kosovo brought up the dilemma of the need of intervention and the inability to achieve Security Council resolution. On the one hand, many international lawyers still argue that Kosovo intervention was “illegal.” On the other hand, there are also voices which insist that in some cases, international society has the “duty” to intervene, or to protect the people.
Regional institutions have also been increasingly playing different roles in international security. This has especially been prominent with the European regional institutions in the Balkans. Institutions such as NATO, EU and OSCE have taken up various tasks such as peacekeeping, conflict prevention, crisis management, policing and peace-building in the course of the Balkan conflicts. Such tendency should be encouraged to fill the gap between the actual needs and the limited capacity and resources of the United Nations.
Unilateral use of force by states will persist for a long time to come. But at the same time, support for multilateralism cannot be ignored. International society is neither totally Hobessian or Kantian.

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The tide of regionalism that originated in Europe and covered the Americas finally reached East Asia in the latter half of the 1990s. The causes were various, including: the search for a new order in the post-Cold War era; the rise in regional economic interdependence as a corollary of the advancement of globalisation; the fear of exclusive bloc formation and the need for an 'open regionalism' in the case of APEC; the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis which gave birth to the ASEAN+3 by enhancing the sense of a common interest and destiny among the East Asian nations; and the rise of China, which increased the confidence of the Chinese in participating in multilateral forums and stimulated the other countries to engage and co-opt China into the regional framework. The success of East Asian regionalism depends largely on the future relationship of Japan and China. The two nations, which now seem to be competing in their promotion of regional frameworks, share the task of overcoming narrow nationalism and materialising a dialectical development between multilateralism and bilateral relations.

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Multilateralism in Southeast Asia has successfully worked for the last 35 years, whereas it is generally argued that in Asia or the Asia-Pacific region, in contrast to Europe, multilateralism in security cooperation in particular has not. The author describes the multilateralism in Southeast Asia as a “Showcase of Multilateralism, ” implying that it functions well in guise while the multilateral cooperation based on it has often failed in solving regional problems especially in urgent nature. Nevertheless, since the inception of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967, it has practiced their multilateral cooperation in various fields and provided the region with benign inter-state relations and thus the environment in which each member country could concentrate on its own economic development and national integration. Until early 1990s, ASEAN was basically able to apply to every member country rules set on shared indivisible values in nondiscriminatory manners, and provide them with rights, obligations and interests almost equally.
In the process of the ASEAN's development, however, with its own organizational expansion and the broader regionalization with its extra-regional partners, its multilateralism which has often been referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’ now met some significant challenges. Especially with its establishment of a multilateral framework for security dialogue, namely the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ‘ASEAN way’ is being questioned and needs to persuade the extra-regional participants in particular that it can also provide them with its rights to participate, interests, and achievements equally. Reality shows, on the contrary, the ARF is still an ASEAN's forum and it serves ASEAN's security in the first place. For its part ASEAN recognizes that unless it retains its own relevancy and unless it can enjoy support and endorsement from the extra-regional partners, especially the big powers, the broader regional forum does not work as it was expected. While there is a general consensus that it was only the ASEAN's idea and initiative that enabled this multilateral framework for security talks to come into being in this region, there are criticisms and complaints about how it should be managed and made more useful.
After the economic and even political crises took place in East Asia in the late 1990s, the multilateralism in Southeast Asia has shown its centrifugal tendencies, if not irrelevancy. The author summarized those tendencies as: (1) bipolarizations between the older member countries and the newcomers, between generations, and between state and people or civil societies, (2) the inward-looking or individual policies of the member countries after the economic crisis, shown quite obviously in their different responses to the International Monetary Fund, (3) possibility of being integrated into a larger framework such as East Asia, also apparent after the crisis, (4) sub-regionalization under the current framework as was shown in the conclusion of an anti-terrorism agreement by four ASEAN countries in response to the aftermath of the September 11 incident. Having mentioned all those tendencies, the author still concludes that multilateralism as a modus operandi of managing relations between countries in Southeast Asia is still valid and effective, considering that any unilateralism based on a narrow-minded nationalism, or bilateralism to be trapped by sensitive issues are likely to disturb relatively stable and benign regional environment. In the near future, however, the wishes and aspirations for peace and prosperity of the people, as well as those of the states, should become the basis for their shared indivisible values in this region.

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The Pacific Islands Forum, which changed its name from the South Pacific Forum to the present one in 2000, can be regarded as the most wellfunctioning multilateralism in Oceania. This article aims to analyze the change and continuity in the Pacific Islands Forum by examining three periods respectively, the period as the South Pacific Forum, the transitional period in the 1990s, and the period as the Pacific Islands Forum.
The South Pacific Forum started its activities in 1971 and consolidated its foundation as a regional body to respond to external pressure, namely nuclear issues. In the late 1980s, it responded to another external pressure, climate change issues, by using other organizations as multiple channels to send a voice to the international community. At almost the same time, it also tried to deal with global trade liberalization as another external pressure by building economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast to this, it avoided getting involved in regional conflicts stemming from ethnic problems within member countries.
However, the South Pacific Forum went through a transitional period in the 1990s, in which it started to commit to intraregional affairs. In order to tackle transregional crime it adopted the Honiara Declaration in 1992, requesting member countries to take law enforcement measures. The Aitutaki Declaration adopted in 1997 went further, setting out guidelines for regional security.
While it maintained its stance of non-interference in relation to the coup in Fiji in May 2000, it eventually decided to adopt a policy of intervention with the outbreak of the coup in the Solomon Islands in the following month. The Biketawa Declaration, defining the Forum's guiding principles and courses of actions towards regional conflicts, was adopted at the annual meeting in October, where the change of name to the Pacific Islands Forum was also officially proclaimed.
Unlike the South Pacific Forum, the Pacific Islands Forum is a regional organization that intervenes in regional conflicts as well as responds to external pressure. It should be pointed out, however, that there is continuity between the two. One of the reasons why the Pacific Islands Forum decided to adopt a policy of intervention was the adverse effect that the two coups in 2000 had to the region's reputation as a trade and investment market, something that the Pacific Islands Forum has tried to form in response to global trade liberalization. In that sense, external pressure still existed behind the Forum's decision of adopting a policy of intervention.

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This article will review and assess the process of development and transformation of multi-layered multilateralism in and around Africa, in the area of trade and development aid. By the term of “multi-layered, ” I intend to classify the levels of global, inter-regional, and regional (even sub-regional) multilateralism. It will try to analyze the process of change of inter-relations among different levels of multilateralism by classifying in this manner.
In the first part of this article, the development of inter-regional relations between Europe and ACP countries (especially Africa) from the 1950s to recent Cotonou Agreement will be concisely summarized by paying attention to changes of the contents of various agreements in a chronological order.
In the second part, I will assess the transformation of the relationship. The first point is that the “special relationship” since the 1950s has been gradually “diluted” even in the framework of innovative Lome Agreement in terms of trade relationship. In other words, the share of imports from ACP counties has been continuously declined, although they are at the top of “pyramide des privileges.” The second point is that multilateralism at different levels has been gradually multi-layered. Furthermore, especially that of global level has heavily impinged on inter-regional multilateralism.
For the purpose of analyzing the influence in more concrete manner, structural adjustment support of European Union and the relationship of it to the Bretton Woods institutions in the case of Zimbabwe will be assessed in the third part. What is clarified in this case is that Lome support was only one part of the wider World Bank/IMF-led donor strategy, despite the claim that its support is different and independent from those of Bretton Woods institutions. This case shows that inter-regional multilateralism has been “subordinated” to that of global level in multi-layered multilateralism, although it is not possible to generalize the finding.
It will be important to research further relationships between different levels of multilateralism to understand the process of transformation and mechanism of multi-layered multilateralism in the 21^St century.

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The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of power shifts on war. Realists have argued that the change of the distribution of power among states is a major cause of war. Yet, they failed to explain how and why it affects state's incentive to attack another country. I propose a window theory for clarifying the causal relationship between them. I argue that the rapid change of relative power affects state's motivation to initiate a war in two ways. First, war is more likely when the window of vulnerability opens. When a state is the declining power, it tends to begin a preventive war for stopping its weakening. Second, war is more likely when the window of opportunity opens. Under the condition that the costs of an offensive war are low, a state in the rising process may want more secure position by the use of forces.
I examine the cases of the opening of the Korean War and the Entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers in 1950 for testing the above hypotheses. North Korea decided to invade South Korea with the approval of the Soviet Union because it expected that the United States would not militarily intervene in the war. The Acheson's announcement of the defensive perimeter indirectly excluding South Korea gave Stalin an opportunity to permit the North's war plan against the South. Kim Il Sung also estimated that North Korea would win the war without US intervention in the short period of time because South Korea was quite weak. Chinese decision makers almost agreed to send the Chinese People's Volunteers to Korean peninsula immediately after that the US-led UN forces advanced across the 38 parallel. China expected better outcomes from the preventive war than a war started later because time would make its security worse. In short, the empirical tests confirm this window theory.

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In July 1969, the Japanese and the US governments exchanged the notes on space cooperation between the two countries. This agreement aimed at allowing US firms to provide certain technologies and equipments requested by Japanese firms for the Japanese space program, and accordingly the Japanese government virtually revised a basic policy of its space program, “independent development, ” to receive technological assistance from the United States. In consequence, post-war Japan-US partnership, which had developed in a variety of fields, expanded into space development. This paper examines why and how this Japan-US partnership in space development was forged.
After the Chinese first nuclear explosion in October 1964, the elements of political leaders and scientists in Japan came to be increasingly interested in the launch of a satellite with Japanese own rocket. They saw that such an achievement was critical to demonstrate its scientific capability to the world and to boast national prestige in the face of Chinese nuclear weapon development. The US government, on the other hand, considered it as its interest to promote Japanese space program in anticipation of diverting Japanese attention from nuclear weapon development.
Under such circumstances, the US government was willing to cooperate with Japan in space development, but the Japanese government was unenthusiastic about space cooperation with the United States. In the late 1960s, the Japanese government was undertaking the establishment of a domestic organizational structure including government agencies, industries, and academics to carry out its space program as a national project, while engaging in space development policy-making activities based on the principle of “independent development.” In the end, however, it was agreed at the meeting of Prime Minster Eisaku Sato and President Lyndon Johnson in November 1967 that the two governments would explore the possibility of bilateral space cooperation.
Thereupon, the US government presented a proposal on Japan-US space cooperation in the early 1968, which was based on political considerations such as strengthening the tie between the two countries and to prevent Japan from independently developing nuclear weapon and its strategic delivery systems, specifically ballistic missiles. The offer was an effort to induce Japan to support the US policies to prevent the proliferation of strategic delivery systems to and via Japan and to establish a single international communication satellite system, namely INTELSAT.
Japan faced a difficult choice: pursuing the policy of complete independent development or advancing its space program with US assistance at the risk of accepting conditions that could constrain Japanese space program in future. This was a dilemma for concerned political leaders, bureaucrats and scientists in Japan. Finally, the Japanese government chose the latter course after concluding the space cooperation agreement with the US government, which resulted in the successful launch of a N-I rocket, the first Japanese large-scale satellite launch vehicle, in 1975.

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