Since the end of the Cold War, regionalism has emerged as an important trend in many different parts of the world, in the realms of both economy and security. However, the impact of the demise of the Cold War confrontation on the rise of regionalist designs and discussions is not linear. On the one hand, the collapse of the dividing walls between the two “blocs” has definitely precipitated the new dynamics of regional cooperation. The end of bipolar conflict also decreased the influence of super-powers, allowing greater degree of “regional sovereignty, ” as put by Richard Rosecrance. But, on the other hand, the end of the global confrontation has brought fundamental transformation to the character and functions of regions. To borrow the terms of Raimo Väyrynen, regions have become “deterritorialized, ” giving increasing importance to “functional regions” vis-à-vis “physical regions.” Thus, region in the geographic sense now becomes less sure and stable, making regionalist projects and discussions more complicated. In the region of East Asia, such growing differentiation between physical regions and functional regions is more prominent than others. Among others, intraregional mistrust and antagonism caused by geostrategic structure and historical legacy make regional states to be wary of “closed” regions. As Norman Palmer pointed out, East Asia has witnessed only a series of “imposed regionalisms” so far. And the trends of “new regionalisms” since late 1960s have taken also the form of “open regionalisms, ” preferring “Asia-Pacific” to “East Asia.” And the regional organizations in the region, such as ASEAN and APEC, have shown tendencies toward “flexibility” in their structures and functions. Different from the counterparts in Europe, these regional frameworks have shunned strict rule-making, preferring the consensus-based “soft regionalism.” In this context the emergence of “East Asia” since the late 1990s is the second generation of “new regionalism” in this region. Since 2001 ASEAN+3 has advanced visions of “East Asian community, ” with increasing regional exchanges and interdependence among the three Northeast Asian countries; China, Japan, and South Korea. In understanding and analyzing the new trends of East Asian regionalism, some theoretical tasks arise: how to define the region and how to make the regionalist visions possible in the domestic political context. In other words, epistemology and politics ask for their respective places in theorizing regionalism in this area of traditional mistrust and antagonism. Eight articles in this special issue on East Asian regionalism have in common in their interest in the impact of changing domestic political and epistemic structures on the intraregional relations, while they deal with different cases of mostly bilateral cooperation or conflicts.
Many observers have pointed out the need for a multilateral security discussion in East Asia. But since the diversity of the region underlies a latent potential for discord, there is also a widely-held pessimistic view that it will be difficult to realize a security arrangement amid the lack of any consensus that could serve to underpin its formation. On the new role of the U. S. -Japan security alliance, the 1997 new guidelines note in an item on “Various Types of Security Cooperation” that the “bilateral [Japan-U. S.] cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.” In other words, it is the new global role of the alliance and its complex functions that are being given particular importance. These functions include U. N. peace-keeping, international humanitarian relief operations and emergency relief activities in major disasters. They also include encouraging security dialogue, defense exchange, regional confidence building, as well as arms control and reduction-an alternative to focusing on the containment of an adversary. Despite the avowed importance of this new role, however, its logical and conceptual underpinning remains to be clearly laid out. During the Cold War, the existence of the enemy was clear, as was the objective of assuring the security of one's own country in opposition to it. But alliances can no longer be considered simply containment measures. Instead, they must be looked upon from the wider perspective of the pursuit of an institutional means of forming and maintaining a stable geopolitical environment through building confidence and mutual exchange among alliance members. Given that, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the potential roles for today's alliance in a security arrangement for the whole region. We will take into consideration issues related to managing the alliance, dilemmas associated with it and the related security structure, as well as the relationship between the alliance and the multipolar framework in which it exists. This paper begins with a clarification of the characteristics of post-Cold War international politics in East Asia, and the structural limitations they place on Japan. A discussion of the new role of the alliance follows, with a comparison between the significance of the concept of “cooperative security” during the Cold War and after it as it applies to the Japan-U. S. alliance. The third part of the paper specifies practical choices faced by alliance members as they endeavor to establish a “cooperative security” framework, as well as the conditions for valid “cooperative security”.
East Asian regionalism, which involves Japan, China, Korea and the ASEAN countries, emerged during the 1990s and has been rapidly developing especially after the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997. It led to the institutionalization of “ASEAN+3” in a very short period. However, except for financial cooperation such as Chiang Mai Initiative, little has been studied on cooperation being promoted under ASEAN+3. In fact, East Asian countries have been promoting various projects in the ASEAN+3 framework. This paper focuses on cooperation on food security issues, i. e. East Asian Rice Reserve System and ASEAN Food Security Information System (AFSIS). This is to illustrate how East Asian regionalism is developing. Specifically it delineates the origin of food security cooperation in East Asia, and the process and backdrops of its development. Food security cooperation in East Asia stems from ASEAN food security cooperation. The ASEAN countries agreed on promoting food security cooperation in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976, and concluded ASEAN Food Security Reserve Agreement (AFSR) in 1979. AFSR stipulated ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR), which was to become the foundation of East Asian Rice Reserve System. Even though AFSR and AERR did not function sufficiently, ASEAN Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF) continued to be interested in food security in ASEAN region. Their intention to enhance food security in their own region led ASEAN+3 to include agriculture issues on the list of fields of cooperation. Japan also played a crucial role in the inception of East Asian Rice Reserve system. Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) became interested very seriously in assistance to developing countries, especially those in Asia, on food security. Behind such interest, MAFF intended to win the support of developing countries on WTO Agricultural Negotiation. In addition, some officials in MAFF were convinced that Japan had to play a leading role in agriculture, forest, fisheries, and food assistance in East Asia. MAFF proposed the idea of a possible framework for international food stockholding at “the Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiation” in December 1999. Besides, Yoichi Tani, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, proposed to the Philippine government in August 2000 a ministerial meeting of Agriculture and Forestry among ASEAN+3 members. This proposal led to the 1st ASEAN+3 Ministerial Meeting on Agriculture and Forest (AMAF+3) in October 2001. AMAF+3 was regularized, and is held annually. Food security cooperation has been promoted within this framework. MAFF, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Ministry of Agriculture and Corporation of Thailand (MOAC) have been taking initiatives on promoting specific projects. East Asian Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR), the core of East Asian Rice Reserve System, and AFSIS are currently under construction.
This article analyzes and focuses on how Japan-U. S. alliance was constructed. The process and products of the alliance are examined by using declassified records of the U. S. State Department, the U. S. Pacific Command, and the U. S. Forces in Japan. As the Cold War entered a détente resulting in the signing of ABM Treaty and the US-China normalization, some Japanese conservative and influential politicians proposed an idea, that is, the so-called YUJI CHURYU, which would allow US forces to station in Japan only in case of contingency of Japan. The U. S. Embassy in Tokyo paid attention to such arguments emerging in Japan after the Reversion of Okinawa and made a recommendation to have candid dialogues with Japanese officials and thus review carefully the U. S. -Japan security relations. A telegram sent to the State Department from Tokyo in November 1972 points out that the trends of arguments were based on “uselessness” of the U. S. forces in Japan even though the United States succeeded in extending MST in 1970. This review was a starting point from where Japan-U. S. security relations evolved into an alliance that share equipments, roles, and missions based on mutual understanding and threat perception. The Japan-U. S. dialogues at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Subcommittee (SSC) that were the highest level of communication channel were a driving force to build up such an alliance. The committees established at several levels under the SCC were to share values and methods for estimating and evaluating international issues. These committees are, for instance, the Security Consultative Group (SCG) to promote mutual understanding on security matters, the Defense Study Group (DSG) functioning as a secret channel at military-military relations, and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) that became an organ that legitimized well-prepared military-military relations publicly and formally. A series of U. S.-Japan joint exercises that started in 1978 and 1980 were the products of the discussions at several committees that established joint military operational plans such as Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan (CJOEP) and Joint Operation Plan System (JOPS). Along with joint exercises at each service level, U. S. Army-GSDF, USMC-GSDF, U. S. Air Force-ASDF, and U. S. Navy-MSDF, three joint-operational plans such as DEFPLAN-OPLAN 5051, DEFPLAN-OPLAN 5052, and DEFPLAN-OPLAN 5053 were studied at the military-military level.
This paper aims to provide insight into the future security environment in East Asia by examining the PRC-Taiwan relations. In particular, I look at issues involving interaction among the following areas: the deterrence of the PRC's use of force against Taiwan, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions (WMD), and the multilateral security cooperation. This paper makes four conclusions: First, the United States deters both the PRC's use of force against Taiwan and Taiwan's “provocative” words and deeds against the PRC. The United States secures deterrence of the PRC's use of force against Taiwan not vis-à-vis international security regimes such as the United Nations, but through domestic legislation, such as the Taiwan Relations Act. On the other hand, the United States persuades the Taiwanese leadership not to provoke Beijing through unofficial bilateral channels. Second, the United States tries to control the terms of both nuclear development and non-proliferation in the PRC and Taiwan. Since the PRC firmly sticks to the position that “the Taiwan issue is a domestic issue, ” it is impossible to have bilateral arms control negotiations between the PRC and Taiwan. If Taiwan possesses nuclear weapons, the PRC's use of force will be inevitable. From this viewpoint, the PRC has benefited from the U. S. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiatives to let Taiwan have “de facto” involvement in international nonproliferation regimes. The United States has also gained the involvement of the PRC in international nuclear non-proliferation regimes and also has succeeded in making Taiwan follow international norms despite the fact that it is not a formal member of such regimes. Third, the United States have made efforts to persuade the PRC and Taiwan to prevent proliferation of materials and technologies related to biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missiles. However, both the PRC and Taiwan have not participated in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—the reasons for this are different for each. The PRC fears that it will lose certain technology export rights if it is to fully observe international norms of export. Moreover, the PRC believes that by adhering to export control regimes such as the MTCR it may lose significant leverage for keeping U. S. arms sales to Taiwan “in check.” Since Taiwan is under the influence of the United States, Taiwan resigns itself to observe international norms without getting membership in the MTCR. The United States thus continues to encourage both the PRC and Taiwan to obey international norms through bilateral channels rather than through a multilateral framework. Fourth, a bilateral framework for promoting confidence-building between the PRC and Taiwan does not exist. Further, Taiwan is eliminated from formal participation in the framework of the multilateral security cooperation. Therefore, there is no official international forum at which discussion takes place on the Taiwan Strait issue and Taiwan's potential international role in the non-proliferation of WMD. From the above four points, we can see that the security environment of East Asia, especially in the PRC-Taiwan relations context, is extremely dependent on the United States, while the formal international security regime is completely helpless. Unless the PRC changes its Taiwan policy, this structure will not change. However, the PRC leadership may fear that such policy changes will promote independence of Taiwan. Thus, decisive U. S. influence, not international regimes, will continue to play an important role in the Taiwan Strait for the foreseeable future.
This paper analyzes the political process of the Chinese foreign policy making. The case is China's support of the building a special economic zone in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). A Chinese businessperson, Mr. Yang Bin, with a passport of the Netherlands announced in September 2002 that he would be building a special economic zone near Sinuiju city in North Korea across the Yalu river from the Chinese city of Dandong. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a short statement a few days after Mr. Yang's announcement and “welcomed and supported” the North Korean initiative. Mr. Yang's project, however, failed to materialize. By early October, Mr. Yang was under house arrest. What does this affair entail? Using the framework of the “fragmented authoritarianism, ” this paper argues that the Chinese foreign policy towards North Korea suffered from the lack of policy coordination. There is no built-in institutional mechanism which is supposed to coordinate different policy goals among participants. The Yang Bin affair illustrates the fragmentation of the policy goals and the mismatch of the timings of the decisions. The Central Party leadership, headed by President Jiang Zemin, minded its own policy goal, that was, the improvement of the relations with the United States. It had little time to consider the full consequences of the new special economic zone across the border from China. The local governments, both the provincial government and the city government, on the other hand, paid little attention to their external environment and cared only the protection of their local interests. They allied together against the Party Central and blocked Mr. Yang's ambition. The Yang Bin affair also indicates that the Chinese foreign policy making revolves around authoritarianism. The Party Central dominates the policy agenda and decides the general directions. The Party Central also monopolizes the personnel management and the resource allocations. The local governments, therefore, often have to comply without organized resistance. But, sometimes, perhaps when the protection of the local economic interests are at stake, the local governments may form a “developmental community” in order to maximize their share of the governmental funds.
The Soviet Union and South Korea concluded diplomatic relations in September 1990. This paper makes references to the Soviet policy decision process in establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea based on the new archives from both the Soviet Union and South Korea sides. The move to expand the economical and cultural relationship between the Soviet Union and South Korea was held in view within the Soviet Union till the beginning of 1990, but regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea, the Soviet Union was still in an opaque situation because of opposition from the Soviet Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB. But the change of the political system in the Soviet Union, i. e., introduction of a presidential system in March 1990, changed the traditional foreign policy decision-making style of the Kremlin, and made it possible for diplomacy to be led by Gorbachev and his assistants, not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After Gorbachev held a talk in San Francisco with the South Korean President Roh Tae-woo by the initiative of the president's executive office of himself in June 1990, he succeeded in weakening the resistance of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's opponents. Furthermore, the approach of South Korea whose positive initiative taken by two assistants for President Roh Tae-woo had the effect of making the talks in San Francisco possible.. Not only the structure of such domestic policy decisions but several other factors contributed to the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union. For example, the aggravation of the Japan-Soviet relationship by the Kuril Islands dispute became a fair wind for South Korea. Gorbachev was interested in approaching South Korea because large economic aid could not be expected from Japan. We should also point out that Soviet recognition towards South Korea improved during the glasnost policy of the Soviet Union, and the image of North Korea got worse in contrast. The report which the Soviet Union Communist Party International Affairs Department submitted in February 1990 showed how drastically Russian view of North Korea had deteriorated. However, East Asia's regional situation was affected seriously by such a policy change, by driving isolated North Korea to resort to nuclear brinkmanship. The establishment of the diplomatic relations, which put priority on narrow national interest rather than on long-term influence which the Soviet Union diplomacy had on the Korean peninsula, should be reappraised in a broader context, including its negative aspect.
It is worth noting that NGOs play growing roles on humanitarian/human rights issues. However, they are often in dilemmas both in donor-countries and in the fields by political situation. In this respect, North Korea is one of the outstanding cases in terms of humanitarian/human rights issues. Since the mid 1990s, severe food shortage has stricken North Korea. But, most agencies are faced with difficulties in doing their operations. For example, NGOs sometimes get little support from the public by lack of transparency. One reason is that concerned parties such as governments and human rights groups oppose unconditional aid to North Korea. Another reason is that North Korean government restricts NGOs' activity inside the country. Under these circumstances, this article attempts to address two questions. First, What are obstacles or dilemmas of NGOs on humanitarian/human rights issues to North Korea? And, second, how do NGOs try to overcome those dilemmas? In answering these questions, I outline the overview and current situation of North Korea's crisis from the viewpoints of NGOs. In relation to NGOs' efforts, I focus on social networks, which often transcend sectors and national borders. By looking at a framework of social networks, we may find how NGOs mobilize resources, and justify their activities. Moreover, we may observe the process of sharing values among different actors. To examine these hypotheses, two NGO networks are chosen as case studies. The first network is specialized on relief and development issues. The second one is mainly focused on human rights and/or refugee issues. In sum, through the cases on North Korea, this article attempts to examine the structural dilemmas of humanitarian actors, and to highlight the roles of NGO networks.
The paper aims at constructing a new regional concept: “Peripheral East Asia”, by grouping Okinawa, Taiwan and Hong Kong together for future developments of the East Asian Studies. The creation of the new concept is established on three characteristics noticeable amongst Okinawa, Taiwan and Hong Kong. To begin with, the three places were historically seen as peripheral areas in the traditional East Asian world order, according to the Huayi System (Huayi Zhixu) or Zhongyuan-Bianchui (center-periphery) consciousness since pre-modern eras. Secondly and more importantly, the three areas experienced “sovereignty change” including “returning to motherland” two to three times after entering modern times. Thirdly, identity problem becomes a grave concern in the relationship between the three areas with their old and new suzerain states particularly in recent years. The paramount issues focused on the identity crises in the “Peripheral East Asia” have been: the huge wave of “Taiwanese nationalism” against China, the appearance of the new “Hongkongese Identity” since the sovereignty handover in 1997, and the reinforcement of Okinawan identity against the mainland Japanese. Based on the three major characteristics of the “Peripheral East Asia”, the new regional concept can be summarized into the following keywords: “peripherality”, “sovereignty change” and “identity”. The notion of “sovereignty change” should be perceived as most important in the concept in comparison with other peripheral areas in the world. In addition, the definition of “sovereignty change” does not merely refer to the formal transition of territories between two or more sovereignty countries, but also includes all political, economic and cultural problems generated due to the “sovereignty change”, as well as the related identity issue on national integration in the “Peripheral East Asia”. Regarding my research on “Peripheral East Asia” up to now, I have been concentrating on the relationship between “sovereignty change” and the formation of identity in the' three areas. My argument is that the dynamism of identity politics with the phenomenon of “de-peripheralisation” in “Peripheral East Asia” occurs as a result of the clash between the centripetal force from the “center” and the centrifugal force from the “peripheries”. Furthermore, I believe that the centrifugal force issuing from the “Peripheral East Asia” against the “center”, their suzerain states or central governments, arises due to the repeating experiences of the “sovereignty change” in Okinawa, Taiwan, Hong Kong and even Macau since modern period. In the paper, I suggest, in place of a rather stable state system and world system built from the “top” following the logic of the “centers” or powerful countries in pre-modern and modern periods, it is about time to rethink the worth of establishing a new state system and world system from the “bottom”; the localities or “peripheries”-based regional orders in this globalization era.