国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2004 巻, 136 号
選択された号の論文の12件中1~12を表示しています
  • 国際政治研究の先端1
    古城 佳子
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 1-2
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 国際政治研究の先端1
    西連寺 大樹
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 3-17,L5
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Generally speaking, Japan's disarmament policy is twofold. The one is “heiwa kokka”, that is to say as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings Japan keeps the Three Non-Nuclear Principals (not to manufacture, possess, or allow the importation into Japan of nuclear weapons). The other is that Japan's security is dependent on American nuclear deterrent. But, it isn't evident that those factors affected Japan's policy on the nuclear test ban problem immediately after Japan became a member of the United Nations. The aim of this article is to describe the process of Japan's policy on the nuclear test ban problem. Firstly, this article examines how Japanese standpoints of “heiwa kokka” and security were in connection with Japan's policy on the nuclear test ban problem. Secondly, as a case study the policy process of the 12th and 14th General Assembly of United Nations is examined. Finally, this article briefly refers to Japanese attitude toward the partial nuclear test ban treaty.
    Because of an aversion to nuclear weapons in the aftermath of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Bikini incident, the Japanese had protested the nuclear tests of United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The Japanese government had also protested the nuclear tests of three nuclear powers. But it was not to promote nuclear disarmament but to prevent the Japanese people's feeling from changing anti-nuclear weapon into anti-western nations. That was the reality of “heiwa kokka”. Because the Japanese government had little realization that Japan had been exposed to the military threat of China and Soviet, the utility of American nuclear deterrent had not been discussed in Japan. For that reason the Japanese government could introduce the non-nuclear principals and carried out protest against three nuclear powers without taking account of Japan's security.
    At the 12th General Assembly of United Nations, the Japanese government proposed the draft resolution of suspension of nuclear tests. That was not to cope with public opinion but to seek higher status in international society from an independent position, because the Japanese government realized that the issue of nuclear weapons tests was increasing in significance for Japan's diplomacy. When the Japanese resolution was rejected, the attempt of the Japanese government to exercise leadership in the nuclear test ban problem came to an end.
    At the 14th General Assembly of United Nations, the Japanese government was in favor of both the resolution of Asia-Africa nations against French nuclear test and Indian resolution. It was because the Japanese Government was afraid of the risk of damaging the credibility of Japanese diplomacy caused by their retreating from their past anti-nuclear weapons tests stance, that they voted for the resolutions. In other words, it was a measure for consulting domestic and international opinion. From the same point of view, the Japanese government signed the partial nuclear test ban treaty.
  • 国際政治研究の先端1
    井手 康仁
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 18-32,L6
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Nowadays, foreign policy appears not only to be carried out by governments but also by civilian activists. Nishihara Masashi has developed a profound classification of unofficial contact-makers which includes civilian activists. Upon dividing unofficial contact-makers into the following three groups; (1) Official=unnanounced contact-makers, (2) Unofficial=unnanounced contact-makers, (3) Unofficial=pre-announced contact-makers, Nishihara highlights the limited role of the 3rd type contact makers, indicating that serious negotiations can only progress at unannounced negotiations. There is however a case in Japanese-Soviet relations which is not applicable to his conclusion.
    According to the Japanese history of civilian diplomacy with the Soviet Union, civilian activities carried out by either leftists or pro-Soviet activists had attracted much attention. Matsumae Shigeyoshi who Nishihara refers to as a type 3 activist, acted as the head of the Japan Cultural Association. The Japan Cultural Association was established in 1966 upon accepting the USSR's proposal, having the Japan Socialist Party play its central role. Since Matsumae was personally close to Ivan Kovalenko, the deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department, the Japanese-Soviet round table conference (Entaku-kaigi) was further established through their efforts in 1979. The round table conference was successful to a certain extent since the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs started attending the round table conference as an observer. The Japanese public, however, considered Matsumae's activities highly influenced by Socialist ideology. For this reason, Matsumae's activities didn't receive sufficient support to have made a significant influence within the country.
    Suetsugu Ichiro, on the other hand, also referred to as a type 3 contact-maker, is said to have had an enormous impact on Japanese-Soviet relations. Upon participating in various social movements, he established a lobbyist status, which was very rare in Japan then. The Soviet Ambassador in Japan suggested Suetsugu to partake in promoting academic exchange with Soviet scholars. Suetsugu thus took and realized this opportunity by bringing the Council of National Security lead by Suetsugu, and scholars from the USSR together, whereby establishing the Japanese-Soviet Joint Symposium.
    So why was Suetsugu, being a type 3 unofficial=pre-announced contactmaker able to act so effectively? In my opinion, one of the reasons was that Suetsugu had strong connections with Japanese political leaders. Another reason is that he was a well-known nationalist within the country. In this way, he was completely different from Matsumae and the other leftists and pro-Soviet activists. As a result, having established close relations with Soviet scholars who in time turned to play leading roles within the Soviet office during Gorbachev's rule, he maintained a trustworthy channel in the center of the Soviet regime. He had managed to act as an activist trusted both by Japanese and Soviet counterparts.
  • 国際政治研究の先端1
    柴田 茂紀
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 33-46,L7
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Japanese application for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) membership in 1952 was obstructed by two major factors: first, U. S. domestic policies, especially with regard to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), and second, opposition from other GATT contracting parties. The RTAA, which was the legal basis for US trade negotiations, faced strong opposition from the US legislature and could not be renewed to reduce tariffs in 1953. As a result, major trade negotiations were delayed for at least a year. Since the US was the main supporter for Japanese accession to the GATT, such delay would possibly lead to a significant postponement of Japan's formal accession to the GATT. This resulted in the establishment of Japan's “provisional” accession.
    In contrast to other studies which focus on US support for Japan's accession to the GATT and conversely opposition from other countries, this paper illustrates the gradual changes of other countries' attitudes toward Japan. This paper examines in particular the relationship between Japan and Canada. Until 1952, Canada evinced negative attitudes toward Japanese accession and refused to include Japan in the Most Favored Nation Treatment. Nevertheless, as negotiations between Japan and Canada continued, Canada began to favor Japan's accession in 1953. Thus, the Canada case illustrates how Japan won approval from other countries. This paper's main emphasis is on the change in Canada's policy and the significance of Canada's support for Japan's provisional accession to the GATT.
    There were three major factors that made Canada an important actor in international trade negotiations: the size of its economy in the world at that time; its political power (particularly in relation to the Commonwealth Countries); and its close relationship with the US. Thus, Canada played a significant role in Japan's accession to the GATT negotiations.
    Furthermore, Canada, which was the second largest trade country among the Commonwealth Countries, did not cooperate with the UK. These factors exerted a strong influence on Japan's accession in multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time, Canada managed to take advantages of its own position in both multilateral and bilateral negotiations. However, the bilateral conditions that Canada presented to Japan differed from other countries' conditions insofar as they were based on free trade perspective. The change in Canada's attitude illustrates a close relationship between bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations among international relations in that period.
  • 国際政治研究の先端1
    近藤 久洋
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 47-61,L8
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article analyses long-term transformation of government-chaebol relationships in South Korea. Since Park Chung-Hee in the 1960s, all presidents Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo, and Kim Young-Sam repeated cyclical transformation patterns of government-business relationships. Every president immediately after inauguration reinforced the legitimacy by initiating chaebol regulatory policies, which were along with anti-chaebol sentiments of people and economic necessities. Meanwhile, labour policies were liberalized. However, liberalized labour became extremely radical; it affected economic performance negatively. Moreover, as long as the Korean economy is largely based on chaebol, these chaebol reform measures required a certain pain of chaebol and ultimately led to worsening performance of the national economy at least for short-term. Since good economic performance, as well as strict chaebol reform, is one of the important sources of regime legitimacy, deteriorating economic performance negatively affected regime legitimacy and president popularity. Hence, while all regimes initiated chaebol regulations due to legitimacy, they also ironically returned to the conventional priority to economic growth due to legitimacy, too. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration certainly succeeded in reforming chaebol after regime changes, these cyclical patterns were also emerging.
  • 国際政治研究の先端1
    伊藤 融
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 62-78,L9
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this essay is to analyze the principle of India's foreign policy, mainly on security. In general, its policy has been illustrated in terms of idealism/realism paradigm. That is to say, Jawaharlal Nehru pursued idealistic policies such as Non-Alignment Movement, whereas Indira Gandhi changed India's policies into more realistic one's, whose lines A. B. Vajpayee also takes over. This essay challenges such dominant discourse and proposes alternative approaches to India's foreign policy.
    Firstly, most of the observers exclusively focus on the attitude of political leaders or the trend of the times without taking the different fields into account. Turning our attention to the difference of policy fields, we will easily find historical continuity and political consensus in India's foreign policy. Outside the region, India has consistently demanded the revision of global structure and regime. At the same time, inside the region, it has opposed to any change of the situation as its own superpower. In other words, it has adopted both ‘extraregional revisionism’ and ‘intraregional status quo’ as guides to foreign policy-making since its independence.
    Secondly, more importantly, idealism/realism discourse is devoid of the consideration of India's ‘nation-state’ itself which differs entirely from that of Western ideal type. Political leadership in India has never been able to take the unity of the ‘nation-state’ for granted because of its own diverse and plural society as well as the existence of cross-border ethno-religious identities. India's ruling elite has been exposed to the internal threat and has been obliged to counter it first of all. That is why its foreign policy has been worked out and carried out not only based on its geopolitical strategic interest but also constrained by the recognized vulnerability of ‘nation-state’. Successive Governments of India have endeavored to approximate to the ideal of ‘nation-state’ or at least prevent it from breaking up completely. It is this type of realism against the vulnerability of ‘nation-state’ recognized by every political leader that has affected the decision-making in India.
  • 国際政治研究の先端1
    小川 浩之
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 79-96,L10
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to examine how the Commonwealth has experienced enlargement and changes after the Second World War. In this attempt, particular attention is paid to South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961. The Government of the Union of South Africa under H. F. Verwoerd made an application to remain within the Commonwealth as a Republic, but eventually decided, or was virtually forced, to withdraw the application as a result of strong criticism against apartheid mainly from Afro-Asian member countries. Therefore, the Republic of South Africa was established on 31 May 1961 outside the Commonwealth. As increasing number of newly-independent states joined after 1947 (when both India and Pakistan became independent and then joined as new members), the Commonwealth which had been originally formulated by Britain and six ‘white’ Dominions was transformed into a multi-racial institution. The major character of the ‘old Commonwealth’ was that the member states maintained traditional ties among the peoples of British origin and did not regard each other as ‘foreign’, while, at the same time, the mutual recognition of internal and external autonomy was the central raison d'étre. However, as newly-independent non-white countries joined one after another and the norm of racial equality was strengthened, both the old intimacy and the conventional principle of mutual non-interference were increasingly faced with strong pressure.
    In those changes which the Commonwealth has experienced, the disputes about apartheid among the Commonwealth countries and the departure of South Africa marked a crucial turning point. Firstly, the departure of white-dominated South Africa clearly demonstrated that the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of member states was increasingly under pressure from the norm of racial equality. Secondly, the often uncontrollable and open rows over South Africa's racial policy symbolized the fact that the old intimacy had been largely curtailed as newly-independent members added ‘alien’ elements into the Commonwealth. Thirdly, the sequence of events culminated in South Africa's departure made some of the original members such as Britain and Australia feel increasingly discontent with the ‘new Commonwealth’ and therefore facilitated the centrifugal forces working in the Commonwealth relations. Britain's attempts to accede to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC) in the 1960s and the early 1970s were noticeable examples of the centrifugal tendencies. However, at the same time, the inter-Commonwealth disputes on racial issues such as South Africa's apartheid in 1960-61 and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Smith regime of Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) in the mid-1960s can also be considered as inevitable hurdles which the Commonwealth had to tackle in the process of becoming a truly multi-racial association.
  • 国際政治研究の先端1
    梅津 弘幸
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 97-116,L11
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the course of the Second World War, the contraction of British military power in the world was dramatically manifested. In the post-World War II period, Australia, with renewed emphasis on its emotional attachment to the mother country and with strong determination to sustain the capacity of the UK to maintain its position as a global power, embarked upon taking a larger share of the defense burden in the British Commonwealth orbit. In 1955, one culmination of Australia's endeavors to prevent the contraction of the sphere of British Commonwealth influence in the world, particularly Asia, came when the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, announced in early April that Australia would become an active partner of Britain and New Zealand in defending Malaya, and that Australian ground forces, together with more air and naval forces, would shortly be stationed in Malaya as part of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. The establishment of a Strategic Reserve signified that the defense of the Malaya archipelago was placed under a joint responsibility of the UK, Australia and New Zealand, and that the primary planning responsibility for the external defense of Malaya was transferred to Australia from Britain. The creation of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya originated at the end of 1952, when the British government made a proposal for the reactivation of the ANZAM arrangement and for focusing the arrangement more firmly upon the defense of British interests in Malaya, and was based on an agreement reached in October 1953 between British, Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff. This article examines why the UK government broached a proposal for the reactivation of ANZAM and for the creation of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya, and why Australia accepted the British proposal.
    This article argues the British proposal for the reactivation of ANZAM arose from a change in its strategic doctrine. The adoption by the UK government of the strategy of nuclear deterrence led the government to project the future reduction of its conventional forces available for overseas commitments and the consequent more reliance upon Commonwealth partners for the protection of British interests in Malaya. At the same time, the UK proposal for a reactivated ANZAM represented an attempt by the British government to reduce the value of the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) security treaty signed in early September 1951. It is also argued that Australia accepted the British proposal for having Commonwealth partners shoulder a heavier cold war burden in Malaya as a way of adjusting itself to the future diminution of the British military presence in Asia. As well, the Australian agreement to the British proposal for involving ANZAM more deeply in the defense of Malaya represented an attempt by the Pacific dominion to block Britain's further pressure for association with ANZUS and to preserve the vitality of the security treaty with the Americans.
  • A・ヴァルシュネイ著『エスニック紛争と公共生活-インドのヒンドゥー、ムスリム』
    小川 忠
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 117-127
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 防御的リアリズムとの比較から
    市原 麻衣子
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 128-144
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山本 信人
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 145-148
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 古城 佳子
    2004 年 2004 巻 136 号 p. 149
    発行日: 2004/03/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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