Hedley Bull proves that, although the nature of the international relations is essentially anarchy, sovereign states have the potential to construct an international order (society). Neo-realists like Bull and Kenneth Waltz suppose that the system of sovereign states forms an international order. But in the world today, the importance of state sovereignty is gradually being eroded. If this is the case, international order would also be undermined. Many academic fields such as those that discuss theories of international organizations, international politics and international law, have sought ‘order’ from their respective theoretical viewpoints. The following three points are common to each of these theories. First, they analyze not only sovereign states but also many other actors. Second, the role of a “norm” is seen as important for creating and developing an “order”. Third, in addition to the creation of public order through international organizations and international law, the respective theories have gradually started to look at the creation of order through “bottom-up publicness, ” which includes civil society, private corporations, trans-national networks and so on. In this volume of International Relations, global public order is considered from four different aspects. The first two articles (by Uchida and Hoshino) study the role of the UN from a perspective of global governance theory. Uchida emphasizes the role of the UN Secretariat. Hoshino proposes a sequence for establishing international peace restoration policy. The next two essays (by Yamada and Watanabe) consider the role of the “norm” in international relations. Yamada explores the possibility of complex governance through the transformation of a global public order from a theory of constructivism. Watanabe discusses the democratization of the legislative process of international organizations from the perspective of global governance. The following three essays (by Koizumi, Nishimura and Yokota) examine global problems which are beyond the realm of sovereign states, namely, refugees, minorities and the environment respectively. The last two papers (by Mori and Yamazaki) make their analyses from a perspective of “bottom-up publicness.” Mori goes after the concept of global order through civil society. Yamazaki proposes a model of a public sphere between an ‘Empire’ and the Westphalian order. In order to construct a theory for global public order, I would like to mention the following three points. First, the “anarchy” within global society should be positively understood. Anarchy allows for flexible, rather than rigid, order in global society. Many different kinds of actors can independently join together to form and develop global public order. Second, the construction of a theory of international politics from the viewpoint of “bottom-up publicness” is awaited. New theories of international politics examine not only sovereign states but also many different actors and aspects such as civil society, NGOs, private sectors, business corporations, individuals and so on. Third, there may well be a possibility of transferring the theory of sovereignty to the theory of global actors. In the global society, the sovereign state is the most important actor, but it is not necessarily an absolute entity. The sovereign state should be considered in relative terms with other actors such as international organizations, NGOs, nations, peoples and individuals. Under the theory of global actors, the power and accountability of individuals or bodies that are not independent states must also be studied in addition to that of sovereign states.
The prototype of the post-World War II order was formulated at the Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods conferences in the summer of 1944. The United Nations system has since occupied a central place in the international collaborative framework in peace and security as well as in development and environment. The accelerated process of globalization, however, in the wake of the end of the cold war, has increasingly eroded the existing “international” order and transformed the role of the states. Non-state actors such as civil society, NGOs, the private sector, and other social forces have appeared on the global arena, to supplement if not supplant, the states in the making of a new order. Against this historical backdrop, this essay purports to examine the possible role that can and should be played by the United Nations in constructing a humane and more equitable global order. After reviewing briefly the impacts of globalization and the concepts and theories of global governance, the essay focuses on the UN's role in various phases of global public policy making, starting from the identification of global issues, consensus-building on goals and principles, deliberations and decision-making, implementation, and review and evaluation. The UN's unique status that enjoys legitimacy as the sole general and universal organization has contributed to each of these phases. A difficult phase is that of deliberation and decision-making. The decision-making in the Security Council reflects quite directly the power configuration of the permanent members and by constitution is restricted to the issues of international peace and security. The General Assembly decision-making, on the other hand, mirrors the concerns of the majority of the developing countries. The consensus arrived at by the General Assembly serves as guidelines, though not legally binding, for world society to act as well as for the UN system. The implementation of the decision is possibly the most problematic phase in the global policy making since the bulk of its actual execution has to be done by the states. This is a crucial phase of providing the global public goods. In further elaborating this phase, the essay attempts to demonstrate the relevance of the concept of global public goods in the making of global public policy within the all-inclusive perspective of global governance. Through this exercise, we may build a manageable theoretical frame on the UN's role in the new global era. It finally addresses the role of the UN Secretariat in particular the leadership and initiative in mobilizing the resources through forming and developing partnerships with NGOs, business and regional organizations. Such efforts led by the Secretary-General augur the nature of a nascent new global order.
Peace is an elusive concept. But its absence results in the great loss of human lives and wellbeing. In this regard, the “maintenance of international peace and security, ” the primary objective that the United Nations Charter enshrines in its Chapter 1, Article 1, Section 1, is a fundamental public goods so that concrete public policy tools need to be devised in order to effect its maintenance. This article proposes to create a policy area of “international peace restoration” in the face of new and increasingly asymmetrical and abysmal threats and conflicts that have deprived people of peace. The peace restoration policy can operationally be defined as the set of policy instruments that international actors (governments, international organizations, civil society/NGOs etc.) take individually or collectively for the purpose of “restoring peace.” This policy area, once clearly identified, would provide a framework in which international actors can devise and bring together a package of operational activities, from direct responses to the threats to post-conflict reconstruction and consolidation of conditions for sustainable peace, in a seamless and effectively sequential fashion. This is a viewpoint to look at the individual policy tools in their totality, bringing together non-military and military responses on one hand and international and domestic efforts on the other. Quick overview is made to compare and contrast the past practices in international responses to the actual cases in Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor with a view to identify how the sequential efforts have been taken. What is found from this review is the fact that, though the policy tools have been employed in rather ad hoc basis than in a coordinated fashion. Thus more structured and strategic approaches seem to be required. As to the effectiveness of these policy tools, the article underlines the longterm significance of obtaining international “authority, ” in the form of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, as opposed to approaches that rely only on “power.” In this standpoint, the author stresses a need for political will of international actors to overcome their unilateralist imperatives that would cause “the crisis of multilateralism.” Finally, the paper argues that Japan has a lot to play in this field of peace restoration policy, especially from its recent “human security” and “peace consolidation” focuses and its inclination to respect multilateralism in pursuing collective goals.
The challenges of global governance in the contemporary world are becoming increasingly complex in that solutions to many global issues ranging from poverty alleviation to environmental protection require the reformulation of the relationships among many competing policy goals. To the extent that such a reformulation of policy goals requires a change in a global public order (GPO), what makes the transformation of a GPO possible? More importantly, what kind of social mechanism is at work in creating a new “common knowledge” which integrates a new policy goal into the previous one? Is the same mechanism in effect for the entire process of GPO transformation? These are precisely the questions that this paper purports to answer. In so doing, it draws on the growing theoretical literature of constructivism with particular emphasis on the process of “socialization.” While “socialization” is generally believed to have two distinct mechanisms, namely “social influence” and “social persuasion, ” this paper argues that it is the combination and sequencing of these mechanisms that holds the key to the transformation of the existing GPO. It hypothesizes that a GPO is transformed in three evolutionary stages; at the first stage, a challenge is posed by a network of NGOs to the existing GPO through social influence; at the second stage, a new, more comprehensive GPO is germinated by stakeholder representatives through social persuasion, and at the final stage, the new GPO becomes propagated to the critical stakeholders through the mechanism of “social elucidation, ” which is a variant of social influence. Moreover, the paper argues that a different set of organizations is either used or created at each stage of development. For instance, at the second stage, a small, but inclusive organization is created to promote social learning among stakeholders' representatives. This evolutionary logic is then illustrated through a case study, which empirically traces the process that led to the formation of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), and to the creation of the Dams and Development Project (DDP) within UNEP. The former set the guidelines for the construction of large dams, and the latter “reinterpreted” them within each national context. The paper concludes with theoretical implications, which point to the fallacy of searching for a single covering law in explaining actors' behavior, often found in rational-choice theories, the fallacy of prescribing only one “optimal” organizational design, and also the myth of international anarchy in the world, which is increasingly characterized by various nongovernmental networks of “complex governance.”
On the ground of the following two points, I would first like to confirm that governance on a world scale, so-called “global governance”, is already fulfilled to some extent. I would then like to consider some measures whereby the global ordering process can be promoted in the direction of international democratization. Firstly, we have to realize that “international organizations” which originated in the 19th century and were developed, in a sense miraculously, by mankind in the 20th century, do not function each in isolation but as a system of international organizations in its totality. Secondly, if one adopts a wider perspective, taking in to account theories of international relations in their broad sense rather than focusing merely on international organizations, it is possible to envisage, on the basis of inter-governmental networks, a three-dimensional network system in which international actors —such as international organizations, NGOs and other civil societies— interact and intermesh, forming the totality of the process of global governance. In this paper, the reason that I shall use the phrase “global order” is as follows: the phrase does not only mean order as a result of adjustment of realistic interests between States, but also includes value-orientation, such as democracy in the global society. In the main part of this paper, the following problems will be dealt with: Firstly, the significance of “the system of international organizations”: secondly, the raison d'être of the system of international organizations in global governance: thirdly, the function of the global ordering process fulfilled by the system of international organizations: and lastly, the direct participation of the representatives of a nation's people in the global ordering process conducted by the system of international organizations.
In the 1990's the main focus of the global refugee problem has moved to the issue of ‘re-integration’ of repatriated refugees and displaced persons in the transitional states from warfare to ‘peace’. The relation between refugee relief and development assistance has been discussed for a long time. The two activities overlap and influence each other. Finally, what assitance agencies thought was to link the two forms of assistance. The nature of this linkage is more adequately expressed as a continuum from initial responses of emergency relief for refugee survival to the longer range issues of area and national development assistance. The name of the collaboration of the UNHCR and the World Bank is called ‘Brookings Approach’. However, this approach apts to apply to the current war-prevalent situations substantially in terms of technical and administrative matters in the obscure distinction between ‘genuine post-conflict situations’ and ‘the situations of continuing conflict and violent rule’. The UNHCR strategy of re-integration is based on a ‘post-conflict’ concept which assumes a gradual transition from warfare to peace and a corresponding transition from relief to development assistance. In cases where the majority of refugees return to a situation of ongoing conflict, applying the post-conflict concept is confused by several assumptions. First, the concept as is currently applied does not sufficiently reflect the fragility of the most war-afflicted states and the characteristics of states with chronic conflict situations. Secondly, the use of that term often assumes that refugee-producing countries have legitimacies as states, and are able to carry out a reasonable number of their administrative and technical responsibilities in coordinating their development policies. The idea that the assistance process contributes to conflict prevention and its mitigation assumes that we have sufficient understanding of the dynamics of violence. However, the conflict-analysis tools are not yet equal to that task, and also do not clearly indicate the appropriate direction of humanitarian intervention. In states where chronic political emergencies exist, development assistance accomplishments are limited. Before international assistance agencies enter these states, they should distinguish, from among the primary assistance factors, both the ones causing conflict and the ones associated with outside assistance. Both groups of these factors contribute to social instability. Next, they must ascertain the possible practical programme goals while acknowledging their assistance limitations.
Aspirations for minority group rights are one of the most pressing issues facing the UN in the post cold war era. This article analyzes the issues of minority rights in relation to the current debate on how the international consensus on state sovereignty has changed. The main thrust of the UN position on minority issues is to balance the integrity of multi-ethnic states with the protection of minority rights. While the UN Charter lacks specific criteria on how to accommodate these conflicting demands, the member states have attempted to establish certain rules to resolve these conflicts. Questions concerning minority rights include whether or not states should protect not only individual human rights but also the group rights of minorities which have developed their own identities. I argue that during the early post-war period the UN was primarily concerned with the stability of nation states, and thus was negative on the group aspect of minority rights. It had taken sides with the existing states or assumed hands-off policies in various conflicts relating to the rights of minorities, such as in Katanga, Biafra, and Bangladesh. However, since the 1960's, minority group rights have gradually to be seen as legitimate issues in UN debates, and since they have come to the forefront of UN discussions. Although the member states acknowledged the danger involved in the recognition of a right to ethnic self-determination, they nevertheless have tried to place minority rights within the framework of conflict prevention and democratization of former authoritarian regimes. Efforts of the UN members on minority issues have been demonstrated in the UN Declaration on Minorities and the activities of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Apparently the UN has increasingly recognized that the protection of the group identities of minorities would prevent radical ethnopolitics. Thus, it is particularly important for the UN to develop mechanisms in which minority rights are protected in a democratic framework. The final section of this article briefly compares the UN mechanisms on minorities with the European system in which various regional organizations have developed multi-layered mechanisms for the protection of minorities. It shows that the UN still lacks effective and proactive mechanisms for the protections of minority rights. The article concludes, first, that the perceptions of state sovereignty among the UN member states have changed, as was shown in recent debate's on minority issues. Second, the UN needs to further develop the current pragmatic approach so that the group aspects of minority rights will be protected within the framework of the democratization of a state in order not to destabilize multi-ethnic states.
The purpose of this article is to examine the role of the United Nations System in assistance of the management of global environmental problems. To this end, this paper focuses on UNEP as a target of analysis. UNEP was created as the product of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm. As the first international organization dedicated to environment protection, UNEP has achieved some of its programs successfully, but due to rapidly expanding dimensions of international environmental issues and dramatic changes in international structure of sustainable development governance, it has not succeeded institutionally in keeping up with the pace of the changing issues. Given the current problems in the global order for sustainable development, and the shortcomings of UNEP as an effective leader in the international community, there is no escaping the need for some level of reform. Preparations for the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development have re-ignited a global interest in strengthening global sustainable development order. Central to this debate is the role of the United Nations System, and the creation of a new World Environment Organization (WEO). Beginning with an overview of global order for sustainable development, this paper first outlines the strength and challenges in the current UNEP structure. Secondly, how external an environment surrounding the organization threatens its international sustainable development order is discussed. Thirdly, this paper examines the reforming process of UNEP, especially International Environmental Governance (IEG) process. As a result of this case study, it is clear that, rather than advocating the unlikely creation of a new WEO, the modest reform with a strengthened UNEP at the center is the only practical way forward. In reality, the process of change will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary in nature and will be based on incremental steps rather than radical changes.
It has been argued that the growth in the number and influence of non-state actors on the international stage is fostering a restructuring of the international order. The adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines, and of the Roma Statute of the International Criminal Court, suggests that non-state actors are in a position to construct global norms in collaboration with like-minded states and international organizations. However, the increasingly large and intense protests against globalization over the last 15 years in Seattle, Washington DC, Prague, Genoa and Cancun show that there is mounting anger in some sections of civil society against the current international order based on the neo-liberal economic policies of international economic institutions (IEIs) such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. Diverse actors in civil society appear to be growing more anxious about the increasing disparity between the rich and the poor, and about the perception that the current policies of the international order are seriously damaging the global environment and civil security. Because the areas in which sovereign states exercise control are shrinking, it has come down to nonstate actors to promote the control of the currently under-regulated corporate globalization, and to propose an alternative global order. This article attempts to explore the reasons why civil society could play as an agent for constructing global order. First, the concept of civil society is examined in relation to international politics and the global market. Civil society is taken here to refer to a realm in which various nonstate actors —particularly NGOs and social movements— interact and seek to shape social order. Second, efforts by nonstate actors to democratize the UN system and the Ms are examined in relation to the case for reconstructing the global order. Such efforts to transform the current international political and market orders are analyzed. Third, the World Social Forum (WSF), held annually in opposition to the World Economic Forum, is examined as an emerging instrument of civil society that is searching for more effective ways of constructing the global order. In summary, it has become clear that the endeavors of civil society to transform the current international order based on social order are being conducted in the following four ways: by democratizing the UN system and the IEIs through institutionalizing the involvement of civil society; by exerting pressure on private companies to act as responsible corporate citizens; by more effectively linking the protest movements and lobbying of civil society; and by developing alternative policy measures based on social order in contrast with the prevailing neo-liberal economic globalization.
The modern world order has frequently been referred to as the Westphalian order, and has since been identified with the international order. This order, however, is now being challenged, and Post-Westphalian order appears to be emerging. The purpose of this paper is, first of all, to show that the world order in and of itself is severely contingent, and to discuss the possibilities and limits of public spheres in this world order. In the first section, I examine the perspective of ‘Empire’, as conceptualized by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, as one possible interpretation of the Post-Westphalian order. The concept of ‘Empire’ is compared and contrasted with the Westphalian order with the aim of making clear the concept of the ‘Empire’. If we compare the Westphalian order with ‘Empire’, the former can be characterized as (1) a system comprised of territorially demarcated sovereign states, (2) nation states, (3) the denial of universalism, and (4) wars between sovereign states as the only legitimate form of violence within this order. On the other hand, ‘Empire’ can be characterized as (1) a decentralized and de-territorialized system, (2) formed by ‘multitude’, (3) universalism (the denial of particularism), and (4) endless ‘global civil wars’ (a chains of intervention and ‘terrorism’). It is interesting to note that the differentiation of international politics and domestic politics collapses in ‘Empire’. As a result, the existing patterns of political confrontation —such as between sovereign states or between state and civil society— become irrelevant. In addition, from the viewpoint of ‘bio-power’ (in Michel Foucault's sense), Westphalian order can be characterized as (1) a disciplinary society and (2) governance through national integration, while ‘Empire’ can be defined as (1) society of control (the institutions of civil society are dissolved) and (2) governance without social integration. In the second section, I discuss ‘Empire’ in terms of public spheres. First, I challenge the concept of public spheres and discuss the dialectical relationship between openness (Öffentlichkeit, which is incommensurable) and commonality (res publica, which is commensurable) in them. Second, I attempt to compare the structures of public spheres based on the Westphalian order with those of ‘Empire’ by focusing on the arena and the role of agency in each public sphere. Third, I scrutinize how each order deals with ‘the Political’, as conceptualized by Carl Schmitt, in its own public sphere. I also explain the dynamism of the generation and decline (collapse) of each public sphere, referring to some examples of anti-globalization movements and events after September 11. In the third section, I analyze the possibilities and limits of each public sphere generated by each .order. In doing so, I criticize the Weltinnenpolitik model (endorsed by Jürgen Habermas), and replace it with the agonistic model of public spheres (advocated by Chantal Mouffe) with some reservations. In concluding, I propose a model of public spheres for the age in which we stand: that between ‘Empire’ and the Westphalian order.