When we consider, in the context of the great changes that have transpired in the international setting, Japan's diplomacy from the ‘opening of the country’ (kaikoku) at the end of the Tokugawa era (1600-1867) up to the present day, we can in broad terms distinguish four periods. The first is the interval from the last days of the Tokugawa era and the ensuing Meiji Restoration up to the First World War. The second is the years between the end of the First World War and Japan's defeat in the Second World War. The third is the period of the Cold War (centering around US-USSR rivalries) which followed the Second World War. And the fourth is our contemporary era of continuing fluidity in the international order that has accompanied the breakdown of the former ‘Cold War structure.’
During each of the four periods so delineated, what are the sorts of ‘international perceptions’ and what are the sorts of ideational schemes or frameworks of ‘international order’ in accord with which Japan's diplomacy took shape and developed? Particularly, in the course of the large changes in the international environment in which Japan has found itself, how has Japan looked at ‘the world’ and at ‘Asia’? And how has Japan positioned itself, so to speak, in the world and in Asia, and how has Japan conceptualized the respective roles that it ought to play vis-à-vis these wider geographical domains? Then, too, what sorts of interrelationships have been presupposed between ‘Asia’ and the larger world? And is it not likely that today (and also in the past) these very sorts of queries point, as part of their raison d'être, to a strongly felt need to see them recognized as important by the peoples of other countries?
And perhaps naturally enough the posing of such queries must be expected to encompass questions about ‘what, properly speaking, is Japan?’ Therefore such inquiries can and should bring into sharper focus Japan's self-drawn images of itself together with other aspects of ‘national identity’.
The greater the changes which take place in the ‘international order’, the more worthwhile it is to give attention to what might be called the ‘capacities for framework-building’ which Japan's diplomacy has exercised under the influence of its changing international perceptions. We should ask, then, during each of the periods outlined, how have those entrusted with the practice of diplomacy, and also others with a significant interest in foreign relations, formed their ideas concerning ‘national interests’ and tempered the intellectual frameworks in which they have regarded them.
This collection of papers was compiled bearing in mind these sorts of questions and the above-outlined periodization for the study of Japanese diplomacy. In the present volume, due to space constraints we limit our purview to the period up to the end of the Second World War. Succinctly stated, the main purpose of this volume is to carry out a historically oriented inquiry into the ‘framework-building capacities’ of Japan's diplomacy during the historical periods discussed.

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This paper will examine Russo-Japanese diplomacy in the late 18th and the mid 19th centuries in order to understand the Japanese view of international order before being assimilated into the western international order.
As the Russians were approaching Ezo, now the northern islands of Japan, the Japanese recognised that Russia might capture Ezo and insisted on protecting it, whether the method was by trade with Russia or naval defence. Russia was an object to be examined as a counterpart, not an inferior barbarian under hierarchy in ‘the Chinese World Order.’ Matsudaira Sadanobu, the chancellor in 1787-93, regarded foreign countries as equal to Japan, and maintained that idea in order to understand them as potential enemies against Japan. When Russian envoy Laxman arrived at Ezo in 1792, Sadanobu dealt with his demand for direct communication to Edo and commerce, according to “politeness and rules”, at the same time leading him to Nagasaki, which could avoid a Russian intrigue against Japan, and preparing the defence. Sadanobu paid attention to the potential threat posed by Russia and other states, coping with that threat by satisfying them and rejecting them according to law, as a means both practical and moral. In the Japanese view of international order, hierarchy was not a basis in the sense that Japan ruled the surrounding order. Rather nations were equal and tended to expand without moral constraints. In Sadanobu's case, the common language was politeness and rules, and the Chinese order and Western order were also recognised as separate international systems in the same world. In this sense, the Japanese view of international order was already “modernised” in advance of intense interactions with the West, and also had developed as a unique one of the Japanese origin.
Reflecting the appearance of western ships and the Opium War, the Japanese recognised that the Western threat was strong enough to assimilate China and Japan. This threat intensified the emphasis on competitive aspects of the Japanese view of international order, thus splitting sharply arguments for trade and those for exclusion. Even in views of Jo-i exclusionists, the international order consisted not of hierarchy with Japan on the top, but of warring equal states. Kawaji Toshiakira, negotiating the border with the Russian envoy Putiatin in 1853, also regarded European states as equal enemies to be studied in order to oppose. In his view of international order, though the evil intentions of European states were emphasised in comparison with the views in the 18th century, the “modernised” aspects such as equality among nations and rational thinking without moral restraints were inherited.

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During the Sino-Japanese negotiations of the mid-nineteenth century, from the Shanghai voyage of the official ship Senzai-maru in 1862 to the treaty conclusion in 1871, one of the first problems was understanding the past and future conditions of the East Asian world order.
At first, Japan wanted China to allow Japanese merchants to go and trade there, in the same way as Chinese merchants had been able to come and trade in Japan since the “national isolation” period. However, in addition, China had to argue about whether or not they should treat an Eastern country like Japan like a Western non-treaty country. Although there were also opinions such as in Japan, that they wanted to exclude the Western monopoly for commerce and, that in China, they should be more flexible toward neighboring Japan, their talks did not advance.
But in Japan, people like Nagura Nobuatsu continued groping for the possibility of Sino-Japanese strategic cooperation, and this agreed with Iwakura Tomomi's idea of national strategy. On the other hand, in China, people like Li Hung-Chang continued to think about a strategic dynamism between China, Japan and the West. In the 1869-70 argument in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, Nagura aggressively claimed that Japan must promote “tsüshin” (a traditional communication, which needed no new treaty) relation with China. He was opposed to the prudent opinion that Japan needed to create a Western-style treaty with China so as not to arouse Western suspicion. Under his initiative, preliminary negotiations regarding diplomaticrelations with China were accepted. It was also significant that when China had changed her attitude, Li Hung-Chang refuted objectors pointing out that Japan had not been a tributary state. He advocated a plan to bind Japan and contain the West.
The Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty of 1871 was almost unchanged from the original China draft. It also lacked a (one-sided or bilateral) most favored nation clause, and it was not only the second article that caused Western powers to become suspicious of the Sino-Japanese alliance and press for the prevention of a ratification. It was symbolic that the Chinese word “tiaogui” was used and not “tiaoyue” (the usual translation of the word “treaty”). From the beginning, the treaty was planned as special. A most important point was that China had deleted the sovereign names of both countries so that they did not stand on an equal footing. Also, in the latter part of the first article, China aimed to restrain the Japanese regarding the Korean Peninsula, but they hid the Chinese meaning of the words in the treaty. The Japanese will to build an even relationship with China as a traditional communication or a treaty was suppressed.

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Were they harmonious with each other, treaty revisions by Munemitu Mutsu and the Sino-Japanese War? This article tried to examine this problem.
Shigenobu Okuma (1888-89 in office), one of the minister for foreign affairs in this period, has been thought as a political rival against Okuma's predecessor Kaoru Inoue and the succeeding prime minister Hirobumi Ito. But, when you investigate their own personal histories, the planning process for the Okuma's negotiation, and the character of the negotiating strategy after Okuma retired, it will be apparent that they three politicians —“Kaimei-Ha” or an enlightenment party— had much common points. They thought that treaty revisions, especially the recovery of tariff autonomy, should take first priority, and that an advance to East Asia should be restrained with all their might.
Then, why Okuma failed and the cooperation of them three ceased? The reason was that there were some middle-management bureaucrats who were hostile to the common thought of the three politicians. They were active behind the scenes, agitated “the public opinions”, and tried to tear Kaimei-Ha into pieces to prevent the treaty revisions. The typical example was Kowashi Inoue. And as a result, Mutsu the minister for foreign affairs, who were forced to begin the negotiations under insufficient condition, was heavily criticized by “Taigai-Ko-Ha” or hard-liners for foreign affairs. And finally he decided to enter the war. Kaimei-Ha was in power almost throughout in this period because they have the clearest foresight, but small number of them made themselves powerless against internal betrayal or terrorism. So they could not yield sufficient success.

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This paper presents an elucidation of the real role played by foreign policy concepts such as “international cooperation, ” “foreign interference in domestic affairs” and “Asianism” during the second Okuma Cabinet, by examining the antagonisms surrounding the foreign policy of the ruling party during the Okuma Cabinet, or, more concretely, the antagonisms between its elder statesmen, Takaaki Kato, Yukio Ozaki and other party leaders.
The outbreak of the First World War gave Japan an opportunity to wield a free hand in diplomacy (except toward the USA), which had thereto been conducted within the framework of an Asian diplomacy designed to function in coordination with (or subordination to) the European and American powers. Under such circumstances, a conflict arose within Japan regarding the choice between two diplomatic policies: cooperation with the world powers or partnership with China.
The antagonism arose over the priority of the two policies. Takaaki Kato pushed for prioritizing the first, while Aritomo Yamagata, Kaoru Inoue and Shimpei Goto promoted the latter. Meanwhile, party politicians (antimain-stream faction) of the ruling party of the second Okuma Cabinet adopted a nationalistic attitude: they criticized the diplomatic approach of Kato as too adulatory of Great Britain, and attached great importance to the relations with Asia, calling for an independent diplomacy.
This criticism had something in common with the criticism leveled at Kato's diplomacy by the elder statesmen, and immediately after Japan's entry into the war, a united front was formed against Kato. However, their wish to open a partnership with China was incompatible with the wishes of the elder statesmen who supported China's Yuan administration. After the reorganization of the Okuma Cabinet, the influence of Kato weakened temporarily. Once the party politicians took leadership and anti-Yuan policy came to be carried out, the united front collapsed, and Yamagata and Goto confronted the cabinet on the matter of which political force in China Japan should cooperate with.
As just described, in the period of the second Okuma Cabinet, various mutually inconsistent foreign policies were carried out, and it is difficult to find any single diplomatic concept underlying them all. Such inconsistency occurred because Takaaki Kato, the President, had not yet established sufficient leadership to gain complete control of the party, while Rikken-doshikai (meaning “Constitutional Comrades' Society”), Chuseikai (meaning “Neutral Justice Society”), etc., which had formed the ruling party supporting the cabinet, had adopted motley foreign policies. And if any mention is necessary in connection with the period thereafter, the foreign policy of Kato consisted basically of cooperation with Great Britain and nonintervention in the internal affairs of China, and these lines were criticized as weak-kneed diplomacy, too adulatory of Great Britain.

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This article aims to analyze KATO Takaaki's diplomatic vision in connection with his political leadership. As is well known, KATO took the initiative as foreign minister when Japan entered World War I and submitted the Twenty-One Demands, and tried to actively expand Japanese interests in China. But after World War I, he accepted the results of the Washington Conference and as a prime minister promoted a moderate diplomacy, the so-called “Shidehara Diplomacy”. What vision had KATO had in this period? How did he or did he not change his vision? I will attempt to answer this question, which has thus far not been clearly answered.
KATO regretted his poor dealings with the controversial negotiations of the Twenty-One Demands. However, he tried to convince himself that he hadn't failed in the Twenty-One Demands securing Japanese interests in Manchuria and Shandong, and he continued to make an excuse even after the end of the Washington Conference. He also insisted that the return of Shandong to China should be done only in accordance with the Twenty-One Demands Treaty and Japan should make no concessions at all to China at the Washington Conference. Kato's attitude led the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party to a hard line on the matter of the Twenty-One Demands, as well as attacking the government. Elder Statesman Saionji Kinmochi was worried about this, so KATO was not appointed as prime minister and the Kenseikai party was kept away from government for a long time.
On the other hand, at the same time, KATO continued to try to make the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party more moderate. KATO's excuse for the Twenty-One Demands gradually toned down. He expressed his sympathy for Wilsonianism and the new trend in diplomacy after World War I. He was strongly opposed to the intervention in Siberia and China carried out by the Terauchi Cabinet, so he controlled the hard-liners on these matters within the Kenseikai party and refrained from making partisan attacks toward the HARA Cabinet with which he shared a fundamental diplomatic vision.
It was at about the end of 1923 that KATO stopped clinging to his excuse about the Twenty-One Demands and made the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party more moderate and coherent. He decided to do this because he had realized his excuse was too emotional and nonsensical. Also, Saionji's anxiety was preventing the Kenseikai party from returning to government. This change of diplomatic policy was the foundation of the Shidehara diplomacy in the KATO Cabinet. I conclude that although KATO's clinging to the excuse for the Twenty-One Demands was a manifest failure, his effort to make the diplomatic policy of Kenseikai party moderate should be duly evaluated.

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The most prominent champion of internationalism in prewar Japan was Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro, who led Japanese diplomacy from the mid 1920s to the early 1930s. However, Shidehara's policy, while based on international cooperation, was sometimes inclined toward unilateralism. How can we explain this contradiction?
In order to answer this question, this paper analyzes Shidehara's perception of Japan's position in the world, particularly in East Asia, where Japanese foreign policy was mainly pursued. This paper focuses on the period during and after World War I. For this was an important formative period for Shidehara's policy of international cooperation: It was a time when Japan faced radical changes within its diplomatic circumstances and eventually began to pursue a policy of international cooperation, which became predominant in the 1920s. It was also a time when Shidehara, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1915-19 and then Ambassador to the United States until 1922, played an increasingly important role in leading Japanese diplomacy, thus establishing himself as leader of the new policy of internationalism.
The main idea of this paper is that Shidehara had a strong conviction that Japan was in a special position in East Asia. During World War I, Shidehara pursued a policy of demanding from the Great Powers recognition of Japan's superior position in China. The underlying assumption of this policy was that Japan, unlike other powers, had vital interests in Chinese affairs, and Shidehara began not to doubt that assumption. After the war, Shidehara fairly successfully adapted himself to the worldwide trend toward international cooperation, abandoning the imperialistic policy of the past. He played a pivotal role in the rapprochement between the United States and Japan as one of the delegates at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. Shidehara, however, continued to hold the belief concerning Japan's special position in East Asia, which he declared at that very conference.
Shidehara himself believed that the perception of Japan's special position in East Asia was compatible with the policy of international cooperation. Yet in reality the former would turn out to be an important constraint on the latter. Shidehara's perception of Japan's position in East Asia noted in this paper also meant putting a limit on internationalism in prewar Japan.

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In the introduction to his monologues, the Shôwa emperor suggested that the remote cause of the “Greater East Asia War” was racial discrimination in the wake of the First World War. But connecting the “humiliation” of the rejection of the Japanese proposal for racial equality at Versailles and American government's Japanese Exclusion Act in 1924 with the invasion of Kota Bahru on the Malay Peninsula and the attack on Pearl Harbor nearly two decades later requires a huge ahistorical leap. Why did an illogical and sensational ideology that proclaimed a “holy war” against the “devilish Americans and British” gain ascendancy in 1930s Japan? The purpose of this essay is to concretely analyze the influence of pan-Asianism, the communal mentality that began to pervade Japan during the interwar period. These sentiments, as embodied in the words “atmosphere” (kûki) and “feeling” (kibun) are essential in understanding Japanese politics and foreign relations of this time.
This paper focuses specifically on institutions that contributed to a global collision of culture, religion, and commercial interests. It considers the Great East Asia Society, which, led by General Matsui Iwane, became a huge non-governmental network. It also examines religious alliances as represented by Buddhism and business groups, which sought to increase the commercial competitiveness of enterprises such as light industry. I argue that pan-Asianism became a political movement that provided the momentum for the creation of new political institutions that threatened existing political parties and provided a platform for national political organizations that pushed for political equality and participation within and beyond Japan. Furthermore, this essay looks at the activities of Taiwanese, Chinese, and Indian merchants who operated on the peripheries of the Chinese, British, and Japanese empires and contributed to the global reorganization of economic relations in the aftermath of the world depression.
How did these elements contribute to the “Greater East Asia War”? This essay describes the gradual transformation and growth of pan-Asianism by considering three events related to the rise of pan-Asianism. The first two were meetings of the All Asian Race Conference, first at Nagasaki in 1926, which took place after the implementation of the Japanese Exclusion Act in the United States, and then at Dairen in 1934, which followed Japan's creation of the Manchurian puppet-state and the Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. The third incident was an anti-British demonstration at Kobe in 1939 that occurred during Japan's embargo against British and French concessions at Tientsin. In short, this paper argues that pan-Asianism helped lead Japan to the “Greater East Asia War.”

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In a Japan that was becoming increasingly isolated as a result of the Manchurian Incident and its withdrawal from the League of Nations, two noteworthy positions were unfolding, with the goal of seeking a new diplomacy in the mid-1930s. These consisted of the “argument of colonial readjustment”, which was directed at the global community, and the “controversy concerning the propriety of unifying China”, which was directed at China.
The “argument of colonial readjustment” reflected the state of global politics at a time when Germany had rearmed itself and occupied the Rhineland while Italy had invaded Ethiopia, and was primarily advocated by the likes of E. House and other politicians and intellectuals in have-nations. This was later submitted by S. Hoare, the British foreign minister, to the League of Nations in 1936 and translated into reality through the establishment of the League of Nations' Committee for the Study of the Problem of Raw Materials in 1937.
Thus, this thesis aims to identify the unique elements of the Japanese position relative to those of the West by sifting through the “argument of colonial readjustment” as it had been embraced in the West and analyzing the given position as it had taken root in Japan, where the influence of the argument had been felt. In this connection, the Japanese position was distinct from the positions of Germany and Italy, as well as those of various other western countries, in that the fundamental rule of freedom of commerce was maintained, a new world order was pursued, and the principle behind independence from colonialism was respected. Advocates who had taken up this position in Japan included Fumimaro Konoe, Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Masamichi Royama, and Tadao Yanaihara.
The fact that Japan sought various breakthroughs after withdrawing from the League of Nations has been revealed in recent research findings. This research also takes that position and will analysis the contents of the reconfiguration of the international order according to the “argument of colonial readjustment”.

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In the midst of the Pacific War, SHINOBU Junpei, international lawyer and diplomatic historian, provided a bold speech at the general assembly of the Japan Association of International Law. Reflecting his experiences in studying and teaching international law of war for more than thirty years, Shinobu cautioned the audience about the rapid decline of obedience to international law after the Sino-Japanese War amongst Japanese. Although making the least reservation for fear of censorship during the wartime, Shinobu undeniably had presented his keen anxiety about the decreasing effectiveness of international law of war as restrainer to the total war. Did practices and norms of the classical diplomacy including international law of war remain relevant to international order during the interwar years? If they still had relevance, how could they be applied to Japanese diplomacy in the different situation from the pre-W. W. I era? This article intends to shed lights on the ambivalent attitude of Japanese intellectuals toward international order during the interwar years who had still believed in the classical diplomacy even after W. W. I with special reference to the case of Shinobu Junpei.
In the historiography of Japanese studies of international politics, Shinobu is known for his pioneering works, “International Politics” published in the mid-1920's. Investigating those works, the first chapter analyzes how Shinobu perceived the trend of the “New Diplomacy.” While skeptical about the Wilsonian idealism, Shinobu regarded the “democratization of diplomacy” as the trend of “national diplomacy” which had increasingly gained currency in Japan after the Russo-Japanese War. In this sense, like H. Nicolson's classical work on diplomacy, Shinobu's works tried to tame the “New Diplomacy.”
Given those perceptions, Shinobu had published a series of essays arguing how Japanese foreign policies were and should be. The second chapter therefore tries to delineate Shinobu's diagnosis of Japanese foreign policies around the Manchurian Incident and evaluate the significance and limits of his legalist approach toward the Manchurian problems with comparison to the cases of ROYAMA Masamichi and KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu, younger political scientists emerging after W. W. I.
The third chapter surveys the trend of Japanese studies on international law of war after the Manchurian Incident. Shinobu's persistence in international law of war will be discussed here with comparison to the case of TAOKA Ryoichi who had shared the realist sentiments to international politics in the 1930's. Finally, on the basis of the post-W. W. II recollections, this article depicts how Shinobu viewed the Pacific War manly focusing on his understanding of the relationship between the Renunciation of War Treaty and the Pacific War.

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