国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2005 巻, 141 号
選択された号の論文の15件中1~15を表示しています
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    松永 泰行
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 1-9,L5
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This issue, comprising of eight research articles and one review article, is focused on “the Middle East in International Relations” and comes in the midst of another structural change in the international environment of the Middle East. The previous change resulted from the collapse of the Cold War structure on the global level. Although the change affected globally, the Middle East was one of the first to experience its impact through the way the transregional actors reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The current structural change, however, is more specific to the region and relates to the latter's relationship with the only remaining superpower, the United States. This time, the change followed the 9/11 attack, which is said to have forced the U. S. policy-makers to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between the U. S. and the Middle Eastern states and societies. How this change in international relations will affect the Middle East as a whole and a multitude of state and subnational actors in the region remains to be seen. Yet the transformative processes apparently have already been under way.
    The articles assembled here differ from one another in their perspective on the Middle East. Some examine recent developments; others focus on historical relations. For the purpose of this introduction, three different perspectives can be identified.
    The first perspective concerns the relations between the only superpower and actors in the Middle East. The United States, as a transregional actor, stands out in its resources and capacity and is capable of entering into relations with a host of state and subnational actors in the region. Sakai's article adopts this perspective and examines the mutually collaborative relationships between the U. S. Government and a number of anti-Hussein Iraqi groups before and after the U. S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
    The second perspective concerns some types of intra-regional dynamics and developments. Tateyama examines the post-Oslo Accord Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Matsumoto assesses the state of democratization in the region by comparing the party systems in ten Arab states. Yamamoto examines nine Arab states in terms of their policies on controlling internet connections. Kashima's review article examines four theoretically-informed monographs on regional intra-state relations.
    The third perspective concerns the Middle East as a foreign policy issue. Three articles by Hanzawa, Takayasu, and Okuda, examine British foreign policy historically during separate time periods. All, however, focus on England's dealings with another foreign power of the time on the matters relating to the greater Middle East.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    酒井 啓子
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 10-24,L6
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Iraq War was a typical case of military intervention aimed at bringing about a regime change in a hostile state. The Bush administration had regarded Saddam's regime in Iraq as a threat to US security since 2001 and decided to bring about a regime change by force in 2003, with the collaboration of Iraqis expatriates. The US was neither the first nor the only foreign power to be invited to intervene in Iraqi domestic political rivalry. Opposition groups such as the Islamists and Arab Nationalists who had been sponsored in Iran and Syria, had a long history of making use of their host states' desire to interfere in Iraqi domestic politics. In contrast, the US administration after the Gulf War, was reluctant to recruit from existing Iraqi opposition groups in Iraq as agents of intervention; instead the US explored new sources of collaborators from independent Iraqis in exile, such as Ahmad al-Chalabi of the INC.
    After the INC failed to unite the whole opposition movement abroad, the Bush administration renewed its efforts to support Iraqi opposition groups by passing the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998. On the basis of provisions set out in this Act, the US started to openly finance Iraqi opposition groups including the SCIRI-hardline Islamists hosted by Iran since 1982. It was clear that the SCIRI and other political opposition groups with a domestic power base played a more crucial role inside Iraq in putting pressure on the regime, than the expatriates groups which had no power base in Iraq. Rivalry between expatriate and domestic-based Islamists intensified when the Pentagon simply decided to make al-Chalabi the post-War Iraqi leader, abandoning the idea of setting up a government-in-exile in preparation for the post-Saddam era. SCIRI and other Islamists in exile, such as the al-Da'wa Party overtly criticised the US military occupation, and reestablished their power bases by means of their religious networks in Iraq. They also had to compete for popular support with the indigenous Islamic movements led by Muqtada al-Sadr and the followers of Ali al-Sistani.
    In due course the SCIRI and al-Da'wa started to split from other pro-US political groups when they took part in the first election for the National Assembly in 2005. They broke with the post-war strategy planned by the US by forming a Shiite coalition under the auspices of al-Sistani. For them the US military intervention was nothing more than a tool to topple Saddam's regime, and it was they who had accomplished the final stages of regime change-not as the US had intended but in a way consistent with their own political aims.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    立山 良司
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 25-39,L7
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since autumn of 2000 the circle of violence has derailed the Israel-Palestinian peace process. In order to prevent the resurgence of violence both parties had tried to promote security cooperation and form an effective security regime between them, but failed to do so.
    It is reported that since 1988 till 1998 thirty-eight formal peace accords were signed, and of them thirty-one failed to last more than three years. Various factors, such as security dilemma, existence of spoilers, and intervention by external parties, cripple the implementation of the peace accords, including the Oslo peace agreement. In addition, the asymmetrical relations between Israel and Palestinians have heavily affected the peace process and resulted in its failure.
    One of the most salient asymmetrical relations is the difference in the nature of both parties. Israel is an independent sovereign state with very powerful armed forces, and has occupied The west Bank and the Gaza Strip. As such, Israel uses its armed forces under the name of invoking the right of self-defense, and has an almost excusive power to determine a future of the occupied territories. On the other hand, despite the establishment of their own self government, Palestinians are still under occupation and struggling for establishing an independent sovereign state. The asymmetrical future also results in a very wide gap between both parties' perceptions of peace. From Israeli viewpoint, a peace should bring an end of any form of violence and eliminate the threat of military and terrorist attacks. For Palestinians, a peace should realize both an end of occupation and an establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Furthermore over the peace process both parties, i. e. the Israeli Government and the Palestine Authority/PLO, have taken even conciliatory attitudes and policies toward spoilers in their own constituencies with the intention to broaden their power basis.
    A number of proposals and suggestions for a military intervention by a third party have been made, but no international presence in the occupied territories has been materialized. Taking into consideration the asymmetrical characteristics between the two parities, however, an international presence could make valuable contributions to restoring a peace process in the following two aspects. First, an international presence could ease to a certain extent an asymmetrical feature of the relations and reduce the feeling of vulnerability on both sides. And by doing so, an international presence could narrow the gap of perceptions concerning peace. Second Israel and Palestine are no exception that political leaders manipulate security concerns to solidify their positions and extract additional resources from their society and consequently they create and intensify the security dilemma. The introduction of an international presence could decrease the possibility of this kind of manipulations.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    末近 浩太
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 40-55,L8
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aims of this paper are (1) to analyze Syria's foreign-policy strategy, particularly towards its neighboring states, Lebanon and Israel, and (2) to discuss significance of this strategy for the international political arena with reference to Syria's relations with the United States.
    Syria has been ruled by the Ba'th party for decades, which calls for Arab unity based on the idea of Arab nationalism (Pan-Arabism). However, Syria's foreign policy should not be exclusively dealt with in the context of “Arabism” (either Hafiz/Bashshar al-Asad's pragmatism), but with in that of Greater Syria as a region still undergoing various and competing attempts at state-building, which include, for instance, Arab nationalism, Phoenicianism, and Zionism. This drive towards state-building is traced back to the time of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire when the present nation states (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine/Israel) were created as a result of the geographical division of Greater Syria by Britain and France. As a result, one can say that these nation states are not constructed with a “hard-shell” and their political and territorial frameworks as a nation-state are perceived as “provisional, ” at least at the ideology level, by most of the political forces active throughout the region.
    The Ba'thist regime has often given priority to Greater Syria in its foreignpolicy and has utilized the ongoing political liquidity of the region in order to control the post-civil-war Lebanon and to gain an advantage over Israel in the peace talks. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Syria has tried to strengthen its cross-border relationship with non-state actors, the radical Islamic movements and organizations in Lebanon and Palestine, such as Hizb Allah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad Movement. By vitalizing their militant activities through financial and logistical support to them, Syria attempts to keep the given political situation in Lebanon and Palestine/Israel unstable with the aim of holding hegemony over the two countries and reproducing the cause and legitimacy of Syria's Pan-Arab and hard-line policy towards them.
    The United States, soon after the “end” of the 2003 Iraq war, began to intensify its criticisms of Syria's foreign policy and apply pressure on the Ba'thist regime to modify it according to the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 (2004). By so doing, George W. Bush's Republican administration seems to try to bring an end to the political liquidity of Greater Syria and to rearrange its political order, essentially based on the principle of Israel's security. Accordingly, Syria-US relations should not been regarded as mere bilateral relations, but as a competition over the question of “how Greater Syria politically ought to be.” However, the Bush Administration has not so far implemented an iron-fist policy with military power towards Syria because high-level diplomatic relation are established between the two countries. This relatively “calm rivalry” over Greater Syria between Syria and the US is one of the major components that has created the present regional order.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    松本 弘
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 56-71,L10
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    We are paying attention to the Democratization in the Middle East because of so-called “Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative” taken by the G-8 Summit in 2004. This initiative, in turn, reflects the latest round of pressure on the Middle Eastern countries generated by measures such as the EU Barcelona Process, the UNDP Arab Human Development Reports and the US-Middle East Partnership Initiative. However the different target countries on the basis of their unique geographical situations and capabilities are demonstrating differential limits to the pressure. Furthermore, it is very difficult for us to generalize the political dynamics of the Middle East because of its heterogeneity. Therefore, initially, we need to devise a basic framework to get a clear picture of the common features and problems of politics in the region. This framework would be useful to study the pressure for democratization as well as democratization itself.
    Concerning the evaluations for the democratization in the region, the Freedom House and Polity IV Project give very negative scores to the Arab countries. Studies conducted on the region in general point out the political instability of political Islam and an inherent structural problem of the region to perpetuate the existing power structure. At the same time, the country-specific case studies show better results on the social and political aspects and consequences of the democratization. There is a large gap between the studies on the Middle East as a part of worldwide democratization and the studies on each country in the region. This gap also indicates the lack of a basic framework to study and evaluate the democratization in the Middle East.
    In this paper, I attempt to show a tentative framework through the theory of party systems by Giovanni Sartori. The governmental parties of Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria and Iraq are the dominant parties. Independent politicians who support the monarchy in Jordan and the rural leaders in Lebanon are playing the roles of governmental political parties. Thus, it is impossible to analyze their party systems here. Applying the theory of Sartori, I analyze on the political system of each country on the basis of its election and other political variables. On the basis of such an analysis, I classify the party system in Syria into “one party pragmatic, ” ones in Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia into “ideological-hegemonic party, ” ones in Yemen, Algeria and Iraq into “predominant-party systems” and one of Morocco into “polarized pluralism.” It is interesting that all states with “one party” and “hegemonic party” except Sudan prohibit the Islamic parties and all states with “predominant-party” and “pluralism” approved those.
    This framework is different from the studies and evaluations of the past. Although there must be objections and criticism, I hope this paper may give a basic plan for further discussion.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    半澤 朝彦
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 72-85,L11
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    One of the remarkable features of contemporary great power hegemony is the existence of global networks of strategic bases for naval and air forces. In the Middle East, where Britain had built up an elaborate informal empire during the interwar period, the United States assumed its predominant position by stages. It is usually the 1950s and after, however, that most scholarship explores presumably because it seems, at its surface, the United States only began to intervene into the region after the 1950s (e. g. Iranian Crisis of 1951-3). Moreover, the conventional literature is concerned more with the activities of the United States concerning the Cold War, rather than the question of how United States leadership evolved out of the debris of the European empires, especially the British Empire.
    This paper explores how Anglo-American hegemonic change took place in the Middle East during the crucial years between 1945 and 1947. It focuses on the British Labour government's efforts to achieve strategic preponderance in the Middle East (as well as in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean) amidst adverse economic circumstances at home and rising nationalist movements in the region. Although the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and the Foreign Secretary, Earnest Bevin, held divergent views about the feasibility of defending the Middle East under conditions of modern warfare, they were ultimately at one in that Britain should remain a great power in the post-war world. Attlee, sometimes described as a humble Little Englander, in fact placed much importance in keeping nuclear weapon exclusively at Britain's disposal for prestige reasons and was ready to use various frameworks of the newly evolving United Nations in order to curtail the cost of the increasingly difficult task of running an empire. When the United States started to demand bases in the British Empire in an effort to establish a worldwide strategic network, the British used the American move to ‘intertwine’ the strategic interests of the two countries and transform their traditional sphere of influence in the Middle East into a new Anglo-American informal empire.
    This paper also suggests that as far as the security matter of the Middle East was concerned, there were curious “unspoken” relations (image management) between the United States and Britain during the period. In short, the United States did not want to appear before its domestic public that it was helping “imperialist” Britain in the “colonial” region of the Middle East while Britain desired to appear that she was still the predominant power in the region in spite of declining prestige.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    高安 健将
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 86-100,L12
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article examines the responses of the British government to the fourth Middle East conflict and the first oil crisis, both of which occurred coincidentally in October 1973. The British government led by Edward Heath recognised that Britain had ceased to be a Super Power and that it was experiencing a domestic crisis. It was therefore fully aware that it could not achieve settlements for the Middle East conflict and the oil crisis on its own. However, the differing interests and perceptions towards the crises made it extremely difficult for the British government to cooperate with the United States in particular and to a lesser extent with the European Community.
    The disagreements between Britain and the United States reflected their respective grasps of the Middle East conflict and their interests in securing oil supply from the Arab oil-producers. The Heath government was more sympathetic to the Arabs, who in fact launched the offensive against the Israelis in 1973. Its consistent understanding was that the Israelis had occupied Arab territories in 1967 and that the acquisition of territory by war was inadmissible. For the Heath government, the Arabs had not crossed an international border to commit aggression, but rather that the fighting was going on in territories that legally, and in the view of the United Nations, belonged to the Arabs. In contrast, the US government initially regarded as the baseline of a ceasefire the dividing line between the Arabs and the Israelis that had been created after the Israeli occupation in 1967. Domestically, the Heath government was facing a huge energy crisis, which was triggered by a ban by coal-miners on overtime work. It was vital for the British government to secure oil imports from the Arab oil-producers, a need not faced by the United States.
    The Heath government and the Nixon administration disagreed not only over the causes of the conflict, and over how to achieve first a ceasefire and then long-term settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis, but also over the perceptions of the actors involved-including Egypt and the Soviet Union -and particularly with regards oil security. While Heath in fact distrusted the intentions of the Nixon administration, which was confronting the Watergate affair, the US government suspected that the British government, by siding with the Arabs, was deliberately undermining its Middle East policy.
    This article argues that the British government sided with the Arabs in 1973 in order to secure oil supplies, despite generating acute tension with the United States and the European Community. Such discord, this paper argues, eventually deprived the British government of any significant role in settling the Middle East conflict and the oil crisis.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    奥田 泰広
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 101-114,L13
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Sir Robert Morier (1826-93) was a lifelong rival of Bismarck, firstly as a friend of Crown Prince Frederick and Princess Victoria in the German court, secondly as an ambassador at St. Petersburg. In his earlyy career, he was a keen Cobdenist who believes in Free Trade as the key to international peace and an advocate of German liberals in the course of German Unification. But the advent of Bismarck becoming chancellor makes him to recognize its danger to European peace because “Bismarck's Peace” by alliance policy consisted of mutual suspicion among great powers. “The dangerous element in Europe is not Germany but Bismarck. He is getting just as dangerous as Napoleon I was after Austerlitz.”
    In the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s, he analyzed that an Anglo-Russian understanding would reduce Bismarck to produce influence within Europe. Therefore, he made a proposal of a joint English and Russian occupation of the Ottoman Empire. But the British government chose to threaten Russia and achieved the diplomatic triumph at the Berlin Congress in 1878. But, at that time, “the Eastern Question” and “the Great Game” were beginning to be closely linked. Russia wanted to compensate for their blunder in Turkey by expanding in Central Asia, at Pendjeh in 1885. The rumor was spread that Britain and Russia were on the brink of war.
    Although war was avoided, the crisis continued. On November 1885, Morier arrived at St. Petersburg as an Ambassador when the Russo-Afghan boundary needed to be precisely demarcated. Finally, he played an important role in the last phase of the boundary negotiations and the agreement was signed in July 1887. His belief in the necessity of an Anglo-Russian under-standing melted antagonism between two states and marked the beginning of the end of a “Great Game.”
    This paper examines analytically Morier's suggestions for British foreign policy from the view of an interconnection of two systems: “the Eastern Question, ” the core of European balance of power, and “the Great Game, ” the global rivalry between Britain and Russia.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    山本 達也
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 115-131,L14
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to examine how the external environments of Middle Eastern governments, which require a serious commitment to the promotion of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), affect policies to control Internet information flow, and how it leads to a change in their domestic politics.
    Currently, we cannot confirm any leading hypotheses about the impacts of the Internet on authoritarian regimes that are widely accepted by political scientists. The main reasons for this is lack of statistical data, difficulties in obtaining sufficient material to discuss this theme, and the low Internet penetration rates in such countries.
    Of course, these hypotheses must surely exist in the Middle East and undoubtedly the relationship between Internet development and the political impacts on authoritarian regimes is an attractive research topic. However, the reasons mentioned above have caused certain limitations in carrying out such research. Therefore, this paper focuses on the regimes' Internet controlling policies, which is designed to block the free flow of information, and tries to expose the implications of political influences on authoritarian regimes by Internet development.
    When we focus on Internet controlling policies in authoritarian regimes, we should carefully assess the degree of governmental interference to the flow of information on the Internet. As figure 1 in my paper indicates, conceptually there are two different types of models regarding Internet controlling in authoritarian regimes. One model is that the government mediates and tries to control the flow of information on the Internet (model C), and the other model is that the government renounces Internet control completely (model D).
    There are two effective concepts to classify authoritarian regimes into model C or model D. The first concept is “network architecture, ” which is defined as the structural character of a network based on a code (software). The second concept is “network infrastructure architecture, ” which is defined as the physical structure of infrastructure to ensure data communication.
    As a result of my examination, most of the Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Egypt are categorized as model C, with only Jordan categorized as model D. The difference between Jordan and the other countries is explained by the engagement of US governmental organization on ICT strategy-making and revising processes, and the leadership of King Abdullah II, the head of the regime, who favors the introduction of policies that create competition in the ICT sector.
    The Jordanian decision to adopt model D leads a change in policymaking processes in the ICT field in Jordan, with transparency and accountability indubitably improved in this country. My paper concludes that the Jordanian case implies authoritarian regimes could adopt model D while keeping their authoritarian characters, and the perception and leadership of these regimes' heads would grasp the key for this change.
  • 国際政治のなかの中東
    鹿島 正裕
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 132-148,L15
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    To be sure, there has been a rather impressive accumulation of research into the regional politics of the Middle East, centering on the Arab-Israeli conflicts, Gulf wars and the involvement of the super-powers therein. However, most of the monographs are more “descriptive” than “theoretical-analytical, ” whether they are historical studies or report on current affairs. While it is perhaps not an exaggeration to claim that most of the related works in Arabic and Japanese are such, some among those in English are theoretical-analytical works, reflecting the heightened demand, especially in the United States, for more social scientific approaches within area studies.
    A typical work in this genre is Steven Walt's The Origins of Alliances (1987), which may be said to have used area studies to establish a social scientific theory, rather than introduced social scientific approaches to area studies. Works that are more based on area studies include Michael Barnette's Dialogues in Arab Politics (1998) and Raymond Hinnebusch's The International Politics of the Middle East (2003). Barnette's work discusses the politics among Arab states, the core of the Middle East states, as does Avraham Sela's The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict published in the same year, although not particularly in a theoretical-analytical way. Both works should be considered as studies in the regional politics of the Middle East, as the conflict with Israel has been strongly tied with the various rivalries among Arab states. Walt's and Hinnebusch's works discuss the regional politics in the Middle East, which involve, in addition to Arab states and Israel, Iran and the great powers.
    In terms of their theoretical tenets, Walt's and Sela's are (neo-) realist and Barnette's constructivist, while Hinnebusch's is liberal, incorporating not only realist frameworks but also constructivist and pluralist (liberal-institutionalist) concepts and even (neo-Marxist) structuralist perspectives. I describe these basic theoretical arguments and delineations of historical phases found in each work, finding Hinnebusch's argument most comprehensive and persuasive.
    Moreover, I look at some other books and articles, among which is Paul Noble's “Systemic Approaches Do Matter, But…” (2004) In this article, Noble tries to apply systemic approaches to the study of the Middle East system and offers a set of regional and sub-regional systemic factors in addition to global systemic factors as explanatory variables. I take up his argument of the global systemic factor change in the post-Cold War period and raise some issues to be explored concerning this on-going period, such as democratization, privatization, and regionalization in Muslim and “rentier” states of the region, especially after the Iraq War (2003).
  • 篠田英朗著『平和構築と法の支配-国際平和活動の理論的・機能的分析』
    鈴木 一人
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 149-159
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 西川 吉光
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 160-163
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 秋月 弘子
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 163-166
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山内 昌之
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 166-169
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 酒井 啓子
    2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 170
    発行日: 2005/05/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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