What is the “New Europe”? In one year before the 60th Anniversary of the end of the Second World War, the EU enlarged from 15 to 25 countries, and the New United Europe, with the exception of the Balkan countries, was realized on 1 May 2004. Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission at that time, commented on the “New Europe” on the eve of the EU Enlargement on 30 April 2004. He declared that Europe was united at last from the western coast of Ireland to the eastern border of Poland, and from Valetta in Malta in south to the tip of Finland in the north, and Europe would not be divided any more by ideological borders. The new Enlarging Europe parallels the Roman Empire and has been united without war. It extends beyond the artificial borders of nation-states and is an aggregation of regions, citizens, and diverse cultures. The background of the New Europe is the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall as well as the reunification of both East and West Germany and Eastern and Western Europe. It is the result of the end of the Socialist system and ideological conflict, the trend toward democracy, and regional cooperation in the global era. Problems of the Enlarged EU: a “two-speed and different-level Europe” Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, however, the catchwords of One Germany and One Europe are incompatible with reality. There is an economic gap between East and West, and there are differences of political and cultural consciousness in both the former East and West Germany and Eastern and Western Europe. Citizens have either become critical of the enlargement or have begun to despair of, or be reconciled to, the status quo. After the first anniversary of the EU Enlargement, the Treaty for establishing a Constitution for Europe was rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands, two of the very countries which had originally lead the Treaty. The people's rejection of the Treaty demonstrated that the citizens of Western Europe are now against, or at least skeptical of, the EU Enlargement towards the East, and the so-called “two-speed and different-level Europe” emerged in many phases. In the Iraq War, the EU was divided into groups that were for or againstt the US policy, and in immigration and agricultural problems it was divided into East and West. About the European Treaty or the policy on border questions, it has been difficult to find a compromise between the EU policy of each country and the opinions of the citizens. The question is how do EU diversity and unification work together as a regional system and in the relations between each interest group of the EU, the nations, and citizens, how does it solve European border and domestic questions concerning immigrants, security, economic and regional differences, minorities, identity, social-policy, and so on, and how does the cooperation policy continue with neighbor countries like Russia, CIS, the Middle East, and North Africa with respect to their mutual interests. However, from such agony and struggle for “New European” experiments, we can learn many lessons historically or pragmatically that can be applied to the Asian case of regional cooperation or international relations with the US.
Even before a European Constitutional Treaty was adopted in 2004, the European Union (EU) had already had its “Constitutional Charter”, according to the case-law of the European Court of Justice. The EU is founded on “constitutional pluralism”, under which the constitution at the EU level, as elaborated in the Constitutional Treaty, and those of the Member States are seen as united in a “European constitutional order”. In such an constitutional order, European peoples co-exist as EU citizens, “united in diversity.” But the governance of the EU has been faced with a legitimacy crisis caused by asymmetry between negative and positive integration. On the one hand, the Internal Market and the Economic and Monetary Union are said to have, to a significant degree, deprived the Member States of their autonomy in economic and other policies and, on the other, there has been no consensus on a “European social model” to recover their autonomy collectively at the EU level. The European Constitutional Treaty introduces a majoritarian system in which the Council makes legislation on a double majority voting with 55 per cent of the States and 65 per cent of the whole population. However, consensus based on bargaining is the rule in the decision-making of the Council, although the qualified majority voting has been increasingly stipulated in the various policy areas every time the EU/EC Treaty is amended. In order to overcome the asymmetry problem, the Constitutional Treaty provides, as a second best, that the President of the European Council be a permanent post to exercise the leadership in consensus-building, that “enhanced cooperation” among some of the Member Sates be made easier, and that the open method of cooperation be strengthened in the social policy fields including social security and social protection of workers. But it does not seem that they would provide a sufficient instrument to deal with the asymmetry problem. The EU, with more than 25 countries, would have to make decisions on the qualified majority (double majority) voting, not by consensus, in some future, if it wants to solve such difficult problems as the above-mentioned asymmetry. This appears to require the EU to meet two conditions: to ensure a social agreement based on distributive justice at the EU level and to avoid creating permanent minorities in the EU. Only through them would EU citizens be prepared to accept EU decisions under a majoritarian principle, which requires a stronger European identity based on EU citizenship.
Today NGO (nongovernmental organization) is a popular theme in international studies. Since the Earth Summit took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, international cooperation of environmental NGOs has continued. As a result, NGOs have been considered the main opponents of Globalization, or global proponents of the “civil society”. The transnational activities of NGOs are often referred to as the “global civil society” or the “transnational civil society”. A case study of an international network of environmental NGOs “Friends of the Earth” and its German and Austrian affiliates, BUND (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland) and GLOBAL 2000 respectively, highlight the possibilities and problems of transnational NGO cooperation. Both BUND and GLOBAL 2000, established as part of a so called new social movement, concentrated on local or national issues in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, both organizations began to work more on global issues, especially climate change and nuclear problems. BUND and GLOBAL 2000 became members of the global network known as “Friends of the Earth” and used the opportunity to act globally without the necessity for internal structural changes. “Friends of the Earth” owes its success to professional coordinators of international mass media campaigns. The worldwide campaigns for climate protection, organized by “Friends of the Earth International”, were always picked up by national mass media organizations and had a huge public response in many European countries. The collapse of the socialist system in Eastern Europe was a turning point for BUND and GLOBAL 2000. They started tackling environmental and nuclear problems in Central and Eastern European countries and began to cooperate with NGOs of these countries. As well, EU cooperation with governments in Central and Eastern Europe, especially plans for building new atomic power plants in Mochovce (Slovakia) and in Temelin (Czech Republic) triggered transnational protests, which created further alliances between NGOs in Western and Eastern Europe. The success of NGO campaigns, however, still depend heavily on existing national mass media outlets. Many environmental activists point to the lack of Europe-wide mass media or “public sphere” infrastructure, which limits their transnational activities. As a result, one of the most important tasks of the European international NGOs is the creation of a Europe-wide alternative public sphere, in addition to the newsletters, annual reports and websites which are usually exclusive to each organization.
The European Union launched the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999, which was constructed within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU learned lessons from the two ethnic conflicts in the Balkan Peninsula in the 1990s and realized that the EU could not play any significant role in post-cold war conflict resolutions without reliable and autonomous military means. This realization was the main incentive for the EU to start ESDP. Decision-makers in the United States were afraid of the development of an autonomous ESDP because they thought that it would mark the beginning of the decoupling of transatlantic relations and feared that NATO might be marginalized as a consequence. This article focuses on the consequences of ESDP to see if it might compete with NATO in the foreseeable future and harm transatlantic relations. This was accomplished by comparing the military dimensions of the emerging ESDP with NATO: goals and missions, mechanisms of operational planning and force planning, and procurement policies. The goals and missions of ESDP are vaguely defined as the “Petersberg missions”: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. There is intentional ambiguity concerning the high end of the tasks, but missions of ESDP surely are far less robust than those of NATO. The institutions and mechanisms of ESDP's operational planning and force planning are carefully managed within the framework of mutual cooperation with NATO. The so-called “Berlin-plus” arrangement was introduced to avoid unnecessary duplication of the assets and capabilities of both organizations. This arrangement functioned well in ESDP missions in Macedonia (2003) and Bosnia (2004-present). Likewise the EU-NATO Capability Group was established to coordinate and harmonize the EU's military capabilities with those of NATO. European procurement cooperation is necessary for EU members to improve their military capabilities. The newly established European Defense Agency is expected to smooth the various national obstacles for the common procurement and institutionalize procurement cooperation among EU member states. In order to obtain full interoperability with the U. S., transatlantic procurement cooperation is essential. EU-U. S. procurement cooperation, however, is a delicate issue because the U. S. keeps strict regulations on exporting sensitive technologies, even to its European allies. Consequently, in military and defense terms, there seems to be no serious danger of ESDP inflicting damage on transatlantic relations and marginalizing NATO. Rather they would reinforce each other and one might say it even constitutes a unique division of labour: the EU would concentrate its abilities on the lower end of crisis management while NATO would be engaged in the higher end of the intervention ladder. This article takes the position that the sharp political rift of Euro-Atlantic relations after the Iraqi war will not go further. On the contrary, steady and quiet mechanisms for mutual cooperation in military dimensions between ESDP and NATO are being established behind the harsh political battle-ground, and this trend will continue in the near future.
Among the member states of the European Union (EU), Sweden is one of the most EU-skeptic countries. Opinion polls have shown strong skepticism of the Swedes since Sweden's accession to the EU in 1995. This article examines anti-EU and EU-skepticism in Sweden and tries to investigate reasons why many Swedes are skeptical about the EU. The first part of this article discuses Sweden's change of support rating for the EU and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), presenting data from opinion polls. The Swedes strongly favored EU membership in 1991, and although their support declined after 1992, it increased again during 1994. After Sweden's entry into the EU, the Union's popularity immediately slumped and a majority of the Swedes became anti-EU. Then support for the EU gradually increased and supporters of the membership outnumbered its opponents in late 2001. Support for EMU has fluctuated since 1997, and by 2004, half of the population opposed the introduction of the “euro” to Sweden. The second part of this article examines the anti-EU/EU-skeptic faction, and investigates its activities and assertions in the campaign of referendum on Sweden's EU membership in 1994 and the European Parliament elections in 1995 and 1999. The anti-EU camp consisted of the Left Party and the Green Party (anti-EU parties), some trade unions, and members of the Social Democrats and the Center Party. The lack of transparency in EU decision-making is their prime issue. Slightly more than half of the electorate voted “yes” to Sweden's EU membership in the referendum and Sweden became an EU member state in 1995. In European Parliament elections, voter turnout was fairly low and anti-EU parties, the Left and Green Parties, gained higher vote percentages compared to national elections. The third part of this article analyses Sweden's referendum on the euro in 2003 and the European Parliament election in 2004. The anti-euro camp opposed further transfer of Sweden's policy-making power to the EU. A majority of the Swedes voted “no” to the adoption of the euro, effective from 2006. An EU-and Federo-skeptic political organization, Junilistan (The June List), which was established for the European Parliament election, became the third largest political party in Sweden's European Parliament delegation, though voter turnout was the lowest of any nation-wide Swedish election in over 80 years. In Sweden, the rise of anti-EU sentiments spawned anti-EU and EU-skeptical groups. These groups would seek to reform the EU. Many Swedes are not satisfied with the democracy, openness, transparency, social policy and environmental policy of the EU.
The Brussels European Council in December 2004 finally concluded to start the accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Turkey submitted its accession application in 1987 preceding all of the ten new member states of the year 2004. Why has it taken so long for Turkey? What is the basic agenda for Turkey to realize its EU membership? To find answers to these questions, the concept of “focal point” might be useful. Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of “focal point” that [most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. … Any potential outcome is one that either party could have improved by insisting, yet each knows that the other would rather concede than do without agreement. … These reflexive expectations somehow converge on a single point at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.] Garett and Weingast elaborate the concept by referring to the “mutual recognition” introduced in a decision of “the Cassis de Dijon” by the European Court of Justice in 1979, and embedded in the European Single Act as a legal system for the single market project. That is, when a natural focal point does not exist, an institution may propose a constructed focal point for an enhancement of expectation towards a possible agreement of a negotiation. In the light of the above understanding of a focal point, there may have been, at least, two potential focal points between Turkey and the EU: the Copenhagen Criteria and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The former was set out unilaterally by the EU as the conditionalities for the EU membership, therefore, the Copenhagen Criteria was meant to be a constructed focal point. But it was originally set out to facilitate and control the accession of the former socialist countries which were making efforts to transform their national regimes, while Turkey with its established nationalist idea and regime had tremendous difficulties in renovating the systems in accordance with the EU criteria. The constructed focal point, unlike the former socialist countries, failed to work automatically in Turkey, but started to function with an additional impetus of the promise to give a starting date of negotiation. Turkish domestic situation required an extra motivation for a constructed focal point to be useful. The latter seemed to have had more chance to become a natural focal point, but Turkey stuck to its national interest particularly with the view to sustaining its de-facto governing influence over Cyprus. Greece, securing the interest of Cyprus, also insisted on the national interest. Under such circumstances, there was no place for the “reciprocal expectations” to develop in order to identify a focal point. Thus, a potentially existed natural focal point was unable to function. It should be expected for the EU to set a focal point in view with the Turkish membership including a solution to the divided Cyprus. What may be critical for identifying a focal point is not the problems such as a mass movement of labour, or huge financial aids to suppress the EU budget, often sited by Turkish antagonists. But whether the EU would be able to convince the European citizens of the significance of the Turkish membership, and to the same importance, whether Turkey would be able to internalize the Copenhagen Criteria that would inevitably transform the principles that Turkey has been standing on since its foundation in 1923..
The European Union elaborated its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in May 2004. The policy seeks to make the EU's new neighbours democratic, stable and prosperous, and to assure the security of the EU, but, at the same time, to avoid promising these new neighbours accession to the Union. To accomplish its objectives, the EU has concluded with these states an Action Plan which stipulates goals as benchmarks to be realised with regard to democratisation and market economic reform. Nevertheless, there has been concern whether the ENP will succeed or not, as it does not assure EU membership to the new neighbours, in contrast to the prior EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe. The success or failure of the ENP, in particular towards the Western New Independent States (WNIS)-Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus-will influence not only the stability of these states and the security of the EU, but also the future of European and Eurasian international geopolitics. Therefore, this article analyses the likelihood of success or failure of the ENP towards the WNIS, focusing on: 1) EU-WNIS relations, 2) WNIS-Russian relations, and 3) EU-Russia relations in relation to the WNIS. Finally, the impact of the later Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Orange Evolution in the Republic of Moldova on this analysis will be assessed. The conclusion reached in this analysis is that, the only thing that the EU can do is to encourage Ukraine and Moldova to accomplish the benchmarks without assuring them of accession to the Union (which means a lack of stimulation for their political and economic reforms) and without obtaining Russian cooperation in stabilizing this region. In addition, prior to the Orange Revolution, both states were interested in accession to the EU, but they fluctuated between closer relations with the EU or with Russia, as they were situated between the two from political, economic, identity, and geopolitical points of view. Furthermore, Russia made efforts to keep the two states within its sphere of influence. Therefore, it was quite difficult to expect that the beneficial effects of conditionality for EU enlargement on Central and Eastern Europe would also occur in the case of the WNIS. With regard to the future relations between the EU and Belarus, there were no prospects for the normalisation of relations at the time. However, in the light of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Orange Evolution in Moldova, the above conclusions have been re-evaluated. The Orange Revolution demonstrated that civil society has matured in Ukraine, and that it is a promoter of democracy and market economics-benchmarks in the Action Plan. The contrast between, on the one hand, the old-fashioned methods used by Russia to influence Ukraine and Moldova and, on the other, the methods used by U. S. -European international democratisation NGOs in their relations with the domestic NGOs which contributed to the Orange Revolution and Evolution in the two countries, has made it inevitable that both states are now approaching the EU and the U. S., while keeping a distance from Russia. The Orange Revolution and Evolution have also led to a more serious involvement of the EU in both states than the Action Plan stipulated. In any event, observers will have to wait until the final results are made clear in the EU Commission report concerning the implementation of the Action Plan to be published in two years.
This paper deals with Russian-speakers in Narva, a city in the northeast of Estonia. Most of the city population (c. 95%) speaks Russian as a mother tongue, while Russian-speakers are minorities in Estonia as a whole (c. 30%). In this paper I consider whether Russian-speakers are “immigrants” or “national minorities” in the context of Estonia. W. Kymlicka points out that Russians did not see themselves as immigrants in any sense and Estonians rejected the idea that Russians should have the sorts of rights accorded to national minorities in the West. He also argues despite this major gap in perceptions, there is some evidence that the two sides are converging on something like the immigrant model of integration. The paper begins with an overview of the migration process in Narva during the Soviet era, which is divided into three periods. Immediately after WW, an influx of immigrants from other regions of Soviet Union began. Most of the people came to Narva as workers from neighboring areas, enticed by the Soviet central government in the 40's and 50's. In the 60's and 70's many people were recruited by factories and enterprises and there were also family reasons for their immigration to Estonia. Thus, it is difficult to say which factors most influenced the migration processes and to clarify the intention of the Soviet authorities. The second part of paper deals with language rights given by internal laws and international conventions. It is important to point out that the Estonian government ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities with the declaration that only citizens can be national minority members. This means that a part of the Russian-speaking population is not eligible for national minority status. However people actually use Russian not only in the private sphere, but also in the public sphere. In addition, the Estonian authorities do not control the situation so rigidly. They put an emphasis on enhancing knowledge of the Estonian language, while Russian-speakers are positive about learning Estonian. Though it is too early to make any conclusions about the minority issue in Estonia, the differences in perceptions between national minorities and immigrants are decreasing, which means that problems have been solved from pragmatic viewpoints. However there are still plenty of stateless permanent residents, who are not EU citizens.
The European Union adopted its first ever security strategy in December 2003, less than a year after the Iraq War. The European Security Strategy (ESS) declared the EU to be ‘inevitably a global player’ and called it to fulfil its responsibility in the world. It was a symbol of the revival of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that had been shattered by deep divisions among the members in the run-up to the Iraq War. The purpose of this article is to examine the current state of the EU as a power in international relations by paying particular attention to the ESS. In the first section, it examines how the revival of the CFSP and ESDP after the Iraq debacle was achieved. First, a bitter experience of Iraq and the imminent enlargement of the EU forced the EU members to discuss issues of common security threat and the means to address them, which had been impossible before because of the reluctance of some members. Second, the need to restore transatlantic relations badly damaged by the Iraq war stimulated the new move in the CFSP and ESDP. In many ways, the ESS can be seen as the EU's overture to Washington. The second section assesses the current state of the EU as a power in international relations by using four concepts: civilian power, military power, global player, and regional player. Some argue (or regret) that the EU is moving from a civilian power to a military power. And EU leaders like to point out that the EU is a global player. But the fact remains that the EU has many different characteristics and this article argues that the multifaceted nature of the EU in international relations is in fact one of the most important sources of the EU's strength. What the ESS calls ‘particular value’ that the EU could add to the international community only comes from this very multi-dimensional nature of the EU that combines civilian and military instruments and global and regional outlook. The last section discusses the issue of division of labour between the United States and the Europe. A functional division of labour where the US engages in ‘high-end’ military operations while the Europeans undertake ‘low-end’ operations such as peace-keeping and reconstruction is a form that inevitably raises tensions, as has been demonstrated in the past decade. But given the huge capability gap between Europe and the US, some kind of functional division of labour is inevitable. But at the same time, what is emerging recently is a regional division of labour where Europe focuses on conflicts in Africa. The EU's new concept of ‘battlegroups’, which is specifically designed for use in the African theatre, is in line with this new direction.
The ongoing process of globalization is transforming the world. Especially, the rapid enlargement of European Union (EU) member states after the cold war is the direct reaction to the globalization process. The age of globalization and the consolidation of a transnational entity, the EU, require the macro framework to analyze. In the EU, there are 25 member states with different conditions. In this paper an attempt is made to indicate some possible framework to analyze EU in a macro way as “the New Roman Empire.” The conditions associated with the existence and stability of a political system have been one of the leading concerns of political science. It is often said that the differences in the constitutional forms of government in each political system are central to the problem. It is true that each system has different constitutional forms arising out of a different background. The term “regime” is the core to the problem. Bridging the gap between the international relations theory and the comparative politics theory, the differences in “regime” types point out some relations between the constitutional forms of government, i. e. the working of political systems, and some aspects of economy and culture. In sum, the co-existence of different regime types in the EU might hinder to transform “the New Roman Empire” to “the United States of Europe.” In order to review this theme, particular attention must be paid to the contribution made by Stein Rokkan. We have here the opportunity to explore the possible application of his theory to the post cold war globalizing and regionalizing world.