The primary purpose of this introduction is to provide a conceptual sketch of what we call “the reciprocal reconfiguration of international and domestic orders.” In essence, the society of states share a collective understanding about what constitutes internal problemsin which they should refrain from interfering and what constitutes international problems in which they can justify playing some active parts. The jurisdictional border, separating the internal from the international problems, does not perfectly overlap with the spatial border between sovereign territories. In addition, this jurisdictional border in our perception has not been fixed over time. Any serious change over time in this international collective understanding has often resulted in reconfiguring the basic arrangements of domestic political order.
Unlike the existing studies on international orders, this theoretical introduction stresses the causal mechanism in which domestic and international orders reconfigure each other. Any analysis of the interplay between the two requires their clear conceptualization. The order of a society will be stable if its constitution clearly defines authorities of the ruler and the rights of the ruled, and if the ruler guarantees the rights of the ruled in exchange for the consent of the latter to the rule of the former. In this sense, the ex ante specification of their authorities and rights facilitates the ex post mutual compromise between the ruler and the ruled. In an analogous vein, the order of a society of states will be stable if the sovereign rights are clearly defined and respected within the society of states.
This article shows that a drastic rearrangement of global political space, such as the collapse of multi-national empires in the wake of major global conflicts, not only reflects the modified legitimate membership of the society of states but also often alter the internal distribution of power between the ruler and the ruled. Since the expected change in the distribution of power triggers preventive use of force and undermines the stability of domestic order, the society of states often demand the constitutional commitments to secure the political rights of the insecure within states. We have just observed this logic in action in the recent cases of the civil wars after the end of the Cold War.

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This essay argues that there have been synchronic elements between international society and domestic society and then contemplates conditions of historically constrained social order. In so doing, the essay seeks to identify that the contemporary world in the 21st century partakes of a new mode of value order crossing international as well as many domestic societies. The essay aims to cultivate a theoretical foundation for further discussions on the nature and the history of international society as well as more concrete policy-oriented issues relevant to international and domestic order including post-conflict peacebuilding activities.
Applying Michel Foucault's conceptual framework of épistémè in social sciences, the essay analyzes three major historical models of social order: Renaissance, the Classical and Modernity. By referring to Hedley Bull's distinction between Christian, European and World international society as well, the essay seeks to identify synchronic modes of social order in international and domestic society derived from dominant values in each historical stage. Renaissance is characterized by ressemblance and exemplified by Jean Bodin's theory of sovereignty. The Christian world view remained influential in this age. It is rather difficult to apply the concept of “international order, ” since there was no or only a premature conceptual background for the “international.” The Classical age is symbolized by tableau and explained by the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes and the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. They represent the political thought of order-construction after the age of devastating wars in England and Europe. Modernity is the age of “man” and “nation.” Knowledge about humans and political movements of nationalism symbolize the age of modernity. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and G. W. F. Hegel appeared to show its typical modes of thought. The power of nationalism and the universalization of nation-states in the 20th century were the culmination of modernity defined in this sense.
Finally, the essay examines the characteristics of international and domestic social order in the contemporary age distinguished from any previous historical stages. This suggests a phenomenon of diminishing modernity. The essay claims that the dominant social order model in the post-Cold war era influenced by the worldwide spread of liberal democracy indicates elements of post-modernity. This is evident in contemporary discussions about sovereignty and the “responsibility to protect” as well as more operational aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding.

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The purpose of this article is to examine the formation process of global constitutional order, in particular its dual structure and its transformation in terms of characters of governmentality by focusing on the case of ICC process. At the end of 19th century, we could find out a dual structure of global constitutional order where an international society (societas gentium) sharing norms such as jus gentium emerged against the other like the socalled barbarian or savage.
We can notice this kind of dual structure (liberal anti-pluralism) in another form even in the contemporary global constitutional order. For example, some states would be labeled as deviant regimes by major powers and their sovereignty would be restricted and would become the objective for international interventions because their domestic governance conditions do not meet minimal international standards. As sociological constructivism approaches suggest, the act of labeling by major powers leads to the making of international norms and to its selective arbitrary applications (normative contingencies). We can observe the same pattern of arbitrary labeling and the exclusionary character (liberal anti-pluralism) of global constitutional order even in the case of ICC process.
After the end of the Cold War, some part of global constitutional order like ICC process has been formed by middle powers and NGOs rather than major powers. It means that the diversification of constituent powers begins to transform the international constitutional order formed by major powers or the hegemony to the global constitutional order. On the other hand, this kind of global constitutional order now faces serious outlaw problems deteriorated by a reckless movement of the global self-(un)regulated market. The serious humanitarian disaster of the Congo Civil War, that ICC process tries to handle with, might be one of them. Through these cases, we should reexamine the critical claim that the global constitutional order only justifies inequalities among peoples at the global level.

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This article offers an analytical framework to conceptualize “state failure, ” a phenomenon which has become widely recognized since the early 1990s as one of the pressing problems to be addressed by the international community today. No consensus exists as to what “state failure” means, what its causal factors are, or how it affects the international community. Factors often associated with state failure, such as economic distress, internal disputes, the ending of the Cold War, colonial experiences, types of regimes, and spillover effects from neighboring countries, do not always constitute sufficient conditions for state failure. Rather than aiming at its precise definition, it is more meaningful to examine why such a concept and phenomenon as “state failure” has emerged and why states that do not meet standard criteria of statehood have survived in today's international scene.
Two structural factors can be identified in today's international system that explain the emergence and the survival of failed states. First, increased awareness and acceptance of the norm of “good governance” by the international community has made state failure stand out as an anomaly when compared to the traditional sense of statehood. The norm of “good governance” also constrains today's countries with a burdensome state-building agenda (e. g., a short time table for development, non-violence, democracy, economic well-being), none of which was expected during state-building processes by the West European states in the earlier eras. State-failure, in this sense, was born as a synchronic phenomenon with the permeating norm of “good governance, ” just as Foucault's “madness” and Levi-Strauss's “savageness” emerged concomitantly with the development of the concepts of “sanity” and “civilization.”
Second, state failure reflects a peculiar resonance between the legal and the empirical senses of sovereign statehood in today's international system. While obtainment of legal sovereignty used to depend on the quality of a state's empirical statehood, legal sovereignty has become institutionalized and stabilized, especially since decolonization, as an independent structure that allows survival of states regardless of their empirical content.
Today's international community associates state failure with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, epidemic disease, loss of investment and trade opportunities, refugees, and drug trafficking, to name a few. In meeting the challenges posed by failed states, some scholars advocate a new type of trusteeship or a system of shared sovereignty. Others are skeptical of the feasibility of these new arrangements, as they would undermine the universal principle of sovereign equality. While the problems related to failed states are increasingly felt urgent, sound theoretical analysis must precede the teleological. What is required in today's study of failed states is a higher level of generalization comparable to that in the study of West European state-building experiences.

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It is undeniable that the United States is currently a hegemonic power which can set universal norms for the international society, reflecting its own values, let alone its specific interests, as if they overlap with universal values. Besides military and economic power, such appeal that the United States is the representative of universal values constitute one important source of American hegemonic power.
Once widely accepted, however, international norms will gain an authoritative status independent of American arbitral control. And such universal norms will also gain biding power over the members of the international society, including the United States, even though the United States continues to believe that it can interpret and apply norms as it likes.
This article focuses on one of the natures universal norms have, namely the boomerang effect, and explains how such effect works to balance out the current predominance of the United States as the norm keeper of the international society.
Among the norms set by the United States around the end of the Cold War are human rights and democracy. The United States especially emphasizes building strong civil society, reflecting its own history of nation building. Through governmental assistances and those by government-affiliated NGOs, the United States has poured lots of resources into civil society organizations of transforming nations. Such features of civil society as political participation, youth and women's empowerment, free press as plural information source, and independent advocacy power, are the main focus of American democratic assistance.
It is quite ironic, thus, that it was such civil society organizations that played an important role in finding out, and challenging, the American conducts in its global war on terrorism that failed to meet the very norms the United States itself has claimed to be so important, namely human rights and democracy.
One case which well illustrates such boomerang effects of universal norms is the reaction of the international society against American war on terrorism. Although terrorism is said to be the ultimate abrogation of human rights, American policies against terrorism also violate human rights standards. The network of global human rights NGOs, along with international institutions, challenges American arbitral use of norms and forcing it to comply with the universal norm of human rights.
It is still too early to say whether the biding power of the universal norms is equally applied to the hegemon like the United States, and thus deprives it of the authority as the unitary norm keeper. The challenge the global network of NGOs and international/regional institutions is currently making against the United States, however, is a promising sign that such mechanism will emerge to counterweight American predominance.

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Ever since poverty reduction and the renewal of depleted environmental resources were included in the UN Millennium Declaration as goals to be achieved in the coming decades, the issue of reforming the World Bank has become a hotly debated subject among political leaders. This begs the question of how successful have been a series of organizational reforms carried out by President James Wolfensohn during the 1990s.
Most assessments of the reforms, however, have been negative. Some have pointed out that the Bank has added on too many missions, ranging from social and environmental sustainability, to fighting corruption, to protecting cultural heritage sites, thus resulting in a chaotic “mission creep.” Others have observed that the Bank has a deeply embedded organizational culture known as the “approval culture, ” which stands in the way of any reform, challenging this bureaucratic culture. By contrast, this paper argues that with respect to social and environmental sustainability the Bank has evolved progressively from the norm institutionalization stage to the compliance-accountability stage, and then on to the multi-norm integration stage. The transition to this last stage, which involves the “mainstreaming” of social and environmental concerns into project cycles, is a significant development, since it was made possible by the activities of the “Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit” within the secretariat.
The paper attempts to explain this organizational change by focusing on the communicative interaction between two mutually resonating transnational networks: the “transnationalism from below network, ” made up of NGOs working in borrower countries, and international NGOs operating in the advanced economies, and the “transnationalism from above network, ” made up of multilateral development banks, developers and local development agencies. The empirical analysis of this paper lends partial support to the realist and principal-agent contentions, which analyze organizational change in terms of changes in the preferences of the organization's member states, and also to the constructivist argument, which focuses on the role of transnational advocacy networks as a source of change. Yet, the author argues that these theoretical arguments emphasizing external factors need to be linked in a causal fashion to those arguments, which emphasize internal factors such as organizational culture as well as organizational leadership. This paper attempts to do this by introducing the notion of a complex governance system, in which two or more transnational networks sharing the same set of norms and knowledge resonate with each other, if successful, to produce a more complex, but coherent international order.

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A transnational social movement (TSM) which aims at institutionalizing a normative international policy can successfully affect the process of making a multilateral agreement which embodies certain international norm through the mechanism of domestic-international dynamic interplay.
TSMs promote an international agreement making by building and keeping international political momentum. The momentum induces opportunistic states to bandwagon the norm entrepreneurs including the TSM's policy even in the absence of domestic pressure, hence an international norm cascade. It also gives an impetus to states which have opposed the policy to change their policy in favor of the TSM if in so doing they think it will enhance their international reputation.
The vulnerability of a state's reputation is determined by both the degree of its perceived need for international image as a good neighbor and the domestic vulnerability of national decision-makers. If the state opposing the policy feels its international reputation is at stake, the international norm cascade will put both domestic and international pressure on the state to change its policy.
Strong momentum thus boosts the TSM's leverage against governments whose reputations are vulnerable by encouraging decision-makers to compromise with the TSM, and by increasing the political legitimacy of the movement itself. This increasing legitimacy gives an incentive to domestic political actors to stand on the side of the TSM, which in turn further strengthens its political leverage. Once the opposing state revises its policy in favor of the TSM's policy, the international momentum will become even greater.
Thus, on the one hand, increased international momentum not only improves the international political opportunity structure for the TSM, but also affects the size of the domestic winning coalition and of the political resources available to it. On the other hand, the momentum will be significantly strengthened if a powerful state which has opposed the policy changes its position in response to domestic and international pressures. This demonstrates the interplay between domestic and international politics in the process of multilateral agreement making.

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Ten small British Caribbean territories planned to attain dominion status in the form of the Federation of West Indies under the initiative of the U. K. government. The Federation was formed in 1958, but its scheme for independence failed due to the Jamaican referendum in 1961. The two main unit territories, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, became independent in 1962 and the Federation was resolved that year.
This paper discusses how the international norms of decolonization affected the constitutional reform processes of the British Caribbean territories and the Federation. Specifically, I will describe and clarify the following issues: (1) how the decolonization. norms were formed at the international system level as well as the commonwealth level, during the transitional period from imperialism to the post-WWII Era; (2) how the constitutional reform movements proceeded in the main territories such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados; (3) how the two key decision-makers, Norman Manley and Eric Williams, perceived the possibilities of the independence of the Federation as well as of their own units; and (4) how the international norms influenced the Jamaican decision.
Theoretically, it could be said that the constitutional reforms progressed as a result of bilateral interactions between the U. K. government and each unit government, or the Federal government. In these processes, the two types of international norms were influential. On the one hand, the traditional Commonwealth norms acted chiefly in the pragmatic, technical sphere of influence, defining the political development and institutionalization of Federal and unit governments, and carefully judging their viabilities. On the other hand, the international norms, such as expressed in the UN conventions, worked mainly in the ethical dimensions, supporting self-determination and independence. The United States sided with this liberal egalitarian standard, strengthening its influence in the British Caribbean territories from the war-time period.
By 1959, Jamaica attained full self-government in internal affairs. Manley visited London in early 1960 and inquired about the possibility of Jamaica achieving dominion status. The U. K. government did not reject the potentiality. By August 1960, the Federal Government and the unit governments of Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados had achieved full internal self-government. But in the perceptions of Manley and Williams, the economic viability of the Federation was unsatisfactory and the possibility of the Federation achieving dominion status was quite uncertain. The 1961 referendum narrowly decided Jamaica's independence. There was no clause for secession in the Federal Constitution and the referendum procedure was necessary to persuade other Federal members to accept the decision of the Jamaican people. Thus, through this referendum, Jamaican secession was legitimized within the frameworks of international norms of decolonization and self-determination.

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After the end of the Cold war era, domestic conflicts became a key issue facing international society. However, there exist cases actually left untouched for several years. Theorists of international politics also have not paid much attention to such cases as the subject of their research, with the result that we have not accumulated knowledge about “pretermitted conflicts” and the dynamics of the peace negotiation.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the sudden change in the behavior of a government in a peace negotiation even though international society sits still and watches. As Gurr points out, however, domestic conflicts have also occurred in quasi-states. This institutional character makes international intervention difficult and justifies the non-intervention of international society.
Making a point of being a quasi-state, the author characterizes the government as a player that tries to maximize public support. Inside the government organization, however, the army, which keeps the capability to overturn the peace agreement between the government and the proindependence militant, exists and opposes a move to the peace agreement. People not directly concerned with the domestic conflict determine support (or nonsupport) for their government after observing the will for peace and the ability to control the armed forces (civil-military relations). But the reality of civil-military relations is the private information of the government. Based upon this setting, the model on a peace negotiation was formulated as an incomplete information game.
After analyzing this model, the author derives two kinds of equilibrium paths to reach a peace agreement. One is a separating equilibrium, in which the government H aving control over the national military (H) proposes the peace plan, but the government Lacking control over it (L) does not when the militant's belief that the government is H is high, and the militant will accept it. The other is a pooling equilibrium that both H and L propose when the belief is low and the militants will reject it. The first is a trivial outcome. However, L can propose it because L can appeal to the people's will for peace without exposing the low ascendancy of L on the separating equilibrium.
Finally, the author explains the dynamics of peace negotiations in Indonesia and the Philippines and points out that civil-military relations could be a useful explanatory variable. And as they are also policy implications for avoiding further humanitarian crisis, international society should not castigate L for a passive stance on the separating equilibrium, and it should notcastigate separates for it in regards to the pooling equilibrium. In this way, by seeing the effect of civil-military relations on the dynamics of a peace process, the optimal reply of international society to the government's and the militant's behavior must be changed to effect a prompt and appropriate response to avoid further massacre or the violation of human rights.

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What kind of political system should the international community prepare in territories internationally administered like Kosovo in order to avoid ethnic conflicts after transfer of political authority? In arguments on peace building in post-conflict societies, because of a focus on social economic problems, problems of political systems and political reforms have not always been examined theoretically until now. In arguments over international territorial administration, the importance of governance and democracy is pointed out; however, political systems and political reforms have not been discussed adequately.
The purpose of this paper is to examine a problem: how should we divide political authority between the majority and the minority to create incentives for the majority to promote cooperative political reforms in post-conflict societies? We suppose that there are two types of political reform; nationalistic and cooperative political reforms. The former is a political reform in which the majority develops nationalistic activity, and the latter is a political reform guaranteeing collective rights of the minority. Furthermore, we suppose that there are two types of political power; political decision-making power and political bargaining power. Political decision-making power is authority regarding how to accept nationalistic activity of the majority, and political bargaining power is authority to distribute payoffs of a political reform between the majority and the minority. Our problem is; how should we distribute two political powers between the majority and the minority for the majority to restrain nationalistic political reform and to promote cooperative political reform?
Our main conclusions are as follows. First, in the case that political reform is not carried out, an actor having political bargaining power can increase its payoff, whoever may have decision-making power. Therefore, it is important who has political bargaining power. Second, in the case. that they cannot negotiate regarding the amount of nationalistic activity, if the majority has the political decision-making power, it has incentive to carry out nationalistic political reform. If the minority holds political decision-making power, the majority has incentive for cooperative political reform. Therefore, distribution of political decision-making power is important. Third, in the case that they can negotiate regarding the amount of nationalistic activity, we should give the minority both political decision-making power and political bargaining power to restrain the majority from making nationalistic political reforms. On the other hand, we should give the minority political decision-making power and the majority political bargaining power for the majority to promote cooperative political reforms.

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