国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2007 巻, 148 号
選択された号の論文の16件中1~16を表示しています
  • 国際政治研究の先端4
    山中 仁美
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 1-14,L5
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article explores E. H. Carr's views of Europe during and after The Twenty Years' Crisis. The initial focus is an examination of his idea of ‘New Europe’, which sought for a regional machinery of interdependence and co-operation among nations that was based on the development of wartime military and economic collaboration for practical post-war needs. Carr's ‘New Europe’ was formed by a question-driven process of discovering an original perspective of Europe, reflecting a dynamic transformation of the basic structure of international politics. It also indicated Carr's consistent belief that the nineteenth-century liberal order, whose decay brought about two world wars, should be superseded by a new order in the post-war era.
    The ‘New Europe’ was intended to defeat two enemies at home and abroad; one was the Axis, against whom the Allies were fighting, and the other was the existing social and economic order, which Carr believed needed radical reform and reconstruction. This ‘double action’ is to be interpreted in several historical and political contexts: global events such as the decline of Europe; British national call for social welfare; and the prevailing international thought on the limitations of national sovereignty and nationalism. Independent of these contexts, the idea of ‘New Europe’ was even used for justification of Japanese war aims.
    The article's findings may be appreciated from two perspectives. Firstly, in relation to Carr studies, it is interesting to observe that Carr's intellectual development revolving around ‘New Europe’ illustrates the process by which his wide range of interests and multi-faceted dynamic approaches were integrated. Beyond the rigid IR ‘realism-or-utopianism’ dichotomy, Carr's ‘New Europe’ sought to synthesise the pragmatism of international co-operation developed by those united in the struggle against the Axis and the idealism of post-national forms of political community in which equal rights are accorded to every citizen irrespective of national origin. Secondly, for students of the history of European integration, it should be intriguing to discover that there was an influential idea of a ‘New Europe’ advanced in Britain as early as July 1940, when many books and political pamphlets urged the necessity of a European federation but discussed in little detail planning for post-war reconstruction.
    Carr's synthesis of two different approaches highlights part of the tense but co-dependent relationship between the ideal and the real that was expressed in the very early stage of European integration. That is, in a large sense, a relationship between the tendency towards post-national political association based on the idea of controlling national sovereignty and the intention to maintain national power under the minimum framework of international organisation from which each national interest can profit. Carr's blueprint of post-war Europe is worth re-visiting as it illustrates both of those discussions.
  • 国際政治研究の先端4
    齋藤 嘉臣
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 15-28,L6
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article will attempt to analyse the détente policy of the Harold Wilson government in the mid-1960s. The structure of the Cold War system began to significantly change from the 1960s. After the second Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, the intense confrontation that had up until this time characterized this conflict was mitigated by the fear of all out nuclear war, thus creating the first atmosphere of Cold War détente in East-West relations. At the same time, within both the Eastern and the Western alliances multipolarity was being promoted, as a result more states were able to contribute to the process of détente. This interconnectedness of détente and multipolarity affected the way the British government engaged in détente and alliance politics.
    The 1960s saw British power decline in world affairs and the rise in power of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in Europe, a situation that became a symbol of multipolarity in the West. To maintain influence in European Cold War politics, Harold Wilson's government pursued a purposeful improvement in relations with the FRG. Therefore, even if the Wilson regime had had its own prescription to the German problem, it could not talk to the East in disregard of the wishes of the FRG government. The continuation of the policy of non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a second German state and the Order-Neisse line as the western border of Poland was the logical result.
    This initiative taken by the Wilson government centred on the idea of a “declaration on Europe”, which was intended to establish a code of conduct applied to all signatory states with the aim of creating a better political atmosphere in East-West relations. It depicted, for instance, removal of restrictions on trade and promotion of cultural exchange with the East. Behind the idea lay the prospect that multipolarity would enhance the autonomy of the East European states vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Due consideration was also paid to the FRG's special insistence on inserting the principle of self-determination in the draft text of the declaration. But the political circumstances were not suitable for the initiative to materialize. The Eastern insistence that the German problem had to be resolved to further détente through Western acceptance of the GDR and the Order-Neisse line, and the Western position that détente must be a pre-condition for the settlement of the German problem, effectively stalled the process of further detente.
    This initiative by the Wilson government needs reappraisal in order to show not only how the British government possessed a forward looking idea to promote and further détente but such a reappraisal also demonstrates the degree to which the German factor regulated the British diplomatic line. In this vein, détente and multipolarity were two determining factors underpinning British détente policy in the middle 1960s.
  • 国際政治研究の先端4
    高光 佳絵
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 29-42,L7
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Far Eastern Division of the U.S. State Department, which played quite important role in policy making in that decade, changed its policy in .February 1937. Hornbeck, Chief of the Division, abandoned his idea that international loan including Japan to China would stabilize the Far East and tried for concluding the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with China in exchange for abolition of extraterritoriality in China. It means the transformation from a policy which would contain Japan under U. S. -Japan conciliation to a policy which would pursue American trade interests under cooperation with China and Japan. The change of American understandings on Chinese-Japanese relations during Japanese aggressions into North China played an important role in this transformation.
    In the first stage of Japanese aggressions into North China in 1935, the United States estimated that if Chinese counter Japanese with armed force, Japanese aggressions would escalate into total war. They believed their interests were in trade relations with China and Japanese aggressions into North China would violate their interests. However, the United States prevented Chinese armed resistance through diplomatic channel, because if Japanese aggressions escalate into total war, their violation of U. S. interests would not be confined in North China but extended to all over China. Thus, it was quite important for the United States that Chinese do not counter Japanese aggression with armed force in this stage.
    But American understandings of Chinese-Japanese relations gradually changed in 1936. In February, they started to think that Chinese-Japanese relations did not have imminent importance to American interests in China. And in May, they finally concluded that while Japanese aggressions into North China would progress, it would not lead to total war between China and Japan. I argued that it was the reason why the United States observed that Chinese became strong enough to confine the disputes within North China, while Japanese lacked strong intention to extend their armed aggressions. Far Eastern Division recognized deadlock of Japanese aggressions into North China because of tensions between Soviet Union and Japan, success of the Chinese Monetary System Reform and reinforcement of Chiang Kaishek's position in domestic politics after death of Hu Han-min.
    United States did not act against Japanese foreign policy toward China until late 1930s. However, it did not mean either that the United States agreed to Japanese foreign policy toward China or that the effort of Far Eastern Division always lead to pro-Chinese policy.
  • 国際政治研究の先端4
    浜中 新吾
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 43-58,L8
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    A lot of dictatorship have collapsed and made a transition to democratic regimes late the Cold War. However, Middle Eastern states were never experienced with democratization wave. So that, there are scarcely any comparative democratization studies dealt with them. Today, we can understand some peculiar topics or indigenous logic of the Arab politics, because of being recently made advances in area studies of the Middle East. But we tend to think that comparative political research methods are not effective in understanding politics in the Middle East and do not help us to become familiar with it.
    Lipset's thesis is revaluated and the most popular one that goes with relationship between economic development and democracy after Huntington's democratic third wave. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators tried to renew a modernization theory, then their works help restore confidence of general and comparative theory. However, there is still a paradox that even rich countries do not catch on the path of democratic transition in the Middle East.
    The rentier state theory is used to explain this paradox why were not Middle Eastern countries democratized. This theory pays attention how much rent, natural resources like oil, natural gas, minerals with which states are able to ensure financial well being, gets support from many political economists. The rent also contains worker's remittance as well as official development assistance from foreign countries. So, a regime without resources may be categorized as a rentier state. A government with affluent rent does not have an incentive to liberalize own politics and societies because it needs not to impose a tax on its people, so the regime is easy to repress dissidents.
    In this study, I formalize a model of the rentier state theory from Boix-Stokes Modernization model, and then attempt quantitative analyses. My formalized rentier model has a scope of rent seeking activity of governments with fertile natural resources. So the purpose of this research is to shed light on a general effectiveness of the theory as well as to deal with democratic transitions as time passed or not, the Large N Studies is adopt as my research design. The method of quantitative analysis is the Dynamic Probit Model, which Adam Przeworski developed.
    The result of my study shows that enormous fuel rent tends to suppress democratic transition and promote stability of a dictatorship. But other natural resources and remittance rent have little to do with political transformation. The official development assistance dose not play a role of rent, seems to have a same effect of economic growth for democratization.
  • 国際政治研究の先端4
    笹岡 伸矢
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 59-73,L10
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    On December 25 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed due to Gorbachev's resignation as president of the Soviet Union. Since then, many scholars have presented papers on the Soviet collapse. In some approaches, the actorcentric approach has had a strong influence recently. This approach is divided into two analytical levels: the micro-level (elite-centric) and the mesolevel (organization-centric). This paper focuses on the latter one.
    During the period 1985-1991, there were three organized actors that maintained plentiful resources necessary to play important roles in the process of the transition: the military, opposition parties, and constituent republics. This paper attempts to examine which actor played the major role during 1985-1991, through using the game theory.
    First, it was in the August 1991 coup that the Soviet military got deeper involved in politics. In the perestroika period some senior military leaders remained deeply concerned about the future of their homeland and developed stronger ties with conservatives gradually. But middle-level commanders that were close to the citizens had a reluctance to shoot. Though the coup was triggered by the coalition that was formed as a result of the strong partnership between senior military leaders and conservatives, the commanders refused to carry out orders from superior officers. Eventually the coup failed.
    Second, in the communist regimes, dissidents had little room to create voluntary citizens' organizations. After liberalization some party reformers seceded from the regimes, and indeed social movements and political parties emerged. Likewise in the other communist regimes, opposition groups in the Soviet Union kept up the momentum towards participation in politics. Because there remained the constitution of Article 6, which guaranteed the leading role of the CPSU, opposition parties failed to participate in the elections of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. On the other side, the 1990 elections at the regional level witnessed the entry of opposition parties, because on March 14 1990 Article 6 was amended to remove the CPSU's leading role. As a consequence of such a difference of circumstances between the center and the republics, opposition parties never had the capacity to overthrow the Soviet central administration.
    Finally, the Soviet Union retained 15 ethno-national republics. Under the Soviet ethnofederalism ethnic cadres based on each union republic had accumulated and monopolized the mobilizational resources despite the intentions of the Soviet authorities. At the start of perestroika leaders of some republics absorbed a significant portion of nationalist movements. However, differences of conflicting positions among the rich republics and the poor republics were clarified. The leaders of the rich republics tended to secede from the union sooner or later, but the leaders of the poor ones chose to stay. As a consequence of the independence of the Baltic republics and the formation of CIS, the Soviet Union broke up.
  • 国際政治研究の先端4
    金 光旭
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 74-88,L11
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    After World War I, American diplomacy in the 20th century is characterized as being rooted in the Wilsonian principle. After entering the 21st century, the Wilsonian principle in American diplomacy is still powerful. By paying attention to such continuity, the first concern in this paper is to examine how the Wilsonian principle in American diplomacy operated in the process of establishing the government of South Korea after World War II.
    The reason it is important to pay attention to Wilsonianism is that the Wilsonian principle is one of the standards by which the foreign policy of the United States was led, not only concerning ideals and humanism, but also in the sphere of national interest. In addition, the purpose of this paper is to examine the Wilsonian principle, including both the country of origin and countries falling under Wilsonian influence.
    In particular, when Korea during the process of independence is considered, it was influenced by foreign trends of thought, repeating the conflicts related to those foreign trends of thought. The diplomacy of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG), initiated by Rhee Syngman, began to carry out its activities based on self-determination, which is one of Wilson's Fourteen Points. Strictly speaking, the Wilsonian principle was applicable only to European countries, and not to Asian countries such as Korea.
    The idea of Korean trusteeship was prepared as a post-war plan of the United States, and was influenced by the Wilsonian principle. This idea was applied through U. S. -Soviet cooperation that was installed as a transition period to lead the colony of pre-war days to independence. Both sides of the U. S. -Soviet cooperation wanted to prevent the establishment of a hostile nation on the Korean peninsula during the transition period.
    In addition, the Wilsonian principle was actively adopted by the military administrative officers who were inclined to the neo-Wilsonian ideology in regard to occupation policy and the establishment of the South Korean government by the United States. The South Korean policy of the United States tried to transplant American democracy, characterized as the Wilsonian principle, and to transplant the system and the values of the home country.
    The influence of the United States over South Korea stands out because South Korea strongly trusts the power and leadership of the United States in the international sphere. There were wishes and actions to invoke the power of the United States for independence and establishing a South Korean government around the end of WWII.
    At present, the friction between the United States and the Korean peninsula including North Korea is continuing. The friction is caused by the problems with national security, democracy and human rights. That is to say the confrontation over the Wilsonian principle.
    South Korea has accepted the Wilsonian principle and has worked to modernize and drive economic development while repeating various trials and errors since the establishment of the government. It is important to make the best use of the experience accumulated in this process.
  • 国際政治研究の先端4
    春名 展生
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 89-103,L12
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Hikomatsu KAMIKAWA, well known as one of the pioneers of the study of international poltics in Japan, is said to have been an “idealist” in the interwar period, though turned to become a “realist” afterwards. However, this presumed conversion, comparable to the contested common image of the Western experience, not only turns out to be flawed because of the duality of KAMIKAWA's comprehensive studies containing both “idealistic” and “realistic” sides simultaneously, it also conceals the logic linking both sides. KAMIKAWA presumed a single-tracked line of evolution subject to biological laws integrating his “realistic” description of the past and the present, and his “idealistic” expectation of the future. He considered the growth of population to be the fundamental driving force of the evolution, and therefore ranked biology among the sciences relevant to the study of international politics. This paper is intended to offer an overview of KAMIKAWA's reliance on biological analogies prevalent throughout his writings on international politics.
    By presumptively drawing an analogy between nations and living organisms, KAMIKAWA turned the arena of international politics into a sphere under the influence of biological laws. The “reality” of international politics was compared to the process of “the struggle for existence” unfolding in the relationship among nations, whose description matches the standard image of “realism.” On the other hand, he speculated on visions to confine the forms of the struggle to peaceful means, or to reinforce cooperation based on “solidarity”, the relationship supposed to develop in parallel with “the struggle for existence.” These so-called “idealistic” ideas were based on the writings of such critics of the doctrine of “the struggle for existence” as Peter Kropotkin or Jacques Novicow.
    KAMIKAWA's indulgence in the idea to analogize international politics to “the struggle for existence” among nations rendered his theories susceptible to German geopolitics which flourished in Japan from the latter half of the 1930s to the early 1940s. KAMIKAWA wrote prolifically with resort to the vocabulary of geopolitics during that period, and his commitment to this combatant prescription for diplomacy, which amounted to the negation of his own “idealist” vision of international politics in substance, apparently gives support to the pervasive conversion hypothesis aforementioned. However, not only does the hypothesis miss the plain fact that KAMIKAWA simultaneously speculated in both directions, “idealism” and “realism, ” the application of such extensive labels covering thinkers from ancient Greece to the contemporary even obscures the characteristic feature of KAMIKAWA's speculations based on biological analogies. This essay is intended as a reminder of such traits of KAMIKAWA left unrevealed by previous studies.
  • 国際政治研究の先端4
    足立 研幾
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 104-117,L13
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    International treaties such as the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty came into force after the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and the Fifth Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons were adopted in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Movements to form or strengthen international regimes have been increasingly visible over the last 10 years even in international security issue areas, where it is believed international cooperation is rarely achieved. Formations of these regimes seem to be related to each other. However, scant attention has been paid to the interactions among various international regimes. This article tries to assess how international regimes are changing and how new international regimes are established by focusing on the dynamic interactions among various international regimes on Conventional Weapons.
    International regimes are not independent from each other. The members of the international regimes are constituted from among some 200 nationstates. Quite a few international NGOs are involved in more than one international regime at the same time. Considering the same representatives from those nation states and international NGOs attend a couple of different regime meetings on similar topics, it is natural that changes within one regime or the formation of a new international regime influences the other regimes. This article demonstrates that interactions among international regimes, especially among those on conventional weapons, have become much denser, after the formation of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. Inspired by the successful formation of the Mine Ban Treaty, some international NGOs as well as nation states are trying to apply the lessons learned from the treaty formation process, the so-called Ottawa Process, to other issue areas, while others are trying to prevent another Ottawa Process from happening.
    This article tries to clarify how the balance between “national security” and “humanitarian consideration” in conventional governance has shifted, due to the interactions among international regimes. Also, this article shows that after the formation of the Mine Ban Treaty, the roles of international NGOs are growing increasingly important in regime formation processes as well as in regime implementation. Although it remains unclear if such a trend will continue, analyses focusing on interactions among international regimes seem viable understanding both changes and developments related to conventional weapons governance.
  • 国際政治研究の先端4
    石川 誠人
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 118-132,L15
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this article is twofold. Firstly, it examines Nationalist's attempts to implement the 1962 “Returning to the Mainland” plan. Secondly, it considers the Kennedy administration's response to this plan.
    After having retreated to Taiwan, Nationalist China placed the highest priority of the national policy on “Returning to the Mainland”. But the United States, the major benefactor of the Nationalists, tried to avoid an armed clash developed between Taipei and Beijing, and consistently restrained the Nationalists from invading mainland China. Following the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the U. S. and the Nationalist China exchanged notes in which Taipei, under Washington's pressure, agreed to withhold military action without holding prior consultation. Furthermore, at the time of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, Washington urged Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his “Returning to the Mainland” ambition. As a result, in an October 1958 joint communiqué' Chiang promised that the “principal means” of regaining the mainland would “not (be) the use of force”. Yet, the Nationalists still continued to pursue the policy of reconquering the mainland.
    The Nationalists envisioned themselves accomplishing its mission through provoking a “revolution” in the mainland before initiating the invasion. In 1961, Chiang, judging that the post-“Great Leap Forward”-chaos in China, along with the Sino-Soviet dispute, had generated widespread anti-communist sentiments, ordered the military to prepare for an offensive campaign. In the following year, he requested Kennedy's blessing for this plan.
    While the Kennedy administration had no intention of consenting to Chiang's demands, it could not afford to let their already strained relations deteriorate further. Therefore, rather than offering a clear reply, the administration partially satisfied Taipei's desire by allowing the Taipei government to carry out small scale “probing operations”. At the same time, Washington monitored Taipei's preparation for an invasion through taking an active part in the operation planning; it also pressed Taipei to reduce its military budget. Taipei yielded to the U. S. position because the two nations had agreed in 1960 to set a ceiling on the Nationalists' military spending. These measures kept the Nationalists from starting an offensive operation without impairing the relationship with the U. S.. Only after their enthusiasm for “Returning to the Mainland” faded, did the Kennedy administration inform Taipei of its opposition to conducting an invasion under the current circumstances.
    Still the Kennedy administration's attitude toward the Nationalist's aspirations for “Returning to the Mainland” remained ambiguous. Kennedy never announced that such an operation would not be accepted in the future. It was not until Lyndon B. Johnson took office that a clear statement denying U. S. support for regaining the mainland was finally issued.
  • サブリナ・P・ラメ著『ユーゴスラビアについて考える』バレール・フィリップ・ガノン著『民族戦争の神話』
    久保 慶一
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 133-142
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 川上 高司
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 143-146
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 植木(川勝) 千可子
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 146-149
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 昇 亜美子
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 150-153
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中村 友一
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 153-156
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中野 亜里
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 157-160
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 吉川 元
    2007 年 2007 巻 148 号 p. 161
    発行日: 2007/03/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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