Many books and articles have been published about the foreign policy of the United States since the demise of the Cold War, but few of them examine and analyze the U. S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War based upon the manipulative Cold War concept. I will first examine what the Cold War was like and then how the end of it impacted upon the world affairs and the U. S. foreign policy.
Today it is widely said that we live not in the post-Cold War period but in the post-post-Cold War period. The September 11 terrorist attack in 2001 seems to make us recognize that we live definitely in the world of the post-post-Cold War period quite different from that of post-Cold War. Even though the end of the Cold War gave the serious impact upon the world and the U. S. foreign policy after it and furthermore the U. S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War profoundly affected the world affairs including September 11 attack, the concept of the Cold War has remained ambiguous even in the academia. Unless it has not been clearly defined, we cannot thoroughly discuss how the demise made an impact upon the world affairs and the U. S. foreign policy. This is why I attempted to examine or define the Cold War which might be to a greater extent used to explain the international politics after the World War II In my article I temporarily define the Cold War as “a state of tension short of direct military collision caused by deterioration of the political communication system between the US and the Soviet, juxtaposed against the threat of an all out annihilation upon humanity provoked by conflict of ideology and nuclear arms”.
Considering the impact of the end of the Cold War upon the international politics based on this definition of the Cold War, I edited this special issue of “International Relations” under the title of “The U. S. Foreign Policy in the World after the Cold War”. Prof. Hideki Kan re-examines the foreign policies of Bush Sr., Clinton and Bush Jr. Administrations from the various angles. Mr. Tatsuya Nishida analyzes the unipolar system taking shape in the post-Cold War world using the balancing theory. Mr. Osamu Kitamura profoundly considers why the United States has been engaged in “the Democratic War” from the perspective of the history of international political thoughts and attempts to reveal the bedrock of the U. S. foreign policy. Mr. Young-Geun Kim explores the reasons why the U. S. trade policy shifted from its conflict with GATT to its coordination/harmonization with WTO. Prof. Nobumasa Akiyama first traces how and why the United States sought to build an order/system for nuclear weapons non-proliferation and then examines how and why the Bush Jr. Administration has tried to reorganize the order/system. Both Prof. Takako Ueta and Tomonori Yoshizaki closely examine the relationship of the United States with NATO in the post-Cold War period. Prof. Motohide Saito overviews the background and process that the relationship between the U. S. and Russia has swung or “zigzagged” especially after September 11. Prof. Emi Mifune examines the reasons why the United States sometimes cooperates and sometimes conflicts with China apparently becoming a great power in the post-Cold War period. Prof. Yuko Ito surveys the U. S. -Philippine relations in the post-Cold War era while analyzing the reasons of the change of the relations. Mr. Kouhei Imai examines the role of Turkey in the U. S. foreign policy toward the Middle East introducing the concept of “transmission middle-power”.

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US hegemony faced post-Cold War challenges both in Asia and Europe. One challenge came from the EU. Other challenges came from Asia where the US-Japan alliance, under the impact of the ending of the Cold War, began to drift amidst the rising power of China and North Korea's nuclear development program. Added to these challenges was a new kind of threat by ‘terrorists’ to the US-centered world order.
The Clinton administration embarked on the redefinition of the US-Japan alliance in the fall of 1994. Through the signing of the Japan-US joint Declaration on Security in 1996 and the establishment of the new Guidelines on Japan-US Defense Cooperation in 1997, Washington succeeded in integrating Japan in the US strategy in Asia.
During the redefinition process, Washington policymakers effectively exploited North Korea's nuclear development program to convince many Japanese of the continued importance of the security treaty. The rising power of China was no less important for Washington and Tokyo in redefining the bilateral alliance.
In the economic field, the Clinton administration pursued a strategy of globalization, pressuring Japan to open markets for US goods and investment as well as seeking similar objectives by promoting China's admission to the WTO. Rapid liberalization of trade, investment and finance led to Asia's financial crisis in 1997. The US response during the crisis failed to live up to the responsibility of a hegemonic power as the last lender because she did not come to the rescue of those countries suffering from the crisis.
The deep disillusionment with the US prompted Asian countries to create an Asian Monetary Fund. Even though the AMF initiative did not materialize in the face of Washington's opposition, Asian countries had not given up the idea that some kind of mechanism was needed to deal with problems of financial instability. Such feelings led to the Chiang Mai Initiative in May 2000 in which Japan, China, South Korea and ASEAN countries declared their intention to establish a basket of dollars and major Asian currencies (“swap lines”) to support each others' currencies in times of economic crisis. This move was seen by many as a first step toward more financial autonomy for Asia, with significant implications for US hegemony in the IMF.
In Europe, NATO has been a key mechanism to maintain US hegemony in the face of the growing influence of the EU but its effectiveness was severely tested in the Balkans. The Dayton accords that had ended the Bosnian war (1992-95) showed that even “the limited use of force…could make a decisive difference.” (Madeleine Albright) Moreover, the emerging crisis in Kosovo that followed threatened to endanger not only the implementation of the Dayton accords but also the process of NATO enlargement that had been under way since October 1996. Therefore, Albright regarded the Kosovo crisis as “a key test of American leadership and of the relevance and effectiveness of NATO.” Faced with the Balkan crisis that challenged US leadership and unity in NATO, the Clinton administration learned that even the limited use of force was effective in maintaining US hegemony vis-à-vis the EU through NATO.
US hegemony during the Bush (Jr.) administration was also challenged by the ‘terrorist’ attacks in 9.11 and the Iraq under Saddam Hussein. President Bush attempted to tackle these challenges by linking his ‘war against terrorism’ with Hussein's alleged program to develop WMD. However, the core members of the EU opposed Bush's war against Iraq. As Bush himself confided, the crux of the matter was not just “about Saddam Hussein” but was “about the ascendancy of power in Europe.” In this sense, Bush's war against Hussein's Iraq was “an indirect war on the European Union” (Thomas Mc-Cormick).
Bush's pursuit of global hegemony ended up in destabilizing not

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This paper aims to explore how states' balancing behaviors have changed in the transition from the bipolarity during the Cold War period to the unipolarity in the post-Cold War period. Whether or not unipolarity is sustainable is still controversial. Structural realism argues that unipolarty is not sustainable, because unipolarity is an imbalanced international system where the superpower monopolizes most of economic and military capabilities and other major powers are likely to balance against the superpower to restore the balance-of-power within the system. However, the unipolarity in the post-Cold War period has not only continued for more than fifteen years but also intensified the concentration of economic and military strength on the United States (U. S.). Also, other major powers have neither built up military strength nor formed an alliance against the U. S. yet. Why have not non major powers attempted to balance against the U. S. and restore the balance of power? Could unipolarity be a sustainable international structure? This paper explores conditions under which the U. S. is likely to sustain the unipolar system without much resistance from other major powers and conditions under which states are likely to balance against the U. S. Basically, the paper argues that whether or not a unipolar system can be sustainable depends on behaviors of the superpower. Although many claim that U. S. should restrain its aggressive foreign policy, this paper asserts that the strategic restraint is necessary but not sufficient for maintaining the unipolarity. The U. S. should continue to provide international public goods to the international society, because the provision of public goods gives incentives for other states to support the U. S. -led unipolar system and makes the unipolarity durable. Then, the paper further attempts to compare predictions and implications of this main proposition with those of the balance-of-power theory and the balance-of-threat theory and illuminate their differences. Examining trends of economic and military capabilities among major powers, threat perceptions toward the U. S., and behaviors of major powers in international organizations and regimes in the post-Cold War period, this paper concludes that the current Bush administration's foreign policy is worrisome but not so threatening to other states to such an extent that they attempt to balance against the U. S. Finally, the paper suggests that it is critical to further assess and determine whether the Bush administration's behavior shows the aberration of U. S. international cooperation policy during the former Bush and Clinton administrations, or the starting trend of the U. S. unilateral foreign policy in the long run for the future.

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It is often mentioned that democracies do not, or are very unlikely to, make war against other democracies. This “democratic peace” theory has become a commonplace not only in international political thought but also in the mindsets of American presidents and diplomats. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, for example, have referred to this international ethical cycle: promoting democracy would make world peace. The idea of democratic peace was advocated by Kant. Kant thought that a majority of the people would never vote to go to war under the republican (democratic) governments because they were cautious of war.
However, the road to democracy may involve war. Democratic peace increasingly seems to be linked to war. It is obvious that democracies are peaceful towards each other but in general they are as war-prone as any other regime type. The theory of democratic peace, therefore, remains fragmentary as long as it fails to account for the practice of war on the part of democracies. At the dark side of democratic peace, “democratic war” occurs. According to Harald Müller, “democratic war” means the resort to the use of force by democracies in order to promote democracy for peace.
In the history of international political thought, some thinkers acknowledge that democracies tend to be war-prone. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, pointed out that democracy in America was likely to go to war. It is true that America foreign policy contains this Tocqueville's legacy. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has justified wars and military interventions to export democracy to non-democratic states. Moreover, in order to prevent transnational terrorism, American foreign policy supports. “war against terrorism” under the just war tradition. For American foreign policy, “war against terrorism” is a just war. Promoting democracy is strongly related to combating against terrorism. Moral justification of war is one of the most important things for American foreign policy after the Cold War.
There was same logic behind the justification of the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the United States' invasion of Iraq was justified in part as a preventive war for making democratic peace. American “democratic wars” are developed by the universalistic (Kantian-Wilsonian) principles of democratic peace. However, attempts to make democratic peace by using external force would have failed eventually. Without regard to humanitarian purpose or not, it is obvious that democracy in America is more war-prone rather than the reverse.

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This paper focuses on the development (and the process of divergence and convergence) of the principle of reciprocity in U. S. trade policy and GATT/WTO.
First I will examine the history and the historical background of the principle of reciprocity. Then I will analyze how the principle of reciprocity in U. S trade policy associates with the principle of reciprocity developed in the WTO through case study analysis.
The fundamental stance of reciprocity in trade relations shaped U. S. trade policy from the postwar period through the 1970s. However, in the 1980s the US policy took coercive measures to end the unfair trade conditions in over-seas markets and open markets to US exports. The reciprocity in this U. S. policy deviated from the principle of reciprocity of GATT (General agreement on Tariffs and Trade) which is based on mutual consent to conduct trade on the basis of Most-Favored-Nation principle and national treatment. Both the objective and means of reciprocity in US trade policy changed. Beginning with President Reagan in the 1980s, under Section 301 U. S. policy began to make unilateral demands for market opening using tariff retaliation action if necessary. This approach was fiercely criticized during the Uruguay-Round GATT negotiations.
The hypothesis of this thesis is that a fundamental principle of reciprocity in U. S. trade policy has returned to the principle of reciprocity of GATT/WTO after the establishment of World Trade Organization (WTO).
U. S. trade policy toward GATT/WTO was understood mainly through international law approach and multilateralism or international regime approach. To date, there has been no academic effort to understand the principle of reciprocity in the U. S. trade policy towards GATT/WTO with the perspective of emphasizing the relationship between international and domestic political process. I will discuss how preferences, policies, and institutions on the side of U. S. are related to GATT/WTO regime and evaluate the impact of the international system (legalization) upon domestic politics (institutions, coalitions, policies). Furthermore, I would like to discuss the theory of ‘The Second Image Reversed’ along with this theme.

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The conventional global order to ensure non-proliferation has consisted of three layers: the NPT-IAEA regime, ‘institutionalized’ deterrence under the U. S. -Soviet bipolar system and an ‘Atoms for Alliance’ as implication of ‘Atoms for Peace.’ These layers formed an incentive/enforcement/legitimacy structure. The NPT-IAEA regime provides a persistent and nearly universal norm of non-proliferation under the ‘grand-bargain’ among non-proliferation, inalienable right of peaceful use of nuclear energy, and disarmament, which have gained universal legitimacy. Institutionalized deterrence provided an incentive for non-nuclear weapons states to comply with the non-proliferation norm by assuring the security (nuclear umbrella) against nuclear attack. ‘Atoms for Alliance’ was a mechanism to offer nuclear cooperation as an incentive for a state to stay in the U. S. camp as U. S. friend and to contain allies' nuclear ambition.
As the Cold War ended, a threat of nuclear exchange in a large scale was fading away. Instead, threats of nuclear proliferation have come to take more complicated shapes as ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran have been engaged in nuclear proliferation activities, and interacted with non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Threats posed by these actors could not be deterred by conventional structures of incentives for compliance of non-proliferation norms.
Recognizing that non-compliance was the most serious problem of the global non-proliferation order, the United States has obviously shifted its emphasis from conventional multilateralist norms based on the universality in acceptance of such norms, to compliance by enforcement and sanctions. In the early period of the post—Cold War era, such tendency appeared in rather ‘unilateralistic’ behaviors of the United States. But after struggles in the ending the Iraq War that was started to eliminate Iraqi WMD program, the United States showed a come-back to multilateralism, in a different way. A multilateralism that the United States pursues is called ‘Effective Multilateralism.’ It places a priority on ‘effectiveness’ of policy implementation, to confront “the real problems … with realism and determination in league with international partners.” Along this line, the United States proposed Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), G8 Global Partnership, moratorium of transfer of fuel cycle technology and materials, and Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and initiated U. N. Security Council Resolution 1540. In a sense, NPT-IAEA non-proliferation norms have come to depend their compliance on external, less universal enforcement mechanisms.
Such initiatives certainly increased the awareness of the international society in compliance with non-proliferation norms. But its ‘coalition of the willing’ type approach may face loophole problems in mechanisms due to the lack of universality and of difficulty in cost sharing. A real concern would be how to manage both universal adherence and effectiveness at the sustainable cost both for the United States and the international society.

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This article traces the US policy toward the Atlantic Alliance since the end of the Cold War. The US has initiated and has led the transformation of NATO in political and military terms in order to adopt it to a changing strategic environment and to make the Alliance serve US interests.
As for military transformation, the US has promoted the enhancement of interoperability with its highly sophisticated forces and to narrow the gap between the US and NATO allies by introducing various initiatives including “Prague Capabilities Commitment, ” as well as “NATO Response Force.”
The successive US Administrations took the lead in the eastward enlargement of the alliance and of launching “out-of-area” crisis response and peace support missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. NATO is currently training Iraq security forces on the spot and supporting the African Union's mission in Darfur.
Longstanding disagreement in the Alliance between the Atlanticist countries and France and its followers, which attaches importance to developing “autonomous” EU military capabilities, has been a structural problem. The US has been suspicious of the development of the ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity) and ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy). Besides this, the problem between Turkey and Greece has made cooperation between NATO and the EU less easy.
The US war on terror divided the US Allies. Immediately after the 9.11 attacks, NATO invoked its article five of the collective defence clause in order to help the US. However, the US did not use NATO military assets but organized a coalition of the willing, which caused disappointment and concern among its European Allies. In their view, for Americans, NATO is one of the tools and is not important. On Iraq, there were notable differences between the US and the UK on one side, and France and Germany on the other side.
Another example of differences is the “Global Partnerships” initiative. The Global Partnerships was a US initiative which would institutionalize cooperation with Japan, Australia and other democratic countries in order to cope with terrorist threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Some countries were concerned about “Global NATO” which might dilute the core mission of collective defence. Finally, it was not institutionalized, but bilateral cooperation with these countries was realized.
Another future difficult agenda for striking out cooperation in NATO will be the US missile defence project in Czech Republic and Poland.
Although there has emerged different positions on various issues in the Alliance, for the US, the NATO will continue to be important since its European Allies and Canada shares the same values and interests. In order to cope with terrorist threats, the US needs allies. However, the military credibility of its peace support operations in relation to terrorist threats will depend on their success in Afghanistan.

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Throughout the Cold War, the U. S. regarded NATO as one of the means to contain the Soviet Union in Europe. The formation of the Atlantic Alliance was a Western response to the Soviet threat, which was fully consistent with a “defensive” realist argument. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, NATO not only survived the end of the Cold War but also became enlarged and globalized; it conducted crisis response operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and trained Iraqi military, with its new members of the former Warsaw Pact. The dynamic transformation of NATO constitutes a challenge to a traditional understanding of alliance.
This article is an attempt to examine how and why NATO has transformed itself into a global “expeditionary force.” The key to unlock the puzzle is alliance's Strategic Concepts (1991/99) and Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006). These strategy documents, decided by consensus of all members, provide a common denominator in alliance management. It contains three important elements. First, alliance's role and mission was redefined. After the Soviet threat vanished, “out-of-area” operations in Bosnia and Kosovo gave NATO a raison d'être. In the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO invoked its collective defense clause, which became a prelude to a historic decision to support the Global War on Terror. Second, alliance's capability was redefined. Even somewhat reluctantly, NATO decided to support the U. S. -led coalitions on a case-by-case basis. This new orientation made it necessary to close the “capabilities gap” between the U. S. and Europe. NATO Response Force, proposed by U. S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, became a stimulus to accelerate the transformation of European forces. Third, a new form of burden-sharing was explored. In the Cold War era, transatlantic “division of labor” was rather simple; while European efforts focused on conventional buildup for the defense of the continent, Americans continued to offer extended deterrence to European allies. Today, efforts on both sides of the Atlantic became more complementary and even mutually enhancing. American “exit strategy” in Bosnia was made possible by handing over command authority from NATO-led to an EU-led force. In Afghanistan, NATO now assumes overall responsibility inclusive of counterinsurgency operations.
Thus NATO forces have become more agile and deployable in global arena, as stipulated in the strategy documents. NATO is shifting its emphasis from defense of members' territory to defense of common interests worldwide, which corresponds with a prediction of “offensive” realism.

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The main purpose of this paper is to analyze U. S. policy toward Russia and the post-Soviet region along with Russia's response from the September 11, 2001 attacks through the July 2007 U. S. -Russian summit talks. First of all, I will illustrate the key features of President George W. Bush's foreign policy toward Russia, and then will argue the evolving US-Russian relationship in three phrases.
The first phase, characterized as the period of President Vladimir Putin's “one-sided love, ” covers the period from the advent of the Bush administration in January 2001 to May of the same year. The second phase, “the period of the U. S. -Russo honeymoon, ” extends from May 2001 through 9/11 of the same year to around the outbreak of the Iraq War in March of 2003. Contrary to the prevailing view, Washington's relationship with Moscow had begun to improve prior to 9/11 after President Bush's May 2001 at the War College. It was against this backdrop that the 9/11 attacks took place and the two nations closely cooperated with the Islamic radicalism as their common adversary. The third phase, i. e., “the period of the Cold Peace, ” started in the fall, 2003 after the end of the Iraq War. In 2006, the bilateral relationship deteriorated sharply after the rise of Russia's clout and the implementation of Moscow's high-handed diplomacy, particularly in its neighboring states. The United States has been apprehensive of Russia steadfastly tilting toward an authoritarian regime. Interestingly, President Bush's stance vis-à-vis Russia appears to be not as tough as the U. S. Congress wants.
U. S. policy toward the Baltic States, Ukraine, South Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia's response after 9/11 will also be discussed in details. A special reference is made to illustrate the U. S. efforts to enhance its influence in Central Asia after the 2005 Andijan uprising in Uzbekistan; since then, Washington has tried to enhance its influence in Central Asia without pressing hard for the democratization of the existing regimes.
Since the disintegration of the USSR, the United States has been pursuing a policy to consolidate the independence of the states in the post-Soviet space. In contrast, the Russian side continuously regards it as its own sphere of influence. Russia contends that the United States has been trying to secure its own hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Although the Cold War is over, mutual suspicion remains.
There is no question that the U. S. -Russian relationship is at the lowest point in the past 20 years. Yet it is an exaggeration to insist that a new Cold War has arrived. For example, a selective partnership between the U. S. and Russia exists in the war on terrorism, the diplomatic settlement of the nuclear issue of Iran and North Korea as well as the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction.

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This paper examines major influences brought on by the end of the Cold War with regards to U. S. -China relations and analyzes the underlying factors made prominent by changes in U. S. -China relations in the post-Cold War era.
From the Sino-American rapprochement to the end of the Cold War, the United States and China have developed a strategic cooperative relationship in order to cope with Soviet power. Despite previous antagonism, Washington and Beijing joined forces to deal with their common Soviet adversary. With the absence of the overriding Soviet threat in the post-Cold War era, the U. S. and China have reconsidered each other's strategic influences and positions. The collapse of the previous bipolar system has significantly impacted Sino-U. S. relations. China has been using its privileged membership in the P-5 as a political and diplomatic instrument to increase its diplomatic power. Cooperative management of U. S. -China relations is important to the interests of both countries. China's rapid rise as a regional economic, political and diplomatic power with global aspirations is an important element of contemporary U. S. -China relations. It is an inescapable imperative that the relationship between the U. S. and China not be adversarial. Therefore, China is promoting multilateralism and its New Security Policy, which is based on cooperation and trust. Chinese multilateralism and the New Security Policy were formed as political instruments to restrain the U. S. containment policy toward China.
These changing contexts have affected the way in which the United States and China currently address chief elements in their relationship such as conflicts over human rights, issues regarding Taiwan, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and economic ties. China's economic trajectory has driven its expanding energy needs, which has now made China the world's second largest energy consumer behind the United States. This growing energy demand has created an increasing dependence on imported oil. To enhance its energy security, China has developed energy deals with countries deemed “dangerous” or “problematic” to U. S. “concerns” through political accommodations and sales or transfers of weapons and military technology to these nations, including Iran and Sudan, whose blatant abuse of human rights is supported by arms supplied by China. These dictatorial administrations oppose criticism from Europe and the U. S. by using the China's veto power in the United Nations to bypass U. S. concerns regarding human rights violations. China also has great potential to compete militarily with the United States, utilizing field-disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U. S. military advantages. Growing modernization in China's strategic forces has enhanced its strategic strike capabilities and is improving beyond that of Taiwan's. China's continued pursuit of area denial and anti-access strategies is expanding from traditional land, air, and sea dimensions of the modern battlefield to include space and cyber-space. Taiwan remains the most sensitive and complex issue for China. Recently, Taiwan's political environment has become unstable due to political disagreement between the DPP and opposition parties, ever-shifting political pressure of the PRC on Taiwan, wobbly U. S. -Taiwan relations, and the constant push by President Chen Shuibian of the PRC to establish a separate international identity for Taiwan. Although China is the second-largest U. S. trading partner, economic issues are now a growing source of contention between the U. S. and China.

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This article intends to explore the transformation of the U. S. -Philippine military alliance during the post-cold war period. The U. S. bases in the Philippines, among which the Subic Bay Naval Installations and the Clark Air Base were the major ones, were the symbol of the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia, as well as the continued post-colonial relationship between the two countries. Although those bases were peripheral in America's military strategy, they were retained during the cold war period, due to the then existing international structure in which they worked as a balancer against the Soviet military presence in the region. The removal of the U. S. bases in the Philippines in 1992 has been generally viewed as the triumph of Philippine nationalism against the continued presence and influence of the ex-sovereign state. However, this type of interpretation does not explain why the Philippines invited the United States to come back to use her bases in the late 1990's, signing the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Moreover, after September 11, 2001, the two countries resumed joint military operations in an attempt to suppress the activities of anti-government organizations in the Philippines. This article investigates international as well as domestic political-economic factors that enabled the bases removal and the following conclusion of the VFA. In addition, it tries to explain the characteristics of the US-Philippine cooperation on the “war against terrorism” in the 21st century, namely, America's intervention in internal affairs of the Philippines under the name of “win [ning] the hearts and minds of the people.”
From the above analysis, it is obvious that the essential feature of the U. S. -Philippine relations during the cold war period, namely the Philippine's dependence on the United States with regard to international security and domestic counter-insurgency, as well as the pattern of the U. S. intervention, still continue in the post-cold war world. Meanwhile, however, the United States has become more demanding from her allies their utmost contributions to the so-called “common defense, ” and set her policy to supply economic and military aid as rewards to the allies' cooperation. Unlike the cold war era when the international structure was relatively fixed, given the United States and the Soviet Union as two contending superpowers, the United States herself decides who the enemies are, in the era of the “war against terror.” Under such circumstances, it tends to be more difficult than before for the weak “ally” to behave autonomously, and the intervention by the superpower in the ally's counterinsurgency operations tends to be justified under the name of the “war against terrorism”.

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The aim of this paper is to explore how Turkey contributes to American foreign policy during the Post-Cold War era, especially Middle Eastern dimension.
The discussion has three parts. Firstly, this deals with American foreign policy toward the Middle East during Post-Cold War era and demonstrates American failure. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, international order started to change and the United States intensified its hegemonic power. But America failed to manage Iraq War, and Middle East region is becoming disorder and nest of terrorism. Furthermore, Anti-Americanism is spreading rapidly in this region. The United States is coming to reach a deadlock.
Secondly, Turkey will be situated “Transmission Middle Power” after Iraq War. Since the word of “Middle Power” is ambiguous, it has to be conceptualized at first. In this paper, “Middle Power” is classified as “Classical Middle Power”, “Functional Middle Power” and “Transmission Middle Power”. Historically, Turkey has been described as “Middle Power”. However, its role and quality of power have been changed by relationship of Great Power and international structure. Now, Turkey pioneers “Transmission Middle Power” by using historical and cultural factors.
Thirdly, this focuses on American-Turkish relations. Since both states faced the Soviet threat during the Cold War period, Turkey contributed American containment policy. The end of bipolar system, however, changed their relationships. During the Gulf War, Turkey assisted the United States through economic sanction against Iraq and offered the multinational force to military bases. Turkey acted as “Classical Middle power” in the Cold War era. But after the Gulf War, both countries disagreed with OPC (Operation Provide Comfort) and OPCII in Northern Iraq. In Iraq War, Turkey did not offer to military bases. This was watershed of American-Turkish relations. After this decision, Turkey seeks to contribute to Middle Eastern stability as “Transmission Middle Power”. In particular, the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) is a good deliberative place among Middle Eastern countries to prevail democracy. Turkey is one of chair countries in Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), which is a component of BMENA..
In conclusion, Turkey is “Middle Power” so it has to keep good relationships with the United States to spread its influence toward International politics in the Post-Cold War era. However, the forms of cooperation have changed all the time by international affairs and structure. Now, “Transmission Middle Power” is the best form both America and Turkey.

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