Existing guidelines for humanitarian organizations on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies are not appropriate for other civilian organizations engaging in peacebuilding. This paper seeks to suggest an urgent need for developing an alternative to such guidelines. By reviewing a series of interactions between the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, the paper purports to illuminate a basic set of guiding principles that would define the relationship between civilian and military actors in peacebuilding.
According to the existing guidelines, the use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations should only be allowed under the following circumstances: (1) in the case of “last resort, ” (2) where no alternative civilian resources exists— “unique capability, ” (3) where the use of military assets to support humanitarian activities is provisional— “time-limited, ” (4) where the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action— “timeliness, ” and (5) where “civilian control” over the use of military assets is guaranteed. Nevertheless, this paper argues that such a set of criteria cannot be adopted automatically as a guideline for both civilian and military actors in the DDR process, which is one of the core activities of peacebuilding. In fact, a very close coordination between civilian and military actors was observed in the Afghan DDR process.
In the Afghan peacebuilding process, a new civil-military endeavor called PRT has been introduced in order to facilitate post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the “non-permissive” environment in the provinces of Afghanistan. The basic concept of the PRT adopts a three-pillar approach, that is, PRTs seek to tackle with three core dimensions of peacebuilding such as security, governance, and reconstruction in an integrated way.
The study examines the functions fulfilled by PRTs in the DDR process in three distinct phases: (1) pre-operational stage, (2) operational stage, and (3) transitional stage. In the pre-operational stage, interactions between the civilian organizations responsible for the DDR process and the military element in PRTs did not occur. This is because the basic implementation plan of the DDR process had already been developed by the civilian organizations in charge when PRTs completed their nation-wide deployment. However, there exists a potential for further cooperation between civilian and military actors in the pre-operational stage, especially in the areas of joint planning and joint exercise. In the operational stage, on the other hand, PRTs fulfilled key civil-military coordination functions such as communication, exchange of information, facilitating agreements, and evaluation. In addition to such key functions, PRTs also contributed to the advancement of the DDR process by performing the following five lubricating functions: (1) deterrence, (2) persuasion and mediation, (3) incentive, (4) information dissemination and collection, and (5) labor service. In the transitional stage, most of civil-military interactions occurred in the Reintegration phase of the DDR process in which PRTs filled in a gap between the DD phases and the R phase. PRTs are also expected to fill in the wider gap between the DDR process and the mid-term socio-economic development.
Based on a close review of the civil-military interactions in the Afghan DDR process, the study concludes that (1) timeliness and (2) effectiveness could be the twin fundamental guiding principles for the civil-military relationship in peacebuilding.

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This study illustrates the gender norms embedded in the socio-political orders in the Soviet Union in the past and in the Russian Federation in the present days, and also sketches how they differ each other and why. For this purpose the author examines following two aspects: the basic principles on women's role and the actual circumstances of women in the society.
In the Soviet ideological principles, all the people, including women as well as men had to work. They thought that wage work would make women economically independent so that they would eventually be emancipated. The Soviet government actually encouraged women to find employment and in later period the number of female workers even slightly exceeded that of male, though female wages in general remained lower.
This line of thought appears to exclude the existence of the gender notion. There was, however, another line. The Soviet government not only encouraged women to work but also expected them to bear children and take care of families as mothers. Women then had to do most of housework other than their daily jobs. This so-called “double burden” was mitigated to some extent by the state support in order that female workers could meet their responsibility at work and at home. In other words, family life was not simply a private matter but a matter of the state's concern.
In spite of the heavy burden, women seemed to generally accept their gendered role with lower-wage work and housework duties, particularly if their husbands earned more. However, some soviet writers insisted especially in the period of Perestroika that women would prefer to stay home if possible economically.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been no definite governmental principles on women's role as in the Soviet period. However, political and economic liberalism, which the new Russian government has adopted at least theoretically, has a certain influence on the women's position. Political liberalism draws a line between public and private affairs and this newly introduced ideology, combined with the severe economic crisis, has led to the cut-off of the state support to family. Economic liberalism justifies the dismissal of female workers for they are more expensive than male.
Under these circumstances the number of female workers was drastically reduced. However, many women are still working and they represent almost half of the entire number of workers. Several researches show that women in Russia want to work rather than stay home even if possible economically. Same researches also demonstrate that women think that they should take the responsibility of doing housework and indeed they do so. Women's “double burden” and their attitude toward it survived the regime change at the present moment.

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During the 70s, the Chinese domestic political system and the East Asian Cold War order faced simultaneous structural changes. It was inevitable that each change mutually affected the other, yet the existent research has not adequately examined how they impacted Japan-China relations. This paper addresses the main factors which influenced Chinese policy toward Japan, dealing with the case of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty negotiation.
This paper seeks to capture the dynamics of domestic and international factors in the Chinese decision making process at three turning-points in the negotiation: interruption in fall 1975, resumption in September 1977 and the final stage of negotiations from May to August, 1978. The basic purpose here is to reexamine Japan-China relations as a part of an integrated Chinese diplomacy, which is conventionally analyzed as bilateral relations.
In the first chapter, the reasons for the discontinuation and the resumption of negotiations by China are explained. Since East Asian affairs were becoming more relaxed at the time, this paper rejects the speculation that China was motivated by a strong intention to make Japan into an anti-Soviet ally. Rather, China was temporarily less motivated to cooperate with Japan due to domestic political disorder. The domestic power struggle took precedence over advancing economic relations with Japan.
The second chapter focuses on what motivated China's sudden change in decision making from May, 1978. In May, China agreed to structure a new security coalition with the US, to supplement the US alliances in East Asia. The United States and China shared a common interest in normalization and excluding Soviet power from the Korean Peninsula. By summer, moreover, out of fear that Vietnam might normalize relations with the US, China hurried to promote cooperative relationships with US allies in East Asia. Consequently, the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan gained a new strategic significance, which motivated China to conclude negotiations rapidly. In any evaluation of the meaning of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty, it is impossible to ignore the role of the US factor.
During the negotiations, the specific bilateral problems between Japan and China, such as history, territory, and Taiwan were not dealt with. Instead, the new East Asian power balance was constructed and maintained during the 80s. The Japan-China relationship was also stabilized in the context of the international system, which resulted in the steady development of the bilateral relationship. Leaving outstanding issues unresolved, however, sowed the seeds of future conflict. In the conclusion, this paper maintains that the complex international context was key to China's decision to shelve its problems with Japan. The Chinese decision was rational given their strategic concerns.

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This thesis picks up Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1973), a Japanese leading liberalist in Meiji-Taisho era. He is known for “Little Japanism”—the idea that Japan should develop sorely by peaceful economic expansion in a world where the high degree of economic interdependence among nations had rendered territorial expansion obsolete. Researchers have praised his liberal worldview almost uncritically. However, his international theory which was based on the fundamental peacefulness of economic relations had some serious weaknesses. Confronted with Japanese immigration exclusion in the United States, Tanzan stressed that U. S.-Japan relations were not at stake because their economic relations were still peaceful. Yet, the experience of W. W. I revealed the vulnerability of the unorganized economic interdependence. Japanese People began to feel awkward about Tanzan's “Little Japanism, ” and insisted that Japan, who was rejected to enter the white countries, had no choice but to expand to Asia.
However, Tanzan was not a naive believer in natural harmony of national interests. He was a “realist” who recognized a fundamental disagreement about a desirable world order between Japan and Anglo-Saxon countries. His “realists” aspect was revealed in his response to American “New Diplomacy.” During W. W. I, American President Woodrow Wilson declared “New Diplomacy.” and demanded that each nation should adopt a more liberal foreign policy. Many Japanese liberalists sympathized with American “New Diplomacy” and encouraged people to share it. However, most people looked at American “New Diplomacy” with suspicion, saying that Americans still excluded Japanese immigrants from their country and violated the very principles that they advocated. Confronted with people's cynical attitudes, the leading liberalists like Yoshino Sakuzo just stressed that American “New Diplomacy” was not such a self-interested slogan as most people thought. They never discussed American racial attitudes for fear of stimulating Japanese people's anti-American feeling. Some opinion leaders like Konoe Fumimaro criticized their pro-American attitedes, and insisted that Japan should not hesitate to fight against Anglo-Saxon contries for a truly just order.
Tanzan did not subscribe to the widespread cynical views on American “New Diplomacy.” Yet, he was also different from the uncritical followers of it. He clearly realized that American “New Diplomacy” did not provide satisfactory solutions of colonialism and racial discrimination, and advocated that Japan should fight for their realization. In this sense, he was a “realist.” Yet, unlike Konoe, Tanzan tried to achieve a just order by throughgoing liberal means. When the United States proposed the Washington Conference (1921-1922) in order to frame a new order in Asia and Pacific, he suggested that Japan should abandon all colonies and imperialistic interests in order to gain the colonial people's support, and then fight against colonialism and racial discrimination with them. His vision of a “liberal struggle” was the product of his realistic insights into the international power relations and his fundamental belief in the powerful trend toward global liberation.

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E. H. Carr has commented the politics between the periods of the two World Wars as “The Twenty Years' Crisis”: the democracy versus fascism, especially, the conflict between the Bolshevik and the fascist was the source of crisis. However, the composition of ideological opposition in Europe did not directly reflect the Asian power politics in the same era.
This study is to analyze the domestic and international power politics with a specially proposed concept “strategic linkage”. The concept can be used to discuss Chiang's closeness towards Leninism and fascism through three levels:
(1) Choice of national revolutionary tactic and foreign strategy
(2) Institutionalization of ruling
(3) and Resistance to Japanese imperialism
There were three characteristics of the pattern of strategic linkage reflecting the Kuomintang's political system.
First, Chiang's choice of national revolutionary tactic and foreign strategy (policy of associating Soviet Russia and Germany) was directly linked. Chiang tried to strengthen the national movement of China in order to resist Japanese invasion through the “World Revolutionization” of national revolution and the “Sinicization” of fascism. However, by no means did Chiang intend to meddle with class revolution or overseas invasion. Preferably, he tried to win over the union and independence of the Republic of China through associating Soviet Russia and Germany under the Versailles regime.
Second, Chiang used the Bolshevik and the fascist organizational principle and the centralism technique models for his party state, and through formal and informal institutionalization he established dictatorship. Under the democratic centralism and the principle of party leadership, Chiang set up party state, and through imitating the fascist Blue Shirts Movement, he consolidated his political power.
Originally, Leninism was created to realize the Marxist revolution, while fascism was characterized by conquest and ethnocentrism; however, Chiang Kai-shek separated class conflicts from Leninism and disconnected fascism from ethnocentrism. In this way, without incorporating the concepts of communism and conquest, Chiang modified the western ideology of dictatorship and turned it into a simple model for dictatorship. Thus the mixed polity of Leninism and fascism was the main feature of Chiang's authoritarian regime based on military force.
Third, Chiang combined the leadership-dictatorship and the united front line, and through uniting the KMT and the Chinese communist, he organized a one-party dictatorship regime like that of Leninist party or fascist party, trying to overcome the splitting situation of China. To reach the goal of national union, Chiang was able to cooperate with the communist. Though Chiang believed in the KMT's ideology, he accepted Leninism and fascism based on realism, associating Soviet Russia and Germany to get close to Stalin and Hitler to resist Japan. In “The Twenty Years' Crisis” of Asia, Leninism and fascism were not necessarily antagonized, but combined tactics for organizing national emancipation and independent movement.

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Scholars have agreed that the Ikeda Administration carried out a forward-looking policy toward China in areas such as trade and in establishing private contact channels with China. Nevertheless, they put forth different arguments on whether this was a result of the administration pursuing a China policy independent from the U. S. According to some scholars, cooperation with the U. S. was so highly prioritized by Ikeda that he did not pursue any autonomous China policy. They argue that his forward-looking policy toward China was realized only because the Americans accepted it. On the other hand, others have emphasized that there were independent aspects such as the administration's attitude toward the so-called “two-China” question and the policy with respect to trade and contact with China. These scholars conclude that Ikeda pursued a China policy that was rather independent from the U. S.
However, both of these dichotomizing arguments are imperfect in explaining Ikeda's policy toward China. Certainly, he had the intention of expanding Japan's autonomy in the China policy. Nevertheless, at the same time, he did not neglect the cooperation with the U. S. The goal he pursued was not the autonomy nor cooperation with the U. S. Rather, it was essential for him to simultaneously maintain the balance between both goals. Therefore, it is necessary to put forth an argument on how he attempted to realize the balance between the autonomy and cooperation with the U. S. More specifically, the analysis should focus on discovering the inherent logic in his autonomous China policy and indicating how such a policy was pursued while avoiding the breakdown of the harmony with the U. S.
By analyzing every aspect of Ikeda's diplomacy toward China, this article concludes that there were two principles in his China policy. First, his policy acted in accordance with the identity of “a Free World Nation” that was defined by the administration itself. In particular, by utilizing the precedents of the positive approach of the West European nations as compared to that of Japan, it could pursue a China policy that was somewhat independent from the U. S., while at the same time appealing the legitimacy of the policy from the position of America's close ally. Second, although the administration elaborated the plan to extend full diplomatic recognition of China, the timing of the action was intended to be decided neither by Japan itself nor the U. S., but to correspond on its admittance to the U. N. By making full use of these two kinds of logic, the Ikeda Administration balanced its somewhat expanded autonomy and harmony with the U. S.

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Foreign Minister Shidehara kijuro intended to lead the nations of the world in diplomacy oriented towards China. Around the time of his second term as foreign minister, the US had responded to the customs treaty revisions of the Nanjing government and the world's nations had kept apace, but Japan was lagging behind and was deadlocked in relation to China. In order to resolve the situation, Japan aimed at taking the lead in resolving the negotiations that had run into difficulties between China and the other nations regarding the revocation of extraterritorial rights, and indicated their favorability on the issue to Nanjing.
Under those circumstances, Shidehara regarded the Sino-Soviet conflict as a violation of the Sino-Soviet pact and advocated the Soviet position of status quo ante, as the Chinese had instigated that conflict leading to the compulsory restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Nanjing, however, sought the understanding of Japan regarding the restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, while also unsuccessfully requesting the mediation of Germany and the League of Nations. Consequently, the only effective means left to China for settling the Sino-Soviet conflict was through Japanese arbitration, but the Nanjing government was adamant about the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway and was halfhearted in this matter. Shidehara, seeing in mid-October that the Soviets had expressed a willingness to negotiate directly with the Northeastern government which had softened its stance, sounded out a solution based on direct negotiations between the Soviets and the Northeastern government, but the Nanjing government was not responsive. The government at Nanjing realized the necessity of arbitration after the Soviet army attacked in force in mid-November. However, by this time the US was demonstrating through the extraterritoriality issue a more favorable stance towards China than Japan was, and Nanjing was pinning their hopes on that. Nanjing in the end accepted the status quo ante solution worked out in negotiations between the USSR and the Northeastern government because of the expanding Soviet military threat, armed attack, and US support of Chinese Eastern Railway status quo ante. That thirtyeight nations joined the US-led statement calling for a non-belligerency pact speaks of the inability of Shidehara, who had aimed at conflict resolution led by Japan, to shape opinions among the nations. Japan was not able to recover its leading role in Chinese-oriented diplomacy because of the expansion of US influence, and Japanese diplomacy towards China continued in that state.

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This article explores the role of third world neutralism in the Berlin Crisis of the Kennedy years. Existing works on the crisis have focused on the decision-making processes of the superpowers and their relations with their major allies, while neglecting the impact of the neutralist movement on these powers' handling of the Berlin problem. Meanwhile, studies which scrutinize the ideological background and historical development of the non-aligned movement do not examine what role the neutral countries played in major Cold War conflicts, such as the Berlin Crisis.
In contrast, this essay argues that neutralism was one of the major factors of which the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union had to take account in dealing with the Berlin problem in the summer of 1961. As a result of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the neutral countries occupied forty-four of one hundred votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by the end of 1960. In this context, Washington and London were concerned that the neutrals might possibly take the initiative in the UNGA in solving the Berlin problem that would support Moscow's position. The Americans and the British also worried that the neutrals' pro-Soviet stance would embolden Moscow. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, attempted to exploit anti-Western feeling among the neutrals in order to achieve its goals in Berlin. Therefore, the United States and Britain decided to pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union from July 1961 in order to strengthen the Western case in the eyes of the neutral powers. This article also reveals that seemingly irrelevant events in the third world, such as the Bizerte Affair in Tunisia, the first Non-Aligned conference in Belgrade, and the Sixteenth United Nations General Assembly, in fact significantly affected the American, British and Soviet handling of the Berlin Crisis in the summer of 1961.
In short, by setting the international context of the Berlin Crisis, neutralism played a more important role in the incident than the existing scholarship has suggested. The increase of newly independent countries and their accession to the United Nations, both of which resulted from decolonization, empowered the neutrals' ability to affect the international events. In this sense, the Berlin Crisis, a Cold War conflict in Europe, and decolonization, a development in the third world, intertwined with each other in the early 1960s. The analysis of this article thus not only reveals the role of minor powers in the superpower conflict, but also portrays the dynamic interactions between the Cold War at the center (Europe) and at the periphery (third world).

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This paper attempts to develop a new model for analyzing the reasons behind trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons in the form of sexual exploitation therefore is caused by differentials in power between sex, the rich and the poor, and citizen and non-citizen. From power differentials evolves discrimination, and discrimination is justified by power. Moreover, the paper suggests possibilities for constructing a social structure that is able to address the problem of discrimination.
By analyzing the trafficking of victims' throughout the world, based on the information provided by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), we recognize specific geographic aspects of human trafficking. Mostly, victims come from developing countries such as those in Eastern Europe or Asia, and their final destinations are developed countries such as Japan, the USA, or Italy. By scrutinizing the conditions for human trafficking based on the modern world-system theory we learn that “core” areas exploit “semi-periphery” areas. This finding applied to the problem of trafficking in persons then means that the “core” exploits the “periphery” physically..
However, modern world-system theory's explanation for the causes of this crime is insufficient. The existing deep discrimination between men and women or the rich, the poor, and citizen and non-citizen brings to light the relation of power between those who discriminate and those discriminated. In this sense, sex discrimination is caused by “nation states” politics, which is strongly patriarchal. Therefore, this politics forces women to be “peripheral”, i. e. to serve as assistants for men in society. Further, discrimination against foreigners is also strongly related with “nation states'” politics, which excludes “others”. Carrying this explanation further, we can argue that economic discrimination promotes people with power while discriminating “others”. The modern world-system structure ties agents' action, thus it is hard to solve the problem of discrimination. On the other hand, there are certain possibilities that agents' action can influence the structure of this world system.
The victims of trafficking in persons are forced to the bottom of the hierarchy structured by power differentials with discrimination and thus to fate of being the slave, whose human dignity is ravished by sexual exploitation. Thus it is essential to remove the consciousness of discrimination, which justifies power differentials between sex, the rich and the poor, and citizen and non-citizen. It is here, where cooperation with international organizations and NGOs serves our purpose.
Firstly, it is necessary to raise consciousness among those who ‘buy’ women, that their action is a “crime”. Secondly, it is important to enhance women's consciousness of being a victim. And finally, it is essential to bring the issue of trafficking in persons to the consciousness of the ordinary people, and encourage them to help the victims.

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This article analyses policies considered within the British government in 1946 on two issues concerning Iranian oil—a new oil concession and a labour dispute against the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)—to investigate how Britain tried to secure access to oil immediately after World War II.
Within the process of policy definition surrounding these two issues, it is possible to see both a search for new policy approaches and traditional ideas. In relation to these two issues, the British search for new policy approaches intended a new form of relations with the United States and Iran. At the same time, traditional ideas retained currency within British thinking and had a great impact on the policy definition process.
Britain intended co-operation with the United States to confront the potential threat of the U. S. S. R. in the process of obtaining a new Iranian oil concession. The Anglo-American co-operation which Britain aimed at, however, was one that would damage neither her independence nor her leadership position in the region, as Britain still perceived Iranian international relations within the traditional framework of spheres of influence in which Britain and the U. S. S. R. were the main actors. Further, as Britain regarded the role of the United States as no more than supplemental, rather than making use of the framework of Anglo-American co-operation in the labour dispute against the AIOC, Britain gradually inclined to unilateral policies employing bare power.
On relations with Iran, the British government on the one hand required the AIOC to give Iranian employees “equal treatment” with the British. On the other hand, plans for a joint Anglo-Iranian company symbolising “equal partnership” were soon rejected when she began discussions for the acquisition of a new oil concession. These apparently inconsistent attitudes can be explained by considering Britain's true intentions regarding equality. The real intention behind Britain's insistence on equal treatment by the AIOC was for the purpose of retaining the existing concession which had made it possible for Britain to secure access to oil. The equality pursued by Britain did not change the existing framework when it came to new concessions. Furthermore, the traditional image of relations with Iran can be seen in the despatch of an army brigade to Iraq and plans for direct involvement in the internal affairs of Iran.
It should not be overlooked that Britain was already searching for new policy approaches immediately after WWII. However, traditional ideas prevented her from implementing policies that would have brought about a drastic change in the international relations surrounding Iranian oil.

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