The article is set to explain why Britain opted out of the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism), the central institution of the EMS (European Monetary System), when the EMS was established in Mach 1979. Possible explanations of Britain's policy towards European monetary cooperation are examined under the heading of international strategy, economic considerations and domestic party politics.
Callaghan's high regard for the relationship with the United States was noticeable in his initial reaction to the EMS. He preferred a global settlement on currency instability involving the United States, and was concerned with the possible impact of the new EMS on the dollar and on US commitment to the security of Western Europe. However, once the Carter administration refused Callaghan's proposal and gave its blessing to the EMS, Callaghan was converted to the European scheme because of his commitment to the Atlantic alliance. He feared that, outside of the EMS, Britain might be excluded from the circle of consultation between the United States and Europe on reform of the international monetary system and the future of the Atlantic relationship.
At the same time, the general thrust of the government's economic policy was compatible with EMS membership, and could be reinforced by it. After the IMF crisis, Callaghan attempted to contain inflation by negotiating a moderate pay rise with the TUC and to achieve export-oriented growth. In other words, he rejected the option of tolerating higher inflation for the sake of faster economic growth and maintaining international competitiveness with periodic currency depreciation. International monetary stability would buttress this new economic strategy.
The lack of domestic support, however, hampered the government's efforts to play its full part in negotiations on the EMS, and eventually led to Britain's opting out of the ERM. The government's hands were severely tied for internal party reasons; the Labour Party's leftwing, who regarded the EC as the Capitalist Club, was hostile to any proposal which seemed to threaten Britain's national sovereignty and the future of socialist programmes. As long as Callaghan's problem derived from the lack of support for the EMS within the Labour Party, it could be mitigated if the Conservatives backed him on the issue. Inside the Conservative opposition, there were actually numerous voices advocating a bipartisan approach to the EMS, including Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson. In the end, the Conservative Party expressed a modest welcome for the EMS. But it was accompanied by a scathing attack on the government's policy, which put an end to any prospect that Britain might be able to enter the EMS on a bipartisan basis.

抄録全体を表示

This paper explores the life and thought of Tomonaga Sanjyuro (1871–1951) from historical and theoretical perspective, in order to find out formation of the epistemological base of understanding modern international relations in Japan. ‘Epistemological base’ is what all people in a certain time and place cannot help depend on or start from, when they try to conceive and explain the question, “What is International Relations?”, regardless of their theoretical or methodological or political standpoint. In other word, this paper aims at founding the proto-paradigm of IR/International Thoughts, or the episteme that made modern IR/International Thoughts possible before such paradigm or school or discipline emerged.
First part of the paper deals with the importance of Tomonaga's Thought, which has been hidden by the presupposition of his historical role as merely an introducer or interpreter of history of modern Western Philosophy. Although his main academic work concentrating on introduction of Western philosophy, he wrote many articles about how Japan or Japanese should be-have as a civilized nation, when trying to receive Western customs, cultures, and way of thinking. He developed his argument by citing and applying his knowledge of the history of Western philosophy, sometimes almost going beyond rigid academic restraint. Tomonaga was not an ivory-tower scholar. Actually he was in a sense a critic of Japanese civilization. His concern is always what is the best philosophical position or attitude Japanese nation should import and incorporate, by amalgamating these western philosophy and traditional way of thinking.
Second part analyzes his one of the two main works, Kant No Heiwa Ron (Study of Kant's discourse on Peace) (1922). Tomonaga always faced with twofold project. One is how to make Japan/Japanese philosophically independent and stable, by make them understanding the history of Western philosophy from his lectures in Kyoto University and his first main book, Kinsei Ni Okeru Ga No Jikaku Shi (Awakening the consciousness of Self in the history of modern Western philosophy) (1916). The other is how to construct the world that Japan/Japanese was stably founded in modern world, as a subject who has the same entitlement as other western states or nations. Kant No Heiwa Ron has been understood as an interpretation of Kant's Perpetual Peace (1795). However this book made a vital role of explaining how self (man), state, and international relations tightly connected by cross-reference structure. His main contention was not how Kant thought peace, but how to use and interpret Kant's argument in his unique way in order to construct the modern world. This paper concludes the validity of his constitution of ‘Self-State-International Relations’ after his death in 1951 and to the present.

抄録全体を表示

Peace agreements do not necessarily end civil wars. Previous research shows that nearly half of the agreements reached between 1949 and 1992 failed to bring about peace. Why do some agreements produce peace while others fail to prevent violence from breaking out again? To answer this theoretical question, the present paper compares the peace process in Mozambique with the two peace processes in Angola. For all the common historical and regional contexts, the contrasting outcomes of these peace processes were striking. In Mozambique, the Rome Accords in 1992 succeeded in ending its civil war whereas in Angola neither the Bicesse Accords in 1991 nor the Lusaka Accords do so.
The comparison of these three peace processes reveals that the post-civil war institutions should be designed to mitigate the fear of the politically weak. Former military adversaries must agree to peacefully coexist with each other as political rivals. Therefore, some guarantee of the security and vital interests for the weak would be crucial to achieve peace. Exactly for this purpose, power-sharing agreements keep the politically strong from monopolizing power in the political, military and territorial dimension. And this is why the territorial power sharing in the Rome Accords enabled the RENAMO to accept its disarmament in Mozambique. Even after the defeat in the presidential and parliamentary elections, they complied with this agreement.
But, the guarantee of territorial autonomy is not a panacea. In Angola, an agreement of territorial power sharing might have effectively eased the anxiety of the weak. Nevertheless, the strong hesitated to concede territorial autonomy to the weak. Why? The strong were afraid that the weak might take advantage of the natural resources in their territory in increasing its own power in their favor. This could destabilize the postwar order. Therefore, the absence of territorial autonomy kept the UNITA from complying with the peace accords. This is the essence of what I call the pitfall of territorial autonomy.

抄録全体を表示

Since its founding in 1967, none of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states have waged war against each other. Of late, scholars influenced by constructivist ideas have offered a social basis for analyzing the long peace among the members of ASEAN and more and more scholars have now turned to constructivism. Constructivists argue that through a traditional method which centers around norms such as non-interference and consensus-building, ASEAN members have gradually developed a collective identity that is critical to the emergence of a security community. These norms are usually lumped together under the heading “ASEAN Way.” According to constructivists, the “ASEAN Way” has been at the core of ASEAN regionalism as a symbol of solidarity.
But basic questions remain to be addressed. When and how did the term “ASEAN Way” emerge? The origin of the concept has been ignored in constructivist accounts of ASEAN. This leads to the central question of this article: Why did ASEAN members begin to use the term “ASEAN Way?” What was the necessity to use the term at that time?
The initial construction and definition of the term “ASEAN Way” was tied to legitimizing ASEAN's diplomatic practice vis-à-vis Myanmar's military government in the early 1990s. Despite heavy pressure from Western powers to impose sanctions, ASEAN leaders adhered to a strict respect for non-interference in members' internal affairs. ASEAN argued that the “ASEAN Way” presented the best means to support constructive political change in Myanmar.
In the late 1990s, expansion of membership to include Myanmar posed an intramural challenge to the principle of non-interference. Receiving support from the Philippines, Thailand's foreign minister, Surin Pitsuwan proposed the concept of “flexible engagement” to move beyond ASEAN's long-standing code of conduct. This proposal was a result of disaffection with ASEAN's policy towards the Myanmar junta. But the proposal for flexible engagement met with hostility from ASEAN states. Authoritarian members argued that flexible engagement challenged the “ASEAN Way” and weakened ASEAN solidarity. They used the term to delegitimate Surin's proposal.
The new term “ASEAN Way” was consciously created and evolved over time, focusing first on a strong commitment to sovereign rights. Constructivists view the “ASEAN Way” as the normative consensus that symbolizes ASEAN's values. But the term emerged and was used frequently in 1990s because ASEAN's traditional method was had fluctuated.

抄録全体を表示

In the early postwar period as instability across Southeast Asia threatened to engulf the region, Japan and Great Britain frequently took divergent approaches vis-à-vis regional geopolitical developments. Indonesia's belligerent policy of militarily and politically confronting Malaysia from 1963-66 can be seen as a clear case in point where Japan and Britain saw a potentially dangerous crisis in a starkly different light, quickly becoming a point of contention between diplomatic officials in Tokyo and London.
While Britain responded forcefully in military terms to the increasingly bellicose Sukarno by massing troops along the Malaysian side of the Borneo border, Japan saw such a hard-line approach as fraught with danger. Diplomatic officials in Tokyo saw this risky approach by Britain as not only risking war in a region strategically vital for Japan, but also as probably hastening Indonesia's leftward drift towards communist China. Moreover, Japanese officials were aware that too much external pressure on Indonesia may cause the nation to politically implode, a scenario seen as bringing the Indonesian communists to power (the PKI) and thus threatening Japan's substantial commercial investments in this country. Due to these high stakes involved for Japan, it decided to pursue a sustained policy of mediation between the key disputants.
During this period of Indonesian Confrontation (‘Konfrontasi’), Japan also exasperated Britain by continuing to trade with Indonesia and by providing financial aid and investment. The Commonwealth countries that had come to Malaysia's defence (Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand) all periodically expressed the hope that Japan would use its growing commercial influence to bring pressure to bear on Indonesia to peacefully accept Malaysia. Japan however, seeing its future economic relationship with Indonesia as a key priority resisted these calls to use its aid as leverage to modify Indonesia's belligerent stance towards its smaller neighbour. This led to British officials in particular to criticize Japan over what they perceived as an overly conciliatory approach toward Indonesia.
Undoubtedly, their markedly divergent policy approaches towards this Southeast Asian crisis did not help the warming of Anglo-Japanese postwar relations. Fortunately however, both sides saw enough utility in the broader relationship to not allow this issue to adversely affect bilateral relations. This ostensibly led to a grudging mutual acceptance that both Japan and Britain would frequently see the Southeast Asian region in a different light.
Therefore, despite their disagreements over how to deal with Sukarno and contain Confrontation, the relationship survived intact with no permanent damage being done. This was graphically shown by the first high-level meeting between Japan and Britain shortly after the conclusion of Confrontation, where both sides had the good grace to barely raise the issue and instead focus on the many commonalities in their respective world views.

抄録全体を表示

In 1963, about one and a half year after he had ended the Algerian War, French President Charles de Gaulle started to publicly criticize the US military intervention in Vietnam and proposed “Neutralization” as a path to peace settlement. But the US government, especially the Johnson administration, already familiar with and tired of, de Gaulle's critical attitudes, flatly rejected this proposal, considering it just another way of attacking the US government and its policies. Then de Gaulle's criticism toned up, culminating in his infamous Phnom Penh speech in 1966, that increased the tension across the Atlantic.
What was the purpose of de Gaulle's peace initiatives? This article reexamines de Gaulle's Vietnam policy in light of new archives disclosed recently (in 2003) in France as well as in the US.
According to my analysis, the new documents seem to show that, contrary to the American perception, with his “Neutralization” proposal, De Gaulle was really trying to mediate a peace between the US, North Vietnam and the NLF. Based on lessons drawn from the disastrous colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, he was sincerely convinced that it would be absolutely impossible even for the US to win the war against such a well-rooted nationalist movement.
If so, however, another puzzle arises. Why did de Gaulle fail to persuade the American government of the utility of his peace plan? What was the cause for this fundamental misunderstanding between the two presidents?
In order to answer these questions, the author is focusing on the duality of de Gaulle's diplomacy toward the US. It is certain that his peace initiative on Vietnam was initially meant as serious and friendly advice. As one of the American allies, France didn't want to see the leader of the Western camp stuck in the mud of Vietnam. It was feared that the American power wasted in Southeast Asia might eventually cause US withdrawal from Western Europe. De Gaulle was far from being a simple anti-American, as was assumed by the Americans. On the other hand, however, De Gaulle's “Neutralization” proposal was inseparable from his World strategy, seeking to enhance the French international influence and status with all possible means. His criticism of the Vietnam War stemmed also from his strong desire to gain France more autonomy from the US hegemony. It is well know that attaining equality with the US was one of de Gaulle's diplomatic ambitions. This position was also so flagrant in his Vietnam proposal that the Americans couldn't help simply rejecting it.

抄録全体を表示

Cryptographic techniques are an important means by which security of information and info-communication networks is ensured. Yet it was not until the mid-2000s that the world's largest developer of standards, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), issued ISO/IEC 18033 on encryption algorithms.
The purpose of this article is to explore a relatively understudied aspect of international standardization by focusing on demand for encryption standards. Drawing on the global governance literature, it argues that the demand for cryptographic standards may be generated not only to address the coordinating problem of technological compatibility but also to address the common problem of information security.
It is assumed that the demand for international cryptographic standards will be generated by the businesses, particularly those engaged in electronic commerce, as they are interested in enhancing the security of the network where they hold transactions. It is also assumed that on-line privacy advocates will support the standardization of encryption techniques. However, the commercial interests in cryptographic standardization may be in conflict with national security interests. Just as encryption technology can be used to protect financial information and personal data, it can be used to protect confidential information of foreign governments and other organizations. Therefore, spread of cryptographic techniques through standardization can be detrimental to national security activities.
Indeed, ISO's early attempt to establish encryption algorithm standard was frustrated by the objection raised by the US government, which was concerned with the standard's implication to national security. In the 1990s, however, the international business community began to pressure government hard to liberalize cryptographic use so that they could take full advantage of the commercial opportunities provided by the exponential growth to the Internet. The commercial interests succeeded in having its preferences reflected in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guideline for Cryptographic Policy of 1997. The guideline, in turn, provided the ISO with an opportunity to launch once-prohibited standardization of encryption technology as it recommended the setting of standards for cryptographic methods at national and international levels. The ISO eventually produced ISO/IEC 18033 to promote the deployment of “state-of-the-art” encryption technology worldwide.
Standards and standardization are often dismissed as technological details in the study of International Relations. However, international standardization of encryption sheds light on the new security dilemma in the information age. Most important of all, the evolution of international cryptographic standards highlights the changing balance between national security and commercial interests in encryption.

抄録全体を表示

This essay discusses Yoshino Sakuzo's arguments on Japan's diplomatic policy during the Manchurian crisis (1929–1933, culminating in 1931 when the Manchurian Incident broke out). Scholars disagree on whether this champion of democracy during the Taisho era was an imperialist or an internationalist, making it difficult to comprehend Yoshino's arguments on the Manchurian crisis.
This essay gives a clearer picture of Yoshino by (1) examining his realistic arguments for an equal partnership between Japan and China and (2) comparing realism with arguments for a regional order in East Asia put forward by Yoshino's contemporary, Royama Masamichi, a political analyst and journalist Yoshino was an idealist in foreign policy, who based his views on internationalism on the ideas of Woodrow Wilson. He also supported the League of Nations temporarily. His “Asianism” led him to apply the internationalist principle of world brotherhood to East Asia. Therefore, he defended the Korean independence movement and the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919. More importantly, he thought of entering into an alliance with China once it achieved nationhood. But China did not completely become independent until the Chinese Nationalist revolution (1924–1927).
While willing to defend the pursuit of national interest at any cost, Yoshino advocated an international order based on equality among nations. Although China remained disunited, he argued that Japan should protect its interests in China even resorting to force. At the same time, he insisted that a China integrated under the leadership of the Nationalists would be desirable because it would be cooperative and reliable in maintaining and even expanding Japan's interests in China. The paper concludes that Yoshino's arguments for Sino-Japanese partnership stemmed not from idealism but from realism.
Royama, on the other hand, argued that Japan should cooperate with the Great Powers in order to control China. Although regarded as a pioneer of cooperative regionalism, Royama actually envisaged Japan including China in its sphere of influence, with the approval of the Great Powers. It was thus that the so-called cooperative Royama hailed the recognition of Manchukuo while the realistic Yoshino strenuously opposed it.
In 1932, Yoshino wrote the foreword to the December issue of the Chuokoron magazine. While superficially appearing to hail the impending new order in East Asia, Yoshino warned that Japan's pursuit of a Monroe Doctrine in East Asia would come to a standstill, which turned out to be his will. Japan's aftermath proved how profound was Yoshino's insight.

抄録全体を表示

Following the end of the Cold War, various tentatives to achieve peace have been made, most notably through the United Nations peacekeeping operations. The first attempt to be carried out was, one called “preventive deployment” and consisted in the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces before a conflict takes place. Under the name United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), such a force was successfully dispatched to the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia) and was able to achieve its purpose of preventing the conflict in Yugoslavia from spreading to Macedonia.
If we consider the terrible events that took place during the Yugoslavia civil war and their consequences as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, numbers alone cannot accurately measure the positive impact this mission had in preventing the conflict from spilling into Macedonia. However, it is doubtful whether one should expect that such a singular success in conflict prevention could easily be reproduced. In this article I propose to examine the case of the UNPREDEP mission in Macedonia and to clarify why it succeeded. In Section 1 I will present an outline of UNPREDEP. In Section 2 I will focus on the reasons that can explain why UNPREDEP succeeded.
Concretely speaking, the mission took place under the following conditions: (1) international trend towards conflict prevention, (2) support for preventive deployment in the country concerned (Macedonia government and domestic players), (3) existence of a reliable force with deterrent capacity (U. S. A participation), (4) existence of a reward (participation to the EU and cancellation of sanctions from New Yugoslavia, etc.), (5) a domestic shared understanding of the potential aggressor country, (6) existence of other conflict prevention means (activity of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), NGOs etc.), (7) clarification/limitation of purpose/mandate, (8) establishment of a division of labor system, (9) good timing. All these can be considered factors that contributed to the mission's success.
This leads us to the following conclusions: UNPREDEP did succeed in the carrying out of its deployment and in the prevention of conflict in Macedonia at that time, because various activities were performed very well, and, at the same time, supported by a set of favorable conditions and environment. So, we can deduce that changes in some of those factors could have led to quite a different, and less favorable, situation. The success of UNPREDEP should not be seen as a solid model. Rather, it serves to show the possibilities, but also the limits of achieving conflict prevention through such preventive deployments.

抄録全体を表示

The progress of economic globalization and preference formation among domestic actors has been increasingly affected by the international economy since the 1980s. Based on these trends, an important question currently in the spotlight is what effect the progress of economic globalization has on domestic social groups and on preference formation among domestic actors.
Among these social groups, this paper focuses especially on the American labor union, the AFL-CIO, and on major companies that have a presence in American trade policy, which in turn has a major impact on the global economy. In particular, the AFL-CIO can not be ignored when we think about the international political economy, by chanting anti-free trade and anti-globalization slogans around the world as, for example, protesters did during the WTO Seattle convention in 1999. This paper considers the effects of globalization on domestic social groups through verifying actor's preference changes regarding trade policy in a time-oriented method.
This paper verifies any preference changes of company and labor unions from the standpoint of the sector-factor controversy by observing eleven American major manufacturing industries and by comparing the 1960's during which there was little movement toward globalization to the 1990's, when there was considerable progress.
In measuring economic globalization, the research uses indicators from trade volume and direct foreign investment. With regard to industrial sector capital and labor preference it uses this congressional hearing records, campaign advertisement pamphlets and investigation into union representation in several labor unions. In this way this paper conducts new research from the point of view of sources.
The results of research clearly show that the 1960s preference during the 1960s which was a cleavage between sector convergences in the 1990s and preference gap of capital and labor is expanding. This shows that the progress of economic globalization creates a cleavage between the trade preferences of capital and labor in American industry. This knowledge theoretically shows cause that the conflict between capital and labor has become more radical in American trade policy. This conclusion is different from the rest in the point of view of not being conventional explicitly pointed out.
This shows that American trade policy has entered an age, in which the preferences of capital and labor are in disagreement and we therefore need to conduct new American trade policy research from the perspective of the labor union.

抄録全体を表示