The Cold War had been fought on various fronts. First of all it was the battle of ideas. The fall of “Berlin Wall” in 1989 was a dramatic event signifying the end of the battle of Cold War ideologies. The Divisions in Europe, including the division of Germany, had also been a very symbolic aspect of the Cold War. Therefore the reunification of Germany in 1990 marked the end of these Cold War divisions. At the same time the Cold War was a military confrontation between two superpowers so the final dissolution of the USSR in 1991 was in this sense the actual end of the Cold War. Since the Cold War has such intertwined aspects, why and how it has come to an end should be scrutinized carefully. U.S. President George H. W. Bush proclaimed “America won the Cold War” in his State of the Union address before a Joint Session of Congress on January 28, 1992. That the U.S. “won” the Cold War became the typical American understanding of the end of the Cold War. The so-called “triumphalists” declared that the collapse of the U.S.S.R. was the result of the American strategy of containment, formulated in 1947 by George F. Kennan. They believe that the successive American administrations, and especially the administration of President Reagan, pursued this policy and finally brought the Soviet empire down with little help from the European nations. Many of the secret archives of the Soviet bloc have been made available to Cold War historians since the beginning of the 1990s and they have allowed researchers to revise the above interpretation: Western Europe, and to a lesser extent some East European nations, played a much more important role in closing the Cold War than the “triumphalists” have been willing to give them credit for. This issue of International Relations covers various aspects of the end of the ColdWar beyond “triumphalist” theory: the impact of “Gorbachev factor”, the role of institutionalization of arms control in Europe, the implication of “Ostpolitik” by West Germany upon the German reunification process, the influence of dissident movements in Eastern Europe, the impact of “deepening” of EC upon détente, and the function of “CSCE effect” as an promoter of “euro-détente”. The articles in this volume shed new light on the process of the end of the Cold War by introducing important European dimensions to the discussions. As editor, I hope this issue can be a catalyst for a fresh look in Japan at the origins of the end of the Cold War.
This article examines the INF treaty negotiations and seeks to capture the dynamics of domestic and international factors that affected the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. This article contends that radical changes in the international environment prompted by the first Reagan administration played a substantial role in provoking domestic debate within the Soviet Union over the direction of its foreign policy. This article focuses on the changes in Soviet perceptions at two turning points in the negotiation process: the interruption of the negotiations in late 1983 and the decision to de-link the INF negotiations from the Strategic Defense issue after the Reykjavik Summit. In the first section, the author argues that while fear of a nuclear first strike by the U.S. loomed large among the Soviet ruling elites, the political cohesion among the Western allied countries regarding the deployment of US missiles, along with the discontinuation of the negotiations, created a sense of failure and weakness within the Soviet leadership. This contributed to a change in climate within the Soviet leadership and helped to convert a general sense of anxiety into a concrete desire among some members of the CPSU hierarchy, particularly in the International Department of the Central Committee, to move away from the Soviet Union's confrontational and unyielding posture. The second section focuses on the motivating factors behind the Soviet Union's sudden and radical reorientation in its INF negotiation policy in early 1987. Although the Soviet domestic debate over the issue experienced some fluctuation, members of the old ruling elite, such as Gromyko, stated that the SS-20 deployment had been a ‘terrible failure’ for past Soviet foreign policy at a Politburo meeting before the Reykjavik Summit. The delinking of the INF negotiations from other negotiating issues was proposed by Gromyko himself, while Gorbachev was rather cautious, at least until late 1986. Gorbachev's final decision to de-link the INF negotiations reflected an altered strategic purpose for concluding the treaty—namely, to signal to the world the Soviet Union's sincerity in ending the Cold War. From this point onward, the change in INF negotiation policy extended beyond simple reactions to past foreign policy failures, enabling the immediate conclusion of the treaty. In fact, the direct causal strength of the international (Reagan-induced) factors is limited in that these factors did not determine the eventual outcome. However, any evaluation of the origins and meanings of Gorbachev's bold attempt to end the Cold War should not ignore the role of the prior recognition of the Soviet Union's weakness and quest for foreign policy change by its ruling elite.
In June 1963, President Kennedy made an historic speech to the public, in which he advocated détente talks with the Soviet Union in order to avoid the nightmare of nuclear war caused by the Cuban missile crisis. Though his idea was to promote humanity and to end the Cold War, the European NATO allies could not accept his idealistic perspective without reservations. Under U.S. pressure to strengthen conventional forces to follow its new strategy, flexible response, the European allies thought that, taking into account the imbalance of conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. nuclear arms control policy would weaken European security ties with the U.S., and might make a Soviet invasion ofWestern Europe more probable. For the allies, nuclear arms control between the superpowers was inextricably linked with the control of conventional forces in Europe. In December 1967, NATO adopted the Harmel Report, formally integrating détente within its security policy. In June 1968, NATO announced the so-called Reykjavik Signal to address an appeal for conventional arms reduction in Central Europe that became the foundation of the later Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. On the other hand, the Soviet Union also needed détente in Europe. In December 1966, the Soviet Union adopted a new military doctrine in order to deal with the threat of China, which had criticized the Soviet Union as a revisionist. The Soviet Union later proposed a security conference to European countries including the U.S., which became known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in order to avoid simultaneous military operations on two fronts. Both sets of détente talks began separately in 1973. But they soon faced stalemate because the Warsaw Pact continued to reject the conditions that NATO set out for the MBFR talks, and NATO countries, especially the U.S., condemned the Eastern countries for violating human rights at the CSCE. It was not until the mid-1980s that the détente talks got back on track when both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev urged détente talks in a different form, namely the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). In an atmosphere of cooperation, when the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed by countries of both blocs in November 1990, the danger of large-scale assaults and surprise attacks in Europe was removed. In retrospect, it may be safe to say that the peace and stability of contemporary Europe depends much more on the fruits of détente talks than the end of the Cold War.
This paper deals with the way France conceived the transition of the world order from the bilateralism under East–West confrontation to the Post-cold war era. It is less about French contribution to the ending of the cold war itself than about her resistance to the American and Soviet domination over European security which led to the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). As a matter of fact, Europe needed to affirm its own identity on security issues within the framework of the occidental collective defense in order to overcome the division of Europe, kept in place by an Iron Curtain. From these points of view, the paper examines how the French 3D-Dissuasion, Defense and Détente-policy led to the conception and the emergence of the ESDI. 3D policy was first established within the Harmel report adopted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1967. Based on this policy were the Mutual and balanced forces reduction (MBFR) conversation between members of NATO and Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO), as well as the bilateral negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union towards the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, concluded in 1987. The sequence of these events concerned the American notion of Arms Control elaborated through 1959 to 1960. France was though against the notion of Arms Control and criticized certain aspects of the INF treaty or at least the way it has been negotiated. She also refused to participate to the MBFR conversation. Thus, French policy appeared to go against the 3D spirit of the Harmel report, despite the fact that she had participated to its elaboration in the past. France did, however, conduct her own 3D policy. This study on the French 3D policy throughout the 1970s and the 1980s has been framed by two major points. The first one is the opposition between the French disarmament concept and the Arms Control concept. The second one is the so called ‘ATTU (Atlantic to Urals) zone’ as a geographical extent of France's and Europe's security. Those considerations have brought to light the contrast between the interests on security issues of a superpower on the one hand and a middle power on the other hand. While the United States were concerned about their global responsibilities, France intended to preserve its autonomy and keep maintaining peace in Europe within the Atlantic Alliance.
The purpose of this paper is to examine Egon Bahr's concepts and its implications for the end of the Cold War in Europe by using new archival sources including the Willy Brandt Archive and the Egon Bahr Depositorium of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn. Bahr's concepts and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik have been criticized for underestimating the importance of the Western unity and for finally delaying the Germany unification. This paper considers whether Bahr's concepts about the European Security System and Brandt's Ostpolitik did endanger the Western unity because of their longterm strategy for German unification within an all-European security system or not. First, this paper describes Bahr's concepts by focusing on his models concerning the European Security System. His long-term aim was to create a new all-European security system that would have made it possible to overcome the division of Germany and Europe through a dissolution of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. He conceived a political integration of Western Europe with the aim of supranationality as an unfortunate phenomenon, but thought that in the short- and middle-term the ties of the Federal Republic with its Western allies ware very important for a successful Ostpolitik. Second, this paper analyzes the German-Soviet negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on 12 August 1970 especially by drawing attention to the problem of opening the European Security Conference. Brandt and Bahr repeatedly stressed that the Federal Republic could only safely seek an opening to the East, if it kept its feet firmly embedded in the West. This paper explores the process of coordination with the Western allies in the same context by focusing on the so called “Bonner Vierergruppe” and the issues of right and responsibility of the Four Powers for matters related to Germany as a whole and the status of Berlin. It, thus, intends to present that close and continuing contacts with the three Western Powers (the USA, Great Britain and France) were important regarding their support for the Ostpolitik. This study hopes to offer a new interpretation both of Bahr's concepts and the interaction between Ost- und Westpolitik during Brandt's chancellorship.
The year 1968 was not only a time of student movements and Cultural Revolution in many Western countries, but also the year of the “Prague Spring” and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The people of Eastern Germany were influenced by those political and cultural events in Western and Eastern Europe. In spite of suppression by the state there were protest activities in the 1960s in Eastern Germany. Under the influence of subculture and student movements in Western Germany the postwar generation opposed the cultural policies of the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or SED). During the “Prague Spring” in 1968, hopes of “socialism with a human face” (democratization of socialism) rose in Eastern Germany. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 brought about different protest activities everywhere in Eastern Germany. According to Stasi files, more than thousand people in Eastern Germany were investigated for painting graffiti, distributing pamphlets or even just public criticism of the invasion. Such protest activities took place spontaneously without political leaders, and were put down by the police immediately. The “Sixty-Eighters” in Eastern Germany organized political alternative movements under the protection of the Evangelical Church through the 1970s and 1980s. Western subculture played a big part in such dissident movements. The Eastern “Sixty-Eighters” also formed civic groups in autumn 1989, demanded democratization of socialism once again and played a main role in “peaceful revolution”. However, the younger generations contributed to “peaceful revolution” by participating in demonstrations or by leaving their country. In fact the generation of “Eight-Nine” includes different age groups. Thus, a legacy of 1968 and 1989 could be the combination of political movements and subculture, which made it possible for dissidents to form a counter public sphere and network in a society of authoritarianism or totalitarianism.
The purpose of this paper is to examine European Union projects in the early 1970s and to examine how the End of Cold War was considered in this project. In this period, the European Community (EC) would enlarge its member states for the first time, try to deepen internal policies and also Conference for pan-European security (that is formed afterwards as CSCE) began. The author tries to reexamine the relations between Cold War and European integration, having an attention to the European Union project concerns both European political integration and European international order. In December 1969, EC countries agreed the political cooperation concerning foreign policies (known as later EPC) at Hague summit. EPC mechanism developed as the arena in which EC countries discussed about the CSCE and whether EC would/should participate in the CSCE negotiation. But in EC Commission, Commissioner Borschette and Spinelli discussed how Political Union could realize from the development of EPC. This Political Union concept conceived as ‘finalité’ (final aims or final form) of European Integration, considering the evolution of economic integration like agriculture and especially the start of monetary integration. In 1971, French President Pompidou launched his plan for the reactivation of European Integration entitled ‘European Confederation’. In this plan, member states would select ‘European State Secretary’ and these Ministers would hold regular meetings and finally this organization would develop ‘European Government’, transferring gradually government's competences to this Ministers institution. On the other hand, EC Commission discussed the acquirement of the role of EC in the field of world politics. Pompidou's concept and that of Commission was opposing each other, but both agreed that EC would be changed after the enlargement of member states and development of EPC. This plan manifested as ‘European Union’ in the communiqué of Paris Summit in the 1972. Realizing of Détente within the framework of CSCE, development of EPC, and acquirement of the role of EC in the world politics connected each other. That is, EC tried to improvement of the relations with Eastern Bloc within the framework of CSCE, and looked for the political integration by deepening EPC mechanism, which would develop at the CSCE negotiation. When these two aims would realize EC would be ‘independent Europe’ as an actor of world politics, so EC sought the redefinition of the relationship with the USA. Especially Spinelli argued that when the entity of Europe restored by establishing new European order which would cover Pan-Europe by CSCE and which would be supported by ‘Political Union’ at the its western side, Europe would step into the “New Yalta” era. Political Union Project, which appeared as ‘European Union’ in the Paris Summit communiqué, was not the project of merely internal community institution, but the project which designated the structural transformation of cold war as prerequisite.
This article covers the development of the Austrian foreign policy shift from permanent neutrality to a strong European Engagement after World War II. After World War II, the Allies (USA, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France) divided Austria into four zones. Neutrality was reached in long and difficult negotiations between the Austrian and the Soviet governments, granting Austrian independence on October, 26, 1955. Neutrality can be seen as the prize Austria had to pay for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Austrian territory after ten years of occupation. With neutrality, Austria declared not to join military alliances and would not allow military bases from foreign countries on its territory. From the beginning, Austria's neutrality has been accompanied by an active and independent foreign policy. Unlike Switzerland, Austria joined the United Nations and has played an active part on many UN commissions and committees, in addition to providing troops for several UN peacekeeping operations since 1960. Participation in the economic integration of Western Europe has hardly ever been seen by Austrian politicians to be in conflict with their country's neutrality, so in the 1960s, there were further discussions concerning membership of the European Community. But Austria's neutrality proved to be an obstacle when these discussions were abandoned in the face of strong opposition from the Soviet leadership, which at that time saw the EC as an extension of NATO. The free trade agreements concluded between Austria and the EC in 1972 were regarded as a sufficient basis for economic cooperation with the EC over the next 15 years. It was towards the end of the 1980's that the question of joining the EC was again raised by the Austrian government, with a view to participating in the EC's Single Market. While Austria prepared for membership, the question was to be answered if such a step would be compatible with the status of permanent neutrality being the core of the State Treaty (“Staatsvertrag”) from 1955. In 1988, the Soviet foreign minister, Shevardnadse, was strongly against the EC membership of neutral Austria, but in 1989 its tone was softened and Soviet Union recognized Austria's right to choose its own integration policy. On 17 July 1989, Austrian foreign minister, Mock, handed in Austria's application for EC membership in Brussels. In the aide-memoire from the Austrian government to the EC in 1990, the aim of accession was confirmed: Austria was in the heart of Europe and wished to assume all the rights and obligations of a Community member. Neutrality, it went on, was Austria's “specific contribution to the preservation of peace and security in Europe”. Thus Neutrality has been redefined in order to enable Austria to conduct a policy of European solidarity.
Using newly available diplomatic sources from Spain and the United States dating from the 1970s to the 1990s, this article examines both the transformation of the relationship between the two countries as the Cold War came to an end in Europe and Spain's effort to conduct an “independent foreign policy” in the Mediterranean under the old bipolar system. Franco's dictatorial regime, initially isolated after World War II, had attempted to draw closer to the West through a bilateral agreement with the United States based on an anti-communism platform as Cold War tensions grew. The article thus first considers how this bilateral relationship was affected by the process of the winding down of the Cold War. We conclude that during this period Spain changed the manner and focus of its participation in international politics from passive to active and from bilateral to multilateral, especially with regard to Europe. Specifically, Spain, which had been drawn into the Cold War through an anti-communist bilateral partnership with the United States, gradually aimed to increase its international influence by continuously confronting its sense of rivalry and distrust towards the United States as well as its feelings of inadequacy vis- ` a-vis Europe. After democratization, Spain resolved this internal inconsistency between its foreign and domestic policies and transformed itself from an economic, military, and political dependency of the United States to a country pursuing a multilateral foreign policy. Secondly, the article considers how the democratizing Spain, which had long hoped for a “return to Europe,” utilized the opportunities provided by the process of the Cold War' s close and how it later balanced its actions on the international stage with its bilateral relationship with the United States. This period proved a felicitous one for the new Spain as it tried not only to return to Europe but also to expand its activities in the international arena. We conclude that Spain effectively utilized this period to achieve a reduction in the number of American troops stationed within its borders while consolidating its democracy and playing a bridging role between theWest and other Mediterranean countries. Specifically, steadily gaining the support of the public after joining the NATO and the EC, the Spanish government exhibited a flexibility that transcended bipolar divisions as the progressive PSOE (The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) moved to the right, allowing Spain to reduce its American troop burdens while maintaining balance in its relations with Europe, domestic politics, and the Spanish-American bilateral relationship.
The Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) in 1975 included human rights clauses as one of the “Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States.” The idea of the CSCE consisting of 35 participating states, including United States and Soviet Union, was originally proposed by the East, aiming at keeping the status-quo of the post-war Europe. However, after the Helsinki, the West took the initiative to review the CSCE process, especially on human rights implementation in the East. Throughout this study, I try to explain who found the Helsinki Final Act as a tool of making pressure on the East around human rights issues. At first Soviet dissidents found its significance, and they tried to inform the West of serious situations of human rights, based on the Helsinki Final Act. At second, U.S. Congressmen visited the Soviet Union before and after the Helsinki to see the human rights situations including the Jewish migration issue. In Moscow, they could receive the appeals directly from Soviet dissidents, in spite of negative reactions from the Soviet authority and from the U.S. State Department. Soviets did not report the fact of the ‘human rights debate’ between the U.S. Congressmen and Soviet counterparts. The State Department did not find much interest in human rights issues as a U.S.-Soviet bilateral relation at the time, and Secretary of State Kissinger tried to neglect the significance of human rights clauses. Though the State Department was extremely negative, President Ford, who ran in the election campaign, signed the act of founding the Helsinki Commission to monitor the Helsinki process, in the Congress, tried to meet the expectations of ethnic lobbies. By reviewing the interconnectedness between Soviet dissidents and U.S. Congress, this study seeks to explain how the human rights issue became serious in the CSCE process. In doing so, this study attempts to make it clear that these changes of human rights politics in the CSCE had been already archived before the U.S. presidential election was held in 1976 and before the human rights diplomacy was launched in 1977 by President Carter, which made the U.S.-Soviet confrontation irreversible. Soviet dissidents and U.S. Congressmen, who had been, before the Helsinki, situated far from the Helsinki, became the mighty groups who tempted to let Soviets keep human rights clauses of the Helsinki Final Act.
Recent Cold War studies have focused on the role of the so-called “third basket” issues, which were stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975, in weakening the European communist states. The power and unmanageable infiltration of western culture to these closed societies obviously had a huge impact on transforming the rigid Cold War structure. However, at the time of signing the Act, most Western participants did not possess a master plan on how to manipulate these issues to overcome Cold War divisions in Europe, nor envisage the demise of communism eventually taking place at the end of 1980s. In reality, the Cold War was expected by many on both sides of the ideological fence to continue for a reasonably long time after 1975. Also, the “third basket” issues were one of least expected articles to be implemented by the communism states. This article explores the rationale for the so-called “third basket” agenda in the negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Final Act from the British government's perspective. It argues that the cultural agenda of the CSCE negotiations, and especially the principle of the “freer movement of people, information and ideas”, was given a double-barreled role. On the one hand, it was superficially an Ostpolitik, aiming to promote mutual understanding among participating states by means of cultural agreements and educational exchanges. However, it was this agenda that prolonged the negotiations at Geneva for two years because of strong opposition from the communist states. Besides, some western states showed an unwillingness to pursue it too vigorously for fear of causing deterioration in their relations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, this agenda remained a priority for British negotiators in their talks with the Soviet Union. Given the already tense relationship with the Soviet Union, the British government did not have much to lose if it pursued such a sensitive agenda. For Whitehall, the “freer movement of people, information and ideas” was intended to be pursued largely within the context of their existing propaganda policy towards the Soviet Union, while also having the purpose of maintaining alliance solidarity by reminding fellow western societies that the Cold War was not yet over and as such maintaining NATO remained a priority. In this sense, it was essentially a Westpolitik in the guise of an Ostpolitik. As this article shows however, the existence of political strategizing on how to maintain a key alliance even during an era of decreasing tension emphasizes the need for a reconsideration of cultural factors during the Cold War. Moreover, despite Cold War tensions decreasing at the time of détente, the Cold War itself continued for another 15 years. Therefore, what role cultural factors played over the course of this ideological struggle will be examined further.
At the beginning of the post-World War II atomic era, technological advancement came to be seen as a clear expression of national power. As such, the significance of technology development in the Wilson government's relations with the EEC countries is relevant to the British Government's search for a ‘world role’ in the late 1960s. This article explores technology cooperation between Britain and the EEC countries, and in particular examines the European Technological Community (ETC) that was proposed by the Wilson government in 1967. In the mid to late 1960s, and particularly around the time of the election of the Labour government, Britain was experiencing a period of profound stagnation in both her economic and foreign policy. One of the approaches that the government took to resolve this malaise was the promotion of technology development as a stimulus for economic recovery. At the same time, however, the government cancelled or scaled down existing large-scale technology development projects with EEC countries. While initially such decisions appear inconsistent, they signalled a change in the character of Britain's economic and foreign policy from the maintenance of national prestige to ensuring economic wellbeing, and demonstrated the British government's preference for cooperation with the United States as a partner for technology development. Despite this shift in focus, the idea for an ETC emerged within the British Government and was then brought up as a potential bargaining chip for use in discussions concerning the British application for membership of the EEC. The details of how the ETC would work in practice were never decided. The main reasons for this failure were that, rather than with Europe, Britain preferred to cooperate with the United States on technology projects, while at the same time expecting to exercise leadership in European technology cooperation projects which the EEC countries would not accept. The failure of the ETC planning process was thus symptomatic of the British Government's attitude towards the European Community at that time. The idea of the ETC, intended to formalise technology cooperation between Britain and the EEC countries, was in the end abandoned. This example highlights the difficulty of establishing technology cooperation between Britain and the other European countries, and failed principally because Britain was not prepared to be sufficiently accommodating in her relations with the EEC countries, and was hesitant to establish strong multilateral ties with the rest of Europe. As a result of this experience, technology cooperation between European countries, and in particular aerospace and largescale technology development programmes, came to be advanced outside the framework of the EC.