国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2009 巻, 158 号
選択された号の論文の16件中1~16を表示しています
東アジア新秩序への道程
  • 高原 明生
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_1-9
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    The post-cold war world order remains in a state of flux. On the level of the international society consisting of nation states, there has been a continuous rise and fall of big powers. In terms of the history of civilisations, the superior position of the west since the industrial revolution seems to be eroding. While the nation states are forming new international organisations to meet the challenges of globalisation, actors in the market and civil society have become increasingly active beyond national boundaries. Considering these factors, change in the global or regional order seems inevitable.
    However, if we define international order as a state in which its members share a basic set of values, norms, institutions and a collective goal, and in which there is regularity in the members' behaviour and their relationships, then a change in the distribution of power does not necessarily alter the international order. Rather, the latter depends on a complex set of factors, such as the policies of the major status quo power, how the values and norms of the rising power match those of the existing order, and whether the rising power intends to change the status quo or not.
    There are two phenomena that could impact largely on the future of the East Asian order. First is the rise of China. China appears not to have the intention now to squarely challenge the status quo in East Asia, the military basis of which is the Japan-US alliance. However, the shift in the distribution of power seems to have changed the behavioural pattern of the nations in the region. On the one hand, China has actually gained from the status quo and finds its interest in supporting it. However, there is also concern that if China increases its power without materialising universal values such as human rights or rule of law, the basis of the current international order could be undermined. It is hard to foresee China's future, and to that extent East Asia's future remains uncertain.
    Another question is how regionalism and regional institutionalisation are, or are not, influencing the East Asian order. Some argue that the newly emerging regional frameworks are changing or at least have the potential to change the regional order, while others deny this. One of the focal poi in the following articles is the so-called ASEAN way; some argue that the principle of non-interference is eroding, while others insist that this principle still hinders the development of a collective identity.
    The path to an East Asian order remains unclear, but one point is certain: this is a topic that requires collaboration of studies in various areas of international relations, including history, area studies, theory, and non-state actors.
  • 現状維持装置としての地域制度の役割
    湯澤 武
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_10-24
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    Asia was long a region in which multilateral institutions had a weak presence. However, beginning with the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989, a number of other region-wide institutions—the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3 (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS)—have been created. The question of whether these regional institutions do matter in regional order in East Asia has been subject to an intense debate among regional specialists as well as scholars of international relations (IR). For instance, while realists, who regard a balance of power among great powers as a key factor for shaping regional order, generally dismiss the role of regional institutions, constructivists assert that regional institutions, which are now constructing shared norms and regional identities, will play a major role in the formation of an East Asian Community over the long term.
    The main object of this article is to examine the role of the regional institutions spanning Asia—APEC, ARF, APT, and EAS—in the maintenance and formation of regional order in East Asia through the lens of the English School approach to IR. By clarifying the potential of regional institutions to serve as a means for constructing regional order, this article also assesses the future prospects of regional order. This article begins with a brief review of the definition of international order presented in the English School and existing studies on East Asian regional order in order to clarify the configuration of regional order. The second section examines the role of regional institutions in the formation and maintenance of regional order. It argues that regional institutions have primarily contributed to the maintenance and reinforcement of the current US-centered order through four roles: (1) improving the predictability of the US presence in the region, (2) coordinating rules governing state cooperation, (3) promoting the rise of China as a force for maintaining the status quo, and (4) easing tensions between major powers. The third section illuminates the limitations of the role of regional institutions in the formation of regional order. It is argued that regional institutions can ultimately play no greater role than contributing to maintaining and bolstering the existing order. Indeed, due mainly to the lack of enforcement mechanisms, regional institutions can neither promote effective rules of state cooperation nor foster a shared regional identity, which are essential for the formation of a new community-centered regional order. The concluding section discusses the future prospects for East Asian regional order in light of the foregoing considerations.
  • 太平洋条約の経験から
    西田 竜也
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_25-40
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper studies historically and theoretically why the United States developed mainly bilateral alliances (a so-called “hub-and spoke system”) in Asia-Pacific while it constructed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a multilateral alliance, in Europe during the early Cold War period. The question is puzzling, because the United States behaved inconsistently in the two regions, a bilateralist in the Asian-Pacific and a multilateralist in the Atlantic. The paper examines the case of developing a Pacific Pact from 1950 to 1951 to learn insights and lessons for building a future security system in the Asia-Pacific region. Defining a collective defense alliance, the paper specifically investigates under what conditions a collective defense alliance develops, although the paper cannot discuss all the conditions for forming such an alliance.
    When military situations in Korea aggravated to such an extent that U.S. military forces might be forced to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula at the end of 1950, the U.S. State Department, particularly John Foster Dulles and John M. Allison, drafted a Pacific Pact in order to promote a peace treaty with Japan. The Pacific Pact is regarded as a collective defense alliance, because the pact proposed “defense by Japan” in addition to the “defense” of Japan and “defense against Japan.”
    However, the Pact did not materialize partially because the United Kingdom opposed to the formation of the Pacific Pact, partially because Japan was reluctant to contribute to the defense of the Far East, and partially because Australia was unwilling to form an alliance with Japan.
    In particular, Japanese military contribution was considered particularly important for forming a collective defense alliance such as the Pacific Pact, since the contribution would have provided a strong incentive to the United States for sharing military responsibilities with Japan and other allies in the region. The process tracing of the development on the Pacific Pact also indicates that the U.S. government suspended the formation of the Pacific Pact not because it was forced to do so by the opposition of the United Kingdom. Rather, the U.S. government deliberately switched from forming a Pacific Pact to constructing a “hub-and-spoke system” after: 1) learning Australia and Japan's unwillingness to contribute to the security of the region as a whole and; 2) carefully calculating costs and benefits of the two defense systems.
    A lesson from the failed initiatives on the Pacific Pacts suggests that Japanese military contribution would be necessary or even crucial if a collective defense alliance is to be developed in the Asia-Pacific in the future.
  • 戸﨑 洋史
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_41-56
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    Northeast Asia is replete with sources of friction and conflict. The prospect of armed conflict lingers as the issues surrounding Taiwan and the Korean peninsula remain unresolved. Other territorial disputes in the region could also lead to new tensions resulting from mutual suspicions or upsurges of nationalism. In addition, the possible security implications of China's increasing influence owing to its rapidly growing economy have also come to the fore.
    On the other hand, with the exception of the Sino-Soviet border conflict and the Sino-Vietnamese War, there have been no armed conflicts in Northeast Asia since the mid-1950s. One factor that cannot be ignored when considering the military aspects of this state of affairs is the presence of nuclear weapons in this region.
    In Northeast Asia, nuclear weapons have assumed the role of preventing not only attempts to change the status quo in relation to overt and latent sources of conflict, including the highly tense issues surrounding the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, but also arms races between the actors involved. Although the “maintenance of the status quo under nuclear weapons” may be considered as nothing more than a method of containing contentious issues, it remains preferable to possible armed conflict and enables efforts toward resolving the issues. Nevertheless, the “maintenance of the status quo under nuclear weapons” involves a “delicate balance” and inherently entails instability, uncertainty, and even the possibility that nuclear weapons may be used.
    Arms control and non-proliferation based on increased transparency and mutual understanding will likely play an important role in containing factors that could destabilize Northeast Asian security—such as distrust between actors, uncertainty over future developments, and the heightening of security dilemmas—while carefully maintaining the “delicate balance”.
    What is required in tandem with precluding Northeast Asia from falling into instability are efforts to build a stable regional security framework that depends less on military power, including nuclear weapons. The creation of such a framework will demand a substantial amount of time, and the current security environment seems to militate against the possibility of realizing such a goal. However, such endeavors would be consistent with ongoing attempts to modify the Japan-U.S. alliance so as to contribute further to regional and international stability and would also enable U.S. predominance in the Northeast Asian regional security structure in a moderate manner while allowing a “rising China” to assume a key role in the region as “a responsible stakeholder.”
  • 中逵 啓示
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_57-74
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    Deepening globalization necessitates nation states to work together. Even a super power cannot live in isolation today without drastically lowering the standard of living of its own people. The financial and economic crisis of 1997–8 harshly reminded East Asian nations of such common knowledge. Since then, they have shared the idea that regional financial cooperation would be increasingly indispensable if the IMF's assistance would fail to be swift, sufficient, and appropriate. This paper examines how close East Asian nations have come to reaching the goal of the necessary regional financial integration since the crisis. Diplomacy toward regional financial cooperation in the past 10 years will be traced especially concerning initiative, leadership, rivalry, and mediation within and outside East Asian nations. The paper also pays attention to the roles of forums in guiding direction and achieving compromise. Finally the efforts of East Asian governments will be evaluated through the criterion of how much they have institutionalized regional financial cooperation. In short, the paper clarifies to what extent regional financial cooperation was politically feasible along with its economic rationality.
  • 大庭 三枝
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_75-88
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper provides a tentative analysis on how regionalism and globalization are/have been interrelated and affected each other, focusing on recent trends of development of Asian regionalism. That Asian countries began to promote a variety of cooperation and dialogue in the ASEAN, the APEC, the ARF, ASEAN+3, the EAS and others indicates that Asian regionalism rapidly advanced in the past two decades. These regional institutions were operated with a set of norms called the “Asian Way” for regional governance, which includes “respect for sovereignty”, “non-interference in internal affairs”, “decision-making by consensus”, and “support for informal and soft institutional structure”.
    On the other hand, especially since the end of the Cold War, complex phenomena of globalization have spread all over the world. This paper focuses on the normative dimension of globalization: the diffusion of pluralistic democracy, human rights and economic liberalism as a set of “universal values” or “global standards”, which are transforming the forms of norms, values and way of thinking in many societies in the world.
    This paper argues that the “AsianWay” for regional governance efforts has been gradually eroded by these “universal values”, even though it still affects activities under Asian institutions. Three trends reflecting this normative transformation of Asian regionalism have emerged since the early 2000s. Firstly, some of Asian countries begin to attempt to promote the realization of “universal values” in the activities and dialogues in regional institutions, and they sometimes extended activities beyond “respect for sovereignty”, “noninterference in internal affairs”. The severe reactions of ASEAN toward the junta in Myanmar since 2003 reveal this new trend in Asian regionalism. Besides, the ASEAN Charter, which was adopted in 2007 stipulates that the promotion of “democracy”, “rule of law”, and “human rights” are some of main purposes of the ASEAN.
    Secondly, regional cooperation in Asia began to place a heavy accent on policy coordination and harmonization in not only cross-border but also the behind-the-border issues. This trend is created by the serious consideration among regional elites for the survival of their countries and regional economy under the severe impact of economic globalization. The establishment of the AFTA by ASEAN countries and the promotion of structural reform assistance in the APEC show the development of this trend.
    Thirdly, some of Asian regional institutions have changed some rules of governance in order to reinforce the effectiveness and validity, beyond the “support for informal and soft institutional structure”. The adoption of ASEAN-minus-X formula in the ASEAN and that of the Pathfinder Initiative in the APEC indicate the intention of these institutions to advance regional cooperation more quickly and effectively with flexible rules for implementation. Besides, the contents of the ASEAN Charter showed that the mainstream of the ASEAN was willing to face the challenge of enhanced effectiveness and validity.
    The transformation of the “Asian Way” will not be linear, but it is sure that the characteristics of Asian regionalism are changing in response to the phenomenon of globalization. However, it should not be ignored that the transformation of the “Asian Way” causes serious splits among Asian countries over the principles, norms and values.
  • ASEAN共同体の形成過程における「下」からのオルターナティブな地域主義に注目して
    五十嵐 誠一
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_89-103
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    The regional order in Southeast Asia has undergone a rapid change in the context of the end of the Cold War and the spread of economic globalization. The mainstream theories such as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism have offered competing explanations of this transformation. However, recently, a new phenomenon that cannot be grasped by these state-centric theories has arisen—the movement toward constructing a regional order from below by transnational civil society actors.
    As ASEAN made a full-fledged start in constructing the ASEAN Community after the late 1990s, the transnational civil society actors began to engage in its decision-making process. Such engagements were specifically observed in the process of drafting the ASEAN Charter starting from 2006. Even after the establishment of the charter, these actors continue to remain involved in the panel and committee related to the framework of the ASEAN Community.
    This article attempts to empirically analyze the activities of such transnational civil society actors, and to explore the scope and limits of alternative regionalism advocated by them. Furthermore, it seeks to examine the embryonic change toward the establishment of a new regional order in Southeast Asia from the bottom-up perspective.
    Section I focuses on a theoretical analysis. After an overview of the New Regional Approach, which is one of the critical international theories and has a vested interest in civil society, it develops a theoretical perspective on transnational civil society in the context of regionalization. Using such a perspective, it also extracts the characteristics of new regionalism in Southeast Asia. Section II describes the basic features of transnational civil society actors, and explores the configuration of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic actors in transnational public space. By focusing on the process of drafting the ASEAN Charter, Section III analyzes the alternative regionalism advocated by the transnational civil society actors. Section IV highlights the two issues that these actors have given special emphasis to after the establishment of the ASEAN Charter: the terms of reference of the human rights body and the rights of migrant workers.
    In conclusion, the article proves that by engaging with transnational civil society actors, ASEAN is gradually moving from an “elite club” to a peoplecentered organization, but given the predominance of neoliberal discourse, alternative regionalism has not enough led to the realization. As regarding the establishment of a new regional order, although the Westphalian system has not yet dissolved, as symbolized by the “ASEAN way” that the nationstates still adhere to, the transnational public sphere has been more rapidly expanded by transnational civil society actors. Furthermore, they have attempted to transform the “ASEAN way” by tackling with issues such as human rights. Such issue-oriented movement would give some impetus to the realization of a post-Westphalian system.
  • 内外の民主化圧力と中国への接近
    中野 亜里
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_104-119
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article focuses on the regional and domestic democratic pressures to Vietnamese communist government and recent Hanoi-Beijing rapprochment so as to put the question that how the democratization of Vietnam will influence to ASEAN cooperation or relations between ASEAN and China.
    ASEAN's core principle of non-interference in the internal affairs was at first fabourable for Hanoi government to enter into regional cooperations and to ensure the legitimacy of its communist regime. Ideologues of the Vietnamese Communist Party insisted on the superiority of “socialist democracy” against “bourgeois democracy” on the one hand, applied the principle of noninterference to the domestic affairs of Asian capitalist countries on the other. In accodance with the principle, Hanoi government also positively supported the affiliation of Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia with ASEAN.
    However, lots of democratic changes took place in East and South-East Asia in 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s. Above all, the collapse of Suharto regime in Indonesia caused the loss of persuasiveness of “Asian Way” on which the principle of non-interference based. Soon after Vietnam had joined ASEAN, the principle became invalid for Hanoi to justify its policies concerning democracy and human rights.
    In the process of construction ASEAN Charter, democratization and protection of human rights became essential ideas of ASEAN Community. In additon to the regional democratic pressures, Hanoi came to be afraid that dicisions of ASEAN Community will restruct sovereignty of member countries and threaten Vietnamese communist regime.
    As Vietnam participated in the international society and its market economy developed, the domestic movements for democratization by multiparty system and protection of civil and political rights have been developed and linked with anti-Chinese nationalism. In recent years, Vietnamese Communist Party has accepted Chinese model of party construction and cooperated with Chinese Communist Party in the theory of “socialist democracy”. However, in the relationship with China, Hanoi faced with questions directly concerned with national sovereignty such as the political system or territorial disputes. From the end of 2008 the democratic movements have focused on the plan of mining bauxite in central highlands with the participation of Chinese aluminium company. Relating to territorial soverignty and national security of Vietnam, the development project of bauxite caused a fierce public criticism.
    In addion to the powerful support of China for Myanmar military government, the ideological cooperation between Beijing and Hanoi as well as the advance of Chinese capital, technology and labor force into Vietnam will have any affects to the regional order in East and Southeast Asia.
  • アジアのパワー・ポリティックスを超える試みとその現実
    伊藤 剛, Joel Rathus
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_120-134
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper seeks to explain how Australia has sought to further its national interests and increase its diplomatic influence in Asia. Managing relations with Asia, especially in light of rise of Chinese power and the decline of the US as global hegemon, is Australia's most important foreign policy problem. In managing its foreign relations with Asia, Australia must strike a careful balance. Becoming deeply involved in Asian affairs risks entanglement in Sino-Japanese great power rivalry. But neither will Australia's national interests be served by remaining aloof from Asian affairs, as it risks isolation from the decisions which might affect Australia's national security or economic well being.
    In striking this balance, this paper will argue that Australia has adopted a ‘middle power’ diplomatic strategy. This strategy is aimed at securing Australia's national interests in regional stability and the continued relevance of Australia to regional affairs by assertive, flexible and low key diplomacy. This strategy has also inclined Australia towards the building up of ad hoc coalitions or networks to deal with specific issues, an approach which has lead Australian promotion of and support for Asian regional multilateralism. Based on this middle power strategy, the Hawke-Keating administration helped sponsor the formation of the APEC and the ARF. The Howard administration too, despite its preferred bilateral approach and close coordination with US, saw to it that Australia joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). More recently, the current Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has been more proactive in the pursuit of building regional security architecture.
    This paper will argue that Australia approach to Asia under the middle power strategy is chiefly driven by external factors. In particular, this paper will address the Sino-Japanese rivalry and the changing role of the US in the region as causes for Australia's desire for ‘friends’ in Asia. However it is impossible to factor out entirely movements within Australia's domestic politics. In particular, it is necessary to discuss the 1996 and 2007 elections, at which Government changed hands from the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to the Liberal-National Coalition (LNC) and back again. While each administration has had differing approaches and assessments of Asia, this paper will seek to explain the underlying national strategy of Australia.
  • 東アジア・サミットをめぐる日本の視座
    大賀 哲
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_135-149
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this paper is to assess the prospects and limits of East Asian community-building by examining perspectives on Japanese foreign policy in the East Asia Summit. With reviewing international relations theories that observe a development of Asian regionalism, this paper focuses on the principles, norms, and orders of the East Asian community. While institutionalizations and the organization of East Asian regionalism have been rapidly implemented within the framework of the ASEAN Plus Three since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8, a proposal of regular regional-level Summit (known as the East Asia Summit) has been one of focal issues of discussion from the earliest times of cooperation. Whereas it has been mostly argued that the membership of the East Asia Summit and East Asian community would be East Asian countries, namely the ASEAN Plus Three countries, Japan has, from the beginning, insisted on inclusion of non-East Asian members, such as Australia, New Zealand, and India. Furthermore, Japan's discourses on the East Asian community focus on concepts of democracy, human rights, and global norms, and thus emphasize bridging a gap between global principles and regional orders. In other words, an important rationale for examining Japanese perspectives on the Summit is to assess whether East Asian community-building has harmonized with existing global principles and norms.
    As this paper assumes, “open regionalism” has played a central role in Japan's perspectives on regional community-building. The open regionalism discourses that were conceptualized in the late 1970s and early 1980s aimed to establish a tangent point between the Japan-U.S. alliance and Asian regional solidarity. In the 1990s, the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) institutionalized that concept by bridging intra-regional economic cooperation with extra-regional economic liberalization. That is, open regionalism has been the functional political concept that is articulated between global principles and regional orders.
    This paper regards Japan's perspectives on the Summit as a continuation of the open regionalism discourses, and assesses the significance of open regionalism in relation to the principles and norms of East Asian regional order. By borrowing theoretical frameworks of previous literatures on international relations and Asian Regionalism, and by critically examining Katzenstein's pronous regionalism and Pempel's geopsychology, this paper constructively evaluates the global importance of open regionalism in East Asian community-building. For research purposes, this paper assesses a series of Japanese foreign policy discourses in the Summit during the Koizumi, Abe and Fukuda periods, and uncovers the global significance of open regionalism from the standpoint of articulated global and regional political orders.
  • 平川 幸子
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_150-164
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    Any kind of Asian multilateral or regional framework necessarily faces the unique cross-straits reality. Two governments, China and Taiwan, which are at the same time politically antagonistic but economically interdependent, peacefully co-exist in the global society. How do existing regional institutions deal with the cross-straits controversy and authorize their affiliations? To answer the above question, this article examines the three cases of GATT/WTO, APEC, EAS, by focusing on the historical backgrounds and institutional bases for the participation of China and Taiwan.
    This study argues that conflicting parties within a divided state are able to co-exist in multilateral frameworks by means of adopting an operational name and devising flexible membership criteria. Simultaneous participation, however, remains risky unless the two parties remain disciplined to not bring their local problems into the regional arena.
    Dual and equal membership is most likely to happen in economic and functional organizations, where the rule of “Separation between Politics and Economics” functions. The GATT/WTO is such a case. In addition, throughout the process, the US-led major signatories had informally agreed that the membership question of China and Taiwan would be treated as a package on a equal basis. This “sit in the same bus” formula contributed to avoiding their conventional zero-sum game. Taiwan joined the international economic regime by adopting the status of a “customs territory.”
    The APEC case suggests that an institutionally weak framework is vulnerable to directly fall into the pit of a bilateral political battleground. As the nature of the APEC was shifting from economic to political, Lee Tenghui's “Chinese Taipei,” which was affiliated as an “economy,” aggressively advanced into the APEC with its pragmatic diplomacy. After years of mediation efforts the APEC members recently found the best compromise is to allow Taiwan's participation in the form of “non-governmental” or “private” status in the APEC summits.
    Meanwhile, China has isolated Taiwan from the EAS. Without US presence, China has actively taken initiative in organizing East Asian regionalism with ASEAN by emphasizing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as the central instrument. China actively promotes the core values of the TAC such as sovereignty and non-intervention in order to pursue a non-conciliatory “One China” policy. This adversely affects Taiwan's possible association with the EAS. As long as signing the TAC is required as prerequisite for gaining its membership, the EAS will continue to prevent Taiwan from appearing in both security agenda and membership question.
  • EUによるアフリカ諸国への経済制裁(一九九〇–二〇〇一)
    田中 世紀
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_165-181
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    Why are economic sanctions initiated? This paper will describe through quantitative analysis the conditions under which a state or states impose economic sanctions against autocratic regimes. Conventional wisdom argues that norms or interests are important factors leading to the initiation mechanism: economic sanctions are likely to be imposed against countries which violate democratic norms or do not have significant trade ties with sender states. Norms or interests, however, can not explain the actual pattern of initiation of economic sanctions.
    In this article I propose that reputation is a key factor in the pattern of initiation of economic sanctions. Specifically, economic sanctions are imposed when the sender's reputation is about to be questioned. To put it another way, states do not consider initiating economic sanctions for purely coercive diplomatic purposes, but rather for the maintenance of their reputation. When does reputation matter? This paper assumes the higher the international concern, the higher the stakes for a state's reputation. For example, when the international community pays great attention to a situation, states must do something to maintain their reputation; but states need not do great things—simply doing something is enough. It follows that states do not implement strong economic sanctions, but rather use weak economic sanctions because the sanctions themselves are implemented as symbolic gestures. I refer to this as the symbolic hypothesis.
    I use panel probit analysis to test this symbolic hypothesis. The data include 24 sanctions initiated by the EU against African countries from 1990 to 2001. The results of my analysis show that the EU tends to impose economic sanctions in reaction to coups, grave violations of human rights, and major states' misbehavior, all of which seem to draw a great deal of international attention. In contrast, the EU is likely to ignore the retreat of democracy and/or minor states' misbehavior, which do not draw public attention. Concerning the type of economic sanctions, my analysis finds that the EU prefers to use relatively weak and costless sanctions such as suspensions or reductions of economic aid, rather than choosing strong and costly alternatives such as trade embargos. All of my results confirm the symbolic hypothesis' predictions. Economic sanctions, after all, are initiated when the senders' reputation is at stake.
    The findings also challenge the central paradox of economic sanctions concerning why such sanctions continue to be imposed despite seemingly having little effect on the target states. States do not coerce other states to do what they desire, but instead they continue to be forced to use weak economic sanctions, which might be ineffective, to maintain their reputation.
  • 国家情報長官(DNI)制度の創設とその効果
    小林 良樹
    2009 年 2009 巻 158 号 p. 158_182-195
    発行日: 2009/12/25
    公開日: 2012/02/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    In December 2004, the United States Congress passed “the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004,” which created the Director of National Intelligence (hereafter DNI). This was the most significant overhaul of the basic framework of the U.S. Intelligence Community since it was established in 1947. The basic idea of this reorganization mainly came from so-called “the 9/11 Commission Report” published in July 2004. The report criticized the weak management of the intelligence community headed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who was also the head of the CIA, then recommended that the DCI should be replaced by a newly created National Intelligence Director to bring more integration and cooperation to the intelligence community. The object of this paper is to try to examine the following question; “Is the DNI functioning as was expected or not? In other words, is the DNI actually overseeing the Intelligence Community as a real head or not?”
    Evaluation of Major Factors
    (1) Status: The DNI, to some extent, has successfully demonstrated his leadership status over the intelligence community. However, some members of the community such as the Department of Defense seem to be still reluctant to recognize DNI's leadership status.
    (2) Man Power: The DNI has already established his own large institutional manpower base to support him, although it has only analytical function and does not have operational function.
    (3) Support from the President: The DNI also seems to enjoy strong support from the President to secure his leadership.
    (4) Budgetary and Personnel Power: The budgetary and personnel power of the DNI endorsed by the legislation is vague and not so strong, more or less similar to the power given to the DCI. The DNI seems to have established actual influence, to some extent, over personnel matters of civilian intelligence institutions such as CIA. However, DNI's actual influence on budgetary and personnel matters of military intelligence institutions affiliated to the Department of Defense seems very limited.
    (5) Quality of Intelligence Product: There has been some improvement for information sharing in the community after the reform. However, still it is too early to say that the new system has achieved significant improvement in the quality of the analytical products of the community.
    Conclusion
    To some extent, the DNI seems to be successfully overseeing the intelligence community as new head of the community, especially over the civilian intelligence institutions such as CIA. However, DNI's oversight has not been perfect yet, rather partial. Especially DNI's budgetary and personnel power over the military intelligence institutions seems very limited. In other words, as a reality, the intelligence community may be divided into two parts; the civilian part overseen by the DNI and military part overseen by the Secretary of Defense.
    Given the above-mentioned limitations, it is unlikely that the DNI's oversight on military intelligence institutions would be improved significantly unless the current legislation is amended. The future success or failure of the DNI system also would depend on personality of those who will be actually appointed as the DNI as well as their personal relations with the president and other senior leaders.
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