In this volume, scholars working on African politics and African international relations address major issues in contemporary Africa in the context of globalization. The basic and original image of sub-Saharan Africa was that of chromic marginalization in globalizing world. However, as Bayart proposed in the name of “paradigm of extraversion,” there is an alternative image that Africans have utilized their external relations (dependencies) in their favor for long time in their relations with the other world. It is in this interactive manner that Africa and Africans have transformed themselves. It is these multi-dimensional changes on which the authors of articles in this volume focus.
This introductory article consists of five sections including brief introduction of each contribution. At first, the old and new issue of nation and state in the context of Africa since colonial period is reexamined. As Mamdani coined the concept of “bifurcated state,” colonial state was by nature dualdimensional despotism. This type of despotism is still observed in Africa in such way as “failed states” like Sudan and Zimbabwe in contemporary period. Also it is possible to point out that nation-building is still unaccomplished “modern” project in Africa.
Second, transformation of conflicts in global context is mentioned. The concept of “conflict” has been often reevaluated in its applicability to describe “new wars.” Alternative concepts like complex political emergencies and emerging political complex was proposed by Duffield to describe the new situation of “conflicts.” In fact, “conflict phenomena” has been deeply transformed in the post-cold war era due to involvement of a variety of actors.
Third section focuses on emerging regionalism in Africa. It was in 2002 that African Union (AU) was established on the new principle of “intervention instead of indifference” to humanitarian disasters on the continent. New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which is a new vision and strategic framework for African development, was also adopted for the purpose of coping with the current challenges facing the African continent. Despite these new initiatives, it remains to be seen if these new organizations and frameworks become effective to sort out a variety of issues on the continent.
Fourthly, change of political regimes in the name of democratization in Africa has been critically evaluated and labeled in such ways as “pseudodemocracy,” “virtual democracy,” and even “semi-authoritarianism.” In this context, democratization is considered to include not only political pluralism and elections but also development of civil society, constitutionalism and so on. Decentralization is also regarded as important component of democratization and improvement of governance from below. Even so, it is still necessary to evaluate roles of a variety of components in its relation to democratization in Africa.
Lastly, instead of marginalization, Africa became a place of engagement of a variety of outside actors, because of the regional war on terrorism and richness of natural resources. In this context one of the most prominent engagements comes from China and India in recent days, which clearly has great interest in African mineral resources. In 2005, G8 also declared its new and heavy involvement in Africa to get rid of chronic poverty in Africa. This is recognized as a “new struggle for Africa,” in which various interaction will cause new political and economic trajectory of this continent. In these ways, Africa will be somehow transformed in the coming years in this obviously interdependent and interconnected world.

抄録全体を表示

The languages of colonial rulers remain dominant in public life even after a colony achieves independence. English, French and Portuguese have been retained as the official languages in most of the Sub-Saharan African countries. The former colonial European language is proclaimed to be the only official language in 28 African countries. Even if African languages do become official languages, they remain the languages of the primary schools and local government offices. In contrast, English, French or Portuguese are languages of the courts, central government offices and institutions of higher education.
Colonial governments did not make any real attempt to develop African languages into official written languages with the exception of Kiswahili in Tanzania. People in colonies were linguistically divided. After independence, the language situation did not change very much. Individuals are still not able to communicate with one another. The language question lies behind various difficulties that Africa faces today.
In Zambia, the only official language is English. Seven African languages are used for instruction in elementary schools and for radio broadcasts. The number of people who speak two of these language, Bemba and Nyanja, is increasing. However, the government has not shown any intention to develop them into official languages at the national level.
English as a second language is rapidly spreading in Zambia mainly because of educational development. Although English is the lingua franca of the middle class, it does not have this status for the entire population. Zambian might be said to be divided into two groups: the thin layer of the educated who gains proficiency in English, and the thick layer of the working classes who continue to speak in their many different languages. Zambia is a typical multilingual/multiethnic state without a particular language understood by the majority of the people. Zambian national unity has not been brought about by language or ethnicity, but by the people taking pride in freedom of speech, democracy and, particularly, in maintaining peace by combating ethnic divisions since independence.
The author will discuss this subject in detail by focusing on the Nsenga people living in Petauke and Lusaka.

抄録全体を表示

Recently the scholars studying conflict theories or peace building in Africa have tended to neglect the historical perspective of Africa. Without knowing the history of traditional kingdoms and chiefdoms, including slave trade, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, we cannot accurately understand serious problems with which African people are now confronted.
Coups d'etat are common in Africa. Nigeria in particular, an oil-rich African giant, has experienced the military rule for about twenty-nine years since its independence. Why did the Nigerian officers decide to seize the power? Why did they desire to keep the power for such a period of time? And, why don't they intend to withdraw from the political arena? To answer these questions, we should consider the impact of British rule in Nigeria.
The Nigerian army was originally established to conquer the native kingdoms and chiefdoms under the policy of British colonization. British rulers sometimes undermined the “rule of law.” Later the Nigerian army became the tool for traditional rulers, who started to work for the British rule in order to suppress their own people. New rulers of independent Nigeria learned how to use the military to defend their vested interests during 1960 through 1966. Therefore, it is the negative legacy of British rule that civilian and military regimes had not maintained “law and order” to save the lives of Nigerian people. So many civilians, being involved in armed conflict between Nigerian army and rebellions, were killed by the army.
Samuel Huntington showed two conditions to avoid military intervention. According to him, the civil-military relation may be destroyed if the governments would not be able to promote “economic development” and to maintain “law and order” and if civilian politicians would desire to use the military power for their own political ambitions.
As to the “economic development,” approximately 80% of Nigerian people suffer from poverty, whereas the retired generals enjoy their political power as well as financial business with a plenty of money. As mentioned above, the aspect of “law and order” has been also neglected by the regimes. After independence, civilian regimes used the military for their political interests and led the army officials into the political arena.
Therefore, as suggested by Huntington, military intervention may be caused in Nigeria again if the Fourth Republic would neglect the importance of promoting “economic development” and of maintaining “law and order.” The Fourth Republic also needs to keep the army out of politics and the politics out of the army to avoid military intervention. Actually it is difficult to meet these conditions, because the group of retired generals still has strong influence over political and economical arenas.

抄録全体を表示

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which has experienced periods of long internal conflicts, organized a series of elections (presidential, national, and provincial) in 2006 in order to close the transitional period that followed the peace agreement in 2002. After the elections, however, the conflicts in the eastern part of the country (Kivu region) aggravated, as the rebel CNDP intensified its military activities. This paper explores why the conflicts recurred in Kivu after the elections, through the examination of changes and continuities during this period.
To understand events of this period, two aspects must be kept in mind. On the one hand, national and regional political environments have changed considerably because of the elections. The RCD-Goma, the Rwanda-backed rebels controlling the Kivu region that became a political party in the 2006 elections, lost its power through a series of national and provincial election defeats. By contrast, parties related to the ex-rebel RCD-ML gained power through the elections. This change can be interpreted in terms of ethnic relations: Banyarwanda-Tutsi ethnic groups lost power at the hands of Nande groups.
Economic aspects, on the other hand, did not change much before or after the elections. Illicit mining, the most important economic activity in the Kivu region, had been mainly controlled by Rwanda, RCD-Goma, and the FDLR (Hutu rebels stemming from the ex-Habyarimana regime in Rwanda) until the transitional period. Recent reports on this issue revealed that the illicit activities have been conducted mainly by three groups: the FARDC (the integrated national armed forces), FDLR, and CNDP. Among the three groups, it is clear that FDLR and CNDP, the Tutsi-hardliners in the RCD-Goma, had already been carrying out their activities since before the elections. The reason that the FARDC came to be involved in illicit mining seems to be related to a certain problematic way of army integration. Under the so called “mixage” army integration system, ex-rebels can become FARDC soldiers, even if they were practically neither disarmed nor demobilized.
The recent uprising of CNDP can therefore be interpreted as purposeful action to change the political order established through the election. The fact that the CNDP had formed around the first-round presidential elections (July 2006) indicates that Tutsi-hardliners had already predicted the defeat of RCD-Goma at this time. The defeat was in fact predictable as the core supporters of RCD-Goma (Tutsi) is extreme minority among Congolese population. Instead of participating in the elections as RCD-Goma, they decided to establish a new instrument for violence, the CNDP, in order to maintain their political and economic vested interests. The 2006 elections, in effect, was a driving force for the subsequent violence in Kivu.

抄録全体を表示

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the role of civil society organizations (CSO) in peacemaking and political negotiations in order to articulate the limits and possibilities of the bottom up approach to peacebuilding.
The dramatic upsurge of ‘new war’, which could be contrasted with earlier wars in terms of their goals, the methods of warfare and how they are financed, urges us to rethink current approach towards conflict resolution. From past practices, it becomes clearer that the top-down approach to peacebuilding, which sought to establish an agreement among key faction leaders could not resolve fundamental causes of conflict and restore sustainable peace in deeply divided societies. Rather, from several successful examples of locally negotiated peace, the bottom-up approach is regarded as an alternative means for conflict resolution, and the emphasis in conflict resolution shifts from state-centered approach to less state-centric approaches, which linked civil society, international organizations, and states.
This trend could be found in Northern Uganda as well. Since 1988, the Northern Uganda has experienced destructive confrontation between the government army, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony. The conflict resulted in serious violations of the human rights of the Acholi people (who live in Gulu, Amuru, Kidgum and Pader districts) by both the LRA and the UPDF. After the collapse of the Bigombe-lead peace negotiations in 1994, it became increasing apparent that the government and LRA were not willing to end conflict. Traditional leaders, religious leaders, and other members of CSO became significant actors in the pursuit for peace in Northern Uganda. Their efforts have been gradually supplemented by the crucial support from international NGOs, international organizations and several western countries. The close co-operation between local CSOs and external actors play important role in laying foundation for peace at the grass roots level, such as the establishment of Amnesty Commission after the Amnesty Act enacted in 2000. However, certain methods and approaches such as restoration of the Elders Council, and a possible implementation of traditional justice, raise doubt and skepticisms about the value of the bottom up approach in the context of international human rights norms. Many religious, civil society and traditional leaders represent only a portion of local people's interests and lack the strategic reach to deal with the full scope of problems that need to be resolved. Thus, this paper evaluates current CSO's initiatives and strategies, and proposes several recommendations and prospects for the future bottom up approach to peacebuidling in the region.

抄録全体を表示

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which consists of seven countries around the Horn of Africa, is one of the least recognized regional organizations in the world. In fact, in the small amount of literature dealing with this organization, it is quite common to depict it as a dysfunctional organization where conflicts and mistrust among the member states have hampered its proper functioning. It is even referred to as a ‘perfect example’ of a paralyzed organization. Given that the Horn has hosted many inter-state, as well as intra-state conflicts, such a harsh judgment might seem plausible.
In this article, a somewhat different view is suggested. By exploring various aspects of IGAD—its activities, motivation of the member states, their relations with each other and with the outside world—, it draws attention to the often overlooked roles of this organization, especially its utility for the survival of the governments of the member states.
First of all, IGAD is by no means a paralyzed organization. Tracking its record of activities reveals that member states have quite frequently gathered at regional meetings. Many of them have actively been involved in diverse activities such as mediations in civil wars in Sudan and Somalia, as well as building a regional conflict early warning system.
These activities are consistent with the urgent needs of the countries in the Horn, that is, regime survival in the context of a more or less fragile state. At the same time, however, these endeavors in IGAD do not necessarily entail deepening regional cooperation, much less integration, among the member states. While they have been trying to expand their cooperation in many fields, including mutual dialogue, conflict resolution, and even collective military action, these have been pursued mostly in an ad hoc manner and their effects remain very limited.
With its stated objective of integration a distant possibility, what aspect of IGAD could ensure its continued existence? The article illuminates the valuable link this organization provides, that is, the link with the wider international society. IGAD can be considered as a sort of forum where member states mobilize various extra-regional actors (AU, EU, UN, donor countries, etc.) for the survival of their own regimes. In fact, the countries in the Horn not only obtain external resources through IGAD, but also raise collective voices there, urging the international community to take specific policies that are conductive to strengthening their domestic rule.
Although the responses from outside the region have scarcely been as much as was expected, they can be helpful for the countries in the Horn, which have been struggling in desperate material and political conditions.

抄録全体を表示

The progress of globalization has given rise of regionalization all over the world. This article explains the progress of regionalization in African refugee problem area by global and regional institutional change.
In the refugee problem area, there are two types of institution, one is an institution normatively formed for the refugee protection, which is called the international institution for refugees, and the other is an institution type without normative formation.
International institution for refugees consists of the global system and the regional system, which can be called ‘nested’ institutional complex. Interaction between those two systems showed unilateral complement by the regional system. That was why the nested international institution for refugees remained its European centric feature, so that it had little effect in Africa.
On the other hand, since 1990s, the horizontal institutional complex which consists of both international institution for refugees and African regional frameworks such as AU, ECOWAS, SADC and etc, has appeared in African refugee problem area. Such change from the nested to the horizontal was derived from global and regional institutional change.
External factors, such as the end of Cold War and the situation of refugee problem in Africa, had some influences on each institutional change. However, these are insufficient to explain the difference in their process of change.
With the institutionalism theory approach, following conclusions have been led;
International institution for refugees has extended in the way of UNHCR activity. By offering informational and transactional functions, UNHCR had been acquired the spontaneous order, which made UNHCR take initiative in implementation of institution after the end of Cold War.
In Africa, AU has strengthened their existing framework for refugees, on the other hand, ECOWAS and SADC has extended their problem area from economy to politics. Internal factors of AU, such as a firm collective decision making system and transactional functions offered by a secretariat, caused institutional reinforcement. In addition, AU had had an organ specialized for refugees, which has reduced the asset making costs. Internal factors of ECOWAS showed different aspects. Because of the lowness of asset specificity, informational and transactional functions such as a trust building system and a decision making system could be applied from economic to political area. And it is also because refugee problem has both humanitarian and security aspects, institutionalization in security area could be spill over to refugee area. In addition, economic institution and refugee institution have common strategies on management of migration. These influences derived from economic institution can be seen in institutional change in SADC. In addition, SADC has historically had political aspects, which made institution extend to political area easily.

抄録全体を表示

Decentralization is the governance reform tackled all around world at the beginning of 21^st century. Africa is not exception in this tide. African Countries started Decentralization reform for an aid conditionality as donor countries and international organizations demanded. Decentralization was initiated several years after the opening of democratic transition in Africa.
After about 10 years from its starting, decentralization has given not only governance reform, but also has made political change and turbulence in African countries. The political influence of decentralization is extending from the local level to the national level, then to the international relations.
In African political studies, the election had not been considered as the core issue of study in military and one party regime era. However, political scientists have begun to focus on elections in Africa while democratization slowly progress though in much difficulty.
The studies negatively evaluated elections in African countries. For example, it was believed that election does not realize democratic consolidation. And the election is manipulated and limited by state power. These arguments have been categorized as a new type of the Authoritarianism perspectives. However, we should not miss the aspects that experience of regular repeats of elections has also given positive effects in African politics.
This article analyzes the series of Presidential election (2006), National Assembly election (2007), and local election (2008) after the full-scale enforcement of the decentralization (2002–) in Benin. Benin has received a good reputation as a democratization model in African continent.
This article tries to understand the political influence of decentralization in Africa through field research on each election held in Benin. I hope that this work contributes to understand correlation between decentralization and democratization in Africa.

抄録全体を表示

Nicolas Sarkozy became French president in May promising “rupture” on every possible issue—and he made clear that the old corrupt ties with former African colonies were among the items to be ditched. During the campaign he called for a “normal relationship” with Africa. This suggests a sharp contrast with France's traditional policy in Africa, which was deeply defensive and aimed at preserving a sphere of influence on a continent. This policy called “Francafrique” and epitomised by Mr Sarkozy's immediate predecessors Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac—was in many ways an extension of colonial rule. Personal links between French and African leaders bound Paris to friendly regimes which were given protection in exchange for political allegiance, votes at the UN, and deals with French firms that were lucrative for all concerned.
But talk of “normalisation” and clean government was not always matched by reality. So are Sarkozy's promises of a fresh start any more credible than previous pledges of reform in France's African policy? The author is trying to examine the reality of Sarkozy's african policy.

抄録全体を表示

After the war on Iraq in 2003, neighbouring Arab countries kept a distance from Iraq. Although diplomatic relationship of all the Arab countries was normalized with Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty in 2004, their diplomatic presence was kept at a relatively low profile.
The cold relationship between them was caused by the transformation in security circumstances and Arabism. With regard to the security circumstances, the democratic domino theory, advocated by the U.S. government, was considered a threat by authoritarian Arab states, since it might have potentially exposed their own political power to danger. After the war, not only did extreme federalism in Iraq accelerate their fear of the partition of Iraq but also the newly established Iraqi government was deemed too weak and incompetent to deal with insurgents and stabilize Iraq. Iraq, consequently, became the country that might open the way to regional destabilization in the eyes of Arab states. At the same time, actors in the Iraqi political arena changed substantially as a result of the collapse of the Saddam regime, the impact of which was most apparent on the transformation in Arabism in Iraq. The draft of the new Iraqi constitution ratified in the National Assembly in 2005 did not stipulate clearly that Iraq was a part of the Arab nations. In addition, Iran rapidly developed close friendly relationships with Iraq, leveraging lucratively their connections with Iraqi politicians, formed when those politicians had formerly been dissident activists. This stirred up fear among Arab states that Iran was expanding its political clout in Iraq, which they felt must be part of the Arab world.
On the other hand, the new Iraqi leaders were extremely distrustful of Arab governments, because they felt that the Arabs had turned a blind eye to the cruel oppression by Saddam against his own people. The Iraqi government also repeatedly criticized Arab countries, accusing them of sending Arab insurgents to Iraq who were thwarting the stabilization of Iraq. The Iraqi leaders recognized Arab countries as threats to their own security.
However, after signs of security improvement and embeddedness of a new political system in Iraq, Arab states have begun to show gradual involvement in Iraq since the summer of 2008. Even though the transformations are undesirable for Arabs, they do not have the power to alter the reality. Five years after the war could be the time required for them to accept the new reality.

抄録全体を表示

The aim of this paper is to consider China's economic security. I will use the term “economic security” to refer to “the use of economic instruments for national security.” Therefore, my question is as follows. How does China utilize economic instruments for its own national security? I will especially focus on ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), and the renminbi area (it refers to a currency area where the renminbi is used as means of transactions and reserves, a currency peg or link to the renminbi is observed, and preferences to members over nonmembers are given).
Economic security has had a long pedigree since the Peloponnesian War. However, it seems that comprehensive studies on economic security have been rare. This problem is also the case with security studies over East Asia. Many students pay exclusively attention to China's military power without considering China's economic security. In addition, when students or journalists discuss ACFTA and the renminbi area, they tend to consider these mainly from economic viewpoints. Although there are important political implications in ACFTA and the renminbi area, they fail to notice them.
My considerations proceed as follows. First, as an analytical framework, I provide eight strategic types on economic security: signal, strengthening, containment, bribe, coercion, counterbalance, extraction and entrapment. Secondly, I consider China's political aims that hide behind ACFTA and examine the conditions under which China would be able to utilize ACFTA as economic security. As exports from ASEAN countries to China increase, “economic fifth column”—the groups who have economic interests in good relationship with China—rise in these countries and put pressure on their governments to accommodate China. Thirdly, I consider the renminbi area not from economic viewpoints but from the viewpoints of China's national security. Today, the renminbi has not yet made its debut as internationalized currency. However, considering the renminbe area is not premature. One reason is the great potentiality that China attempts to establish the renminbi area in the future. Another reason is the great impact which the renminbi area will have on security environment in East Asia.
Economic techniques can sometimes achieve good results which military techniques can not achieve. For example, if China uses military means bluntly in anarchical international political structures where a central government does not exist and national survival is not assured, it may cause balancing or containment against China. But if China adroitly utilizes economic security, China can lead neighboring countries to accommodate China's interests more smoothly. If China's sphere of economic influence is built through ACFTA and the renminbi area, China would be able to form its own sphere of political power in East Asia without using force, so without incurring moral criticism, and perhaps without being noticed by neighboring countries.
Thus, to truly understand East Asian security environment and its future, it is essential to consider the security implications of ACFTA and the renminbi area.

抄録全体を表示