Threatening to retaliate is a common means of influence in trade conflicts. In most cases, retaliation is carried out either through the suspension of tariff concessions or through additional tariffs. The target of retaliations can be industries that were uninvolved in the original conflict. This article examines the use and effectiveness of such “cross-industry” threats. With a cross-industry threat, the compositions of domestic games tend to become more complicated with respect to both the threat's sender and target, as compared with intra-industry cases. Unrelated industries tend to have different industrial associations, fall under different bureaucratic jurisdictions, and be represented by different politicians. Thus, we can expect the decision-making process involving cross-industry threats to be more complicated and politically difficult than in intra-industry cases. However, the extensive literature on threat effectiveness has paid insufficient attention to whether retaliation threats are cross-industry or intra-industry. To compensate for this limitation, I examine cases involving U.S. unilateral trade actions and WTO dispute settlements, which yield several findings. First, the use of cross-industry threats by the United States has increased dramatically in 1980s. Second, a close examination of U.S. section 301 cases reveals that cross-industry threats are clearly more effective than intra-industry ones. The selection of targets (cross-or intra-industry) also exhibits a clear tendency. Cross-industry threats are used almost exclusively in attempts to open foreign markets (through the removal or modification of high tariffs, quantitative restrictions, patent protections, industrial standards, tax systems, etc.), and not in the cases of export subsidies, in which the purpose of the U.S. is to protect its own industries from import penetration. The increase in the use of cross-industry retaliation, this study argues, is caused by the changing nature of the negotiation process. After the 1980s, the principle source of trade conflicts shifted from foreign export penetrations (e.g., textile, steel, and auto) to foreign non-tariff barriers such as government regulation, copyright protection, market structure, and domestic institutions. The domestic group supporting trade barriers are not limited to the export industry, and therefore, are not always subject to trade retaliation. Since this renders threats of intra-industry retaliation ineffective, cross-industry threats are now used more frequently. This trend is not limited to the United States. Records from WTO dispute settlement cases demonstrate that most trade retaliations are now targeted at industries that are unrelated to the original conflict. Underlying this change is a dynamic process of liberalization and international harmonization. Trade liberalization begins with competitive industries, and uncompetitive industries tend to be left behind. Similarly, domestic systems of nontradable goods sectors are last to be harmonized. Therefore, as internationalization continues, supporters of alleged trade barriers are less likely to engage in export businesses, thereby decreasing their likelihood of becoming a target of direct trade retaliation.
The aim of this article is to examine the role of Japanese diplomacy in bringing cooperative relationship among oil-consumers, and how it led to the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in November 1974 after the First Oil Crisis (FOC). The foundation of the IEA has an epoch-making significance in itself, as this institution provided a platform in which long-term policy cooperation among oil consumers could be designed and implemented. The IEA obligates signatory states to stockpile a designated certain amount of oil reserves, and it also specifies the Oil Emergency Sharing System in the agreement. This represents an effort for advanced countries seeking cooperation while the postwar international economic order was undergoing to serious changes. Most works on Japanese diplomacy dealing with the FOC period have tended to focus on Japan's stance toward the Middle East. They generally emphasize highlight the anxiety within the government to secure a stable supply of oil as the principal reason for Japan eventually swinging toward pro-Arab policy. However, such narratives do not provide us with a whole picture, since the FOC was not only brought by Arab oil embargo. If we were to fully grasp the underlying cause of Japan's policy behavior in the FOC, we must first take into account a structural change in the international oil market since the late 1960s resulting from the strengthening of oil-producers. In the same vein, it is equally crucial to analyze how the oil consumers in general responded to the oil producers united under the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). After the FOC, cooperation among oil consumer states intensified with Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, and Japan was an active participant during the process. In fact, the Japanese government was the first to announce its intention to participate in the conference. It also actively took part in Energy Coordination Group (ECG) following the Washington Energy Conference, and facilitated ECG in playing a moderating role between Great Britain and West Germany. Japan actively participated in these institutional frameworks since the policymakers shared two perceptions. The first is the recognition that the oil consumers, in order to decrease their vulnerability in oil supply, must unite. The second perception is that it is important for Japan to support the maintenance of a liberal international economic order which would ensure the stable flow of oil supplies. Seen from this context, the Japanese participation in the establishment of the IEA from the first stage is a drastic deviation from past diplomatic practice of passively joining already-existing international organizations. Although Japan's role in G7 for facilitating international cooperation among advanced countries is better known, it is significant to notice that Japan's early participation in establishing cooperative framework in the aftermath of the FOC is the true turning point.
Political scientists have usually considered E. H. Carr as a pioneer of the academic field of International Relations (IR). Given this understanding is tenable, in which historical context did he establish a new discipline? In the early twentieth century, Max Weber discerned in the emergence of bureaucratic institutions an idiosyncratic phase of modern instrumental rationalism. The currently acknowledged form of academic divisions was at best contestable when Carr wrote his monumental The Twenty Years' Crisis (1939). Indeed, Carr was a multifaceted scholar: sometimes, he was an advocate of political realism; other times, he was the author of the controversial historical studies on Soviet Russia; yet other times, he was a biographer of nineteenth century thinkers. It is a grave mistake to recognize Carr exclusively either as historian, political scientist, or biographer. The chief objective of the present article is to situate Carr in the context of the emergence of professional intellectuals, and thus clarify the meaning of the popular understanding that he was one of the pioneering figures of IR. This author focuses on his early works: Dostoevsky (1931), The Romantic Exiles (1933), Karl Marx (1934) and Michael Bakunin (1937). Compared with his texts in the two decades around the middle of the twentieth century, these works have not occasioned much scholarly interest among IR researchers. One of the main reasons of this ignorance is probably their apparent irrelevance to the study of international relations. As I see it, however, Carr's inquiry into international relations was a continuation of his project he advanced in his biographical works. Through his exposure to the untraditional thoughts of nineteenth-century Russian (and Russia-related) intellectuals, Carr obtained a historical view that the modern western world was in radical transformation. On the other hand, Carr discerned various European elements within the apparently unfamiliar Russian thoughts. Carr's project was ultimately a remedial self-critique of Europe. Carr's search for alternative cultural value ended up reattaching him to his familiar liberal world. By suggesting these points, the present article aims to add another contribution to the recent reinterpretations of Carr. It also directs our attentions to the issue of contexts in general for further advancing our knowledge about the history of international studies as well as Carr's relevance to the contemporary world.
It was in his monographic essay titled “Westphalia and All That” that international relations scholar Steven D. krasner criticized the “orthodox” view that the peace of Westphalia of 1648 marks the end of the old medieval world and the beginning of a new era in international relations history. Leo Gross, a prominent internationa law expert, had similarly maintained that Westphalia was the starting point for the development of modern international law and that it was “the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world”. Krasner rejected both the “orthodox” and Gross' views as “wrong”. Krasner's criticism is based on three propositions; 1) “History is not so neatly compartmentalized”; Westphalia was neither an end nor a beginning; 2) The basic issue at Westphalia was not so much one of building a new international order based on sovereign equality of states as a more reaistic one of how the Holy Roman Empire, which had lost the war, would satisfy France and Sweden, which had won; 3)Contrary to the “orthodox” view, Westphalia was “past-oriented”, in the sense that most of the issues taken up there were those of the feudal period, such as hereditary succession, composition of the Diet, election of the Empperor, etc. The purpose of the present study is to place the “orthodox” and Gross' views against the background of Krasner's criticism in an effort to judge which side can provide more adequate and convincing evidence for a satisfactory interpretation of Westphalia. By employing what we propose to call a “symbolic monument” approach, which “constructs” history by connecting historical evidence with interpretation, we have examined such issues as the role of “world charters”, laicization of international law, the system of collective security, and the policy of prestige and diplomatic formalities, and arrived at the conclusion that the “orthodox” and Gross' views are convincing enough to warrant full recognition, while krasner fails to “construct” his own history to make his criticism meaningful. Criticism for the sake of criticism alone does not lead to a discerning knowledge and evaluation of historical realities. “Construction” of history must accompany criticism.We fully share, however, Krasner's admonition that history is not so neatly compartmentalized, and probably it is through the sharing of this admonition with him that a diaogue will begin between us.
When the establishment of the United Nations (UN) was planed in 1945, the following two points were taken in as the experiences of the League of Nations (LN): First, the authority of great powers in the maintenance of international security was widely recognized, and second, international cooperation in the economic and, social and humanitarian works were promoted. This article examines, through UNICEF's relief activities towards Japan, how the UN social and humanitarian works, which were founded on the LN's experiences, have developed its role as an international functional cooperation. The meanings of UNICEF's activities can be summarized as follows: Firstly, its activities carried the American cold war policies on its shoulder. As the cold war raged, UNICEF's activities were convenient for the American policy that aimed at Japanese incorporation in the Western bloc, and the promotion of Japanese reconstruction. Secondly, UNICEF's practical activities were accomplished almost neutrally and independently, although they were much incorporated in the international movement as mentioned above. This was the harvest of the system change, which occurred in the transition era from the LN to the UN. Thirdly, a close relationship has been established between UNICEF and Japan, by American encouragement, through the relief plan, Japanese participation in UNICEF's relief plans for Korea, and so on, which has played a role in Japanese postwar diplomacy. That is, UNICEF's activities ensured the continuance of its role as an international functional cooperation in spite of its involvement in international political movements. The international social and humanitarian works, which were behind the political and military problems in the LN, have changed their stance to the main and independent actor. Owing to this change of stance, UNICEF has come to engage in activities corresponding to the local needs, and the opportunities of dialogue and trust, which were made through its activities, gave birth to not only technical harvests but also international functional cooperation. If we keep these trends in the macroscopic international history, including the LN, we find three important turning points: (1) the germs of the UN system were already grown in the end of the LN; (2) these germs were taken into the establishment of the UN, at which time, the middle and smaller powers promoted these movements; and (3) many UN special agencies, which have succeeded the LN's heritage in talents and techniques, were founded under the UN through War-time relief activities. The history in which the international social and humanitarian works have improved its role as an international functional cooperation is, simultaneously, the history in which international security has come to be secured by diversified measures including the promotion of international cooperation. In this trend, the transition from the LN to the UN was the pivot period.
In the mid-1960s, the Japan-U.S. alliance was institutionalized through the establishment of its first two working-level consultations. The Japanese and U.S. governments held the first meeting of the Policy Planning Talks in 1964, and as a consequence of discussions via this channel, the Security Subcommittee (SSC) was set up in 1967. It is the alliance's character as a “Secretarial Alliance” (managed by working-level policymakers not ministers of governments) that makes this a critical juncture for the development of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Indeed, these consultations have served as a mechanism for transforming the alliance, enabling it to adapt to a changing external environment. The origins of the consultations, however, are yet to be analyzed. In this article, I argue that this alliance institutionalization was caused by “the diffusion of power” in two dimensions. First, nuclear capability diffused; China achieved a nuclear explosion in 1964, ending the U.S.-Soviet nuclear duopoly in Asia. Second, economic power diffused; since the late 1950s, Japan had been in high economic growth while the U.S. suffered balance of payments deficits. “The diffusion of power” prompted the establishment of the two channels through the intensification of U.S. requirements toward Japan to assume a share of the U.S. defense burden in Asia, the emergence of mutual fear, and the burgeoning necessity of role-sharing. The Policy Planning Talks was established as a channel through which U.S. policymakers could educate the Japanese government in defining its own security interests. In so doing, Washington expected Japan, a growing but reluctant ally, to assume a share of the burden of defending the interests of “the Free World” in Asia, offsetting the political influence of nuclear China. The SSC was created as a result of mutual fear. First, Japan's sense of anxiety over the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence against Chinese nukes came to the surface. Tokyo needed the SSC to safeguard the credibility of the U.S. commitment. Second, a U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy toward Japan emerged. Due to Japan's rising nuclear potential concomitant with economic growth, Washington sought to prevent it from becoming a military power by influencing its defense strategy through the SSC. In addition, the establishment of the SSC was a consequence of the growing necessity of role-sharing between the two countries. As deterioration of balance of payments led U.S. forces to withdraw from Japan, Japanese defense experts planned to build-up supportive capability for the U.S. to come to the aid of Japan in an emergency. U.S. policymakers, caught by a newborn dilemma between expectations for Japan's assumption of a share of the U.S. defense burden and fear of its resurgence as a military power, opted to restrict Japan's strengthened capability to supplementary roles within U.S. strategy. The SSC was established as a forum to coordinate this role-sharing.
There are lots of studies on the Suez Crisis, which show us why the British government carried out such an infamous military intervention in Egypt in 1956. Various reasons of the intervention have been discussed since 1960s; some explain British intentions of regaining control over the Suez Canal, dealing a heavy blow to Nasser's regime and holding the British Empire in the Middle East, while others refer to political inside stories of Anthony Eden's administration, especially impact of hawks in the Tory, “Suez group” and Eden's health conditions. These interpretations can be persuasive for understanding the crisis, but we should also view the problem from a different perspective: that is, why could Eden carry out his plan despite the fact that some of his ministers and the Foreign Office opposed to Eden's belligerent attitude. One of the keys to reconsider the crisis is to examine senior government bureaucrat in the Whitehall who personally supported Eden's foreign and military policy, but it has been difficult to follow these senior staffs' influence on the crisis. When Anthony Nutting, ex-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs published his book, No End of a Lesson in 1967 (which is still one of the basic works for Suez watchers), the British Government censored the book and eliminated most secret matters, including names of senior bureaucrat alleged to have an involvement with the crisis decision-making. However the British National Archives opened record of the censor and we come to know their roles, especially Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Patrick Dean, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Kirkpatrick's subordinate at the Foreign Office. Recent studies such as Whitehall and the Suez Crisis (2000) and Reassessing Suez 1956 (2008) reveal the role of the senior officials during the crisis. This essay also focuses on the influence of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department (PUSD) on the crisis decision making, which Kirkpatrick and Dean were involved in. Documents released at the National Archives, Kew, oral history records of the Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives, King's College London and private papers of the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford would give us a chance to reconsider the crisis.
What explains the differences in the frequency with which developed democratic countries resort to dispute settlement (DS) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO)? The present paper proposes three hypotheses: 1) Countries with small constituencies frequently use DS in the GATT/WTO, 2) Countries with few veto players measured by the number of government parties use DS frequently, and 3) Countries with a competitive agricultural sector tend to use DS frequently. The purpose of this paper is to show that both of the two domestic political institutional factors, constituency size and number of government parties, are important determinants of GATT/WTO filing. Existing literature have seldom analyzed these two political factors simultaneously. This is because they not only belong to “consensus model” (Lijphardt 1999) but also are highly correlated. As such, they are often considered as two sides of the same coin and it is rendered useless to put them in the same set of analysis simultaneously. However, there are some studies, such as Nielson (2003), that argue that constituency size and number of government parties, may have opposite effects on foreign policies. This latter finding thus urges us to study the impact of these factors more closely in a combinational manner. The present study employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis as a method to examine combinational effects of the two factors. The result of the analysis shows that either of the following two combinational conditions leads an advanced democracy to become a frequent complainant. First, as “consensus model” indicates, countries with both small constituency and small number of government parties are frequent complainants. Second, countries with competitive agricultural sector and either small constituency or small number of government parties frequently resort to DS. The latter combinational conditions indicate that frequent complainant countries need not have both small constituency and small number of government parties, as in “consensus model”.
By Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951, the U.S. could continue to rule over Okinawa and have the exclusive right to maintain military bases there. After the ratification of the treaty in April 1952, people of Okinawa voiced opposition in regard to the use of land by the U.S. military. In June 1956, the U.S. authorities in Okinawa released a Report of the Price Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (hereinafter called the Price Report) that supported the land policy proposed by the U.S. military. The Price Report recommended lump sum payments for fee title and accepted to the planned acquisition of additional land. However, the release of the report inflamed the opposition movement of the people of Okinawa. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the political process over the Price Report in 1956 by focusing on the attitudes of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State. After the release of the Price Report, Okinawans requested that the Japanese Foreign Office negotiate with the U.S. government to solve the land dispute. During June and July of 1956, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu requested the U.S. Ambassador John Allison to abandon lump sum payments and to reduce the acquisition of additional land. Following the recommendation of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, the U.S. State Department carefully reexamined the Price Report in regard to the possibility of abandoning lump sum payments in order to improve U.S.-Japan relations. However, shortly before the State Department was due to hold a conference with the Department of Defense (which supported the Price Report), the issue of abandoning lump sum payments was dropped, because the U.S. Consul General in Okinawa strongly recommended that the State Department not retreat from the Price Report. However, the State Department did ask the Pentagon to make some modifications, such as abandoning the acquisition of the fee title, in view of possible damage to U.S.-Japan relations. After this political process revealed the importance of taking into consideration the involvement of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department, it was clear that the U.S. military was not capable of ruling Okinawa on its own. Thereafter, U.S. military control over Okinawa was always considered in the context of Japan-U.S. relations. Therefore, the political process over the Price Report in 1956 marked the start of Japanese Foreign Office and U.S. State Department involvement in U.S. military control of Okinawa. Concomitantly, it also was the starting point of recognizing that the role of the U.S. military in Okinawa was an issue affecting Japan-U.S. relations.
Discussions on the dispatch of Japanese personnel to UN Peace-keeping missions generally begin, with the Gulf Crisis of 1990 and the dispatch to Cambodia of 1992. In fact, however, Japanese contributions did not begin with the sudden end of the Cold War. They go back to the “International Cooperation Initiative” of the Takeshita cabinet that was founded upon three pillars, including the contribution of financial support and dispatch of personnel for settlement of regional conflicts. Based on this policy, the UNTAG dispatch may be considered the first full-scale dispatch of personnel due to the temporary nature of the transfers to UNGOMAP and UNIMOG. In this report, I seek to clarify, using newly released MOFA documents, the policy making process of the Japanese government regarding the dispatch of election observers to UNTAG, a subject which has heretofore received little analysis. I will also make clear the limitations inherent in the MOFA initiatives. In order to throw into relief the political conditions regarding the UNTAG dispatch, I will devote particular attention to the activities of Prime Minister Takeshita and the MOFA authorities directly in charge on this occasion. Although MOFA which agreed to the “International Co-operation Initiative” of Takeshita, was not able to accomplish a Self-Defense Force (SDF) dispatch, establish relevant legislation and a human resources pool organization, effective use of a postponement technique paradoxically allowed the dispatch to UNTAG to be realized. Such realization of the civilian dispatch to UNTAG was only a provisional step, however, and MOFA needed two phases of technique to realize SDF dispatch after the civilian dispatch. During MOFA's attempt to realize the Takeshita initiative using this postponement technique, the project to dispatch election observers to UNTAG got somewhat ahead of itself, and measures to ensure their safety of were deemed insufficient. Although Minister for Foreign Affairs Sousuke Uno pointed out in discussions with National Governor's Association chairperson shunichi Suzuki that “bullets won't be flying,” the gun battles which had already broken out in Namibia rendered such optimistic assessments untenable. Actually, however, though the local situation was unstable just before holding the constitution parliamentary election, the above-mentioned optimistic prospect of Uno was maintained throughout. As for the government, its response to these circumstances were remarkable for their inflexibility. In 1992, the SDF dispatch that MOFA had always aimed at was finally realized. Meanwhile, establishment of relevant legislation and a human resources pool organization are still in postponement. The contribution to UNTAG under the Takeshita administration was the first step in establishing the postponement mode in Japan.
As Stanley Hoffmann has convinced us in his 1977 article, it was in the United States in the wake of the Second World War that the study of international relations, IR as is now called, was established as an independent academic discipline. This article explains in what sense it has been an American social science and explores whether it still offers a useful analytical tool with which to better understand the multifaceted political reality of today's international relations. This article first goes back to the origins of IR and reviews its main features in the foundational work of Hans Morgenthau. His work stressed that perception matters in power politics among nations in that the outcome of diplomacy depends upon the perceived persuasiveness of threats and promises. In addition, it devoted attention to the relations between politics and law to explain how the status quo in international order had been maintained and challenged. And then this article examines the way in which IR has been Americanized since his time. In a nutshell, first, the influence of Thomas Schelling's work in the 1960s was profound and far-reaching in the entire field of IR. The intellectual hegemony of rationalism (or the analytical methods of rational choice) in the 1980s meant that the mainstream IR came to pay less and less attention to actors' perception and law. And second, it was totally ironical that the discipline of IR has recently retrieved the sociological discussion on perception, law, and norm, which it intentionally deleted in the process of importing rationalism from economics. This article concludes by emphasizing that the discipline of Americanized IR should expand its horizons: the study of diplomacy should be broadened to cover not only coercion for the purpose of either deterring a challenger from altering the status quo or compelling it to restore the status quo, but also reassurance for the purpose of achieving peaceful change; and the study of international order should highlight the way in which international and domestic orders have co-evolved in history.