This article analyzes whether civilian control over the Russian military has been reestablished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Civilian control had been firmly established under the communist regime by the Brezhnev era and functioned very well. It was a kind of division of labor based upon the common ideology, in which the Communist Party leadership decides the overall direction of foreign and security policy, while the General Staff with its exclusive military expertise provides option formation and implementation. The Party leadership gave the military everything they need and want, and the military in turn does not interfere into the politics.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, this controlling system also ceased to function. The political leadership can no longer look after the military's interests, while the military got fully politicized in and outside the Duma. Then the former President Putin tried to reestablish the control system, although it was not a democratic one, but the control by the president. Putin wanted to transform the military into a small but highly efficient and usable one in the local and regional conflicts. Although Putin's plan did not frame well, in 2007 with the new defense minister Anatolii Serdyukov appointed the situation began to change.
This article examines the three aspects of Putin's (and Medvedev's) reform efforts, namely the reform of military bureaucracy, the fulfillment of the military's interests, and the change of the official threat perceptions. First, in terms of civilianization of the defense ministry and the subordination of the General Staff to the civilian defense ministry, much efforts has been made, but still not enough. Due to lack of civilian military experts, it will take some more time to overcome the General Staff's exclusive status and power inherited from the Soviet era. Second, the political leadership attaches a great emphasis to the modernization of military equipment and the improvement of material conditions for military service. Still, the lack of capital and an inefficient way of using it have impeded visible progress. Third, after long procrastination finally the new official strategic documents, the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine, have been approved. They revised the official threat perception from a large scale attack from the West to local and regional conflicts along the borders. Nevertheless, we should notice that a deep distrust against the West, especially the U.S. and NATO, is rooted in the newly attained consensus.
In sum, civilian control in Russia is working far better than in the 1990's, but is still incomplete. There is much room for the military's dissatisfaction or distrust against the U.S. to exert its influence to the political decisions.

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According to a recent study, the subject matter of Morgenthau's Scientific Man vs. Power Politics is to criticize the modern man as “scientific man” who, Morgenthau thought, has blasphemous confidence in his ability to solve all the problems of society “once and for all” by applying laws of causality discovered through empirical science and to attain perfection in this world without God's help. This paper argues that here is the key to understand why Morgenthau emphasized “tragedy” and “evil” in his works written after his emigration. In order to prove my interpretation, this paper proceeds as follows:
First, it is claimed that Morgenthau's “objective standard”, “transcendent standard”, and so forth were proposed as functional substitutes for morality of traditional religion and natural law which can no longer normatively restrain man's aspiration for power. But Morgenthau actually appealed to “objective standard” only exceptionally, because he thought not only that its normative content is inscrutable, but also that modern man, who has “irreligious self-glorification”, is indifferent to the existence of “objective standard”.
Second, Morgenthau emphasized “tragedy” and “evil” in order to destroy modern man's confidence completely and to ultimately restore objective moral order. Morgenthau's tragedy must be understood not “as the framework for understanding contemporary international relations” (Richard Ned Lebow), but as a condition of human life in contrast with the Almighty. Similarly, Morgenthau's evil is directed not to political action distinct from other human action, but to political action as a “prototype” and “paradigm” of human action in general. This understanding of evil is based upon “Weltablehnung” (Max Weber) of Christianity.
Third, however, Morgenthau did not pursue this strategy of “re-enchantment” consistently, because this strategy logically means that we must give up to solve any social problems and leave them to God. In order to reconcile re-enchantment and solution of social problems, Morgenthau proposed to solve the concrete problems “temporarily” by not “scientists” and “engineer” but the “statesman” as “the prototype of social man” in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. Morgenthau's statement that “Politics is not science but art” and his concept of “political intelligence” with special emphasis on moral judgment must be understood from this angle. This reconcilement was best achieved in Reinhold Niebuhr then, this is why Morgenthau was tremendously influenced by Niebuhr.
In conclusion, it is argued that recent literatures fundamentally misunderstand Morgenthau's intention in that they suppose that holocaust, genocide, and massacre are tragedy in Morgenthau's sense, and the current usage of evil is directly opposite to Morgenthau's evil in that the latter is not applied to others and their action but to one's own action.

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It is widely believed that the United Kingdom had decided to retreat from “East of Suez” in January 1968. It planned to withdraw all its forces stationed in South-Eastern Asia and Middle East by the end of 1971. However, the next Heath government made a small change in this policy, left some forces in the area and maintained military commitment beyond 1971. These forces were finally withdrawn by Harold Wilson who was back in power in March 1974. Few studies, however, mention the British forces in the “East of Suez” after 1968. This thesis clarifies the detail and the logic through the policy of retrenchment from 1974 to 1975.
The Conservative government decided to maintain military commitment in the “East of Suez.” First, there were still lots of British bases in South-Eastern Asia, Indian Ocean and Middle East though the force level was reduced. Second, the United Kingdom retained the general capability which would be available to be deployed outside Europe. Finally, there were regional organisations like CENTO or FPDA (Five Power Defence Arrangements) which enabled the United Kingdom to cooperate with the local countries.
However, the British economy in the 1970s could not support these commitments. Roy Mason, the Secretary of State for Defence in the Labour government, began the Defence Review as soon as he entered office. The principal object of the Review was to reduce defence budget from 5.5% to 4.5% of GNP in the next 10 years. The non-NATO commitments were preferred to be cut since the British government tried to concentrate its defence efforts in the NATO area. In addition, he also decided to abandon the reinforcement capabilities outside NATO.
The Defence Review was so drastic that it needed consultation with allies. However, the negotiations were not easy. Most countries tried to keep the British forces in the “East of Suez” because they recognised the importance of the British presence. The United States was concerned about the abandonment of intervention capability outside NATO and desired the British presence in the Mediterranean. As a result, the British government compromised with some of these demands and decided to stay in some areas. Apart from this concession, the British government could carry out the withdrawal as it originally planned.
This study indicates the British aspect as an “Empire detained”. British departure was regretted not only by the United States but also by the Commonwealth countries. Britain's retreat from the Commonwealth marks the transformation of British external policy from the world to the Atlantic community.

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The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused the emergence of 15 new sovereign states. Many quickly gathered into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but this regional organization was soon recognized as a kind of loose “clasp.” A few years later, the region started splitting up into pro-and anti-Russia groups. The Pro-Russia group, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia itself, signed the Collective Security Treaty, and then formed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). At the same time, the anti-Russia group worked within a coalition to escape Russia's influence. These states, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, formed a strategic alignment called GUAM. When Uzbekistan joined, it was renamed GUUAM. The Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) belong to neither of the two groups, but are members of the pro-Western Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), which includes GUUAM's Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova.
I investigate the conditions under which the non-Russian post-Soviet states (NRPSSs) went their separate ways and have remained in separate camps since the 1990s. Though previous studies deal with the states individually as well as the whole region, they seem to center on overviews of the area or qualitative case studies and pay little attention to utilization of quantitative research methods. Therefore, using the statistical-analytical approach, I try to identify the causes.
I posit three premises. First, Russia and the NRPSSs make up a community. Second, there exist asymmetrical relationships between Russia and the NRPSSs. Third, and most importantly, Russia always seeks to influence these relationships. My research thus intends to focus on the behavior of the NRPSSs and to incorporate the existing literature of alliance formation and management.
I conduct two kinds of analysis. The dependent variables are firstly whether the NRPSSs have joined CSTO and, secondly whether they have joined GU (U) AM. The independent variables draw from not only empirical evidence from inherently regional phenomena but also some hypotheses in International Relations. These variables are multi-level stratified: Russia, the NRPSSs, and the dyad relationship between Russia and the NRPSSs. They, further, divide the political/military dimension into an economic one.
Results show some important facts. First, when relations between Russia and Europe get worse, the NRPSSs are likely to unite with Russia. Second, the less democratic and the more recessionary the NRPSSs are, the more pro-Russia they are. Last, acts of terrorism within Russia have a negative effect on the formation and maintenance of anti-Russia alliance.

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What types of characteristics do the diplomatic relationships of countries with unstable “regime security” exhibit? These are countries where the use of force is used to challenge the authority of the central government, for example, by means of revolution; civil war; or coup d' état. According to the existing literature, the argument that “when domestic governance within a country is unstable, that country's relationship with other countries will also be unstable” seems to dominate most research.
In contrast to these works, this paper aims to conceptualize the mechanism where countries choose to cooperate multilaterally and internationally, in order to heighten their own regime security. In particular, two types of international institutions which exist for the purpose of heightening domestic security will be introduced. The first type of institution, which is responsible for defining the concept of what a “domestic political regime” should be, seeks to actively impose sanctions on those countries which defy the concept. On the other hand, the second type of institution seeks to mutually recognize the legitimacy of its member countries' political regimes, regardless of the form that these regimes might take. In this way, the second type of institution can be described as being “negative” in nature. Examples of such institutions include Mercosur and ASEAN. This paper will demonstrate that the role of these institutions goes beyond stabilizing international relationships, but also extends into the realm of reinforcing regime security, which is the prior concern of its member countries.
Moreover, since the stance adopted by this paper is that “regime security and the international institutions are closely linked”, it will also add a fresh perspective to the existing literature on the evolution of the international norms. The evolution of the international norms refers to the change in the perspective of countries over time, when they choose to replace policies of mutual non-interference with new policies. Originally, such changes used to be interpreted as a “transition in the international norms”, or as “the waning of sovereignty”. However, this paper argues differently. Instead of seeing changes in the international regime as a “break” in the existing state of affairs, this paper proposes that the change from mutual non-interference to mutual cooperation is in fact a form of continuity in the international norm, borne out of the desire of countries to heighten their own regime security.

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The early 1970s witnessed the transformation of the Cold War structure accompanied by a trend towards détente and multipolarity. As a result, the transatlantic relations became strained. Nevertheless, in June 1974, the NATO Heads of Government singed the “NATO Declaration”, mainly prepared by France and the US, which highlighted the importance of the Alliance original function: “deterrence and defense”. It also reaffirmed the transatlantic cohesiveness, and thus put an end to the transatlantic rift of 1973.
This article sets out to explain why such a declaration was prepared during the period when the Cold War structure underwent transformation. It argues that American and French concerns over its strategic environment, and the mutual fears between two countries played an important role in the process.
America's sense of anxiety over the weakening of the Alliance led to its “Year of Europe” initiative in April 1973. First, the US feared the Soviet attempt to “finlandize” Europe through détente; and second the domestic pressures for US troop withdrawal from Europe and the Western domestic disregard for the Alliance. To prevent it, the US called for Europeans to be engaged in the drafting of a “new Atlantic charter” dealing with the political, military and economic issues, through which it tried to give the impression at home and abroad of the transatlantic cohesiveness. However, a “charter” was never prepared due to French objection.
Instead, France found meaning only in a declaration on military issues. The arms control negotiations and the Prevention of Nuclear War agreement led by both superpowers raised French concerns over the credibility of US extended deterrence, the Western domestic pressures for defense budget cut, and the value of its nuclear forces. To safeguard the US military commitment and to justify each ally's defense effort, in September, France submitted its own NATO Declaration draft, which reflected its concerns and emphasized the importance of the original function, “deterrence and defense”. The draft was adopted as a basis for discussion in NATO.
Despite the new transatlantic tension over the fourth Arab-Israeli War, the work on the declaration continued. The US didn't abandon the project, owing to fears that it could be advantageous to the USSR. Moreover, since French participation was indispensable to show the transatlantic cohesiveness, the US behaved with restraint towards France. On the other hand, the war reinforced French concerns. Therefore, France also adopted a flexible attitude to secure the declaration, while continually criticizing a US-Soviet “condominium”. Despite their disagreements, both countries finally compromised to achieve the declaration. As this article shows, although the crisis in the transatlantic relations in 1973 is well known, it is significant to notice that the members of the Alliance rediscovered the importance of the “deterrence and defense” function due to the anxieties in the era of détente and multipolarity.

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The present article explores the underlying factors that led the governments of the Organization of the American States (OAS) to adopt the American Convention on Human Rights (the convention) in 1969. The convention is the foundation of the inter-American human rights institution, whose functions have been entrusted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Despite its legal and political significance, however, the proposal for an Inter-American convention on human rights did not reap wider support from the beginning. The OAS had respected for national sovereignty, and had opposed a binding agreement on domestic issues such as human rights. This was evident in 1948 when the OAS rejected the Uruguay's proposal for the binding convention and rather opted for the non-binding human rights declaration; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.
Given such background the question is, why did then the governments change their positions regarding the convention by 1969? The existing studies on human rights conventions interpret the adoptions as a result of intergovernmental processes. However, the adoption of the American convention cannot be explained solely from an intergovernmental point of view. The present paper focuses on the IACHR established in 1959 which played an essential role stimulating the governments to adopt the convention.
Although at first the IACHR was not authorized for protecting human rights and was regarded as a “study group”, it nevertheless gradually widened its functions. It began to receive communications from individuals and conduct investigations. The IACHR started also issuing recommendation to a particular government and publishing country reports. From there on, the IACHR supervision of governments conduct in the area of human rights became a fait accompli. As a result, the exceeding practices of the IACHR raised awareness among the governments regarding the effectiveness of the IACHR and affected the governments' positions on the convention.
The change of the positions of the governments was revealed at the Second Special Inter-American Conference in 1965, when the national representatives agreed about the positive role of the IACHR and express support for its further institutionalization in the area of human rights protection in Americas. The conference was a turning point for the adoption of the convention. While authorizing the IACHR for expanding functions, the governments approved the resolution for concrete step for adopting the convention.

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This paper clarifies Brandt's purpose in organizing the Commission on Global Governance (1992–1995).
First, Brandt's purpose in organizing the commission was derived from his ideals as the chairman of the SI (Socialist International) (1976–1992). The SI was reestablished in 1951 on the basis of the ideology of social democracy. It primarily aims to empower politically, socially, and economically weak people around the world, including those in developing nations.
Second, as the chairman of the SI, Brandt proposed an ideal of “Welt-Innenpolitik,” which can be identified as the original idea underlying the commission's model for global governance (“Welt-Innenpolitik” can be roughly translated as “world domestic politics”). According to this ideal, the human race shares common interests in the globalized world, and, therefore, it is imperative to develop a comprehensive world order, unrestrained by sovereignty, in order to achieve the common interests.
Moreover, since all human beings share common interests, the responsibility to cooperatively resolve poverty in developing nations falls upon all of us, in the development of Welt-Innenpolitik. In sum, in proposing the ideal of Welt-Innenpolitik, Brandt primarily aimed to resolve poverty in developing nations.
Third, during the 1980s, Brandt was concerned about the rise of neoliberalism. This was because, from the ideological viewpoint of social democracy, Brandt believed that neo-liberalism worsens poverty in developing nations, due to its proclivity to encourage the pursuit of economic self-interests at the cost of the welfare of less advantaged people, including those in developing nations.
Fourth, Brandt insisted that the SI renew its efforts to resolve poverty in developing nations, given the above development. Toward this end, Brandt urged the SI to draw people's attention to the poverty prevailing in developing nations. Moreover, Brandt suggested that the SI propose a new world order that would induce people to focus on worldwide problems, including those of poorer nations, mirroring his own ideal of Welt-Innenpolitik.
Fifth, to heighten the mass appeal of his idea for a new world order, Brandt and the SI organized the Commission on Global Governance as an ideologically neutral entity that would not be swayed by ideological peculiarities. In order to achieve this, Brandt and the SI almost intentionally concealed the fact that the commission was organized on the basis of the goals and human resources of the SI.
In sum, Brandt and the SI organized this commission as a front, to conceal its real entity, the SI, so that Brandt's ideal of Welt-Innenpolitik could be more widely accepted as “global governance.”

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Many previous studies on the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) argue that regional countries tried to draw Indonesia into regional affairs in a friendly and constructive manner, since Indonesia had been regarded as a potential great power in Southeast Asia. In reality, however, Indonesia took the initiative in the process of forming ASEAN, and thus other member countries changed their opinions regarding Indonesia's participation in regional cooperation. They began by viewing such participation as negative. The Indonesian government, especially its army, believed that it had a natural right to play a leadership role in regional affairs due to Indonesia's potential power, and regarded the regional cooperative body as one of the vehicles to expand Indonesia's influence. Other regional countries, especially Malaysia, had vague but realistic concerns regarding Indonesia's initiative. They were concerned that Indonesia would play a dominant role in regional cooperation and, in the longer term, utilise the forthcoming regional organisation as a diplomatic tool to gain regional hegemony. There has not been adequate discussion of the way in which Indonesia's initiative in the process of establishing ASEAN caused concerns among the members about Indonesia's motives and preferences. Moreover, even the researches that refer to ASEAN countries' mistrust of Indonesia do not clarify the impact of these concerns on the process of establishing the association and, in particular, how the mistrust was mitigated during the negotiation process.
This research hypothesises that as a means of gaining sufficient trust to achieve regional cooperation, Indonesia sought to reassure the other states of its intentions by forming an institution in which unilateral acts by Indonesia were constrained. More specifically, Indonesia sought to reassure other future members of ASEAN by rejecting cooperation which would cause tensions with communist countries who regarded the new organization as anti-communist and a pro-Western defence alliance. Moreover, the proposed organization was reassuring to other future members of ASEAN because it was also structurally difficult for Indonesia to gain a dominant or leading role in it. Moreover, through regional cooperation, Indonesia refrained from using its power to inflame tensions among other countries, blocs and specific peoples inside and outside the region. Further, Indonesia's delegation to the founding meeting of ASEAN in August 1967 told other delegates that Indonesia would allow the maintenance of foreign bases in the region, even after the advent of the new organization. This was welcomed by other members not only because their defence depended on external powers such as the US and UK but also because this military presence would likely keep the expansion of Indonesia's regional influence in check.

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The purpose of this article is to revisit a very controversial issue-the evaluation of the Sato Eisaku Cabinet's China policy from 1970 to 1972-through the clarifications regarding the situation in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the period. Since, in the wake of World War II, the Allied Powers had dismantled the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been the central bureaucracy, being responsible for the planning and drafting of the diplomatic and security policies of the Japanese government. However, preceding studies have not focused adequate attention on the very important issue of how the high officials of the ministry had discussed the Japanese government's China policy in the era. This article analyzes the issue empirically on the basis of primary sources, which mainly comprise the recently declassified diplomatic documents of the Japanese government.
Because the Japanese government has disclosed a very limited number of diplomatic documents thus far, the quality of information through these Japanese sources tends to be extremely fragmentary. I have invested considerable effort to organize the pieces of fragmented information and painstakingly compared them not only with preceding works but also with the documents declassified by the White House and the U.S. Department of State. During the course of those lengthy and difficult procedures, I discovered certain historical facts that are very important for studying the Japanese government's postwar foreign policy.
These facts prove that the ministry failed to formulate a strategic response to the drastic transformation of the international situation in the early 1970s. These facts also reveal that the ministry decided to normalize its relations with China and severe diplomatic relations with Taiwan, as early as immediately after the Taiwanese government was expelled from the U.N. on October 25, 1971. In addition, before the formation of Tanaka Kakuei's Cabinet on July 7, 1972, the ministry succeeded in mending U.S.-Japan relations, which had been seriously damaged by President Nixon's unilateral initiative for the U.S.-China reconciliation.
Lastly, I would like to draw your attention to another very important point regarding the manner in which Hashimoto Hiroshi, who served as the chief of the “China Section” for the ministry during the period, evaluated the far eastern policy of the Nixon administration. He is conventionally recognized as a “pro-China” Japanese diplomat or as having a “sense of independence from Washington,” because he consistently asserted the prompt normalization of relations with China. However, his assertions regarding the China policy was based on his expectation that Washington's commitment to the defense of Taiwan was very stable and reliable, and it meant that the conventional views of him could be oversimplifications.

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This paper examines the evolution of the relationship between the territories on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf and the British Empire, from the nineteenth century up to the full independence of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971. Looking closely into the history of the Gulf region, using declassified British and American documents together with Arabic primary sources and interviews, I aim to critically re-examine the phenomenon and idea of decolonisation. Given that the territories concerned were never colonised in the constitutional sense (hence they were called ‘Protected States’) this may not be the most intuitive example of decolonisation, but most of the existing narratives are implicitly aligned with this notion.
Decolonisation has been studied broadly from two perspectives. One highlights the call from the dependent territories for self-determination as a driving force behind the whole process, whereas the other emphasises the changes in the imperial metropole. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but they have contrasting normative connotations. The former gives more credit to the nationalist movements, whereas the latter reflects the European side in a better light. This distinction is problematic partly because it overstates the division between the West and the rest. More importantly, the debate between the two schools of thought, driven by a hidden normative agenda, obscures the centrality of sovereignty in the process of decolonisation.
Since the nineteenth century Britain had exercised significant influence over the southern coast of the Persian Gulf. For centuries local rulers' legitimacy in the southern Gulf had largely depended on their ability to secure military protection from external powers, and Britain provided precisely that. By signing treaties with the rulers, it created polities whose legitimacy from the outset was dependent on an outside patron. The oil concessions negotiated in the mid-twentieth century further advanced the shadow of sovereignty onto the region by bringing in a new idea of territoriality. Yet, in 1968, Britain unilaterally announced its intention to withdraw from the region and the rulers of nine Protected States were left to decide their own fate.
The findings of this paper suggest that decolonisation of this region did not take place as a response to the demands of the local societies for self-determination. Instead, it was initiated by the metropole in the face of the opposition from the Protected States, and it was only finalised by a process of haphazard compromise and reconciliation between all the actors involved, including both the local rulers and the British officers.

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