国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2012 巻, 167 号
選択された号の論文の14件中1~14を表示しています
序章 安全保障・戦略文化の比較研究
  • 渡邊 啓貴
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_1-13
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This special issue focuses on research in the field of security and strategic culture in international relations.
    The first point in creating this issue is the concepts stated in the title and the need to address it. The approach of elucidating the nature of foreign policy decision-making process from the perspective of security and strategic culture hasn't yet been established in Japan. In particular there is a paucity of conceptual debate. Hence, the primary objective of compiling this special issue is to mark the beginning of research in this field in Japan.
    The second point is the historical timeline of security and strategic culture studies. Is it possible to explain the relationship between cultural studies and actual strategic diplomatic choices and behavior? It is evident from the existing research that this question is difficult to verify. However this does not mean that cultural studies in this field are not required. The importance of cultural approaches involving values and ideals has steadily increased in the Post Cold War era. While the cultural approach is not a necessary and sufficient condition for strategic diplomatic choices and behavior, its significance as necessary condition is undeniable. Despite that, there is hardly any full-fledged research in Japan in this field.
    Given the above context, this special issue is an attempt to shed light on the trends in research and interests in the field of security and strategic culture in Japan. A majority of the arguments in this issue are aimed at revealing diplomatic behavior that stems from history, culture and values. This can be thought of as a result of progress in the field of area studies. This issue contains examples from the United States, China, Eastern Europe and England. The next argument is a case study of strategic culture which looks into the influence strategic culture has on leaders. You find papers on Iran and England, mainly the Tony Blair dministration. The third argument focuses on the changes in values and world view among the citizens brought about by the changes in the global environment in the Post Cold War era. You find is some discussions of changes in Germany and France from a cultural and value perspective. Lastly this issue also features a paper characterized by a comparative study in attitudes towards intelligence in England and the United States and discussing the position of Japan within the above framework.
  • ユダヤ=キリスト教的伝統・共和主義・自由主義
    中嶋 啓雄
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_14-26
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The United States has always had a unique attitude about its national security. This attitude is reflected in its isolationist tradition, the massive building of nuclear arms during the Cold War, and its eagerness to retain its military strength as the only superpower after the Cold War. This essay depicts the contours of United States security culture from a historical perspective utilizing recent studies on American foreign policy by diplomatic historians. In examining the security culture of the United States, the essay focuses upon three distinct characteristics of American political culture: the Judeo-Christian tradition, republicanism, and liberalism.
    The United States is one of the most religiously observant industrially advanced nations and the Judeo-Christian tradition has influenced American security policy as illustrated in the concepts of “city upon a hill” and “Manifest Destiny.” Its anti-communist crusade during the Cold War, exemplified in John Foster Dulles's diplomacy, and the evangelical overtones of the war on terror also testify to its strong influence upon American security policy. On the other hand, the Jeremiad, typically detected in the writings of George Kennan, has urged American people to reflect upon the shortcomings of their security policy.
    Republicanism is a secular heir to the Jeremiad, for its fear of “corruption” and its emphasis upon the importance “virtue” has also demanded people to contemplate the possible fall of the republic. Republicanism had a great impact upon the war for American independence and the War of 1812. The reason why American people endorsed territorial expansion in the first half of the nineteenth century is that the massive land seemed to ensure that they would remain as yeoman farmers who had civic virtue. By World War I, republicanism had been replaced by liberalism, which had been on the rise since the War of 1812, as the main current of political thought in the United States. As shown in the antiwar movement during the Vietnam War, however, a republicanism that is averse to overseas empire-building still remains as an undercurrent of American political thought.
    Liberalism was reflected in the Wilsonian internationalism following WorldWar I. The League of Nations, a product of Woodrow Wilson's imagination, was a concrete example of liberal internationalism. The “containment” of the Soviet Union after World War II was another. Bill Clinton's “engagement and enlargement” policy that promoted democratization of the former communist countries and the Third World was also an example of Wilsonianism. Even war with Iraq with the goal of democratizing the Middle East can be seen as a legacy of Wilsonianism.
    Thus the Judeo-Christian tradition, republicanism, and liberalism have been important factors in United States security culture from the time of its founding to the present.
  • 浅野 亮
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_27-41
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    Main propose of this paper is to analyze the strategic culture of China.
    Advocates of thesis of strategic culture, both in China and Western countries, persistently claim that China has uniquely non-belligerent strategic culture which has been formulated in its long history, and that China firmly maintains its pacifistic character no matter how China's security environment becomes deteriorated.
    They persistently contend that military thought of Sunzi, a prominent strategic thinker in ancient China, is a humanitarian pacifist, ant that modern China as well as ancient China is essentially a peace-loving country because modern China also employs Sunzi's traditional non-aggressive military thought.
    However, this argument is fundamentally misleading because tremendous number of sentences and expressions of Sunzi cited in China's classical and modern documents and speeches on military strategy does not necessarily reflect reconciliatory tendency of China's actual strategic behavior. Almost no academic study on China's strategic culture could prove that China has consistently employed a pacifistic strategic behavior in its history. Most of researchers on this field have failed to show a significant positive causal relationship between China's peace-loving rhetoric and its actual behavior.
    Likewise, even though ancient Sunzi also stresses the imperative importance of coherent and comprehensive grand strategy which not only comprises military but also extensively covers political, diplomatic, psychological and economic factors, it does not automatically mean that China has almost always maintained a farsighted and coherent grand strategy.
    Academic studies on major warfare and diplomatic negotiations among the major countries during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period usually show that the main reason why Sunzi emphasized the need of minimal exertion of military force and coherent grand strategy was mainly because he intended to reduce the huge cost of actual battle thus avoiding an unexpected protract of armed conflicts; otherwise his country would be suffered by an unfavorable risk of diplomatic and military intervention by other hostile countries.
    Idealizing of Sunzi in Western countries has been endorsed when some leading military analysts and politicians such as Hart and Weinberger criticized the existing Western military strategy and thinking, with stressing a sharp contrast between the reality of political and military institutions and idea of Sunzi, in order to emphasize the necessity of promoting a radical reform of existing political and military institutions.
    In China of the 21st century, China's major strategic thinkers utilize Sunzi to convince the mainstream of China's public opinion to accept their blueprint of increasing China's international role in a prudent, patient and tightly self-restrained manner without carelessly activating a devastating confrontation/crisis with the existing powerful hegemonic countries, while some belligerent Chinese claim emotionally to accelerate the pace of increasing China's international influence and to employ a more coercive approach to challenge the “iniquitous order of international ancien regime dominated by the United States.”
  • 原則的抗米姿勢と抑止力追求の背景
    松永 泰行
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_42-56
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    Why has Iran been refusing to comply with the binding U.N. Security Council resolutions and to halt its uranium enrichment program? Why has the apparent cost that it incurs by defying the international community not deterred Iran from furthering its nuclear program? Why has postrevolutionary Iran been opposing the U.S.-led peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians and made it a rule to counter any U.S. influence in the region?
    In this article, I posit that postrevolutionary Iran's principled opposition to the U.S. is not just rhetoric or an ideologically-driven self-image, but that it may well be considered its self-constructed strategic cultural proclivity. While mindful not to fall into the trap of essentialist or cultural determinist arguments, I find the concept of strategic culture as a context useful. Following scholars such as Stuart Poore, I posit that decision makers perceive and interpret their strategic environment culturally, while what may be considered their constituted strategic culture give meaning to material factors.
    As a first step toward identifying postrevolutionary Iran's strategic culture, I examine the views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the paramount leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement and the first head of the postrevolutionary Islamist state, as regards contemporary international relations and the roles of the superpowers therein. Convinced that part of the mission of the Islamic revelation was about providing salvation against oppression and fighting injustice, Khomeini went on to construct postrevolutionary Iran's dominant strategic discourse anchored in the perceived obligation to avoid and counter earthly hegemony or domination. Khomeini preached that Iran must resist the “satanic” moves of the both superpowers and find only sanctuary under the banner of Islam. While finding it logical and necessary to build and maintain good neighborly and mutually respectful relations among states, Khomeini ruled out submitting to any international hegemon.
    Iran in its post-Khomeini period continued to maintain its counterhegemonic stance. Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor to Khomeini as the head of the Islamic state of Iran, cultivated its counter-hegemonic strategic culture in part to secure his own authority and build his power base. The strategic alliance constructed between Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved to perpetuate post-Khomeini-era Iran's anti-American strategic culture.
    In conclusion, I argue that Iran may be best regarded as a counterhegemon, not an aspiring hegemon and that the kind of power that postrevolutionary Iran has found necessary to possess is not the power for hegemony and domination, but the power to resist and persevere. This proclivity helps explain why Iran has continued its nuclear program despite the cost it incurs by defying the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also helps explain why it has maintained its principled anti-U.S. stance for the last three decades. It does not, however, seem logical to conclude that Iran's apparent pursuit of the deterrent capabilities through its nuclear or other programs is directly influenced by its counter-hegemonic strategic culture. The argument, nonetheless, supports a view that Iran's strategic posture is almost exclusively defensive and that its apparent pursuit of the means of deterrence should not necessarily be considered posing a threat to the region or the international community.
  • 政治的、歴史的、社会的文化の影響
    小林 良樹
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_57-71
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The objective of this article is to examine the influence of cultural factors on systems of democratic control over the intelligence communities of different countries and the light this can shed on the road ahead as Japan develops its own oversight mechanisms.
    The intelligence communities of different countries are configured in different forms. In the US, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the IC, while in the UK, the Joint Intelligence Committee which is a part of the Cabinet Office is responsible for directing the IC. This variation reflects not only the different presidential and parliamentary political systems but also the different organizational cultures of intelligence agencies in Britain and the US. For instance, the prevailing characteristics of organizational culture in the British IC are collegiality and collaboration. In the US, divisionism and bureaucracy are predominant. These cultural differences are rooted in the different political, historical and social environments unique to each country.
    Systems for democratic control of the ICs also vary in different countries. In the US, congressional committees specialized in intelligence matters in both chambers of Congress exercise oversight and have strong authority over the IC. Although in the UK the Intelligence and Security Committee which directly reports to the Prime Minister is responsible for oversight of the IC, it exercises comparatively moderate control over the IC. Such differences are a reflection of the cultural differences between each country. The US system of oversight by powerful congressional committees reflects the high levels of public distrust in the IC, the result of a litany of intelligence-related scandals. This system also reflects the history of serious power struggles between Congress and the executive. In the UK, however, public trust in the IC, and collaboration between the executive branch and Parliament, has historically been greater than in the US.
    Currently, Japan has no organization dedicated to democratic oversight of its intelligence organs. If Japan expands the scope of its intelligence activities, it will be necessary to develop new and enhance existing mechanisms for democratic control. In doing so it will be vital to ensure that they take account of the cultural factors at play in Japanese society rather than to transplant the systems of control in place in foreign countries which reflect their different cultural milieu.
    The Japanese cultural factors that systems of control in other countries do not take account of are, firstly, a strong public distrust of intelligence activities, and secondly strong public desire to maintain the political neutrality of intelligence organizations. These cultural characteristics can be attributed to Japan's historical experiences during the Second World War, and are very different from circumstances in other countries. The existing Independent Regulatory Commission system could be a possible foundation on which to build a uniquely Japanese system for democratic oversight of the nation's intelligence activities.
  • 戦争、安全保障、「民主化」とEU・NATOの拡大
    羽場 久美子
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_72-87
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article investigates the “Strategic Culture” of Central Eastern Europe and the Balkans, as the “European Crisis Area”.
    The most relevant to the “Strategic Culture” is Jack L. Snyder's book The Soviet Strategic Culture, which investigates the strategic research of the enemy country, the Soviet Socialist System in the 1970s. “Strategic Culture” generally investigates not only politics and security, but also culture, history and social environment because the strategy, ideology and value are completely related to these elements when the government decides its policies. It was already shown during the Second World War, in Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. The Strategic Culture investigates enemy countries generally, so during the war and historically the research concentrated on the enemies' regions and groups, and tried to understand their behavior.
    Central Eastern Europe and the Balkans are unique regions, which landed between Big Powers like Russia and Germany geopolitically, that is why they collaborated with their enemy's enemy for defending their homeland, combining hard Security Policy and cultural and social Soft Power policy. It was the strategic wisdom of small countries that was invaded and annexed during the Modernization era.
    This area is called the “European Crisis Area”, as it was involved in the Balkan Wars, Russo-Turkish War, WWI, WWII, Cold War and Post-Cold War or Iraq War, and it was the representative region in the Balkan Conflict, the World Wars, the Kosovo Conflict and the Bombing of Kosovo. In the Iraq War in the 21st century, they aggressively joined President Bush (Jr.) 's War, so they were called “pro-American area”.
    Here the author investigates the “European Crisis Area”, “Lands between Big Powers”, why they have different cultures and traditions from Western Europe, and why they have such a strong will for “Freedom and Liberty”, because they were controlled in all historical times. They did not bend to the Big Powers, and access to the US for their own security policy against Russia. They deployed the MD for NATO, and they never obeyed the European Big Powers, even though they exist in Europe... The author shows and investigates such a tough and strong self-assertion of Central Europe and the Balkans, which combines with war, security, and democratization.
    The Contents are:
    1. Historical Background—“European Crisis Area” and Three Wars, 2. The “Strategic Culture” of the “European Crisis Area”, 3. NATO Enlargement and the Bombing of Kosovo, 4. September 11 to the Afghan/Iraq War, 5. MD deployment against Russia, 6. New Situation after 2010, Conclusion and Foresight.
  • 連邦軍と徴兵制をめぐる議論を中心として
    森井 裕一
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_88-101
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    Germany ceased conscription for its military, the Bundeswehr, in July 2011. Ever since the establishment of the Bundeswehr, the system of conscription had played a key role in connecting the Bundeswehr and German society. The concept of “Staatsbürger in Uniform” (citizen in uniform) was a guarantee to keep the Bundeswehr as a military for peace. This paper discusses why Germany stopped conscription, even though it had long been regarded as a vital component of Germany's postwar security culture.
    In the first section of this paper, historical developments in the German security culture and the role of the Bundeswehr are discussed. During the process of German rearmament in the 1950s, a new military was established in a way that would prevent it from being able to become an independent and undemocratic institution outside society—as it did in the days leading up to World War II. The Bundeswehr gained respect from society and became one of the most successful institutions in postwar Germany.
    In the second section, the changing role and the military transformation of the Bundeswehr after the end of the Cold War are examined. The changing international security environment forced Germany to reconsider the role of its military. During the period up until the end of the Cold War, the use of Germany's military was restricted to the defense of its own and its allies' territories. However, this previously respected self-imposed restriction became an obstacle in the new international environment. The 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) made the deployment of the Bundeswehr outside NATO areas legally possible, although the FCC at the same time gave more power to the Bundestag, the German parliament, to control the deployment of the Bundeswehr. In the 1990s, the new military role for international crisis management demanded the military transformation of the Bundeswehr. Since the mid-1990s, many proposals were made to reform and reorganize the Bundeswehr, but they were not totally successful, because the domestic political discourse did not change as rapidly as the technical needs had changed. In addition, constraints upon the state budget made the reform even more difficult. After more than ten years of discussion, conscription was finally suspended under the strong leadership of the politically popular defense minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. According to zu Guttenberg's reform, the Bundeswehr would be an effective, efficient and flexible military for international crisis management.
    The final section analyzes the implications of the reform of the Bundeswehr on Germany's security culture and foreign policy. Germany's security policy defined in multilateralism, i.e. within NATO and the EU, would stay unchanged. However, the new security environment might change the domestic understanding of Germany's military, and thus Germany's security culture in the future.
  • 歴史的文化的背景と安全保障文化
    坂井 一成
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_102-115
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    In recent French external relations, not only Europe but the Mediterranean region has also been attached with great importance. Its background can be found through geopolitical reasons, historico-cultural reasons, and global strategic reasons; however, how can we recognize characteristics of the French security policy in the Mediterranean region? This article attempts to clarify these characteristics through analyzing French security policy in this region from the viewpoint of the study of security culture.
    French national security culture is analyzed in this article from three viewpoints: 1) an external view of the world's environment, 2) in terms of instrumental preferences for security maintenance, and 3) in terms of interaction preferences with other states. For the first point, though the foundation has carried the perspective of realism since de Gaulle, it can be also confirmed that in the multi-polar world, securitization has developed wherein non-state actors have become a target of security. The second point refers to the preference of preventive diplomacy and peace building through non-military means which is increasingly taken into focus. However as the exercise of military force is still considered superior in the protection of citizens, there is a continuing clash between the use of military means and the use of non-military means. For the third point, the French preference is to criticize unilateralism, while having the highest regard for security actions based on multilateralism.
    The manifestation of French security culture in the Mediterranean region can be confirmed with the above stated orientation. Gradually raising the awareness of the importance of regional security in the Mediterranean, successive presidents of the Fifth Republic not only have securitized various sectors involved in the transformation of the entire international community, but also have put importance on regional stability through international institutionalization based on multilateralism, thereby strengthening the orientation to ensure the safety of France. Concrete manifestation of their security activities can be understood through the non-military means of strengthening cooperation with southern Mediterranean countries, through the military reform in France based on the changing situation around its Mediterranean neighbours, the development of regional security mission of European Union CSDP, while taking advantage of the Union for the Mediterranean that was launched in 2008, and through verifying how France has exhibited its leadership. In the Mediterranean region, France is promoting multilateralism based on international institutionalization in terms of all aspects ranging from the military to non-military aspects, which promotes the strengthening of France's political leadership.
    In the external policy of France in the Mediterranean region, although the realistic Gaullist attitude is still deeply rooted in the foundation, the French have gradually come to focus more on realistic political responses focusing on non-military means in adapting to the changing era of security, while utilizing a multilateral concept of framework of international relations which also supports this kind of political orientation.
  • ブレア政権における政策の変化と継承の視角から
    齋藤 嘉臣
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_116-129
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    The argument that the European Union (EU) has its own strategic culture has been given increasing attention among academics. As the result of the development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the EU deployed more than twenty missions throughout the world prior to 2010. These deployments have been stimulating the debate on the “European way” of using military forces in the event of crises. An angle closely related is how ESDP has been influenced by the strategic culture of each of the member states. Given that the member states are not willing to give up their sovereignty for the sake of integration, it is necessary to investigate the policy preference of the member states and the strategic cultures behind them.
    The aim of this article is to shed a new light on the Blair government's policy toward the European Union's security and defence policy by using the concept of strategic culture. Owing to Blair's pro-EU overtures, New Labour's foreign policy and its policy on the EU have been widely debated. Some have even claimed that his policy “U-turn” led to the change in UK's strategic culture. However, considering the characteristics of the military forces in the UK and the historical preference in the field of European security cooperation, this article argues that the strategic culture of the UK has been rather stable under the New Labour government.
    While New Labour's ethical foreign policy and Blair's conviction on the need for the international community to deploy military forces in the event of humanitarian crises contrast with those of the Conservative government's policy, it is necessary to make clear that they are based on weak domestic obstacles for deploying forces and heavy emphasis on expeditionary forces, which have been historically retained. At the same time, the insistence that NATO should have a right of first refusal could be regarded as a manifestation of another policy continuity. Whereas ESDP would not have been promoted if Conservatives had retained power after the 1997 election, the Blair government's policy change was a European turn rather than a U-turn in that Atlanticism was not in any sense discarded. Therefore, there is more continuity than change in the policy of the Blair governments on the ESDP.
    The Blair government's pro-EU policy is not so much the fundamental change of policy preference as a change of tactics in using the EU as a useful arena for expanding national interests. By way of Europeanizing crisis management and promoting other member states to initiate military reform a la UK's Strategic Defence Review, the Blair government tried to use the EU as a means to sort out its military problem. As a result, the EU started to insist member states had a strategic culture of intervention for humanitarian crises.
  • 秘密活動局設置に至る軍部及び帝国防衛委員会における検討を中心に
    奥田 泰広
    2012 年 2012 巻 167 号 p. 167_130-143
    発行日: 2012/01/30
    公開日: 2013/09/21
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the ‘strategic culture’ of Britain, which gives importance to external intelligence activities prior to the formulation of the foreign policy. ‘Intelligence’ is sometimes narrowly defined as the activity of collecting information covertly. However, in this paper, the word ‘intelligence’ has a broader definition; it is defined as the state's activity to investigate the international environment. In history, some countries formed their foreign policies without considering the broader definition of ‘intelligence’ and subsequently encountered defeat in wars. Britain has managed to avoid serious defeats in wars owing to its intelligence-oriented strategic culture.
    Such a feature can be seen in the case of Britain's intelligence activity prior to the First Word War. From the late nineteenth century to the eve of the First World War, Britain conducted some important activities to investigate the international environment. While adversary relationships were hardening within Europe, the Admiralty and War Offices tried to comprehend the entire picture of the international crisis and began to clarify the ‘emergency powers’ of the government. In addition, in the process of doing so, both offices decided to reinforce their own intelligence services. Furthermore, concerns regarding both offices were shared by the higher stratum of the strategic decision-making authority—the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) —. Further, the establishment of a new intelligence service—Secret Service Bureau—was determined by the CID in 1909; this service later became MI5 and SIS as we know them today.
    Subsequently, in 1911, the ‘War Book’ was compiled with the cooperation of many departments such as the Foreign, Admiralty, and War Offices. Although the War Book did not describe detailed plans for the war, Britain could avoid internal confusions at the onset of the war owing to the War Book. The important point here is that the officials of the Naval and Military intelligence departments attended the meeting for the compilation of the War Book held among the officials from the other offices of the government. The War Book can be regarded as representative of the intelligenceoriented strategic culture of Britain.
    From a common perspective, the broader definition of ‘intelligence’ should be highly valued before making any decision. However, in reality, many countries have not conducted such policy-related activities. This paper considers the activities of the British intelligence prior to the First World War as a salient example of an ‘intelligence-oriented strategic culture’ and discusses this case in depth.
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