国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2014 巻, 176 号
選択された号の論文の14件中1~14を表示しています
国際政治研究の先端11
  • ―規範起業家と規範守護者の相互作用から―
    足立 研幾
    2014 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_1-176_13
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    Attention to norms in international relations has been intensifying in recent decades. Researchers have been looking into how new norms spread internationally. The “norm life-cycle” model is the analytical framework used most often to grasp the diffusion of a newly created norm. When norm entrepreneurs present a new norm, they often re-frame the issue and re-define the problem. Sometimes, they engage in so-called “norm grafting” to show the relevance of the new norm to already established norms and try to enhance the legitimacy of the new norm. Thus, a certain degree of research has been conducted on norm entrepreneurs’ strategies, including framing, norm grafting, and shaming, among others.
    While not all the newly presented norms spread internationally, the study on norms in international relations has focused excessively on the successful spread of new norms. The “gatekeeper” theory is one of the few explanations offered for why a newly presented norm does not spread. Clifford Bob insists that a new norm cannot easily spread unless “gatekeepers” in the issue area adopt the norm as part of their agendas. R. Charli Carpenter’s work on non-emergence is another example of such research. She sheds light on the intra-network politics in NGO networks to explain why some of the newly presented norms are not adopted by the NGO networks.
    However, even when a newly presented norm survives intra-network politics and is adopted by a gatekeeper, it does not necessarily spread internationally. What are the differences between a norm that diffuses internationally and a norm that does not? In this paper, I will analyze a new norm regarding medicine patents as an example of an unsuccessful norm diffusion case. Even though gatekeepers adopted the issue onto their agendas and led the international campaign, the newly presented norm on patent on medicine did not successfully diffuse.
    What determined whether a new norm succeeded or failed to diffuse? I will try to address this puzzle by focusing on the norm protectors’ campaigns to challenge the newly presented norms. Through examining the interaction between norm entrepreneurs and norm protectors in the above mentioned case, I will conclude that the close contest between the norm entrepreneurs’ and norm protectors’ campaigns determines whether the newly presented norm will diffuse or not.
  • 石田 智範
    2014 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_14-176_28
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    In January 1983, Japan finalized an economic assistance agreement with the Republic of Korea (ROK) pledging to extend $4 billion economic aid to the country concerned. Prior to the finalization of the said agreement, both countries held rounds of negotiation on the aid package conditions and, this led them entering into a period of growing political frictions.
    Despite this, nonetheless, a political consensus was eventually hammered out in 1983 over their disagreement and this had far-reaching impacts in stabilizing the political relationship between both countries. Doubtlessly, numerous intellectual researches have been consistently conducted in the above field of studies. Nevertheless, the reasons behind Japan’s commitments to rounds of political negotiation with ROK have yet to be positively analyzed and convincingly substantiated.
    Against this premise, the main aim of this article is to analyze the motivational forces that brought Japan to the negotiating table with ROK. More specifically, it focuses on analyzing the impacts of the formalization process of the Japan-U.S. agreement that served to induce Japan to address the ROK-aid negotiation issue conscientiously.
    The analysis reveals clearly that the major factor that spurred Japan to revisit its ROK’s aid package conditions was its concern over the security burden-sharing scheme with U.S. It may well be that in July 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko in his summit meeting with President Ronald Reagan pledged to initiate official talks with ROK in response to its request for an extended economic aid package.
    In tracing the course of Japan-U.S.’s political negotiations from the period between 1977 prior to the formalization of ROK’s aid agreement, the analysis distinctly reveals that both countries were politically in consensus on need of the agreement as a one of the critical means to resolve a myriad of their security burdens. Nonetheless, it is further disclosed that both countries derived at their ROK’s aid consensus from different perspectives that were politically beneficial to their own countries concerned.
    On the one hand, the U.S. expected Japan to assume greater responsibilities on security burden sharing in line with its global economic status. On the other hand, partly because of its political limitation in shouldering a regional security role, Japan’s primary concern was to minimize its economic burdens as far as possible and in such way as not to disrupt its harmonious security relationship with U.S.
    On top of this, insofar as U.S. was concerned, it seemed to be unwise to request Japan to overshare the bilateral security defense expenditure which might be detrimental to its political stability at home and which at the same time affecting the credibility of their security alliance relationship.
    In a nutshell, the article explicitly shows that the Japan-U.S. ROK’s aid consensus was beneficial to both countries in term of resolving their differences in the political operation of their security alliance scheme including burden sharing responsibilities. This is indeed the real factor behind Japan’s commitment to revisit its economic aid package with ROK.
  • ―一九五六年、一九六八年、一九八〇―一九八一年―
    荻野 晃
    2015 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_29-176_42
    発行日: 2015/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this paper is to examine the characteristics of Hungarian foreign policy under the Kádár-Regime. Especially the author thinks that analyses of the Czechoslovak situation in 1968 and the Polish situation in 1980-1981 are of great importance in Hungarian foreign policy after the Soviet military intervention in 1956. Hungarian leaders repeatedly placed emphasis on “Hungary’s experience” of 1956 on the occasion of the crises. In addition, the author regards ‘two front struggle,’ which was the basic principle of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HSWP) after 1956 as important. In this paper, he focuses on how Hungary coped with the Czechoslovak crisis and the Polish crisis.
    János Kádár, the First Secretary of the HSWP, grasped power after the Soviet military invasion in 1956. Kádár and his colleagues strengthened the leadership of the Central Committee of the HSWP, and began to consolidate the socialist system by taking a hard line. In spite of cracking down on the opposing forces, his regime started to relax its domestic control and to introduce economic reform within the frame of the one-party rule in the mid-1960s.
    During what was called the Prague Spring in 1968, Hungarian leaders expected Alexander Dudček, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, to make a moderate reform without political liberalization, as they had done since the mid-1960s. But Czechoslovak leaders could not keep the Prague Spring under their control. Kádár supported the Soviet leaders and agreed on the military intervention in Czechoslovakia as a last resort.
    However, Hungarian leaders were skeptical about the effects of the military intervention. They were anxious that the military intervention would have a harmful influence on Hungary’s reform. So Kádár tried to mediate between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. But his mediation ended in a rupture, because Dubček refused to make a concession to the Soviet Union. Finally, he made a decision to participate in the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Hungary’s participation in the military intervention was to follow the principle of international socialism.
    Kádár expected the Polish leaders to find a way out of the difficulties by themselves in 1980-1981. Hungarian leaders were skeptical about the effects of the military intervention in Poland, although they regarded Independent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity” as an enemy of socialism. He advised Polish leaders to restore the order by using internal forces without the intervention from outside.
    Kádár thought that Wojciech Jalzelski, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, and his comrades had to carry out consolidation of the socialist system, just as he had done after 1956. When Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law, Hungary supported him.
  • ―アメリカ・ユダヤ人委員会、国際人権とイスラエルの建国一九四二~一九四八年―
    小阪 裕城
    2014 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_43-176_56
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article examines the American Jewish Committee (AJC)’s postwar planning based on “international human rights”. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Zionist movements had struggled to establish a Jewish state in Palestine as a solution for the so-called “Jewish question”. However, every Jew was not Zionist. There were non-Zionist groups in the United States, which had criticized Zionism. Focusing on the AJC, which was one of the most prominent and influential non-Zionist groups in the United States, this paper tries to answer the question of what the AJC aimed to do in the postwar international arena and why their plan did not work as an alternative to the Zionist solution.
    While Zionist had sought to establish a Jewish state, the AJC had tried to build an international human rights system as another solution for the Jewish question. They thought their plan could contribute to protection of rights of Jews all over the world. The AJC criticized Zionist because creation of a Jewish state was likely to be utilized by anti-Semitism movements and accelerate exclusion of Jews from each country. Therefore, the AJC sought to build an international system based on international human rights as a solution of the Jewish question.
    However, the AJC’s postwar plan and activities turned out to be infeasible when the relief of Jewish displaced persons (DPs) in the postwar Europe emerged as an urgent task before the AJC. The AJC lobbied Britain to admit those Jewish DPs into Palestine; at the same time they insisted that every country including the United States should reform their immigration law system to accept the DPs. It was necessary for the AJC to let those DPs acquire citizenship of any country under the aegis of international human rights system. In reality, such idea was difficult. First of all, the U.S. immigration law system stood in the way of the AJC’s activities. Having been dominated by the conservative GOP, it seemed that it was not easy for the U.S. Congress to allow the Jewish DPs to immigrate into the United States. In addition, because the severe situation in the DP camps in Europe became worse and worse, and because the extreme revisionist Zionists armed forces such as Irgun had escalated its terrorism in Palestine, the AJC could not help but cooperate with more moderate Zionists group, Jewish Agency. As a result, they supported partition of Palestine and creation of the Jewish state in order to relieve the DPs in Europe as soon as possible. Here we can see the transformation of the AJC’s postwar plan and activities.
  • ―補完性原則と必要性原則の政治学的分析―
    志村 真弓
    2014 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_57-176_69
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article theoretically examines the political dimensions of international norm dynamics in the process of which the parties concerned reach some consensus on general standards of appropriate behavior but nevertheless continue to disagree over specific interpretations of the behavioral standards. It focuses on the idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing committed within territorial sovereign states.
    Most existing studies on international norms share in common the definition of norm as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity” as in Katzenstein (1996). When are such norms formed within the society of states? Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) interpret the increased consent from states to a specific standard of appropriate behavior as the evidence that those states come to share expectation for the proper behavior. According to their model of the “norm life-cycle,” the idea of R2P is interpreted to have gained the status of an international norm after the UN World Summit in 2005 when heads of states and governments reached consensus on its definition. However, subsequent debates especially in the UN Security Council demonstrated that states still have a long way to go to achieve an agreement about exactly what each of them is expected to do as before 2005. This suggests that the very idea of R2P consisting of vague or abstract notions is subject to mutually conflicting interpretations by those pursue political advantage in authorizing or withholding interventions in the name of responsibility to protect.
    This article examines political factors in the contested interpretations of R2P by considering two political principles: ‘complementarity’ and ‘necessity’. The principle of complementarity means that national jurisdictions of sovereign states in protecting civilians are not replaced but complemented by international organizations. This logic leads to controversy over the ability and willingness of states to protect their own citizens between the interveners and the intervened. On the other hand, the principle of necessity means that military means are considered legitimate in protecting civilians only when necessary in that all the other means have been exhausted. This logic leads to controversy over effectiveness of actual and considered options. Analyzing cases of R2P in Myanmar in 2008 and Syria since 2011, this article examines the political origins of the contested interpretations over the behavioral standards in the process of international norm dynamics.
  • ―NPT批准を目指して―
    津崎 直人
    2014 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_70-176_83
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper sheds light on formerly unknown details about the diplomacy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to conclude the IAEA-Euratom agreement (hereafter the “verification agreement”), the signing of which in 1973 was an essential precondition for FRG’s ratification to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1974.
    In order to start the negotiations to sign the verification agreement, FRG required consensus among the Euratom member states. However, France requested its exemption from the Euratom inspections as a condition of its agreement to start the negotiations. They argued that since the Euratom inspections should be under the influence of IAEA due to the verification agreement, France would be under the influence of IAEA as well because its peaceful nuclear activities were under the control of the Euratom inspections. However, there were no legally justifiable grounds for France to be under the influence of IAEA because it did not sign the NPT and therefore had no obligation at all toward IAEA. Therefore, in order for France to be freed from the influence of IAEA, it requested exemption from the Euratom inspections.
    At first, FRG rejected this stance and tried to change France’s position; it was afraid that if France was exempted from the obligations of Euratom this could badly influence European integration. However, France would not change its position and FRG became concerned that worsening its relations with France would have an even more detrimental effect on European integration as a whole. In the end, FRG was judicious enough to concede to France’s request in order not to antagonize relations between them. As a result, France agreed to start negotiations to conclude the verification agreement.
    Based on this consensus among the Euratom member states, FRG was able to start negotiations with IAEA. FRG aimed to minimize the influence of IAEA on Euratom and successfully achieved this objective. However, FRG was under strong pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States to conclude the negotiations and ratify the NPT as early as possible, since FRG’s ratification to it was one of the essential conditions for easing of the Cold War confrontations in Europe. Moreover, FRG itself was anxious to improve relations with the Eastern bloc as part of its “eastern policy.” FRG therefore pushed to ensure the date for signing of the verification agreement as soon as possible.
    By these actions FRG achieved not only its fundamental purpose, minimizing the influence of IAEA over Euratom members, but also achieved its diplomatic objectives to maintain good relations with France and improve relations with members of the Eastern bloc.
  • ―「東方ガスプログラム」と中露ガス交渉の事例から―
    長谷 直哉
    2014 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_84-176_96
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines Russian gas export policy and interaction among Russian national government, Gazprom and other actors in the negotiation on sales of Russian gas to China. How do Russian domestic actors participate in policy decisions and implementations? What kinds of roles are expected to Gazprom in political sphere? And also, to what extent can Gazprom’s action be subject to the restriction of Russian government’s decisions? These questions are significant to identify Russian energy governance in gas policy field.
    Of course, the trend of an international energy market affects on corporate decisions of Gazprom. There are arguments that the decisions of huge state-owned company lead Russian gas policymaking. However, Russian government has found strong significance to long-term energy policy since beginning of the 1st Putin’s administration. Putin’s administration prefers to build centralized and “vertical” political system, this approach was also applied in economic arena. As a result, Russian government strengthened stock controlling for state-owned companies, and carried up reshuffle of the top-management. These facts show that Gazprom’s corporate decision depends on Russian domestic political games.
    Russians promotes industrial development in the Far East and the East Siberia through strengthening of energy cooperation with the countries in Northeast Asia. They expect to lay down gas transport infrastructures in the Far East and the East Siberia with expansion of the gas export to the countries in Northeast Asia as the driving force, and to build the basement of economic development through fostering resource-processing industries. The key document is “the Eastern Gas Program” which the Russia government and Gazprom established together. This is a policy document of regional development and the gas export for China and other Asia-Pacific countries. Gazprom were assigned for a resources development coordinator in the Far East and the East Siberia.
    Though Gazprom gained dominant position for regional development in the Far East and the East Siberia,it bore too heavy burden at the same time. “The Eastern Gas Program” gave top priority to secure gas for economic development in the Far East and the East Siberia. Therefore, Gazprom had no choice but to suggest export of West Siberian gas to China, so that it secured promising new gas fields in the Far East and the East Siberia for domestic use. This caused competitions over gas business interests in Russian domestic political process.
  • ―歴史のなかの英国学派―
    秦野 貴光
    2014 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_97-176_110
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    The relationship between theory and history is one of the topics of great interest in International Relations. Hedley Bull, a leading figure of the English School of International Relations, once argued that theories are constructed by theorists who are embedded in specific historical situations, and that the understanding of historical conditions is crucial in evaluating those theories. However, there is no denying that much of English School theory has been interpreted rather abstractly and taken out of historical context. This paper is an attempt to contextualize some of the theories of the English School and to understand them in terms of the intellectual and linguistic context out of which they arose.
    This paper begins by sketching the existing literature as it touches upon the English School, and points out the general tendency to abstract theory being discussed from context surrounding it. Instead, this article stresses the importance of historical context when interpreting and understanding the meaning of texts. The first part outlines the argument over “peaceful change” that took place between the First and Second World Wars in order to identify the context. In this process, the international political thoughts of Hersch Lauterpacht, E. H. Carr, and C. A. W. Manning, who all actively participated in the debate, are explored. Secondly, the international political thoughts of Martin Wight and C. A. W. Manning, both of whom are thought to be the founders of the English School, are surveyed so as to show the continuity between the argument over peaceful change and some of the arguments of the English School. The third part focuses on Hedley Bull’s work. After adumbrating some of his central arguments, it points out that Bull’s work on Order and Justice in international relations can be understood as an extension of the debate over peaceful change. Finally, the last part of this article argues that the understanding of English School theory depends upon our understanding of the nature of the debate which took place during the inter-war period. Accordingly, the interpretation of its theory and of some of its key concepts can be altered by reexamining and reviewing those controversies. Bearing this in mind, it goes on to offer a fresh interpretation of “Rationalism” and “international society” in the light of peaceful change. This paper concludes by emphasizing the importance and productiveness of understanding “peaceful change” in interpreting the texts of the English School, especially those produced during its formative period.
  • 溝口 修平
    2014 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_111-176_125
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    After Ichiro Hatoyama became Japan’s Prime Minister in December 1954, Japan and the Soviet Union began a series of negotiations to reach a peace treaty. The most difficult issue to be resolved was the territorial problem. As the two countries could not reach a final agreement on this issue, they left it unresolved and instead of signing a peace treaty, signed a Joint Declaration in October 1956.
    This article reevaluates the shift of the United States policy toward these negotiations. Previous studies have made it clear that the role of the United States was significant in the negotiations and that although it had kept to a “non-involvement” policy at first, eventually it intervened in Japan’s decision-making process in the final stage. With regard to the interpretation of this policy shift, however, there is a divergence of views: some argue that the United States came to give full support to Japan, but others conclude that while it did give strong support to Japan, it avoided adopting any clear stance on Japan’s claim that “the Kurile Islands,” which Japan renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, does not include the two disputed islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri. How can we construe the essence of the United States policy shift?
    Based on the research at the National Archives at College Park, this article concludes the following three things. First, it is appropriate to interpret the policy shift as the latter. In September 1956, the United States government presented the Japanese counterpart with an aide-memoire, in which the United States stated clearly that the four disputed islands “should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty.” This was a strong political support to Japan, but the United States did not say anything about the definition of the Kurile Islands. The second argument here is that this US position was consistent throughout the Japan-Soviet negotiations. Though preceding studies tend to stress the aspect of the policy change, there was also continuity in the US policy to the effect that the United States government supported Japan in a political sense, but avoided any statement on the legal problems. Finally, this continuity resulted from the dilemma of the interest structure which the United States had in the Cold War era. In this period, there were two essential national interests of the United States in Asia, that is, the preservation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty regime and the maintenance of Japan-US alliance. But these interests were difficult to keep at the same time, and would be damaged by any change of the status quo in East Asia through the Japan-Soviet negotiations. Thus, the United States had to keep its policy, just because it had almost no other choices.
  • 湯川 拓
    2014 年 2014 巻 176 号 p. 176_126-176_139
    発行日: 2014/03/31
    公開日: 2015/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
    The balance of power has always been conceived as being closely connected with realism, in the conventional International Relations literature. In particular, realists believe that the balance of power is the result of alliances being formed within the international system, by nations in their pursuit of self-interest.
    In contrast to the conventional literature, this paper emphasizes the role of the balance of power as a behavioral norm, within the international society. To be more specific, it sheds light on the fact that the balance of power provides moral and obligatory standards for the members of international society to adhere to. At the same time, it has also contributed to public interest within international society. Although the normative balance of power first made its appearance in the 18th century, the current balance of power (observed in contemporary international society) does not bear the role of a behavioral standard. Two relevant questions which we should consider then, is (1) at what point in time exactly, and (2) in what way exactly, the balance of power norm waned in terms of influence. This paper aims to answer these two questions.
    Its main finding is as follows. This paper stresses on the legitimacy of the balance of power norm (within international society) as being key to answering the two research questions above. In the 18th century the balance of power referred to the need to maintain an equal distribution of physical military power, as a norm that was necessary for ensuring stability in the international society. Some necessary conditions for the balance of power to exist as a norm in the 18th century were the absence of disputes over legitimacy, and the recognition (or achievement) of a certain degree of homogeneity amongst the members of international society. When the balance of power came to be established as a norm in the earlier half of the 19th century, it was perceived as contributing to homogeneity in international society. It referred to the maintenance of equilibrium in the international society, vis-a-vis the sustenance of a particular regime, rather than the balancing of physical power. It finally lost its appeal as a norm during the latter half of the 19th century and after the First World War, when new principles of legitimacy such as nationalism and democracy appeared.
    The various different meanings implied by the term ‘balance of power’ tell us multitudes about the type of world order which was deemed desirable by the international society, under different situations.
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