Changes of government parties had been regarded as unrealistic in the post-war Japan. As the party system has been transformed during the 1990s, however, changes of government parties have been realized. Moreover, the result of elections was partially due to the government’s diplomatic performance. That is why this topic has received much more attention. We extend the research scope by including not only changes of cabinets by the same government party but also regime changes such as breakdown of democracy or democratic transition. We often ascertain that changes of leaders in the same party sometimes brought much more different policies, but regime changes brought very little change on their policies.
Regarding the impact of governmental performance on changes of governments, we must accumulate many case studies. “Failure” of diplomacy is sometimes regarded as fatal and promotes changes of governments, but ordinary governments usually never regard it as failure. How much weight is the evaluation of diplomatic performance considered in the voting behavior in elections? How much change do electoral results bring in terms of political arrangements? Domestic political process is important for explaining the impacts of international factors on changes of governments.
Moreover, we must take the impact of governmental changes on the continuity of diplomacy into consideration. On the one hand, diplomacy might have to be consistent regardless of governmental changes because its national interest is relatively constant according to its international environment, and its reliable relation with other countries is so important lest the revolving policy changes should cause damage to its diplomacy. On the other hand, changes of foreign policy due to governmental changes should be taken for granted because diplomacy has to be under democratic control. What is problem is how to compromise the mutual different views of previous diplomatic achievements between countries.
The role of political leaders is important in terms of diplomacy, but changes of leaders never always bring policy changes. Moreover, the role of such professional institutions as NSC is also important for diplomatic stability, but they cannot automatically guarantee diplomatic continuity. The institutionalization of decision-making process is also important, but performance of leaders are sometimes beyond institutional constraints. International constraints are regarded as decisive for guaranteeing diplomatic continuity. What is important is not whether such constraints exist or not, but how much constraint governments perceive. A government ordinarily cannot but obey the constraints, but it sometimes tries taking advantage for promoting policy changes. Nixon’s policy toward Vietnam and Brandt’s Ostpolitik are regarded as latter cases. International constraints are not always obstructive for policy changes, and the new government sometimes can change the perception toward constraints and take the chance for policy changes.

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Traditionally, the role of the supreme leader in foreign policy making has been regarded as decisive in authoritarian states such as China. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), only four leaders—Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao—have run the state. Consequently, in the analysis of Chinese foreign policy, great emphasis has been placed on particular supreme leader’s “First Image,” or the role of the individual. However, unlike charismatic strongmen such as Mao and Deng, who had contributed to the establishment and the nation -building of the PRC, the leaders of later generations have had less authority and have been more constrained by collective decision-making.
This paper analyzes change and continuity in Chinese foreign policy toward Japan during the time of the transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. Jiang ruled the PRC from the 1990s to the beginning of the twenty-first century. His generation carries the anti-Japanese feeling from its youth. Jiang emphasized the issue of national humiliation and frequently raised historical issues regarding Japan on diplomatic occasions. On the other hand, Hu’s generation has not been directly influenced by memories of war. In addition, in the early stages of his career, at the dawn of the “Reform & Opening Up” Policy, Hu was partly responsible for the large-scale participation in youth exchange programs between China and Japan. Consequently, his approach toward historical issues seemed to be much softer than Jiang’s was.
Looking back at Hu’s ten years as supreme leader, from 2002 to 2012, it is ironic that Sino-Japanese relations were shaped more by diplomatic tensions and unpleasant public sentiments, even though mutual economic dependence greatly increased. Hu’s goodwill and efforts to improve the bilateral relationship can be discerned even at the time of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated symbolic visits to the Yasukuni War Shrine, which became the main cause of tensions between the two countries at that time. On the other hand, after putting too much emphasis on historical issues and on repelling the Japanese, during his state visit, Jiang came to adopt a much more cooperative approach to Japan after China experienced serious tensions with the U.S. When the diplomatic obstacles were removed, Hu quickly exercised his personal leadership to improve the relationship with Japan. However, today’s Sino-Japanese relations are more influenced by such structural factors as China’s expansion of its maritime activities, the rise of nationalistic public opinion, and, ultimately, the shift in the power balance between the two counties. The role of personal leadership has become less influential.

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This paper aims to provide insights into the effects about the role of the National Security Council (NSC) from the government change to Taiwan’s foreign and security policy decision-making process.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a series of missile tests targeting the Taiwan Strait from July 1995 to March 1996 after Lee Teng-hui, President of the Republic of China (ROC), visitedthe United Statesin June 1995. This international security crisis from the missile tests by the PRC is also called “The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.” After thecrisis, the cross-Strait relations re-emerged as acritical security issue in East-Asia which might involve the United States and Japan.
Moreover, Chen Shui-bian, who is a member of the Democratic Progressive Party and declares promotion of Taiwan independence, won the presidential election in 2000. His presidency endedthe Kuomintang regime in Taiwan. The government change is not only marked in the political history of Taiwan or the ROC,but also has its significance in international politics.
Later, Taiwan has been worried to tend China by the government changeafter 2008, because Ma Yingjeouwon the presidential election in 2008, who is a member of the KMT and is considered “pro-China”.
However, Chen Shui-bian did not actually declare Taiwan independence during his term of office. The cross-Strait relation has improved at the time under Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. Nonetheless,most of the main policy by Ma’s administration is a continuation from Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administration.
This paper used case study method and analyzed the operations about the NSC in Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. Three major conclusions are as followed. First, the NSC is the only mechanism whichcan coordinates all sectors of the foreign and security policy decision-making process in Taiwan. When the core staffs forthe foreign and security policy around theNSC are stabilized, Taiwan’s foreign and security policy could maintain a critical stability. Second, the operations of the NSC have been over relied on the president’s personal leadership which leads to instability in the operations of the Taiwan’s foreign security policy decision-making process. The operations of the NSC are conducted by informal approaches from Lee Teng-hui to Ma Ying-jeou, while the formal foreign and security policy decision-making process is in the fragmentation. The NSC operations changed when the government changes as well as the presidents changed even though they are from the same party. The changes may lead to political blank or instability on foreign and security policy. Third, President of ROC has strong authority in the foreign security policy decision-making process when he wants to change or promote the policy. However, if President force through his demands, the foreign and security policy decision-making process will become instability because the formal mechanism is in the fragmentation.

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This paper examines South Korea’s change of foreign policy toward Japan due to its changes of government since democratic transition in 1987 by taking into account the three points of view: First, I focus on the policy makers’ ideal inclination, conservative or progressive, as well as on power relations among ruling party, opposition party and public opinion; Second, South Korea’s policy toward Japan have to be analyzed in connection with ones toward North Korea and US; Third, I take the 1965 regime, under which diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan was established with containing not merely communism but also post-colonial issues, as an indicator to classify continuity and change of the policy.
The two conservative governments after the 1987 transition, Roh Tae-Woo and KIM Young-Sam administration, showed continuity of foreign policy toward Japan as seen from the perspective of the 1965 regime. The two administrations cooperated with Japan when Japan kept adopting hard-liner policy toward North Korea. The two also continued containing post-colonial issues although South Korea instead confronted Japan when Japan tried soft-liner policy toward North Korea.
The change of power on election in 1997, unprecedented in the South Korean political history, brought about a significant change. Kim Dae-Jung’s “National Government” developed reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and simultaneously maintained cooperation with Japan. Roh Moo-Hyun’s “Participatory Government” forged ahead with such a change. It pursued peace and prosperity with North Korea despite confronting US because a fear of entrapment was mounted among South Korean public opinion. Roh, moreover, promoted policy toward Japan to overcome the colonial past, which have had been contained under the 1965 regime.
Lee Myung-Bak’s “Practical Government”, inaugurated in return of power to conservatives after 10 years’ progressives. Lee administration adopted again hard-liner policy toward North Korea and reintensified the alliance with US while adhered to the 1965 regime with Japan. Lee, however, confused coherence of policy and strategy toward Japan by sudden landing on Takeshima/Dokdo in just before his term expired. The present Park Geun-Hye administration, irrespective of her conservative ideal inclination, couldn’t but tackle with the post-colonial issues from the beginning of the term, as well as is trying a kind of soft-liner policy toward North Korea.

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François Mitterrand was elected as the President of French Republic in 1981. The article asks if this change of government in France had a substantial and direct effect to the foreign policy of the country, especially when one compares it with the previous administration.
It starts with an examination of the existing literature of the relationship between national politics and foreign policy. The author states that there is no direct and mechanical effect between the change in national politics and in the diplomacy; however, the latter is activated by the former when some conditions are met.
When analyzing the case of “Euro-missile Crisis” in the early 1980’s, we clearly see that the Mitterrand Presidency has changed its policy stance as compared to the opposition period and also to its predecessor. The Mitterrand Presidency showed a clear preference to the “Atlantist” policy, and supported the deployment of the U.S Pershing Missile in West Europe. At least this case leads to the fact that there is an obvious shift in policy that has been made by the change of government, and that the literature stressing on the continuity in French diplomacy doomed to be false.
In fact, the reasons of the decision made by the new presidency were multi-faced: 1) to give assurance to the U.S. that the new presidency, even there are Communists inside the government and to be recognized as the legitimate Left government, 2) to show its electorates the difference compared to the former government, 3) to exclude the possibility that the West Germany possess a nuclear weapon, and finally 4) to keep French strategic independence. But the decision was not clearly taken from the beginning; the above-mentioned policies were consequence of a strategic consideration after failure of the Socialist diplomatic agenda which intended to change the U.S monetary policy and to strengthen North-South cooperation.
The French diplomatic historian Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle pointed out that in the age of democratic governance, political leaders had to be careful about the “mood” generated by the direct and indirect demand from the internal politics. If they are only adaptive to the international environment, it can be contrary an obstacle to the diplomacy. In other words, a skilful diplomacy means to conciliate the state as an actor and as an arena.
After a close examination of the Mitterrand diplomacy in the early 1980’s, we can conclude, despite many miscalculations, that at least the maneuver on missile deployment has been a success as a result of the change of government, and has restore the equilibrium between France and conditions of the New Cold war.

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In the Westminster parliamentary system, shadow ministers in the official opposition, which is the largest opposition party, sit across the floor from the frontbenchers and face the governing party. They can form the next government at any time if the government falls. In a respective portfolio, a shadow minister finds fault with what his or her counterpart does. They rarely miss any opportunity to jump on the government’s shortcomings such as policy failures or behavioural misconducts. In election campaigns, opposition parties try to present their own sets of policy proposals to differentiate themselves from the government. Once they are in after capturing the majority of the seats in Parliament, they are in an enviable position to carry out many of their proposals. Do they remain faithful to their promised goals? Upon a closer examination, small as it is, parties do make more than a little difference in domestic policy. However, in foreign policy in general, in immigration policy in particular, it is concluded that no matter which party comes into power, little if any changes in policy output occur. The Brian Mulroney Progressive Conservative government put Canada on a trajectory to expand its immigration levels despite the high unemployment rate. This radical policy style was not ad hoc but continued in subsequent administrations regardless of party affiliations. It could have been the Liberal government that conceived what the P.C. government invented. The Tony Blair Labour government initiated the economically driven immigration scheme with the point system to take in more of advanced human capitals. The radical change of British immigration policy was realized by Labour in the international competition for rich human resources. Naturally, the Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition government maintains the path tailored out by the predecessor. Several reasons are suggested for continuity in immigration policy. First, senior immigration officials have formidable expertise in the area, which immigration ministers can never match. Second, the nature of the capitalist system coerces immigration-making into a particular pattern, in which business interests can never be overlooked by government. Third, the policy community into which the state and the relevant segment of civil society are intertwined does not give instantly appointed government policy-makers a free hand. Fourth, the international immigration market exists independently of governmental policies. It is finally pointed out that the state in the Westminster system is not at the whim of interest groups, but it is a nation-building state pursuing continuously its distinctive interests.

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This article aims to properly contextualize the drastic and surprising changes in Myanmar’s diplomatic relations with the United States and China since March 2011. It includes a critical review of conventional understanding and a closer investigation of the relationship’s development since 1988. The literature has interpreted Myanmar’s diplomatic “normalization” with Western countries as a byproduct of the United States’ Asia rebalance policy and Myanmar’s departure from an over-reliance on rising economic and political power of China. This explanation, however, reflects a common tendency to oversimplify the relationship between a small state and two major powers. In order to provide a more balanced perspective and a more accurate understanding of the dynamics, this article points out three oversimplifications concerning the Myanmar-United States and the Myanmar-China relationships, and then the author argues that they made it difficult for us to predict Myanmar’s diplomatic “normalization” in this short of a term.
The first oversimplification assumes that Myanmar’s political leadership and its foreign policy have been making the country a “pariah state” that defies Western political values, such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law, with strong, and often unreasonable, consistency. This article critically review the assumption by highlighting the strategic thinking of the military regime of Myanmar by focusing on the impact of the 2011 political reformation on the new state leaders’ policy priorities. The second simplification is that U.S. sanctions against Myanmar have been based on a value-centered policy approach mainly caused by the United States’ strong sympathy for the democratization movements and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. What is missing here is an understanding of the changeability of the value-centered approach. So the author analytically traces the process in which the Obama Administration has shown favorable responses to the political reforms in Myanmar and subsequently U.S. sanctions have been eased. Finally, Myanmar’s reliance on China has been improperly interpreted as China’s relentless control over Myanmar’s policy options by taking advantage of the gap in the national strength between the two countries and of Myanmar’s international isolation. While this asymmetrical relationship caused by their fundamental conditions is obvious between them, the close examination in this article suggests that the nature of the ties between these two countries was not sufficiently consolidated to shape the range of Myanmar’s policy options and to prevent Myanmar’s balancing behavior to cope with the uncertainty in the changing regional order.

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The results of the PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council) election in January 2006 surprised international society with the ascension of Hamas as the ruling party. It was the first national election that Hamas officially participated in, but it succeeded in attracting votes as an alternative to Fatah—the dominant party of the PLO since the liberation movement began. The rise to power of Hamas made Israel, the EU and the United States anxious about its foreign policy, and compelled them to impose severe economic sanctions on the new government. As a result, the inauguration of the new government changed the geo-political map of the region.
This article focuses on this change, and investigates the relationship between the governmental change and its new foreign policy. Special attention is paid to Hamas as an Islamic party and its response to national and international politics. How has its ascension affected the relationship between it as a governing party and international society? What kind of foreign policy does the Islamic party envision for the future of the conflict with Israel? What has been the impact of the international reaction on internal politics? These questions will be answered in this paper.
The first section deals with the results of the PLC election and clarifies the reasons for Hamas’s success in 2006. Several factors are pointed to as contributing to this, including its grassroots support, the rivalry with Fatah, and Fatah’s failure in its electoral strategy. The second section illustrates the reaction by international society to the ascension of the Hamas as an Islamic party. The conditions presented to it by Israel and the Quartet for the lifting of sanctions are detailed. In comparison to these conditions, Hamas’s position on conflict resolution and negotiation is studied by analyzing its charter and statements. In addition, its concept for peace talks—cease fire—is investigated. The last section discusses the diplomacy of the Hamas government after the economic sanctions were imposed. The support from Russia and Iran, and its limits, and the changed regional geopolitics are explained. In reflecting on the diplomatic situation, the attempt at reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, and its institutional disturbance is also investigated in this section.
The rise of Islamic parties has become a commonplace phenomenon in the contemporary Middle East. The case of Hamas can be evaluated as a precedent for this, and the analysis of the logic, the interaction with internal politics, and the influence of international society should be investigated as a significant historical reference point. The study will suggest possible courses of action in diplomacy.

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This study aims to clarify the process of the Okinawa reversion in 1969 with regard to the establishment of “asymmetry,” which has been regarded as a special feature of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. The mutual acceptance of asymmetric cooperation between the two countries can be evinced by examining the security dialogue on the status of Okinawa and bilateral security cooperation after reversion. Asymmetry in the alliance, which is considered a fundamental problem in U.S.-Japan cooperation, became a structural feature of the alliance in the reversion negotiations.
To analyze the process of acceptance of asymmetric cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, this study utilizes James D. Morrow’s “arms vs. ally” model. This model presents an alternative explanation for nations’ willingness to form alliances in the face of a common threat. For a nation to enhance its security, there are two main options: to ally with another state or to develop armament. This decision is made based on calculations of the domestic/external costs and benefits. The perspectives of Japan and the U.S. on Okinawa’s status after the reversion clashed during the negotiations, with Japan desiring the denuclearization of Okinawa and across-the-board application of the prior consultation system articulated in Article 6 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The United States, for its part, wished to ensure freedom of military operation in Okinawa after reversion. The two countries carried out their negotiations based on consideration of their internal and external circumstances. As a result, the reversion of Okinawa enhanced alliance cooperation, which in turn signified a new Japanese security presence in East Asia. The Korean clause in the Sato-Nixon Communiqué was a consequence of the calculations of the two countries and delineated some of Japan’s increasing responsibilities in alliance cooperation. This served to deepen asymmetric cooperation rather than mitigate it. The Korean clause brought about the political elimination of asymmetry in the alliance even though the substance of asymmetric cooperation remained unresolved. Nevertheless, this represented a rational solution, considering the two countries’ contradictory demands and respective circumstances.
In analyzing this process, this study clarifies the significance of the Okinawa reversion through the alliance model. Unlike most states, Japan has emphasized alliance cooperation as a means of enhancing her security. This factor has been influenced by the uniqueness of Japan’s foreign policy, which is formed within the bounds of the U.S-Japan Security Treaty and its Peace Constitution.

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The EU is a regional community in which the member states cooperate closely. According to the literature on EU negotiations, threats or coercive tactics, apart from the use of the veto, are seldom used, since the member states normally seek a consensus, with particular focus on the maintenance of cooperative relations.
However, a close look at EU intergovernmental negotiations reveals that threats, in the form of depriving or damaging the interests of the target government, have occasionally been used to obtain compliance. Notably, however, there is no evidence that the relationships between the threatening and the threatened states have deteriorated in consequence. This paper aims to uncover the conditions under which threats can be used effectively as a bargaining means to elicit concessions from other states, but without endangering the relationship between the governments involved. To this end, this paper examines three cases in which coercive threats were indeed employed: the IGC 2000 negotiations on the size of the Commission, the Irish problem of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, and the 2003–4 Constitutional Treaty negotiations on the definition of Qualified Majority Voting.
On the basis of the empirical findings from analysing the three cases, this paper sheds light on the significance of a set of conditions which allow certain member states to resort to the use of threats. First, the size of the country matters. Only three large states—Germany, France and the UK—can play a leading role in instigating threats. Second, the threats have to be used in conformity with the general objectives of the negotiations. Employing threats, despite its forceful nature, can be justified if the aim of the threats is to achieve the stated objectives of the negotiations. Third, the effect of threats can be enhanced if a threatening state offers some kind of return to the threatened states for making concessions. Returns of some sort can make it easier for the threatened states to make concessions. Fourth, threats should be used as credibly as possible. Otherwise the threatened governments can dismiss the feasibility of the threats and go their own way. These conditions, taken together, can further the chances of successfully threatening other governments without bringing about severely adverse effects on the relationship between the governments involved.

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The First Oil Crisis started as a result of the six Persian Gulf members of OPEC announcing a raise in the posted price of crude oil on October 16, 1973 and OAPEC deciding to reduce oil production by 5% per month on the following day, touched off by the breakout of the Yom Kippur War. Japan was faced with an unprecedented dilemma between the Arab countries, who strongly demanded Japan to condemn Israel, and the United States who pressed Japan to align with their Middle East policy based on diplomatic relations with Israel. When the Arabs announced a 25% cut of oil supply on November 4, the European countries, similarly to Japan, who were scarce on resources, immediately criticized Israel, and declared support for the Arabs. However, the Japanese government was hesitant to criticize Israel. And the Arab countries pressed to intensify oil supply reduction unless Japan announced to break off diplomatic relations with Israel in the case Israel would not obey the UN Security Council Resolution 242. On the other hand, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger restrained Japan by stating that condemning Israel would hinder Middle East peace talks with the United States and that cooperative relations with the U.S. would be profitable for Japan from a long-term view. On November 18, the Arab countries announced that they would release the European countries, excluding Holland, from the weighted oil supply reduction measure of 5% from the benchmark set on December, because the European countries had criticized Israel. As a result, the criticism of the weakness of the Japanese diplomacy in attaining resources made the headlines of the Japanese newspapers.
How was the Japanese government to escape such dilemma?
The Japanese government finally criticized Israel by name and made its pro-Arab positioning clear in the statement made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido on November 22. Further on December 10, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki, as special envoy, left for eight Middle Eastern countries to offer economic and technical aid. At first glance, the Japanese government took a pro-Arab policy without accepting the warning of the Unites States. This document, however, will empirically clarify that the U.S.-Japan friction related to Japanese Middle East policy was resolved before November 22 in the midst of the development of multilateral diplomacy for the “Kissinger Plan”, a unified framework among Japan, the U.S. and the European countries, and that the Japanese diplomacy during the First Oil Crisis achieved to broaden the permissible scope of the United States.

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