This introductory essay overviews six research topics essential for a better understanding of the linkage between science and technology (S&T) and contemporary international relations. They are (1) the globalization of S&T, (2) international politics in cyber space, (3) the information revolution and the changes in national security, (4) diplomacy for S&T, and S&T for diplomacy, (5) the role of the state in S&T innovation, and (6) the global governance of S&T. Each section introduces one or two articles in this special volume and reviews their theoretical and empirical contributions to the field.
Prevailing trend of globalization has changed the mode and style of defense production and associated technology development, especially after the Cold War in major western countries.
A level of sophistication on civilian technologies has advanced to a military applicable level making COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) as conventional measures of major defense item production. Dual-use technology has become a major source of defense production. Under the condition which sophisticated technology dispersed among hi-tech companies, research laboratories, and universities around the globe, even a major defense companies have to make an outreach beyond national border in order to keep their technological edge.
It is true that a strategic trade control is taken as a significant policy measure to prevent proliferation of WMD and related technologies. However, at the same time, a trade control has been increasingly thought as an obstacle to trade promotion, since it put barriers on hi-tech trade, which U.S. and other western countries have comparative advantage. A trade facilitation and defense technology development collaboration have positive effect on security cooperation and defense production under globalized world. While the risk of technology proliferation is perceived as keen strategic issue, how to strike a balance between two conflicting demand become serious political agenda.
Despite these concern, the U.S. and the European countries lean toward liberalization of cross-border technology development collaboration, either through international defense production collaboration and/or market-oriented approach. Historically, the U.S. policy makers were reluctant to increase its technology dependence on external sources, since it affects capability to make independent security policy decision. Although, reflecting the state of globalized defense production in the post-Cold War era, the U.S. moved forward to implement an open-market approach by emphasizing the significance of securing access to defense-capable technologies deemed critical for future defense production, rather than putting emphasis on policy independence.
As a result, the U.S. and European countries have implemented export control and defense trade reforms in late 2000’s to early 2010’s. Japan, also shifted its half-century long policy on a defense trade ban policy and liberalized its defense transfer in 2014 to accommodate these trends to its policy on defense technology developments.
As seen in the case of F-35 production and its logistic system supported by private company, a membership to a joint defense production become one of the facilitating force behind this open-market approach. Relaxing an export control to a limited qualified countries enables this approach. And, the ways in which to put condition to be qualified become major policy measure to accommodate current state of defense technology development with preventing uncontrolled proliferation of defense related technologies.
This paper analyzes how U.S. export control policy for dual-use technology to China is made. That is to examine whether security or the economy more important in determining how countries behave. Trade generates wealth, and increased security is an externality of wealth. Countries are concerned about this externality when they begin to trade with others, so they introduce export controls or embargos to try and prevent their enemies from becoming wealthier than themselves.
The satellites used for either commercial or military communications contain one or more of militarily sensitive characteristics. Therefore there are concerns so that the satellite exports require a consultation among related officials. The exports of satellites are controlled either under the U.S. Munitions List (USML) of the Department of State or the Commerce Control List (CCL) of the Department of Commerce. One of the reasons why satellite exports are so concerned is the technological similarities both in satellite launch and ballistic missile launch.
In this research, the U.S. satellite exports toward China are to be analyzed from historical perspective, political decision mechanism, and priority between security and economy. The prior research considers trade a concept in its own right. However, it can more accurately be described as a combination of trade commodities and security relationships, Three types of trade commodity can be identified, depending on their fungibility and relevance to military capability: (1) munitions, (2) dual-use and (3) civilian goods. In terms of export, countries will be sensitive about trading munitions with enemies and non-allied states,and may even be reluctant to trade arms with its allies. On the other hand, there is less externality in exporting civilian goods than in exporting other commodities and they are in directly fungible over time, so that states are not concerned about them. Dual-use items come somewhere in between, and are less easy to categorize because they can be used for both munitions and civilian purposes, and they are directly and quickly fungible. This means that the export of these goods simultaneously raises issues of national security and economic interest, and export policies will therefore be vulnerable to changes in the bilateral political situation. In deciding whether to export or to prohibit the export of dual-use technology, a country faces the dilemma of whether to give priority to economic interests, which focus on gain, or to national security, which focuses on preventing the other country from developing its capabilities. In the case of trading with non-allied countries, the dilemma increases more, relative to the case with allied countries.
Commercial satellite is one of examples of dual-use technology. U.S. government had exported these satellites to China since 1988, but prohibited the export in 1999. To examine what factors affected on this policy change, this paper analyzes nineteen cases of export practices. In conclusion, (1) whether the security relationship is positive or not, (2) whether inputs from social actors are security or economy, and (3) condition of overall economy, can be traced as independent variables.
In response to an increasing number of cyber attacks, many governments have tasked their intelligence agencies with ensuring the safety and security of cyber space. This is a marked shift from the Cold War era when intelligence agencies’ main role was espionage in hostile countries. Their targets in this sense were clear and their tasks specific. However, perpetrators of cyber attacks today can hide themselves in the vast traffic of digital information. They might send computer viruses to a large indefinite number of computers and order them to attack a target by remote control. Or, they might take over someone else’s computer to eavesdrop others’ communications or to steal confidential information. This makes it difficult to identify the perpetrators of cyber attack incidents. With attribution becoming one of the core problems in cyber security, intelligence agencies are shifting their missions from espionage of fixed targets to wider surveillance of possible targets. This sometimes includes the general public.
The shift has been generated by three changes in the information society. First, governments need to care for unknown risks rather than known threats. Intelligence agencies need to cast wider nets to detect possible signs of risk. Second, digital communications lowers the costs of collecting, processing, analyzing, and storing information. These lowered costs make surveillance easier. Finally, the prevalence of social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook has meant that people are putting an increasing amount of private and sensitive information online, available for collection by intelligence agencies. These changes have compelled intelligence agencies to shift their practices, with signal intelligence (SIGINT) increasingly becoming more effective than human intelligence (HUMINT). This paper looks at case studies of the United States and the United Kingdom to analyze the shift in intelligence practices in response to cyber security.
In June 2013 former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden revealed vast surveillance programs such as PRISM by the NSA. The British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was also revealed to be working in close cooperation with the NSA. Snowden’s revelations also shed light on hidden cooperation between intelligence agencies and information technology companies including Google, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Twitter and others. Without such cooperation, intelligence agencies face difficulties accessing the communications of possible targets. These activities have been amplified by cultures of anxieties after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The U.S. and the U.K. might be exceptional cases, but other countries, including other democracies, are conducting surveillance in some ways. As more and more people get online, the needs for such forms of surveillance may grow. Governments worldwide must consider reasonable and proper ways to protect their nations in cyber space, while striking a balance between privacy and security. This is an unavoidable policy task to be considered in the information age.
Cyberspace is an arena of disruptive activities as well as social, economic, and political transactions. With ever-increasing risks and threats, securing cyberspace is among the priorities of governance in the electronically connected world. However, global rules and norms for cybersecurity have been slow to develop, lagging behind the exponential growth of information networks. This article provides an account of the rivalries and cooperation among states with regard to emergent rules and norms for secure cyberspace. It argues that global cyber security norms are underdeveloped because of the divergence of principles espoused by cyber powers.
At the outset of the information revolution, a small number of relatively homogeneous states, namely western European countries and the United States, led the way to develop rules and norms for cybersecurity at such fora as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). As major developers and users of information technologies, these countries were concerned with “cybersecurity” in the sense of the safety of information systems and their components (i.e. computers) and information processed over them. An important outcome of their cooperative efforts is the CoE Cybercrime Convention of 2001, which is the only binding international instrument in the field so far.
Meanwhile, with the diffusion of information technologies, a greater number of states became interested and involved in global cyberpolitics and began to challenge Euro-American standards. Significantly, China and Russia have been actively pursuing an international arrangement for “information security”. In 2007, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), led by China and Russia, endorsed an action plan for “international information security” and, in 2009 the member states of the SCO signed an agreement on inter-governmental cooperation in the field of “international information security.” Furthermore, in 2011 Russia and China in cooperation with other SCO countries proposed to the United Nations General Assembly a resolution regarding an international code of conduct for information security, which called on member states, among other things, to refrain from distributing information that might destabilize the political systems of other countries.
It should be noted that “information security” as proposed by SCO countries includes not only the integrity of information and availability of information systems but also protection of socio-political systems from threats arising from cyberspace, that is, information that might have detrimental effects on the domestic regime. This notion of information security is inconsistent with the Euro-American conception of cybersecurity, which places emphasis on free flow of information. The United States, in particular, criticized the code of conduct as an attempt to offer an alternative view that would legitimize government control of the Internet. China and Russia, nonetheless, have found allies in the developing world.
In short, two groups of like-minded states now are promoting their respective rules and norms of behavior in cyberspace. It may be argued that, given the difference in the underlying principles, a comprehensive framework for cybersecurity is unlikely to be established in the foreseeable future.
Since the Gulf War, the United States has built up a joint information system, which is interoperable among the military services--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The application of information technology to the military system has contributed to maintain the prominent position of the United States in international politics. According to Kenneth Waltz’s theory, however, the United States cannot sit on its laurels. His balance-of-power theory leads us to expect states to emulate the successful policies of others.
João Resende-Santos has developed a “neorealist theory of emulation.” This theory contains two noteworthy points. First, the timing, speed, and scale of military emulation vary in accordance with the level of threat in the surrounding security environment. Second, when the option of relying on the capabilities of other states through alliance formation (external balancing) is available, the perception of reduced threat weakens the timing, speed, and scale of military emulation. In other words, emulation, as well as innovation, is regarded as one form of arms buildup relying on one’s own capabilities (internal balancing).
However, is the level of threat in the surrounding security environment a really decisive factor of emulation? Do the timing, speed, and scale of military imitation vary with the region of the world? Moreover,don’t states emulate others for the formation and strengthening of an alliance? By verifying these questions,it is possible to contribute theoretically to research on the international diffusion of military technology and ideas, especially the diffusion of information revolution in military affairs, on which little research has been conducted.
This article attempts to refute Resende-Santos’ arguments, by analyzing the diffusion of the joint information system of the U.S. Armed Forces to two allies, the United Kingdom and Japan. As a result of this analysis, I make two points. First, even in regions where the levels of threat in the surrounding security environment are different, the military emulation of similar timing, speed, and scale may occur. Second, states emulate others not only for their own military buildup but also for the enhancement of their alliance through ensuring interoperability.
The body of this article is divided into three sections. First, I describe the development of the joint information systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan during the post-Cold War period. Second, I suggest the diffusion of the joint information system from the United States to the other two countries and present a framework for analyzing emulation, a concept that is similar to but different from diffusion. Third, I consider the emulation of the U.S. military system by the United Kingdom and Japan in more detail.
This article examines the technological dimensions of border security within the North American continent in the post 9/11 context. The realities of the post 9/11 security environment at the center of the U.S. homeland security lead us to conclude that new technologically-oriented security measures have become the major tendency at the internal and external borders of continents: surveillance devices, biometrics and information technology etc. They have basically emerged as preferred policy solutions to the conundrum of screening for “risk factors” such as terrorists, illegal migrants and drugs into the United States through its international borders while facilitating flows of legitimate people and goods in the age of globalization. With the post 9/11 security environment increasingly common, this may be called a risk-profiling approach.
After 9/11, the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed two major agreements: the Smart Border Accords and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). In 2002 and 2001, the United States signed the Smart Border agreements with Canada and Mexico respectively. They involve multifaceted cooperation on the border security issues, including pre-clearances of people and goods, biometric identifiers, database coordination, information-sharing and other areas. The SPP is a regional framework for trilateral and bilateral cooperation in North America. While this is not a binding legal agreement, nor a formal international treaty, it includes two important agendas related for the post 9/11 context: one reflecting on security and the other on economic prosperity. The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) was launched as an automated biometric entry-exit system in 2004. The US-VISIT program collects biometric and biographical data from foreigners when they not only enter the United States but also apply for the U.S. visas abroad. It represents the proliferation of risk management techniques as a means of regulating mobility in the contemporary war on terror. It is also designed for functioning far beyond geographical boundaries of the U.S. itself. Under the US-VISIT program, the management of border control cannot be recognized simply as “geopolitical and physical bordering measures” of the sovereign states. Rather, it can be understood as “virtual bordering measures” which are seen as obtaining network characteristics. Behind this logic is a recognition that borders and border functions are becoming diffused over everybody life. The concept of “the biometric border (L. Amoore)” represented by US-VISIT along with other technology-driven border security is now becoming common bordering practices of our society.
Borders have usually taken for granted in classical IR which assumed “the inside/outside model (R.B.J. Walker)” with which nation-states have long operated. It can be said that the concept of the state has lacked theoretical reflection among IR scholars. We are facing the new challenges by globalization and new security measures which have changed the meaning of the borders. Rather than fixed lines on maps, borders are increasingly understood “portable and mobile machineries” that are embedded in bodies. In this vein, the fundamental shift towards the practices of new bordering measures raises the important task of developing alternative conception of border in the IR.
Despite their outstanding technical capabilities, Japanese firms have recently decreased their international competitiveness in various fields. The purpose of this paper is to examine one factor of this phenomenon, namely the diremption between Japanese firms’ technical capabilities and their international competitiveness, by focusing on the aspect of standardization.
The studies in international politics analyzing the correlation between international competitiveness and standardization argue that failure to win international standards harm firms’ competitiveness. However, as the studies in business economics point out, standardization means the disclosure of technical information. Considering the technical imitation by emerging countries’ firms, it is presumable that winning international standards encompasses negative effect. Even though emerging countries’ firms lack the capacities for technical development, the technical imitation by using international standards allows them to produce the same product at lower cost. For developed countries’ firms, this means the deterioration of their competitiveness. In order to avoid this negative effect, they need to ensure their discretion to limit the scope and condition of standardization.
However, with the conclusion of the international treaties including Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and Agreement on Government Procurement, the discretion of firms was deprived. The core obligation under these treaties is the priority adoption of international standards. This creates concern that the products and systems being inconsistent with international standards can be rejected in domestic and world markets. Because of these treaties, the success and failure of acquiring international standards directly links to firms’ competitive results.
At stake is whether or not to exercise the discretion in negotiations at the international standardization organizations, and it depends on their decision-making rules. As the international standardization organizations such as ISO and IEC are made up of national standards bodies of each state, they adopt the one-vote-per-state system. This decision-making rule has the effect of transforming the technical competition among firms into the political battle among states. It means that the political power of each state is much operative than the technical one, and the political power of Japan, namely one vote, is significantly weaker than that of European states voting cooperatively. This is why the state-of-the-art technologies developed by Japanese firms are prone to be rejected as international standards and their international competitiveness are harmed. The international institution for standardization consists of these three layers: the international treaties (upper layer), the decision-making rules of international standardization organizations (middle layer), and international standards (lower layer). This paper concludes that the nature of international institution for standardization is one factor that causes the diremption between Japanese firms’ technical capabilities and their international competitiveness.
Brazil, the seventh largest economy by nominal GDP in the world, has sophisticated high-tech industries and performs vigorous diplomacy for science and technology. This article examines the continuity and change on high-tech policy, especially that of dual-use technology, in the historical context of foreign relations of Brazil.
Owing to the government-led development model after WWII, Brazilian activities of research and development (R&D) of high-tech tended to be led by the military. After the coup of 1964, this tendency was accelerated from the viewpoint of national security by the military government. Brazilian air force supported the establishment of aircraft manufacturer, and fostered missile industry as well as promoted the space rocket program. As regards the nuclear technology, armed forces, especially the navy, engaged eagerly in R&D of home-grown technologies for nuclear reactors and enrichment of uranium, in response to the progress of Argentine nuclear program and the restriction of technology transfer by developed countries.
After returning to democracy in 1985, many military-led projects were put under the control of civilian authorities or abandoned by pressure from developed countries, especially the U.S.; moreover, in the face of debt crisis, the adoption of neoliberal policy for economic reform resulted in the privatization or dissolution of state-run high-tech enterprises as well as the suspension of R&D activities by the austerity budget.
Since the establishment of the Workers’ Party (PT) government in 2003, however, some diplomatic trend similar to that under the military regime reemerged in Brazil’s foreign policy on the dual-use technology. In the nuclear field, even after the ratification of the NPT which was refused once by military regime, Brazil continues to regard it as discriminatory on the safe-guard and to assert the right of developing countries including Iran to enrich uranium. Such diplomatically dangerous policy that might arouse suspicion from developed countries originated from the diplomacy of South-South Cooperation promoted by the PT government, as well as from the demand for the right of peaceful use of atomic energy advocated by the military regime. As regards the south-south cooperation, in the nuclear field it is still under planning with Argentina or in the framework of IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), by contrast, in the aerospace field it has already achieved much success in regional-jet and satellite projects with China.
Three characteristics of high-tech policy of Brazil can be pointed out to be common to military government and PT government despite their political differences: the maximization of technology transfer on desirable conditions, the challenge to technology control established by developed countries and the enlargement of technology market through the cooperation to other developing countries. However, in contrast with the government-led model of military government, the new form of the public-private partnership (PPP) model appears in Brazilian high-tech policy under PT government. The high-tech diplomacy of Brazil is activated by the multi-polarization of world political economy and bringing the new forms of cooperation and confrontation.
There are two major political issues that have been repeatedly debated in China’s modern history; how China’s relationship with the West should be and how China should treat Western science and technology.
During the Cultural Revolution (CR), criticism against “bourgeois academic authority” raged. Science and even the lives of Chinese scientists were in jeopardy. The world-renowned physicist Albert Einstein became one of the main targets of this campaign. It was triggered by an article titled “Xiangduilun pipan (Criticism on the theory of relativity)” written by a local middle school teacher.
In Beijing, one of the vice presidents of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Chen Boda took charge of the campaign. Most of the participants were young scientists whose knowledge was too limited to refute Einstein’s theory. Senior scientists such as Zhu Kezhen, another one of the vice presidents of the CAS, and Premier Zhou Enlai’s protégé Zhou Peiyuan, vice president of Beijing University and physicist who had worked with Einstein, took the side of Einstein.
Chen brought the campaign to schoolchildren and even planned to organize a rally of ten thousand people. But he fell off the ladder of power when he joined the bandwagon trying to elevate his patron Lin Biao to the position of the President of the State at a conference in Lushan in August 1970. It made Mao suspect that Chen in fact intended to replace Mao with Lin who had demonstrated his ability to mobilize the People’s Liberation Army in October 1969. The anti-Einstein criticism ceased in Beijing after Chen disappeared, but in Shanghai Chen’s rivals Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan continued it.
Thereafter two major changes in domestic and international context strengthened the hands of Zhou Enlai, who had been protecting scientists, through the upheaval of the CR: the U.S.-China rapprochement and the Lin Biao incident.
Henry Kissinger secretly arrived in Beijing in July 1971, which opened China’s door to the West. Zhou Enlai intentionally issued important directives on promoting basic theoretical study in science in front of the Chinese American scientists who were visiting China. Zhou also encouraged scientists to write him letters in order to make the issue publicly known. After the Sino-US rapprochement, a newly published Chinese academic journal “Wuli (Physics)” became the stronghold for physicists who supported Einstein and his theory.
Soon after his allegedly aborted assassination of Mao Zedong in September 1971, Lin Biao died in Mongolia. It weakened the authority of Mao who chose Lin as his successor, and enabled Zhou Enlai to bring back the scientists to Beijing from local labor camps.
Zhou also gave the green light to physicist Zhang Wenyu’s proposal to build a high energy accelerator at the cost of $ 2 billion, despite a contrary voice from Yang Zhenning, a Nobel laureate physicist and professor at the University of Chicago.
High energy physics is based on Einstein’s theory of relativity. The physicists who had participated in building China’s first atomic bomb supported building a high energy accelerator. Zhang Wenyu led a delegation of Chinese scientists to the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in the United States in 1972, and Zhou Enlai established the High Energy Physics Institute in the CAS in 1973.
By 1972, the Cultural Revolution in the field of science had lost steam because the physicists were now allowed to applying Western physics despite its “bourgeois”, “academic authoritarian”, and “wasteful” nature that had been fiercely condemned during the Cultural Revolution.
The governance of nuclear technology is required to address two critical natures of technology; the dual-use nature and great impact to the wellness of the society. Because of these natures, the acquisition of nuclear technology possibly changes the dynamics of international relations both in security and economy, of the state that acquires the technology. The governance of dual-use nuclear technology needs to meet two conflicting goals, namely, preventing the deterioration of international security environment through proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology and securing the equity among states in enjoying benefits of utilizing nuclear technology, which naturally causes the spread of such technology.
The governance of nuclear proliferation risks is shaped not only by international and domestic regulatory schemes, but also the dynamics of market, and the process of how technology diffuses. These factors are mutually affecting. Political dynamics over regulation of technology transfer is shaped by the number of supplier states. However, as more states become involved in technology transfer in the market, it become more difficult to form a consensus on regulatory rules. Although some states prioritize security concerns to strengthen regulations, others’ economic incentives to transfer technology may hinder the introduction of stringent regulation. Conversely, regulatory needs could distort economic rationality in social choice of technology.
The current international regulatory scheme of nuclear non-proliferation was founded with a basic deal to ensure nuclear non-proliferation without undermining the objective of promoting international cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear technology. It was possible because sensitive technology such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing had been owned by only a limited number of nuclear weapon states, and proliferation risk was not critical.
However, in the 1970s, as technology diffuses, political and economic environment regarding nuclear non-proliferation made drastic changes. The first oil crisis increased aspiration for national nuclear energy program in developing countries. The U.S. dominance in enrichment market was lost by European countries’ acquisition of enrichment technology. They meant the emergence of new paths of technology diffusion, and the increase in risk of nuclear proliferation. Such concern was realized in India’s nuclear test, claimed as “peaceful nuclear explosion.” Although the United States intended to tighten the control over technology transfer, loss in power in enrichment market and technology dominance prevented the United States from exerting influence over other supplier states. In the short run, the U.S. attempt to establish an international consensus to ban transfer of fuel cycle technology was failed. In the long run, however, risk of nuclear proliferation seems to shape technology transfer through regulations.
The diffusion of technology strongly depends on social context in which how the market and regulatory politics evolve. But the social regulatory scheme is also shaped by the dynamics of technological diffusion.