How does the rise of emerging states influence the international order? The historical exploration of the various aspects of this topic is the theme of this special issue.

The question of “the rise of emerging states and the international order” has its origin in the distinctive situation of Europe, characterized by the coexistence of a plurality of leading countries. The appearance of emerging states such as Germany and Italy and the growing nationalism destabilized the “Concert of Europe”—which Great Powers had created to establish a balance of power—leading to the outbreak of the First World War.

At the Versailles peace conference after the First World War, emerging states such as the United States and Japan appeared. The United States proposed the establishment of the League of Nations, whereas Japan made a proposal for the elimination of racial discrimination. After the end of the Second World War, the birth of many newly independent states from decolonization created a sense of urgency to reform the “international order.” The Bandung Conference was a symbol of it, and in the 1960s the developing countries raised the issue of the “North-South problem.” However, the oil crisis weakened the unity among developing countries. On the other hand, there are arguments that the rise of the Asian NIEs made the Soviet leadership recognize the inevitability of reforming the socialist system.

Japan and Germany (West Germany), which in the pre-war period represented the emerging states, were integrated into the United States-led postwar system. However, it is interesting to observe that in the 21^st century Japan and Germany formed the “G4” and together with India and Brazil—the emerging states of this century—have been seeking to reform the United Nations Security Council, which is a cornerstone of the postwar system.

By examining this topic from different perspectives, this special issue sheds light on the historical aspects of the “the rise of emerging states and the international order.”

One of major characteristic of today’s emerging powers is the fact that they are very populous. It can be easily assumed that the more populous the more powerful a nation will be. It is also often argued that the advantage of early modernizers like today’s G7 countries are quickly disappearing as modern technology and scientific knowledge spread all over the world, equalizing per-capita productivity, favouring more populous countries. Thus, what we are witnessing is a return to a pre-modern world where populous empires dominated the world. But even pre-modern history is full of small political units that became highly dominant international players. This suggests populous countries may have inherent disadvantages.

One possible disadvantage is low-per capita productivity. Despite impressive aggregate wealth, per-capita income was and still is relatively low in countries like China and India. In fact, successful city states were more effective in accumulating wealth through international trade. The low per-capita productivity is also related to difficulty in providing good governance in large countries. Another possible disadvantage is its lack of intellectual freedom needed for technological development. Innovation is a dynamic continuous process rather than a single unique historical event. But a huge country tends to have an authoritarian regime that fails to offer favourable environments for innovation by oppressing intellectual freedom. Finally, a huge empire, though powerful externally, can be highly vulnerable internally with many centrifugal forces at work constantly threatening effective mobilization national resources for unified goals.

Simple statistical analyses cannot find meaningful co-relations between the size of the population and the above mentioned disadvantages. But it is certain that a larger population size works in favour of aggregate power. Thus, it is safe to assume that a certain level of large population is a necessary condition to be a dominant player in the world politics. Selecting 16 countries in today’s world that have more than 80 million populations or 1% of total world population can selected as likely candidates of powerful players in the future, only 3 out of the 16 are liberal democracies and the most of the rest have weak domestic governance as well as low per-capita productivity. Whether those potential powers can actually develop into major political players in the future depends upon improvement of their domestic governance. But at the same time, given the exceptional enormity of the population size of China and India, it is likely that they can offset their weaknesses by sheer force of numbers. The US, on the other hand, is a unique political unit that is a wealthy liberal-democracy with a large population size.

There was a remarkable power shift in international politics from the end of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century. The rising states in different regions—Japan in East Asia, the Unites States in the Americas, and Germany in Europe—began to displace in various ways British hegemony worldwide. Following the basic logic of the power transition theory, the world at the time was in an unstable condition in which Japan, the United States, and Germany, as a dissatisfied and non-status quo rising power, sought to change the existing international and especially regional order.

The purpose of this paper, which focuses on Japan and the United States as emerging powers in this era, is to make it clear how the orders of two regions, East Asia and the Americas, although geographically separated, evolved by interacting with each other through the Monroe Doctrine’s functions.

The Monroe Doctrine was originally pronounced in 1823 by U.S. President James Monroe, who declared the principle of mutual non-intervention between the Americas and Europe, eventually becoming a longstanding tenet of U.S. foreign policy. In particular, around the turn of the century, the doctrine, by functioning as an ideational mechanism that legitimized American leadership in the Americas, contributed to a “peaceful” power or hegemonic transition in the region between Great Britain and the U.S. On the other hand, this American doctrine was applied beyond the Asia-Pacific to East Asia, as an idea that could sanction Japanese domination over the region symbolized by the proposal of a “Japanese” Monroe Doctrine by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905. However, the efforts of seeking the Japanese Monroe Doctrine ultimately resulted in the failure of a peaceful power transition in East Asia, despite or because of the use of the Monroe Doctrine.

There are a number of preceding studies, mostly using a historical approach, on the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless, few studies explore the synchronic developments of the Monroe Doctrine and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, which interconnected the regional order already in process in East Asia and the Americas,from the viewpoint conceptualizing the doctrines as ideas of legitimizing regional hegemony. Furthermore, this paper, highlighting the workings of an ideational factor, the (Japanese) Monroe Doctrine, in the rise of Japan and the rise of the United States, provides a perspective different from the traditional power transition theory that focuses on material power. It can also be said that revisiting the past of the Japanese Monroe Doctrine offers an implication for contemporary international politics in East Asia, which face a new power shift and the possibility of a “Chinese” Monroe Doctrine.

This paper examines (1) the rise of the U.S. and the Monroe Doctrine in the Americas from the late 19th century to the early 20th century; (2) the rise of Japan and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine in East Asia from 1900 to the 1910s; and (3) the development of the Monroe Doctrine and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine in the Americas and East Asia from the 1920s to the 1930s.

During the early days of the post-WWII era, China (i.e. the Republic of China or ROC) was expected to become a regional “big power” that would help the victorious nations of the war to maintain peace and order in the Far East. But the ROC was unable to play a sustainable role as a rising power due to its defeat in the Chinese civil war. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist regime (i.e. the People’s Republic of China or PRC)—the new ruler of the Chinese mainland—was somewhat more influential as a newly developing country in the region. But the PRC would not defend the international order supported by Western countries. Both governments thus failed to take on leadership roles under the existing international order immediately following WWII. However, the ROC and PRC had in fact tried to improve their international status via international organizations in the late 1940s through the early 1950s. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is one of the organizations that they used for that purpose. This article argues that the ROC’s cooperation with UNESCO stemmed from a carefully planned strategy aimed at obtaining “status” and “assistance” simultaneously from a highly respected international organization, whereas the PRC’s flexibility in handling its relationship with the organization was motivated by the necessity to gain the recognition of the wider international community. The ROC had successfully persuaded the founding fathers of the United Nations (UN) to stress the importance of cultural and educational cooperation in the UN charter, and it managed to act as a leading Asian cultural power inside UNESCO until the early 1950s. The PRC, on the other hand, lacked a seat in both the UN and UNESCO for more than 20 years after the nation’s establishment. And yet the Communist regime tried several times to gain representation in UNESCO, allowing the organization’s liaison office to remain in China, even after its troops clashed with UN forces in Korea in the early 1950s. Despite the drastic change in China’s domestic politics, UNESCO adopted a consistently positive stance toward China’s cultural and educational reconstruction efforts. The organization endorsed and encouraged the endeavors made by both regimes. It did so not for political or ideological reasons, but because many individuals who were involved in the organization’s enterprises in China deeply believed that cultural and educational exchange should be independent from any domestic or international conflicts caused by the East-West confrontation. It was against this complex backdrop that China made its contribution to the initial development of UNESCO as the world’s largest intergovernmental cultural organization.

The 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was a diplomatic event of major importance. Because the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) lacked comprehensive provisions such as commodity agreements and agreements regarding foreign investments, which had been contained in the 1948 Havana Chapter, the membership of GATT was basically limited to western countries. This was a major driver for newly independent countries in Asia and Africa and economically isolated countries in Latin America to call for a new economic order. The developing countries formed a caucus, negotiated through a common spokesman, and voted as bloc, eventually, forming Group of 77 (G77). UNCTAD was the first major international conference in which the confrontation between East and West was overshadowed by a North–South problem.

Supported by the former Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness in Latin America President Raúl Prebisch, who was a strong ideologue, these developing countries demanded fundamental changes in international economics. They identified four areas of controversy: access to markets including a preference system, commodity policy, invisibles and finance, and institutional arrangements. The expressed expectations for economic change were extremely high, thus received negative reactions from all of the western countries. The Unites States adhered to the Most Favored Nation policy and coming negotiation of GATT Kennedy round. The United Kingdom made an impressive speech advocating for a constructive role for UNCTAD but expressed concern over replacing the preference system of the Commonwealth. France and the European Economic Community also tried to keep their colonial ties with African countries. Furthermore, it was clear that Japan, whose level of industrialization was still low, had no intention of giving any concessions to developing countries.

The negotiations at UNCTAD were harsh between the Southern and Northern countries, and very little was achieved except for some specific institutional arrangements. Eventually, the Secretary General of UNCTAD, Prebisch, acted as a pragmatic compromiser. However, he insisted that consensus, rather than confrontation, was the only viable approach to reforming global trade and development policy. The developing countries that had been advocating radical resolution for their vision of a new economic order, reluctantly agreed to compromise.

This article concludes that the quest for a new economic order at the first UNCTAD resulted in little achievement, because the countries that were involved did not have any concrete ideas or concepts to build suitable new international trade and development policies. Reflecting the confrontation with Southern countries, the Northern countries tried not only to develop international cooperation arrangements but to reactivate the GATT through tariff cuts and trade liberalizations.

This article reconsiders the restructuring of the international financial system in the 1970s and early 80s. The restructuring began after the failure to sustain the value of the US dollar in August 1971 (referred to as the Nixon Shock) and the subsequent collapse of the Breton Woods system due to the floating of major Western currencies in 1972–73. The monetary reform process then proceeded in a broader context of changing the world’s economic power structure: the growth of the economic power of West Germany and Japan, a huge resources transfer to oil-producing nations after the oil crisis of 1973–74, and a strong call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) from developing countries. There was a widespread expectation that the challenge to the US post-war economic ascendancy would lead to some erosion of the dollar’s position as a dominant international reserve and trading currency.

However, the US dollar’s position was not undermined in a significant way throughout the 1970s, and, along with the spread of neoliberal economic policies among the Western developed countries, the dollar retained its global leading role. This outcome was attributed to several factors: the attractiveness and depth of the US financial and trade markets, the country’s geopolitical strength and influence on institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, and the lack of rival currencies (The Special Drawing Right (SDRs), the Japanese Yen, and the German Deutsche Mark were not at a stage where they could act as international currencies).

This article does not disagree with the conventional explanation, but it is important to recognise the two major challenges the international financial system faced in the 1970s: the worldwide monetary disequilibrium and the financial problems of many developing countries. The expansion of private international money flows, which were promoted by the US’s financial and currency liberalisation, answered these two challenges (Though the transformation of the international financial structure in the 1970s was inimical to the aspirations of the NIEO). The dollar’s reserve and trading role was also key in sustaining the expansion of private finance flows. Of course, the emerging global integration of trade, investment, culture, and information, as well as the recycling of oil-money to Western financial markets, were necessary conditions for the success of the US policy.

Recently, interest in the neglected topic of the international development issues in the post-war international monetary order has been growing. Assessing the developing economies’ problems in perspective, we can cast new light on the restructuring of the post-Bretton Woods international monetary system.

Emerging countries are seen as “unusual” in the international order established under the leadership of already advanced countries. It has therefore been believed that advanced countries, i.e., status quo powers,and emerging countries, i.e. revisionist powers, are apt to come into conflict with each other. However,the dichotomy of status quo powers and revisionist powers is inadequate for identifying international relationships with respect to emerging countries. For example, while China has acted to preserve the status quo in a limited number of fields, with regard to territorial issues, it has behaved in a revisionist fashion. This illustrates that emerging countries can sometimes exhibit inconsistent behavior depending on the field or the era in which they are acting. In addition, even when emerging countries behave as status quo powers,advanced countries may force them to comply more rigidly with existing international norms and customs. In this paper I use the word “taming” to describe the way that emerging countries and advanced countries perceive each other’s conduct as appropriate for a status quo power and work together to maintain the international order.

In this paper I employ a case study to analyze what kind of political process this taming emerges from. For the case study, I selected Japan’s summit diplomacy during the late 1970s. The questions I explore include the following: What did prime ministers Fukuda and Ohira think about international contribution? What kind of international contribution did they make at summits? How did other advanced countries view this? How did they react?

Prime ministers Fukuda and Ohira both believed that Japan should act as a status quo power and attempt maintain the international order. The former was optimistic about the reception of Japan’s diplomacy, while the latter was pessimistic. In addition, other advanced countries, whose position was to maintain the existing international order, responded harshly to the summit diplomacy of both of them. In other words, other advanced countries demanded that Japan make domestic demand the driver of its economic growth and demonstrate resistance to OPEC by restricting imports of oil. As an emerging country,Japan tried to act as a status quo power, but the advanced countries imposed restrictions on the direction this could take. Furthermore, because Japan’s efforts were not fully accepted by the other advanced countries, taming did not occur.

The international development landscape has been changing since the end of the 1990s. This is mainly due to emerging powers or emerging economies which have been remarked as influential countries in the international development arena. As those countries have been carrying out development co-operation with other developing countries based on the idea of mutual benefit, it is more appropriate to call them as emerging development partners rather than development aid donors. China, inter alia, is such a leading development partner and its way of development co-operation is quite different from that of OECD/DAC member countries.

An international development regime has been constructed by the industrialized countries mainly at OECD/DAC. The industrialized countries have formulated rules and procedures about aid giving based on their foreign policy interests. For example, they have imposed political conditionalities such as an emphasis on the respect of human rights or democracy on recipient countries in exchange of giving aid. In contrast to that, emerging development partners do not impose any conditionality but an emphasis on equality, mutual benefits, and non-interference principles. In addition to that, their way of development co-operation which follows investment and trade has brought about economic growth of the recipient countries. Then, such a style of development co-operation has become popular among developing countries, and OECD/DAC members’ foreign aid has been losing support.

With the rise of the emerging powers, developing countries have begun to emphasize the significance of “South-South co-operation”, hoping for development cooperation by emerging powers to realize economic growth. However, this phrase is not new as it was popular in the 1970s when developing countries were struggling to ameliorate the international economic order which had been established by only some industrialized countries. In those days, developing countries held up the term “solidarity” and they acted politically under the banner of “South-South co-operation”.

In order to retrieve its influence in an international development regime, OECD/DAC initiated the launch of a new forum on development co-operation, Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), even though a similar forum, United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF), had been established under the umbrella of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. It can be said that the former is led mainly by the industrialized countries and the latter is supported by the developing countries. In other words, the rivalry between “the Global North” and “the Global South” seems to be emerging, competing for the initiative to establish new rules and procedures for development co-operation.

However, the story is not so simple, because the hierarchization in “the Global South” is occurring and the relationship among the countries in “the Global South” is changing from horizontal to vertical. In such circumstances, the true value of the “South-South co-operation” should be reconfirmed in order for the developing countries to become “rule-maker” rather than “rule-taker” for international development co-operation.

In the past three decades, China has achieved remarkable economic development with a double-digit economic growth rate. Accompanied by rapid economic growth, China’s political and economic influence has expanded far beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

Rise to great power, a peaceful one if possible, has become one of the top priorities in China’s foreign policy from the early 2000s. Since then, China has been prudently developing and adjusting its grand strategy as a rising power.

How should we understand the characteristics of its diplomacy as a rising power? To analyze China’s evolving grand strategy, this paper addresses such questions as: What are China’s fundamental foreign policy objectives? How has the Chinese government employed diplomacy in the pursuit of these objectives over the last two decades?

This paper argues that China is adopting an aggressive and comprehensive grand strategic policy. China has been rapidly modernizing its military capabilities and is becoming more and more assertive in defending its “core interests”, including the maritime issues. On the other hand, great efforts to stabilize the bilateral relations with the United States have been taken as well.

China has been actively promoting bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). For China, FTAs, RCEP and FTAAP are important economic instruments of its strategic scheme to offset the negative impact the U.S.-led Trans-pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have on China, and therefore, to confront the U.S. and facilitate the rise of China.

To enhance the structural power in the international area, China takes a dual approach. On the one hand, China is developing great enthusiasm to play a major role in the existing international institutions. On the other hand, China is cooperating closely with other emerging economies to promote the reform of the international financial and monetary system. In this regard, BRICS and G20 are considered useful platforms to leverage its growing economic might into effective political clout.

This paper finds that there are three major factors that shape China’s calculative rising strategy. The international and regional balance of power works as a significant constraint on China’s behavior. The geopolitical concerns have become a major determinant of Chinese foreign behavior. “The South-South cooperation principle” has re-emerged as one of the critical guiding principles for china’s policymaking in recent years.

This paper indicates that the success of China’s grand strategy as a rising power depends on its ability to translate its economic power into political power.