国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2018 巻, 192 号
選択された号の論文の12件中1~12を表示しています
国際政治研究の先端15
  • ―国内避難民支援を事例として―

    赤星 聖
    2018 年 2018 巻 192 号 p. 192_1-192_16
    発行日: 2018/03/30
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    Complex governance comprises several governance systems that aim to solve global issues. Actors involved in complex governance need to coordinate with each other to achieve coherent and effective solutions to complex issues. While the agencies of the United Nations (UN) also play a significant role in complex governance, there often are gaps or overlaps in each agency’s mandate. Under what conditions do the UN agencies cooperate with each other in complex governance?

    This study attempts to answer this question by introducing the concept of inter-organizational relations (IOR), a new framework to analyze the relationship among international organizations. Previous studies on international organizations based on principal-agent theory and sociological institutionalism focus on relations between states and international organizations, and IOR was typically not considered in these studies.

    This study’s hypothesis is derived from the framework of IOR. It assumes that an international organization that has focality is more likely to be obeyed by other agencies. Focality refers to the primary authority on an issue-area that an international organization possesses as a basis of its statutes, resources, and legitimacy. The focal organization attempts to establish a common interpretation of complex global issues to gain control by substantively linking the issue to its own mandate.

    To test the hypothesis, this study traces the history of changes in the governance of assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs). IDPs live in conditions similar to those of refugees; however, unlike refugees, they have not crossed international borders. The author has studied primary materials collected from several archives and makes several conclusions.

    First, before the UN General Assembly Resolution 43/116 (1988), the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) accepted responsibility for IDP issues by interpreting IDP assistance as a part of refugee protection, an area in which the UNHCR has focality. Thus, other UN agencies cooperated with the UNHCR’s coordination efforts, recognizing the difficulty of opposing the UNHCR’s stand on refugee protection.

    Second, after the end of the Cold War, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was established within the UN system as a coordination agency for humanitarian assistance. However, the DHA lost its focality, and other UN agencies opposed the DHA in this issue-area. Subsequently, these UN agencies negated the DHA’s coordination efforts in IDP assistance. As a result, although developed states such as the United States and the United Kingdom argued for the establishment of a strong coordinator for IDP issues, the DHA could not manage these issues, and thus without a strong coordinator, the decentralized coordination mechanism gained momentum.

  • ―KBS・国際交流基金の事業を中心に―
    秋元 美紀
    2018 年 2018 巻 192 号 p. 192_17-192_32
    発行日: 2018/03/30
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper examines Japan’s cultural exchange policy toward the Middle East through the Society for International Cultural Relations (KBS) and the Japan Foundation (JF) in the postwar years. Cultural exchanges are often used by countries as a foreign policy tool to make citizens of other nations to have favorable/sympathetic views about your own country, as well as to deepen mutual understanding.

    This article argues that the Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East in the postwar period has been conducted largely as an ad hoc manner. When crises happen in the Middle East and the Japanese image in the region deteriorates, Japan then initiates huge exchange programs for the Middle East to cope with the crises. Although the Middle East has not been given a high priority like the US and Southeast Asia in the Japanese cultural exchange program, it is important for Japan to maintain a friendly relationship with the Middle East for economic security reasons.

    Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East has been gradually developed by KBS and JF. Having obtained government aid, KBS launched the first original program for the Middle East in 1962. However, the contents were mainly the photo exhibition about the Japanese industry and the education. In the high growth period, Japan did not need to expand the cultural exchange with Middle Eastern countries because Japan’s relations with the Middle Eastern nations were never threatened or in jeopardy.

    Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East began to change in the 1970s and 80s as a result of such events like two oil crises and the Iran-Iraq War. JF, which took over KBS in 1972, embarked on large-scale projects to promote human exchanges between Japan and the Middle Eastern countries through sports including judo and soccer. It must be noted that the Persian Gulf War of 1991 did not have a big impact on Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East because it was the crisis in US-Japan relations sparked by the Gulf Crisis rather than the Gulf War itself that had greater effect on Japanese foreign policy. The percentage of JF’s projects for the Middle East were consistently lower than major areas like North America.

    In the 21st century, the September 11 attacks caused a war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Japan clearly strengthened the cultural exchange for the Middle East again. JF made a framework and tackled reinforced projects including intellectual exchanges to deepen mutual understanding and trust relationship. However, it ended in 2006. If crises and conflicts had not occurred in the Middle East, Japan would not have carried out enormous programs. This indicates Japan increases cultural exchange projects for the Middle East when crises happen and when these crises might badly influence the Japanese image.

  • 大内 勇也
    2018 年 2018 巻 192 号 p. 192_33-192_49
    発行日: 2018/03/30
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    The adoption of international human rights treaties has been a subject of great interest in International Relations. As human rights protection has been regarded as a domestic matter, it is understandable that many states were reluctant to restrict their sovereignty by treaties in this field.

    Existing studies therefore focus on treaties with implementation mechanisms like human rights courts or individual petitions. At the same time, these studies assume that agreements on human rights treaties depend on governments’ acceptance of principled norms of human rights. And based on discourse theory, they claim that states agree on the treaties because they are “persuaded” by arguments referring to principled norms.

    Yet such norms do not always imply specific means to realize human rights. Therefore, treaty implementation mechanisms are often contentious issues in negotiations, and the results of negotiations vary. Existing studies cannot explain the differences in these results. What explains the incorporation of implementation mechanisms?

    To answer this question, this article focuses on legal experts as political actors in “epistemic communities” and explains how they incorporate implementation mechanisms into human rights treaties. I argue that legal experts are able to define agendas and specific policy for governments in two ways. First, when human rights problems are internationally recognized, these experts create a legal framework for international policy and take the initiative in drafting. Second, they prepare the draft of their policy preferences and direct the course of governmental negotiations.

    In the two steps above, three conditions affect the extent of legal experts’ influence on governments’ positions. First, the higher the level of agreement between legal experts on treaty provisions, more influential the experts become. Second, the more uncertain governments are about the nature of human rights problems and the prospect for policies, more dependent they are on legal experts. Third, the greater the level of disagreement between governments on treaty provisions, the more influential legal experts become. When these conditions are favorable for legal experts (i.e., agreement between experts, high government uncertainty, and disagreement between governments), they can realize a treaty that matches their preferences.

    To test my argument, I analyze the drafting process of the European Convention on Human Rights adopted at the Council of Europe in 1950. This convention is a significant case of providing both the human rights court and individual petitions. Yet most states were unwilling to provide these implementation mechanisms in the beginning. My analysis shows that legal experts of the European Movement succeeded in incorporating these provisions into the convention, because the three conditions were favorable for legal experts. These conditions made it possible to realize their human rights project despite the major power, Britain, strongly opposing both of the implementation mechanisms.

  • ―バ・モオ暗殺未遂事件の処理をめぐって―
    武島 良成
    2018 年 2018 巻 192 号 p. 192_50-192_64
    発行日: 2018/03/30
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    In recent studies, attentions has been drawn to the fact that in Japanese occupied Burma, the Ba Maw government resisted Japan head-on, and the Japanese military made concessions. Japan at that time regarded ‘independent Burma’ as a trial newly ‘independent’ countries in the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and these studies are important to understand Japan’s later policy towards the Sphere. Meanwhile, however, Ba Maw and U Nu (Foreign Minister) left reminiscences that implied Japan did not make concessions and considerations in the legal action on the attempted assassination of Ba Maw. In these reminiscences it was written that Japan did not put the attackers (Japanese and Burmese) into prison, but also refused to have Burmese jurisdiction applied to the Burmese accomplice. In this research, the processes involved in the occurrence and outcomes of the incident were investigated in order to reveal what actually happened. By doing so, this research aimed to comprehensively illuminate the relations between Japan and the Ba Maw government.

    The Army Ministry of Japan at that time actually was eager to establish responsibility for supervising the incident. They switched from a court-martial system (軍法会議) to trials by military law (軍律会議). However, this meant that they did not intend to apply Japanese municipal laws to judge the incident. Also, despite the fact that they could have brought the Burmese accomplice to justice by the court-martial or military law conference, they tried to leave him under Burmese jurisdiction instead.

    The Japanese Burma Area Army then did not accept fully such requests from the Army Ministry. However, they were conscious of treating the incident as exceptionally important, and accepted part of what the Army Ministry requested. Then, they ruled to put the Japanese attackers into prison, and they were actually confined. The Burmese accomplice was not prosecuted, as he neither broke into the residence of Ba Maw, nor was he a central figure of the incident.

    Consequently, Japan was actually making considerations to the Ba Maw government to a certain degree. There simply was a discrepancy in the ideas of the degree of considerations and concessions between the Army Ministry and the Japanese Burma Area Army.

  • 山本 章子
    2018 年 2018 巻 192 号 p. 192_65-192_80
    発行日: 2018/03/30
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article aims to examine the links between the fall of Détente and the dysfunction of the U.S. - Japan alliance in the end of 1970s.

    The previous studies have explained that Secretary of State Vance who sought for keeping Détente with the Soviet Union and Presidential Assistant Brzezinski who sought for anti-Soviet coalition with China were confronted each other in Carter Administration, and the administration abandoned the Détente policies such as SALT II after President Carter decided to support for Brzezinski.

    How did Japan commit with the process of the fall of Détente? The American researchers have tended to insist that Japan was a junior partner of the U.S. and China during the process. But the Japanese researchers have verified that Fukuda and Ohira Administration managed to keep independence from the anti-Soviet coalition of the U.S. and China, because Japan managed to stabilize the regional order of Asia, especially Indochina. They have also pointed out that the outbreak of the New Cold War caused by Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan constrained Japan’s diplomatic independence than before. However, all the previous studies have never discussed how the split in Carter Administration affected Japanese diplomacy.

    In this article, I address the question of how the division in Carter Administration and the dysfunction of the U.S. - Japan alliance linked, to point out that the interaction prevented Japan from continuing her own diplomacy strategy for Vietnam, a main part of effort to keep Détente during the period of Ohira Administration.

    In conclusion, I would like to indicate three points, the feature of Ohira’s strategy for keeping Détente, the way Carter Administration interrupted Japan’s own diplomacy, and the point of no return to the fall of the Détente. Firstly, Ohira Administration pursued that Japan would be a balancer in Asia by taking advantage of economic assistance to ease of tension between the Soviet Union and China, China and Vietnam, or Vietnam and ASEAN countries. Secondly, Carter Administration didn’t give no clear guideline about their policy toward the Soviet Union and China to Japan because of their internal split. In addition, Carter Administration was indifferent to how their diplomacy influenced that of Japan. What is worse, Carter Administration deprived Japan of her diplomatic leverage because the Administration lacked the power to influence China and Vietnam. Thirdly, the U.S. - China normalization announced in December 1978 was the point of no return to the fall of the Détente.

  • ―選挙監視の効果についての理論的考察―
    湯川 拓
    2018 年 2018 巻 192 号 p. 192_81-192_96
    発行日: 2018/03/30
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    A striking tendency of the post-Cold War international community is its designation of a specific political system—namely democracy—as ideal domestic regimes as well as the rewards (and sanctions) that it hands out in response to democratization (and autocratization). As part of this, international election monitoring has become standardized as a representative method for promoting democratization. Existing theoretical research on international election monitoring has come to examine why election monitoring suddenly spread as an accepted practice. At the same time, despite limited case studies on the influence or effects of international monitoring, theoretical research has been scarce.

    This paper examines the effects of election monitoring by taking the theoretical perspective of “three types of information.” I posit that the assessment resulting from election observation is transmitted as information respectively to 1) the international community, 2) the population of the country under observation, and 3) the government of the country under observation, and that this influences the subsequent behavior of those actors.

    In the first instance, the election monitoring informs the international community about the level of democratization achieved by the country under observation. This information may at times lead to sanctions in the form of a withdrawal of aid. At the same time, election monitoring becomes an important way for a developing country that hopes to be rewarded for its democratization to demonstrate to the international community that it is now truly democratic.

    In the second instance, it informs the people of the country under observation about whether or not the political process is democratic. Reports about electoral fraud may lead to popular protests, but for a government that is operating an actual democratic system, election observers play a deeply significant role as third-party witnesses who can attest to it before the people.

    In the third instance, it serves to clarify the international standard for fair elections to the government of the country under observation. This paper takes particular note of the international dimension of the creation of electoral authoritarianism, which refers to how the acquisition of the aforementioned information has allowed some states to adapt to the international standard and become so-called “electoral authoritarian” states.

    Furthermore, when we consider that a single report from an election monitoring mission imparts information to multiple recipients, this allows us to integrate and organize the arguments of previous studies into a single framework from the viewpoint of information. This opens up the possibility for an examination of the political consequences of election observation from a composite perspective.

  • ―スターリング協定成立過程、一九六五―一九六八年―
    川波 竜三
    2018 年 2018 巻 192 号 p. 192_97-192_112
    発行日: 2018/03/30
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article explores how the British government developed its sterling holding policy to prevent the sterling area from decreasing sterling balances from 1965 to 1968 through focusing on the policy making process between the Treasury and the Bank of England. As a result, the paper may reveal consistent principles when Britain decided this policy. The British government started to take the issue seriously in 1965, when the sterling area began to diversify their reserves away from sterling. Britain regarded this action as one of critical factors led to the sterling crisis. Until the devaluation of sterling, the Bank of England and the Treasury considered some extreme policies such as blocking, which was against the rule of the Bretton Woods system and had a negative impact on the international monetary system. Moreover, some people in the government preferred floating. However, these policies were rejected, and alternative moderate policies were chosen, such as improving the balance of payment and getting central bank cooperation. This was because the government was too afraid of the collapse of the international monetary system. Therefore, even if Britain bore the burden of the sterling as an international currency, the government had no other choice but to do so.

    After the 1967 devaluation, while the British government totally agreed with new central bank cooperation, there was a sharp difference of opinion between the Treasury and the Bank of England about the way to operate an exchange guarantee to the sterling area. Although the former argued for issuing dollar-denominated or sterling area local currency bonds to lighten the burden about stability of the international monetary system as much as possible, the latter preferred a formal exchange guarantee because this policy was more acceptable to the sterling area. Finally, the British government, which had hoped to avoid failure of bilateral negotiation with the sterling area, opted a formal exchange guarantee in spite of increasing the burden.

    After that, the British government, whose position at negotiation with the sterling area was too vulnerable, was forced to concede to most conditions. For example, the charge for the guarantee was abolished. However, Britain continued to try to reach an agreement within two months to avoid collapse of the international monetary system. Finally, the Basle Agreement and the Sterling Agreements of 1968 were completed, and they especially contributed to stability of the sterling and the international monetary system.

    In conclusion, the British government gave priority to stability of the international monetary system rather than lightening the burden of the sterling as an international currency. This attitude originated from fear of breaking down the existing international monetary system, which was a base for the Western countries.

  • ―トランプ・ポピュリズム・グローバル化―
    西岡 達裕
    2018 年 2018 巻 192 号 p. 192_113-192_128
    発行日: 2018/03/30
    公開日: 2018/12/19
    ジャーナル フリー

    In November 2016, Republican Donald Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States in a major upset. He was a complete political amateur. Trump won the close election against Democrat Hillary Clinton largely because he carried Rust Belt swing states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. It seemed that his populist, anti-foreign and protectionist rhetoric had attracted white working class voters in the Rust Belt, who had not felt the benefits of globalization.

    Still, the sudden rise of the amateur politician president is not easy to fully understand. Given that the labor market had recovered from the Great Recession and the U.S. Economy was on a path toward recovery, why and how did American voters give victory to a populist candidate like Trump? To answer that question, we need to understand the 2016 election in the broad context of American history.

    It is assumed that the rising tide of populism which brought this historic victory to Trump was not the result of a single factor, but rather a set of factors. This article focuses on five factors which have caused populist movements in U.S. history: change in the industrial structure, globalization, a deep recession, distrust of politics, and cultural backlash. This article discusses the 2016 election in association with each of these factors and offers specific examples of populist movements in the past in an effort to reinterpret the contemporary history of the United States.

    The background of the rise of populism in the 2016 election was public distrust of politics. Outsider Trump successfully convinced voters that he would be an anti-establishment president. If the two major political parties had substantially performed their function of interest aggregation, there would have been no chance for an outsider to win the presidential election. The Republican Party had inherited Reagan’s conservative coalition from the 1980s, while the Democratic Party had inherited Bill Clinton’s center-left coalition from the 1990s. However, the 2016 election marked the end of an era. Trump and his supporters were not so much interested in Reaganism, and Bernie Sanders and the liberal Democrats challenged Clintonism.

    Since the end of the Cold War, income inequality in the United States has increased markedly, and many people have come to believe that this was caused by liberalization and globalization. American workers have felt left behind by the political system and are demanding major change in that system. At the very least, Trump’s policies should shake up the old architecture of the two-party system.

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