There is an ongoing controversy among historians regarding the historical evaluation of the peace of Westphalia of 1648. “The Westphalian system” school, representing a huge number of historians of the past two centuries, argues that modern international politics based on the concept of state sovereignty and its corollary such as sovereign equality of nations has originated from Westphalia. On the other hand, the revisionist school, which has gained ascendancy during the recent 20 years, contends that the state sovereignty concept is of a more recent origin and did not exist at the time of Westphalia, and, therefore, what “the Westphalian system” school stands for is nothing but “a figment of the 19th century imagination”. The present study, upon re-examination of the theoretical and empirical arguments of the two schools, has come to conclude that those of “the Westphalian system” school are both more tenable and discerning than those of the revisionism in all the respects considered. The following is a summary of its argumentation.
In expatiating on “ the Westphalian system” , the present study calls attention of historians to a fundamental theoretical fact that “the Westphalian system” is itself a Weberian <ideal-type>, designed to illuminate <reality> and its historical significance, with a theoretically relevant implication, however, that an <ideal-type> must not be equated with <reality>. As Weber says, “an <ideal-type> is not identical with <reality> but is a theoretical device which will heuristically help cognize <reality>”. The revisionist school commits a fatal mistake of failing to recognize this theoretical and methodological distinction between Westphalia as <ieal-type> and Westphalia as <reality>. It is equally a mistake, however, to assume that an <ideal-type> is a mere product of imagination with no relevant relation to <reality>. For the simpl reason that it is indeed a ”meaningful” aspect of <reality> that motivates a historian to construct an <ideal type>, this “meaningful“ aspect serves as a “nexus” or <linkage> which connects the <reality> to the <ideal-type> in question. What is, then , this <linkage> which connects Westphalia as < ideal-type> with Westphalia as <reality>?
The present study takes notice of a concept “supremum dominium”, a package of authority and property rights transferred to the French king when a large part of Alsace was ceded to France in the Peace Treaty. Linguistic as well as ethnographic-legal studies all indicate that this concept has had much in common with the modern concept of sovereignty. The French knew it, and knowingly demanded the use of this concept to justify their new sovereign rule over the ceded territories. It is this “supremum dominium” that the present study regards as the <linkage> connecting Westphalia as <reality> to Westphalia as <ideal-type>, thereby, providing an adequate and justifiable basis for the validity of “the Westphalian system”.
This article describes Sweden’s diplomatic efforts for neutrality at the beginning of the Cold War with a focus on Sweden’s submitting the draft resolution in the United Nations (U.N.) in December 1951. The diplomatic possibilities and limitations for the “neutral” countries in the U.N. during times of high tension between the West and the East are also discussed.
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the Eastern Bloc adopted a positive attitude to resolving the question of the German unification. Through this stance, they attempted to show the structure of the “positive East” and the “negative West” regarding the German unification and to delay the Western plan for West German rearmament.
To resist this Eastern propaganda, in November 1951, the United States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (U.K.), and France proposed the Western draft resolution to the U.N. on conducting free elections for the unification of Germany. Because the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries refused to discuss the German issue in the U.N., the aim of the Western countries to project the Eastern Bloc as the obstacle in the unification of Germany would be realized.
In this context, the Swedish foreign minister Östen Undén criticized the Western draft resolution as being unrealistic and submitted the Swedish resolution in December 1951. The Swedish resolution requested the four occupying countries (the U.S., the U.K., France, and the Soviet Union) to cooperate in conducting free elections in the whole of Germany as a prelude to unification.
The Western countries considered Undén’s initiative to have dangerous consequences not only because the Western aim could fail but also because the Swedish resolution could delay their plan for the rearmament of West Germany, which would benefit the Eastern Bloc. This was why the Western countries condemned Undén and requested him and the Swedish government to withdraw the resolution.
Despite the pressure from the West, Undén refused to comply with the request and continued to criticize the Western resolution. Finally, a revised Western resolution, which was proposed by other Western countries and which incorporated some points proposed by Undén, was voted for.
The reason for Undén’s unwavering stand on the Swedish resolution was his desire to show Sweden’s ability to remain diplomatic independently. His ultimate purpose was to show that Sweden could stay neutral in case of war. The Soviet Union was skeptical of Swedish neutrality at the time and it was necessary for Undén to convince the Soviet Union of his country’s ability to stay neutral. This is why Undén took great efforts to project Sweden as a trustworthy neutral country by maintaining diplomatic relations independently of the West, regardless of frictions between Sweden and the Western powers.
The purpose of this paper is to explore West German foreign policy towards the U.S. troop reduction in Europe in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, focusing on the offset problems and the burden sharing conflicts within the Western alliance based on the new archival sources. In previous study regarding the offset issues in context of U.S.-German relations it is mainly paid attention to the process of negotiations and achievements of the trilateral (U.S.-U.K.-West Germany) agreements of April 1967. This paper examines the multi-dimensional aspects of offset and the burden sharing issues, even after the trilateral agreements, especially shedding light on its meanings for West German Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) and its Western coordination (Westpolitik). Despite American critics of the troop commitment in Europe in the late 1960s and the early 1970s the U.S. governments maintained their military commitment there partly because of its concern on the so called “double containment”. On the other hand, West German governments protested strongly against the unilateral U.S. troop reductions. The offset agreements were thus a major factor in stabilizing the American presence in West Germany. Due to the heavy impact of Vietnam on America’s balance of payments, West Germany played in fact a role in helping to maintain the value of the dollar by agreeing the American proposal regarding the offset agreements. However, it became increasingly difficult to put pressure on West German governments because they abandoned dogmatic insistence on an undiminished U.S. troop presence in the early 1970s. Instead of the bilateral agreements between U.S and West Germany, the focus of the burden-sharing was gradually shifted into the multilateral framework of the NATO, the Eurogroup. West German Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt took an initiative in formulating the multilateral burden sharing within the NATO by introducing the “European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP)”. The West German government under the chancellor Willy Brandt realized that the U.S. presence in Europe is very important not only for West Germany’s security but also for its successful Ostpolitik. Thus, West Germany accepted some of the U.S. requests for the burden sharing within the Western alliance, including the offset agreements till 1975 and the “Euro-Package” by the Eurogroup, to avoid the dramatic and unilateral U.S. troop reductions in Europe.
Cold war historians researched the Polish question, which was diplomatic question over Polish government and borders after the Second World War, as one of the origins of the Cold War. The Polish question became the subject of heated debates of the Yalta conference, whereas the question was not resolved completely during the conference. Nevertheless almost all of the cold war historians, which are classified into three groups: the orthodox, the revisionist and the post-revisionist, did not pay attention to British diplomatic policy vis-à-vis Poland after the Second World War. In order to clarify the British foreign policy towards sovietising Poland, this paper analyse the negotiation process of the Anglo-Polish Financial Agreement, which dealt with the settlement of Polish debts to the UK. Regarding documents, this paper utilised mainly records of the British Foreign Office, which are kept in the National Archives (TNA), Kew.
British Foreign Office and Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, aimed at forcing the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to hold ‘free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot’ in order to establish liberal democratic Poland without communist influence. For this object, Britain utilised two questions as levers. The questions were the financial questions between the UK and Poland, which this paper focused on, and the repatriation of the Polish Armed Forces under British command. The British diplomacy towards Poland, however, did not work well for two reasons. The first reason is that Poland used financial questions as propaganda that Britain hindered Polish reconstruction. Secondly, the British Foreign Office failed to act in cooperation with the United States and Canada when they resolved Polish financial questions. Moreover, Cavendish-Bentinck, who was then British Ambassador to Poland and led British foreign policy towards Poland, was involved in the trouble caused by Polish Worker’s Party. Eventually, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, who was supported by Britain, lost in the general election of January 1947. Although Britain failed to establish liberal democratic Poland, she did not abandon her purpose even after the election.
In spite of the background of the conflict between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, Britain did not forsake Poland and intended to diminish Polish communist influence just after the end of World War II. As a result of the unavoidable diplomatic failure, however, the relation between Britain and Poland deteriorated gradually.
One of the new approaches that has emerged during the so-called “refugee crisis” in Europe is maritime search and rescue (SAR) operations conducted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Pioneered by Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) in 2014, several NGOs have begun regular searches of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean Sea to save their lives. Their practices have been controversies since then, but scholarly works have been limited to fully understand the dynamics that this emerging NGOs’ practice has brought to the EU border control governance.
This article attempts to fill in the gap in literature and explors the reasons that NGOs have begun SAR operations, the institutional environment that has been surrounding them and the interactions that NGOs have had with the EU and member state authorities, by focusing on two NGOs, MOAS and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). For this paper, data was primarily taken from official documents published by the EU, EU’s member states and NGOs. It was also taken from interviews the author conducted with EU government officials and NGOs staff in Europe in 2016. The article took the policy network theory which helps analyse possible interdependent relationships between NGOs and government actors through such factors as the institutional/legal setting, human, financial and material resources.
After providing the overview of literature and discussing the historically marginalised position of NGOs in the EU border control policy-process, the article first analyses how MOAS and MSF decided to take an action in the Mediterranean Sea despite difficulties and dilemma over their foundational principles of humanitarianism and neutrality. It also shows the process of conducting operations as well as three Italian and EU level border control operations, namely, the Operation Mare Nostrum by Italian authorities, the Joint Operation Triton by the EU border agency Frontex and the Operation Sophia by the EU Naval force. The article also demonstrates critical responses to NGOs by authorities.
The result shows that, while the refugee crisis has been a momentum for NGO to play a proactive role in the border control governance, their involvements at sea have been received by rather antagonistic reactions and tensions remain high between NGOs and the EU and member state authorities. It has turned out that their activities have been left fragile and the outlook of the institutionalisation of NGOs is thus not promising, but further research is needed to keep up with this ongoing phenomenon.
The U.S. withdrew the troops from South Vietnam and the ROK on the basis of the Nixon Doctrine, implemented détente that supported relaxing international tension by U.S.-China reconciliation, and pursued peaceful coexistence on the premise of the status quo in Asia. This is the reason why I focus on the Vietnam War which had been the background that caused structural changes of the Cold War in East Asia. And, the Vietnam War was the first test case that the U.S. and South Korea cooperated in the actual combat since the formation of the alliance. The experience in Vietnam was the opportunity for the ROK government to know the possibility and the degree of the support from the U. S. in times of emergency.
However, few previous studies have ever been done on the Vietnam War from South Korean viewpoints of the U.S.-ROK alliance. In that sense, the questions caused by the foreign policy of the U.S. must be demonstrated as follows; first, as a divided country like South Vietnam, what did the ROK government think about the U.S. support in combat? Secondly, while peace negotiations went on, what was considered necessary by the South Koreans? Thirdly, after Paris Peace Accords, what were South Korean views on it and how did the ROK government respond to the problem by its policy? Lastly, how did Koreans feel about the fall of Saigon and what was the difference between the U.S. and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula issues of post-Vietnam War?
The purpose of this paper is to explore further into the Vietnam War, associated with the ROK and the U.S.-ROK alliance, based on the diplomatic archives. Especially, I would like to focus attention on the question of how the ROK government dealt with Vietnam’s situation in the process of US withdrawal and what happened to its way between self-defense and the alliance since then.
Through the whole analysis, the following conclusions were obtained; the first is South Korea became aware of partnership from the patron-client relationship and the transferring of operational control of South Korean forces because of the Vietnam War. The second is unilateral US withdrawal plan and the end of the war by negotiations decreased reliability of US military commitment in ROK. Nevertheless, South Korea also reconfirmed that the alliance was indispensable to the national security. The third is the U. S. reduced the possibility of direct intervention in conflict on the Korean peninsula after the Vietnam War. One final point is the Vietnam War was a factor to accelerate self-defense policy in Seoul.