This article introduces the aims and background of this special volume alongside the contents of each of the articles contained within.

“International Relations and China” is an old, but ever-evolving topic of academic inquiry. This evolution is, of course, a result of scholars’ unbridled commitment to the field, with new avenues being opened up through the posing of direct challenges to received historical narratives, trial and error, fact-finding, and the application of new perspectives and methodologies. China has become one of the key players on the international political stage, and it aims to create its own theoretical paradigms through which to interpret international relations and politics. China has, for example, made significant strides in constructing enormous academic databases that play host to a vast array of content, and these databases have begun to shake up the very way in which China scholars approach their field. What’s more, China has also ramped up its efforts in disseminating alternative forms of discourse on itself, both through the means of public diplomacy and through the distribution of more blatant propaganda.

In this new age of China scholarship we find ourselves in, scholars are exploring original research questions, utilizing previously unavailable resources, and applying new methodologies to challenge our understanding of China in the context of international relations. Firstly, in terms of the field of Chinese history, while more and more historical materials are now accessible to scholars, the research questions set by these very same historians are often influenced by China’s present-day situation. For this reason, historians have struggled to avoid posing questions which are not predicated on some aspect of the China we know today. Secondly, the issue of how to approach the Republic of China, or Taiwan, is one new challenge outlined in several articles featured in this special issue. The ROC/Taiwan is one of the leading players in East Asia and its archives are a fruitful resource for approaching PRC history. Furthermore, newly opened archives in Japan and in local Chinese provincial archives have also brought new research questions into the limelight. Thirdly, it is still difficult to conduct research on post-1980s China, because the majority of historical archives only allow access to content up until the 1970-80s. Each article in this issue challenges our understanding of contemporary China through their respective research questions and methodological approaches. At the same time, however, these articles also demonstrate the problem of doing contemporary Chinese history: primary materials are often scarce and one often stumbles across many challenges when determining what theoretical approach is most apt.

The first wave of modern scholarship on Chinese diplomacy began as a form of international political history which drew upon foreign sources. Following the publication in 1929-30 of the Chouban yiwu shimo 籌辦夷務始末 (lit. the management of barbarian affairs from A to Z; hereafter CBYS), the possibility of exploring Chinese diplomatic history from the Chinese perspective finally became a reality. However, scholars who made use of the collection were inevitably experts whom were versed in the methodologies and approaches of the Western school of diplomatic history. Their readings of the CBYS were thus predicated on Western paradigms, leading to a skewed understanding of the historical realities and circumstances which underpinned the context in which the collection’s documents were penned by Qing bureaucrats in the 19^th century. More specifically, their readings failed to be conducted in line with the autochthonous Qing perspective, or tianchao dingzhi 天朝定制.

Many scholars have perceived the Zongli Yamen 総理衙門, established in 1861, as performing the function of a foreign office. However, from the outset, Qing bureaucrats limited the scope of the institution’s functionality, curtailed its scale and authority, and planned for its eventual abolition. Similar characteristics can also be observed in debates in the early 1860s surrounding the role of the Minister Superintendent of Trade. Zeng Guofan 曾国藩, for instance, articulated his institutional vision for this role from the standpoint that trade was an issue which was of an identical nature to domestic tax collection. In other words, while the Qing did establish new institutions and roles for the handling of foreign affairs, it nevertheless planned from the start to limit their functionality, curtail their scope and, eventually, abolish them in favor of a more traditional solution. The key focus for the Qing when it came to institutional change in the mid-19^th century was, therefore, not what had changed, but how to reinstate former precedents in place of of these changes.

In the 1860s, the instigators of internal rebellions (such as the Taipings) and foreign powers (such as Russia) were all, for the Qing, comparable entities in that they did not genuflect to the authority of the Celestial Empire (tianchao 天朝). For this reason, all were categorized as “foreign entities” (yiwu 異物). During the compilation of the CBYS, both foreign relations and domestic problems were treated indiscriminately, and the collection did not draw any distinctions between internal insurgencies and foreign threats. At this juncture then, the Qing did not pursue a “foreign policy” in the way which we understand it today; rather, it pursued a foreign policy which addressed foreign entities in the domestic context only.

This article explores the Chinese Nationalists’ early nuclear development and the international politics contesting over uranium deposits in China at the beginning of the Cold War.

Current historiography on China’s nuclear program describes that China began building the bomb at Mao Zedong’s decision at a secret meeting among top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in January 1955. But at the latter half of the 1940s, the Nationalists had already sent young and capable scientists to the United States, with an expectation to build an atomic bomb with both technical and financial foreign assistance. Although the Communist history only negatively writes of the frustrated Nationalist attempt, in fact it bore some fruits that were eventually succeeded to the Communists when they came into power in 1949.

The most important legacies that the Nationalists left to the Communists were uranium deposits and scientists. Since the discovery of nuclear fission of uranium in 1938, and countries began contesting for new deposits of uranium around the world. The Japanese army also dug China’s northeast region, Manchuria, for uranium to build a bomb.

The Japanese discovery of uranium in Manchuria was inherited to the Nationalists. The Nationalists themselves had also found the resources in Southern China in 1943. They also planned to use the Japanese scientists for their bomb. The Soviet filled the vacuum that the Japanese defeat had made in Manchuria and Xinijiang, while the United States started talks with the Nationalists to jointly develop uranium mines in China and to provide China with training Chinese nuclear scientists and engineers in the United States. Switzerland also showed interests in uranium with a promise to send renowned scientists to help China to develop an atomic bomb.

The Nationalist efforts on the nuclear program were not only about uranium. They also dispatched young and promising physicists to the United States in 1946 so that they could learn the knowledge to build a bomb. Although they were not permitted an access to the military secrets at the beginning of the Cold War and the McMahon Act of 1946, what they learned was huge enough to be a “founding father” of China’s atomic bomb, in Zhu Guangya’s case at least.

Thus, the Chinese Nationalist government boasted that it had enough knowledge about uranium and human resources for the basis of building an atomic weapon as early as the spring of 1947. They lost to the Communists in the Civil War, which forced them to flee to Taiwan. But their early effort was, partly and against their will, took over to the Communists.

Was the Sino-American Rapprochement a turning point that changed everything? In 1969, the ROC changed the military strategy from “Offensive Posture” to “Unity of Offensive and Defensive”. Certainly, the advent of Nixon gave a big impact to the ROC’s national security, which heavily relied on the US. However, the ROC Government might decide to change its military strategy from “Retaking the Mainland,” which had been attempted for over a decade, to building up the consolidation of Taiwan’s defense when encountering the escalation of the PRC’s military threat even at the peak of the chaotic Great Leap Forward and Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s provided a chance for the ROC to retake the mainland. The ROC would have been able to initiate military operations if received support from the US Nevertheless, US Government after the Kennedy administration was seeking coexistence with the PRC and therefore rejected all ROC’s requests.

At that time the PRC was strengthening its nuclear capability and conventional forces despite being in a state of political chaos. In response to the growing military threat of the PRC, improvement of the ROC government’s defense capability to secure “Taiwan” became its top priority. Moreover, when the US abolition of Military Assistance Program was announced, the ROC Government was forced to improve military advancement at the expense of its own economy and spend the limited budget on defense in priority. Therefore, the ROC Government had begun to reform the “Offensive Posture” strategy that it adopted since 1949, and decided to change to the “Unity of Offensive and Defensive” strategy that focused on defense more than before. This was before Nixon put forth the “Guam Doctrine” and started to approach the PRC.

Division of “China” was incorporated into the Cold War and immobilized. Although the chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s was likely to develop into “hot war” if ROC took military action. The US suppressed the ROC’s action for changing the status quo and avoided military conflict with the PRC. There is no doubt that the current US-China-Taiwan relations was formed in the 1970s, beginning with Nixon’s rapprochement to the PRC. However, the structure of maintaining the status quo of the ROC’s endeavor to acquire the US military commitment to resist the PRC’s continuous military expansion was gradually formed through the 1960s.

It is well known that China’s ethnic-minority elites fell during the Cultural Revolution, especially in the periphery areas near from Sino-Soviet border. However, Saifuddin Azizi, who was trusted by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and other top leaders, was protected and maintained his position in Xinjiang since the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. In addition, he was promoted to the first secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee, which was the post where only Han cadres had taken office before the Cultural Revolution. Han cadres have fallen in the process of Sino-Soviet confrontation and the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang, and the ethnic-minority elite became the top leader of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. That is in contrast to the process in which the Mongolian cadres, who had held key positions, were being persecuted one after another, starting with the fall of Ulanhu in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and their status being relegated to the Han.

The case of Saifuddin indicates that China’s ethnic-minority policy under the Sino-Soviet conflict also has dynamics different from the trend toward persecution. This mechanism has not been considered as a major research target in recent research, but this paper shows that it was relatively well known in research conducted in Taiwan in the same age. However, as those researches at that time had limitations, this paper also uses the historical materials published recently. Analysis shows that Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and others trusted Saifuddin, and used Saifuddin heavily to realize “Great Confederation” and to strengthen “Unity for Ethnicities”.

Why are the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which were the same as the front line against the Soviet Union, were so different? In the case of Inner Mongolia, Ulanhu was criticized before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, and the existence of himself in the party was regarded as a problem, and it is clear that the content of the criticism was closely related with the institution of Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities. On the other hand, in the case of the Xinjiang, the main target of criticism was not Saifuddin from the beginning, but Wang Enmao, the first secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Party Committee. As Wang Enmao was considered as the “old cadre” to be excluded from the trunk, he was criticized heavily. The progress of the Sino-Soviet conflict urged the realignment of multi-ethnic governance, but it does not necessarily result in fall of minority leaders. If the “independent kingdom” of Han leader, Wang Enmao, was regarded as bigger problem, it was criticized first.

The 1978 Senkaku fishing boat incident occurred in April of that year, when several Chinese fishing fleets, which are said to be operating in the vicinity of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, repeatedly entered the territorial waters of the disputed Islands, despite the leaving orders from Japanese Coast Guard vessels. The Japanese government immediately protested against the Chinese government twice through the diplomatic channel. Although the case developed to be a diplomatic issue between Japan and China, both governments prioritized the conclusion of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Consequently, the problem was quickly simmered down with the Chinese fishing boats withdrawing from the area and the recommencement of Sino-Japanese negotiations. However, the truth of the incident remained unclear for a long time, and some facts are still blurred. This paper reveals the background and details of the event mainly based on the documents in the Shanghai Municipal Archives.

The Hua Guofeng administration, which had consolidated power after arresting “Gang of four”, pursued a dramatic economic development while touting commitment to Mao Zedong’s “thought of the class struggle”. As a means of promoting strong economic growth, a method of the Mao Zedong era- linking the class struggle with mass mobilization, was adopted, and the criticism towards the Gang of four was regarded as the class struggle in a new era. Government officials also repeatedly maintained that the achievement in the campaigns of the criticism of the Gang of four would be reflected through the improvement of productivity. As a result, Shanghai’s fisheries industry, which was deeply involved in the entire process of the Cultural Revolution, had come under intense pressure to increase productivity.

In 1978, the campaigns of “The industry learns from Daqing, the agriculture learns from Dazhai” had left a strong impact on the fishery industry, and the production target of the fishery industry was set at sky-high. Monetary rewards and financial incentives were introduced to boost motivation in fishery workers. Thus, in the fishery industry, an atmosphere to pursue a dramatic increase in fishery production was evident.

However, in addition to the inertia of the decentralization advanced during the Cultural Revolution period, the command and control system in the fishery industry also was fragmented. As a result, when a large number of fishing vessels from various provinces start to crowd in Senkaku vicinity, an efficient command system was lacking. Therefore, the 1978 Senkaku fishing boat incident was caused by such inadequacies in domestic governance.

In the 1980s, China began to undergo major changes both domestically and externally after the reform and opening-up. In the meantime, China adopted “independent diplomatic policy” – not taking sides with the United States or the Soviet Union, and economic development also benefited from the bold diplomatic policy. Hu Yaobang, the then General Secretary of China, believed that China should actively integrate into the international economy, achieve technological tie-ups and plunge into the international circulation. It is worth mentioning that Hu Yaobang visited Japan and carried out outstanding diplomatic activity. In a broad sense, the Japan-China relations in the 1980s improved steadily though some problems emerged, such as the Japanese Textbook Event and Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. Leaders, ministers and party members of both countries actively boosted mutual visits. Meanwhile, military and youth exchanges were promoted. Since Yasuhiro Nakasone was inaugurated as the Prime Minister in November 1982, the friendly contact between Japan and China has further increased and the bilateral ties have become closer.

In the present paper, the author analyzes Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s second visit to China in November 1986, while the discussion on Chinese political system reform was booming and the 13th National People’s Congress was pending. Moreover, the author reviews the contributing factors of the visit and the contents of the meeting. Based on these efforts, the author reviews the Japan-China relations and the internal situation of China in the 1980s.

The Chinese party actively set the stage for Nakasone’s second visit to China. At that time, Japan and China jointly worked to keep good bilateral relations. For example, the Chinese government made efforts to prevent large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations. The specific topics during the meeting include Hu Yaobang’s visit to the United States, the Sino-Soviet relations and China’s attitude towards the Korean Peninsula issue, reflecting the foreign attention to Hu Yaobang. Regarding China’s domestic affairs, Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping referred to personnel affairs, aiming to further deepen the reform after the 13th National People’s Congress in 1987. Back then, both Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping confided to Nakasone that they intended to achieve national rejuvenation. As for the exact start time, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang did not reach consensus. Two months later after the meeting, Hu Yaobang resigned. This is the last visit to China for Nakasone as Japanese Prime Minister.

The aim of this study is to understand how international negotiations on China’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were linked with the country’s domestic economic reform, specifically, price reform. Negotiations on China’s accession to the GATT were held from 1986 to 1994. The Chinese government decided to seek GATT membership in 1986, and its representatives began negotiations with GATT members such as the United States and Japan.

The United States was the largest negotiation partner during this period, and one of the requirements it demanded of China was price reform. Price control is one of the remarkable differences between a market economy and a planned economy. The United States government sought the abolishment of this system because it was seen as an unfair non-tariff barrier to trade meant to protect China’s domestic market.

Domestically, beginning in earnest in 1984, price reform had become a major issue in economic reform within China because price liberalization meant abandoning the government’s means of economic control. As solutions to reform the centrally planned economic system were explored, the issue of price reform, or the deregulation of price controls, was a sensitive political issue both internationally and domestically.

Previous studies conducted in the 1990s and early 2000s have provided a rough picture of negotiations on China’s accession to GATT. This study aims to answer the following research question: Why were negotiations on China’s GATT accession delayed? Previously analyses of this question have considered China’s negotiations that took place from 1986 to 1994; however, the relation between an individual economic policy and these international negotiations has not been fully studied. This study refines those analyses and demonstrates the linkage between the international negotiations and domestic economic reform surrounding China’s accession to GATT as a case study of price reform.

As a result of analysis, the paper points out three points about this linkage. First, the stability of the power base of the Communist Party of China (CCP) leader was important in advancing GATT accession negotiations. Second, GATT accession negotiations were strongly constrained by domestic economic reforms and macroeconomic trends. Third, China’s economic reforms and policies were affected by GATT negotiations. The outline is as follows. Since the mid-1980s, Zhao Ziyang, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of CCP, was promoting both price reform and GATT membership. However, he forced to give up its power to make economic policy decisions due to the failure of price reform after August 1988. Then, with the failure of price reform, negotiations with the United States which demand China price liberalization stagnated.

This paper explores its research question on the behavior of China upon its participation in the creation of an international law, where institutions of different issue areas intersect. It establishes a starting point for theoretical research on the relation between the fluidity of international institutions and their effect on states’ interests.

As to its potential contribution, firstly, since earlier studies that focus on the institutions’ “evolutions” treat states as homogeneous entities, it is valuable to provide the view from states, who utilize the institutions to pursue their own interests. Secondly, while earlier research on China and international institutions concentrates on the socialization of China in the “western” institutions, this paper highlights institutional fluidity and complexity, and the aspect of China utilizing them from their side. China is a country worth taking up, since it is a state with increasing importance in world order.

Methodologically, this research takes up the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which regulates maritime order, and the related international negotiations in establishing an environmental institution on “Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ)” under UNCLOS. Qualitative analysis is conducted on the international and Chinese arguments by looking into related minutes, statements and analyses. Related institutions, organizations and international law arguments are also referred to.

Having traced international and Chinese arguments on BBNJ initiation, the conclusion is as follows; firstly, they all attempted to preserve their status quo maritime order as the norm, which I labeled as the “first trend”. Meanwhile, there was a “second trend” that aimed at restricting sovereignty by the international institution, which began as an exceptional argument on environmental control over areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). However, when it was time the regulation details be specified, it became clear that they had to agree on concrete points, making it difficult to keep the norm intact. The clash between the two trends is ongoing in the international arena, as can be seen in the discussion on the creation of Area-Based Management Tools, and the specification of Marine Genetic Resources.

China was reluctant in undertaking the “second trend” idea at the outset, but gradually committed to its elaboration, as the “third trend” argument on sheer environmental protection also transformed to an issue of maritime order, which questioned whether upholding sovereignty serves as the primary way to maximize state interests. The Chinese interest and the BBNJ process should be further examined by looking at its domestic decision-making process, and the impact of its traditional maritime disputes with surrounding neighbors. Further longitudinal studies should also serve to show how the rising power faces international institutions. However, overall, the “three trends” perspective serve as a heuristic tool to probe the relation of the change in international institutions and state interests.

China’s lending to many developing countries, including countries of the “Belt and Road Initiative”, is currently of great interest. Many of these loans do not conform to OECD’s definition of Official Development Assistance. This article focuses its agenda in the various occurrences in which the Chinese government’s lending policy was criticized in the international community, analyze the reaction of the Chinese government amidst such circumstances, and discuss the risk of foreign aid in the context of controversial between developed donor countries and developing donor countries.

China’s external loan, which has been rapidly expanding in recent years, has been mainly invested into the infrastructure construction of developing countries. Due to the opaqueness of its policy process and the attachment with Chinese companies, there is an increasing level of criticisms both from other donor countries such as Japan and from recipient countries. Although there is a view that the “over-lending problem” could be seen as great power politics, this article wants to pay attention to the situation where lender countries, for the first time after the end of the Cold War, act with fundamentally different logic.

Many of the developed countries set a strict criteria for recipient countries, and yet implement assistance that provide high-level incentives. On the other hand, China does not care as much about good governance and environment nor about human rights situation, though it does loan with relatively high interest rate. China is not bound by the framework of DAC and the Paris club. Not only does China argue that it should not be criticized for the “over-lending problem” from the viewpoint of development aid, but it even claims that the past development aid model is absurd to follow. By challenging the international norm of foreign aids, China aims to maintain its liberty in development projects and pursue its own political and economic agenda.

The size of China’s foreign aid is still small and not competitive with Western donors. Compared to Japan, which has maintained the world’s top spending on aid over the 1990s, China as a donor country has only limited share in global aid expenditures. However, this article argues that the mingling of international politics and presumed agenda with the foreign aid and debt problems, loan from China is affecting international society more than any other non-OECD donors. The international regime of ODA, China’s foreign policy, as well as domestic politics of recipient countries are allowing Chinese loans to raise reaction and influence bigger than their monetary size. While countermeasures against Chinese lending were also deployed by the Western countries including the United States, this distortion that international politics brought to foreign-aided economic development would eventually cause additional risk for both donor and recipient countries.