This special issue illustrates new horizons in Soviet studies as they have developed over the nearly 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, following the clue through this growing body of work in three keywords: memory, legacy, and empire. Memory reflects more as the distance of time or space from the given objects and phenomena grows. The idea of legacy, too, emerges after its objects come to an end and disappear. Thus, the analysis and examination of the Soviet Union in terms of memory and legacy could be introduced only after it ceased to exist in the present.

The third term, empire, however, has been part of the discussion of the USSR dating back to the time before it vanished. For instance, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse’s work L’empire éclaté : la révolte des nations en U.R.S.S., first published in 1978, describes the Soviet Union as a multiethnic empire in which the central power, which inhered absolutely in the Communist Party, exercised total control over a vast space. Furthermore, it cannot be doubted that the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc in the moments immediately before and after a series of ethnic conflicts erupted within its borders expanded this discussion of the Soviet Empire. The imperial order that dominated Soviet territory, along with its regions of influence, has reemerged as an important issue. The series of studies of empire that has developed in historiography and international relations has been driving this orientation. Finally, the Soviet Union has also found its place within the umbrella of comparative studies of empires as well as an intriguing area of research.

This special issue explores new horizons of research on the basis of the three concepts of the Soviet Union in memory, the Soviet Legacy, and the USSR as an empire.

What do we consider as the Soviet/Russian foreign policy toward East Asia? Many historians tend to discuss its nature using an “expansionist” model in general, particularly in Europe. This may differ in terms of discourse: some have emphasized the security factor against neighbors, while others have focused on ideology as “socialist” in the Cold War era and “Eurasia” in the present day. However, the recent development of Soviet/Russian studies accents more on the “pragmatic” and “state-interested” based causes for policy orientation.

As background, this paper sheds a light on comparative studies of Soviet/Russian foreign behavior toward China and Japan. In contrast with the European/Atlantic front, Soviet/Russian behaviors have been more “moderate” and “restraint” toward East Asia/Pacific before/after the Cold War period. Indeed, it depends on the difference of Soviet/Russian power influence between Europe and East Asia. How have the Soviet Union/Russia dealt with China and Japan in East Asia/Pacific? For the Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan have been big powers to manage for security as an “enemy” or as a “friend” in triangular relations dependent on historical factors.

This paper focuses on the foreign activities of Khrushchev era to Putin via Gorbachev. It is well known that Khrushchev’s foreign policy of “peaceful coexistence,” which tried to use “space” between “friend and enemy,” triggered a more pragmatic and flexible orientation than the predecessor’s dichotomy. At the time, with the Soviet Union facing territorial/border disputes with China, a communist ally, and with Japan, a potential enemy under US control, Khrushchev decided to deal with each in a different way: For Japan, a promise in the 1956 joint declaration for the handing over of two islands, Shikotan and Habomai, but for China, the ignoring of its demand for re-bordering the Amur and Ussuri rivers after the negotiations of the mid-1960s. As a result, war with China started while a deal with Japan was frozen mostly because of US pressure on Japan.

The failure of Khrushchev’s foreign policy impacted his successor’s decision. The lessons brought about Gorbachev’s success on the border agreement with China in 1989 and Putin’s follow-up on finalizing the remaining border issues in 2004. It also framed Russia’s policy toward Japan. Gorbachev never recognized Khrushchev’s failed proposal of the 1956 declaration and Putin, recognizing the validity of the declaration, has strictly demanded that Japan depart from US influence as a condition of Khrushchev’s deal. As a result, Russia has enjoyed its best relationship with Japan while using the “territorial card” as a theoretical concession of the 1956 declaration to keep Japan from going against Russia.

This paper draws conclusions from the transformation of the Soviet and Russian foreign policy toward China and Japan. It also suggests lessons gleaned from Russo-Japan relations for academics and foreign policy circles in Japan and Asia.

The paper deals with the politics of the ‘Aral Sea problems’ during the perestroika time and its legacy after the independence of five Central Asian states. The research questions are as follows: What kind of actors did what sort of discussions in relation to the environmental, social and economic aspects of the Aral Sea problems during the perestroika? How did the authorities of the newly independent states inherit these discussions in taking measures against the problems? The paper especially focuses on the rencontres in the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for the Ecology and the Rational Usage of Natural Resources (1989–1991).

The Aral Sea is the inland lake located in the desert area across Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the territory of the former Soviet Union. It was the fourth largest lake all over the world, which started shrinking in 1960 due to the extensive development of irrigated plots and the irrational usage of water resources in the basin. The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident in 1986 disclosed public voices over environmental protection matters and, with the bottom-up initiative of locals, the life-threatening issues around the Aral Sea began to be unmasked for wholesale discussion in the Soviet Union.

Four types of actors engaged in the discussion and policymaking upon the Aral Sea problems. The first is the ‘framers’ in Moscow, who led the policy formation in spite of their divergence in opinions, accordantly claiming that people firstly should economize waters for irrigation. The second is the nature protection oriented writers and scientists, who condemned the hydraulic engineers and the gigantic hydraulic constructions, initially gaining support from the ‘framers,’ but breaking with them afterwards. The third is the hydraulic engineers themselves, who seemed to have experienced the downfall of their credibility, but came back to the front of policy making in the final days of the Soviet Union. The fourth is the local authorities, who intended to acquire as many subsidies as possible from Moscow to ensure the further development of the region as well as to resolve the Aral Sea problems, supporting the engineers but being antagonistic to the conservationists.

These four actors argued heatedly, but accomplished almost nothing. Notwithstanding, the authorities of the newly independent states inherited these arguments during the perestroika as the framework to tackle the Aral Sea problems. They have continuously paid attention to the socio-economic and sanitary-epidemiological conditions of localities, the improvement of the water efficiency in irrigation, and the partial restoration of the lake itself. However, the Aral Sea continued to scale down. The confrontation between the upstream and the downstream countries is severe, although the basin coordination institutions were established.

Fedor Rotshtein began his tenure as the plenipotentiary of Soviet Russia soon after the signing of the Soviet Iranian Treaty of Friendships on February 26, 1921. He was later succeeded by Boris Shumiatskii. This article reviews Russia’s Foreign Policy towards Iran during the “New Economic Policy (NEP)” era by examining Rotshtein’s diplomatic activities in Tehran with the aim of answering two key questions: 1) how did Soviet Russia handle the ‘tough-negotiator’ tactics adopted by Iranian diplomacy during this period; and 2) how, and under what circumstances, did the tone of Russia’s approach towards Iran change during the NEP era? This article will argue that the main feature of Soviet Diplomacy during this era lies in its historical trajectory moving between a realist policy aimed at normalizing relations with neighbouring states and a conventional revolutionary foreign policy.

During his tenure, Rotshtein’s primary diplomatic engagement was the pursuit of an accord that would resolve the disputes over the Russian Empire’s oil and fishery concessions in Iran in addition to concluding a supplementary trade agreement. However, the Iranian government, cognizant of the severe famine spreading across Russia, adopted a tough-negotiator posture; including showing reluctance to ratify the Treaty of Friendships, as strategic negotiating tactic to maximize concessions from Soviet Russia. On the other hand, Rotshtein particularly concentrated on resolving the disputes over oil concessions in northern Iran. This was because at that time Soviet Russia saw the disputes as the national security issue rather than as a commercial one; formerly the Russian Empire had regarded Iran as within its sphere of influence, and Soviet Russia was concerned about Britain’s expansion in the region.

Such was the importance that Rotshtein attached to deepening commercial relations with Tehran that he even helped Reza Khan suppress the revolutionary movement carried out under the auspices of Caucasian communists in northern Iran. This Rotshtein’s policy was severely criticized by David Gopner, a leftist in the Communist Party, but the criticism might have been politically inconvenient for the Soviet central government at that time because it had been prioritizing strengthening commercial relations with neighboring states over revolutionary ideology. In this context, it had profound implications for Soviet foreign policy that Boris Shumiatskii was assigned to Tehran as a successor to Rotshtein. He was an expert on Siberia, and unfamiliar with Iranian affairs. This posting was arguably a demotion for Shumiatskii, having clashed with Stalin over an ethnic issue in Buryatia, but the case was not that simple. The enthusiastic revolutionary’s transfer to Iran was a disguise to make Soviet policy look revolutionary again when, in fact, Soviet Russia had abandoned its strict revolutionary policy. Shumiatskii, however, had difficulty imposing his revolutionary policy on a country where he found himself to be a total stranger, and it is not surprising that it took only a few years before he departed the post. Overall, this article argues that Soviet Russia’s active opposition to revolutionary policy in Iran shifted to a “mild” permissive revolutionary policy.

This study reconsiders the Soviet policy toward Japan before the USSR and USA established diplomatic relations in 1933, especially taking American factors into account, which have been neglected in the previous studies.

After the Russian Revolution and military interference by the Allied Powers, Soviet Russia and Japan began negotiations in 1920. During the negotiations, Russia demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Russian territory, while Japan sought some economic benefit in return. In order to counter this Japanese strategy, Soviet Russia signed contracts with American companies in the form of “concessions (investing with the right to develop the designated areas)” in the Far East. Since the US government refused to recognize the Soviet government however, and the negotiations with Japan had progressed, Soviet leaders prioritized the agreement with Japan. Finally, under the Japan-Soviet Basic Convention in January 1925, the USSR promised to give Japanese companies “concessions” in the Far East, and annulled the contracts with the Americans.

This provided a basis for Japan to expand its influence into the Russian Far East in the late 1920s. G.V. Chicherin, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, planned to attract American companies to the Far East again, in order to indirectly restrain Japan’s expansion. At the same time, it was also thought that any diplomatic tension with Japan should be avoided, so as not to obstruct Soviet policy toward China; this finally led to the abandonment of the policy to attract American companies.

At the end of 1928, it was reported that UK and Japan could ally to war with America. Soviet leaders feared that the USSR would get involved with this war in some way. L.M. Karakhan, the Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed to strengthen border security and affiliate with China, in order to lock the Japanese out from the Far East, and restrict them in Manchuria. He expected the conflict between Japan and America to play a minor role in this plan. The Politburo adopted his plan, and in order to incite this conflict, incorporated in their policy the “concessions” to American companies a third time. This policy, however, did not realize due to the Sino-Soviet Conflict in 1929 and the friendly relationship between Japan and America.

The Manchurian Incident was a trigger for the implementation of this policy. The Sino-Soviet Conflict discontinued, allowing the Soviets to strengthen border security in the Far East. Moreover, at the beginning of 1932, I.V. Stalin and Soviet leaders judged that the United States and China opposed Japanese aggression and were inclined to reach some agreement with the Soviet Union. Finally, the USSR established diplomatic relations with these two countries, and laid “siege” to Japan by 1933.

This essay reveals how the newborn Soviet government as the first socialist government in history treated the properties and property rights of foreigners, including concessioners, who were entitled to invest their properties in Soviet Russia. The private property system was the most important issue in the antagonism between socialist and capitalist regimes; therefore, by tracing Soviet policies on foreigners’ properties, we can ascertain how the Soviet government compromised, however insufficiently, its socialist mission to coexist with the capitalist West and then ended those compromises to build socialism in one country.

The Soviet government, created by the Bolsheviks upon the October Revolution in 1917, embarked on the abolition of the private property system through policies such as the socialization of land, the nationalization of banks and enterprises, and removing the inheritance system. The government also cancelled all foreign debt for the sake of the revolution. Further, the Bolsheviks dropped out of World War I in March 1918 to make a separate peace treaty with Germany, leaving its former Entente allies behind. These actions were met with anger and distrust by the Entente, and the U.K., France, and other former allies even militarily intervened in Russia’s revolution, further intensifying its civil war. Though its government survived this war, it left Soviet Russia economically exhausted and diplomatically isolated.

Despite mutual distrust between Soviet Russia and the West, economic and diplomatic relations were soon restored after the civil war. The Soviet government wanted foreign capital for economic recovery and further development, while the West sought stability in international relations and investment destinations. Particularly, Western countries demanded that Soviet Russia secure conditions for normal capitalist economic activities under its socialist government. In response, the Soviet government guaranteed property rights under certain restrictions and restored the inheritance system by enacting the Civil Code in 1922. The Bolsheviks understood this partially rebuilt Soviet market economy as a compromise with the socialist revolution.

The Soviet government further called for concession projects from foreign countries and in turn granted concessions to foreigners for their economic activities. However, Soviet authorities, loyal to their socialist cause, often obstructed the concessioners to confront the concessions administrations. Furthermore, by the mid-1920s, Soviet leadership felt the country’s relations with the West were beginning to strain, which only increased the hostility to concessioners and fueled intra-party struggles. This led to Soviet Russia’s radical industrialization and construction of socialism under the first five-year plan. Accompanying this plan, most of the concessions were liquidated in the course of nationalization. The Soviet Union thus became increasingly isolated because of its soured economic and political relations with the West.

There is a paradox in Central Asian politics of the late Soviet period: Independence movements were feeble and political elites were basically loyal to Moscow, but the leaders of the republics swiftly decided to declare independence during the fall of the Soviet Union. While contemporary observers underlined nationalism shared not only by activists of national movements but also by leaders of the republican communist parties, it was hardly a major concern for the latter. Research on the Brezhnev era shows that political elites in Central Asia gained limited but significant autonomy during that period, but this fact alone cannot explain the process of independence. This study reexamines the relationships between the national question and politics in the Central Asian republics, especially the impacts of the four major conflicts: the Almaty events of 1986, the Ferghana events of 1989, the Dushanbe events and the Osh events of 1990. We argue that these events triggered or accelerated the transformation of politics in the republics, adding elements of mass politics to Brezhnevite boss politics in narrow elite circles and creating the republics’ own political arenas. The emergence of these arenas did not mean a growing orientation toward independence per se, but the violent suppression of demonstrations and riots, combined with repercussions of defamatory campaigns against nationalism in the early period of perestroika, which made the relationships between Moscow and Central Asia uneasy, gave centrifugal force to these arenas.

At the same time, these events had varied influence on the standing of political leaders and on intra-elite cohesion and cleavages. In Kazakhstan, Gennadii Kolbin, whose appointment caused the Almaty events, had no other choice than to cooperate with Kazakh elites, who remained cohesive and subsequently supported the next leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev. In Uzbekistan, the Ferghana events facilitated the ascent of Islam Karimov, who later concentrated power in his own hands on the pretext of keeping the relative post-conflict stability. In Kyrgyzstan, the Osh events discredited Absamat Masaliev and created the opportunity for the academician Askar Akaev to become president, but it also deepened intra-elite cleavages and paved the way for the perpetuation of “pluralism by default.” In Tajikistan, Qahhor Mahkamov remaining in power despite his mishandling of the Dushanbe events seriously deepened intra-elite cleavages that later developed into a civil war. Thus, the national question and conflicts during perestroika preconditioned diverse power relations in the post-Soviet Central Asian states. At the same time, the experience of conflict strengthened the political leaders’ desire to restore order and boss politics, now without Moscow’s tutelage, leading to an inclination toward authoritarianism.

In a highly patronalistic society, such as one in post-Soviet Eurasia, a popularly elected president is generally the most dominant political figure in the country. As he or she not only has great formal power prescribed by the constitution but also exercises a high degree of informal power through patron-client relationships, the president can control the political elites by giving rewards and delivering punishments. The more immense power the president has, however, the more uncertain presidential term limits will make the problem of succession. In fact, some presidents in the post-Soviet states managed to extend their stay in office beyond their mandated periods, but others failed to do so. This article explores what causes such a difference.

The existing literature adopts a rationalistic approach to this problem: presidents decide whether to extend their tenure or to step down by calculating the costs and benefits to remain in power. These studies argue that presidents will succeed in the extension of their tenure, when they hold great power and resources to co-opt and threaten the elites. There have been some instances of tenure prolongation, however, where power and resources were equally distributed between the president and the opposition leader. In these cases, the rationalistic explanations have limitations.

This article argues that presidents would succeed in extending their tenure by justifying their rule beyond their mandated periods and obtaining the public endorsement for it, even when they have difficulty in gaining its approval from the elites. This is because public support would affect the elites’ expectations about who would be the dominant political figure. Thus, referendums are useful tools for presidents who want to evade their term-limits.

With the above in mind, this article conducts three case studies. First, in Central Asian states where presidents acquired enormous power just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the constitutional provisions of presidential term limits have been “gutted” because presidents have felt no constraint to distort the term-limit rules. Second, Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka, making use of his populist rhetoric and holding referendums, was successful in expanding his power and prolonging his tenure. Third, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma also used referendums for the sake of his own interests, but the defections from the ruling elites interrupted him from achieving his goals. As Kuchma lost public support due to the “Cassette Scandal,” the elites changed their expectations about who would be their strongest patron. In sum, in a hybrid regime where a certain degree of political competition exists, the success or failure of a president to extend his or her tenure depends on the endorsement from the public, because it will influence the elites’ behavior.