国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2022 巻, 206 号
選択された号の論文の16件中1~16を表示しています
国際政治のなかの同盟
  • 青野 利彦
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_1-206_16
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    This special issue is an attempt to reexamine the dynamics of alliance politics from historical and theoretical perspectives. The subsequent essay serves as an introduction to the current issue and is divided in two parts. The first half provides a short overview of the theoretical and historical literature concerning alliance politics, with special attention to important topics, such as: alliance formation, alliance security dilemma, alliance functions, alliance institutionalization, and the dynamics of asymmetrical alliances.

    The second half of this piece contends that the scholarly contribution of the eight articles in this volume are significant to the study of alliance politics. With evidence from neglected archival sources, YAGUCHI Hiroaki and TAJIMA Nobuo reinterpret the nature of such well-studied alliances as the Quadruple Alliance in the nineteenth century and the alliance among the Axis powers in the 1930s. FUJII Atsushi’s article on French-Belgian relations and NAKASHIMA Takuma’s article on the US-Japan alliance respectively examine the alliance politics in Europe and Asia with emphasis on the wider historical contexts – decolonization in the 1950s and the development of nuclear weapons technology in the 1960s. International Relations (IR) theorist IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro offers a new “dynamic” theory of alliance politics concerned with the interplay between allied countries and their adversary, while FUKUSHIMA Hiroyuki seeks to reassess the transformation of the post-war US-Japanese alliance by means of his new analytical model. Articles by SANBYAKUGARI Hiroshi and SATAKE Tomohiko shed new light on the post-Cold War US-Japanese alliance. The former meticulously scrutinizes the development of the Two-Plus-Two system between the allies after 1990, while the latter analyzes the implications of the increasing Australian-Japanese security cooperation for the “hub and spoke” alliance system in post-war Asia. All in all, this special issue makes significant contributions to the historical and theoretical literature on alliance politics.

  • ――ロシアの対イギリス政策の視点から――
    矢口 啓朗
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_17-206_33
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    The Quadruple Alliance, which was signed by Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia on November 20, 1815, established the foundation of the Congress System. However, the main object of this Alliance was the prevention of another instance of French aggression. In the 1830s, the international order was threatened by the French July Monarchy, which wanted to influence neighboring countries through ideas of liberalism. The autocrat of Russia, Tsar Nicholas I, who was afraid of these ideas, tried to prevent the spread of French influence. Many previous studies have emphasized that he strengthened relationships with the Holly Alliance. However, this study focuses on Russia’s relationship with Great Britain and reveals the Russo-British partnerships in the Quadruple Alliance for the defense of the Vienna System when Britain was governed by the liberal Whig Party during most of the 1830s.

    Although there was a liberal ideological identity, in both Great Britain and France in the 1830s, the two countries had many conflicts of interest in Europe and the Near East. The Whig government never permitted France to expand its influence over Belgium and Syria. For example, when a son of the King of France was recommended as the new Belgian king in January 1831, the British Foreign Secretary Palmerston rejected this idea, because Britain could not agree to the practical annexation of Belgium by France. In addition, since Britain showed negative attitudes to France in 1831, Russia could be sure of Britain’s commitment to the Continent through the Quadruple Alliance. Although in 1832 the ideological differences between Russia and Britain appeared with the passing of the Reform Act in Britain and by means of Belgian independence, Russia relied on Britain to deflect French aggression to neighboring countries. However, after the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which was signed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire on July 8, 1833, Britain approached France because they did not agree with the expansion of Russia’s influence in the Near East.

    Nevertheless, during the Second Syrian Crisis, when the divergent and conflicting of Anglo-French interests in the Near East resurfaced, Russia approached Britain and took the initiative to develop the First Straits Convention, signed without France on July 15, 1840. Since “disgraced” France was threatening its neighboring countries into signing another convention, Russia demanded Britain’s commitment to defend Europe. Britain agreed to deflect the French invasion, although it did not want to sign a formal agreement. Russia used the Quadruple Alliance as a tool for involving liberal Britain in consistent defense against France in the 1830s. This Alliance contributed to the preservation of the Vienna System even after the collapse of the Congress System through the continued solidarity of the Four Powers against France.

  • ――「反ソ防共」から「連ソ容共」へ――
    田嶋 信雄
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_34-206_50
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    This study will analyze the political realities of the Japanese–German Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, and the Japan–Germany–Italy wartime alliance. Particular attention will be paid to the following: (1) introducing a new perspective on Axis relations from the viewpoint of Japan’s policy toward India, Afghanistan, and Iran; (2) providing new historical knowledge on Axis relations while unearthing new materials; (3) demonstrating that the trend of international politics, the development of Axis relations, and the change in the “virtual enemy” of the alliance factored in changing Japan’s Axis Alliance policy. It will also analyze the political transformation of Japan’s Axis policy, which, metaphorically speaking, drastically changed from “a policy to combat Russia and defend against Communism” to “a policy to work with Russia and accommodate Communism.”

    Conventionally, studies have underscored the continuity in the relationship between Germany, Italy, and Japan, categorized as the “Axis,” from the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 to the collapse of the Japanese–German wartime alliance in 1945. The Axis Pact has been regarded as a “hollow alliance,” as Johanna Menzel Meskill (1966) put it more than half-a-century ago. In addition, the Anti-Comintern Pact has been thought of not as an ideological anti-Soviet alliance but as a power-political anti-British alliance from the beginning, which had a commonality and continuity with the Tripartite Pact, in other words, the anti-British and anti-American alliance. Moreover, scholars have situated the origin of the Tripartite Pact in the “Axis Diplomacy” of the 1930s. They have also emphasized the continuity between the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact.

    This study will compare the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, and the Japan–Germany–Italy wartime alliance, with a focus on the policies toward India, Afghanistan, and Iran, to demonstrate that the Axis relationship was not “hollow” but a real one and that the Tripartite Pact and the wartime alliance were not based on the continuity of the Anti-Comintern Pact but rather on its negation.

  • ――分断戦略と結束戦略の相互作用と冷戦初期の米中ソ関係――
    泉川 泰博
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_51-206_66
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    Since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979, structural realism (neorealism) has occupied the dominant position in the realist paradigm. Criticizing classical realism for its “unscientific” focus on human nature, Waltz posits that the anarchic structure of international system severely constrains states, forcing them to take balancing behavior. While structural realism contributed to making realism more “scientific,” it has generated one drawback; it has turned realist scholars’ attention away from states’ attempts to manipulate external security environments.

    This article aims to present an alliance theory, dubbed dynamic theory of alliances, that may overcome the aforementioned drawback. This theory regards the degree of alignments as a product of not only the distribution of capabilities/threats but also a clash between a state’s attempt to divide adversaries (wedge strategy) and an allied state’s effort to maintain/enhance unity with its ally (binding strategy). In other words, an alliance is never in stasis but in a state of dynamic equilibrium, a phenomenon in which an equilibrium situation is achieved when two or more countervailing forces cancel one another. Based on these concepts, this article presents the logic of how states choose different wedge/binding strategies and how interactions between them may influence the formation and breakdown of alliances.

    To examine how the theory may explain alliance politics in the real world, the case of the U.S.-China-Soviet relations in the early Cold War period is analyzed. In the late 1940s, Washington aimed to woo Beijing away from the Soviet orbit while Moscow tried to tighten its alignments with Beijing. After the U.S. wedge strategy failed to prevent the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1950, Washington continued seeking to divide the alliance in the 1950s by using coercion. The case analysis shows that the hypotheses derived from the theory effectively explain the three-way interactions among Moscow, Beijing, and Washington.

  • ――パワーと脅威の均衡と日本の同盟政策――
    福島 啓之
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_67-206_83
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article explains historical transition of the U.S.-Japan Alliance by applying theoretical frameworks which combine the distribution of power in the world and the degree of threat. The explanation reveals the evolution of Japan’s alliance policy as a minor ally. It suggests that the minor ally’s adaptable behavior in order to respond to the threat and unite with the major ally contributes to the maintenance of the asymmetric alliance. This argument provides an implication to answer why the U.S.-Japan alliance has been maintained although it had unfair or unequal relationship for each ally.

    Theoretical frameworks to examine the asymmetric alliance rearrange four basic forms of the minor ally’s alliance policy. They are reflex balancing, buck-passing, hedging, and complementary cooperation. Reflex balancing is to counter a threat and to rely on a major ally. Buck-passing is to make a major ally accept the burden of an alliance. Hedging is to approach a target country while cooperation with a major ally is maintained. Complementary cooperation is to counter a threat and to assist a major ally.

    I argue that the combination of the distribution of power and the degree of threat affects the minor ally’s alliance policy as the member of the asymmetric alliance. Their causal relationships have following four patterns. First, if the distribution of power is decentralized and the degree of threat is high, a minor ally chooses reflex balancing. Second, if the distribution of power is decentralized and the degree of threat is low, a minor ally chooses buck-passing. Third, if the distribution of power is concentrated and the degree of threat is low, a minor ally chooses hedging. Fourth, if the distribution of power is concentrated and the degree of threat is high, a minor ally chooses complementary cooperation.

    Applying theoretical frameworks of balance of power and threat, I explain four basic forms of Japan’s alliance policy which were adopted by succesive administrations except for three short-lived ones. When war and confrontation were observed in the Cold War period, Japan relied on the U.S. and balanced against the Communist camp’s threat. When leaders’ talks and tension reduction were observed in the Cold War period, Japan depended on the U.S. When the sole superpower U.S. pursued unilateralism and exhausted in the Post-Cold War period, Japan cooperated with the U.S. as the ally while it approached China and Russia. When Senkaku islands problem fell into a territorial dispute in the Post-Cold War period, Japan decided to start collective self-defense with the U.S. Therefore, the implication of this article suggests that the adaptable nature of Japan’s alliance policy to the changes of international environment sustained the U.S.-Japan alliance.

  • ――アルジェリア戦争とフランス・ベルギー関係――
    藤井 篤
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_84-206_100
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    The Algerian War (1954–1962) accomplished a series of decolonization of the French colonial empire after World War II. Both France and Belgium, tied to each other by a historical friendship, were in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, partners in the European integration, and imperial powers facing decolonization in their African territories. This study thus focuses on the Franco–Belgian relationships and analyzes the cooperation and its limits between both the parties around the issue of decolonization in Algeria.

    France tried in vain to make use of the NATO Council to gain international support just after the outbreak of the Algerian War. The United States refused the French proposal due to the fear that such an attempt would destroy NATO. France, on the contrary, continued to claim that the Algerian problem was an internal matter to avoid foreign intervention in the conflict during the war. France was fiercely opposed to submitting the problem to the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the grounds that it was within the sphere of domestic jurisdiction as stipulated in Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN).

    Belgium firmly and consistently supported France in Algeria in the UN due to the fear that Belgian Congo might be debated there when it would be unstable and uncontrollable in the wave of nationalism. France was pleased to have Belgium on its side. While the Belgian UN delegation developed pro-French positions, the Belgian embassy in Paris implicitly had a pessimistic perspective in relation to French settlement of the conflict. Belgium sought diplomatic cooperation with France, and tried to avoid an increasing split of NATO that the prolonged war could bring about. When the French President Charles de Gaulle announced his new policy on September 16, 1959, allowing the Algerians the right of self-determination after peace had been restored, Belgium promptly decided to give this new position its unconditional support. That decision was due to an increasingly aggravated situation in Congo where Belgium nearly lost its administrative powers.

    While friction and discordance were not salient in the Franco–Belgian relations, Belgium’s vigorous pro-French attitudes could not help but cause Arabic countries to accuse it of being in collusion with French imperialism. Belgium therefore continued to struggle in achieving the three following incompatible goals, namely, cooperation with France, the continuing unity of NATO, and friendship with the Arab nations.

  • ――核兵器技術の発展と同盟管理のジレンマ――
    中島 琢磨
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_101-206_116
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    The purpose of this paper is to clarify empirically the political and diplomatic processes centering on nuclear submarines’ visits to Japan in 1964. When the Security Treaty with the United States was revised in 1960, Japan legally stipulated that bringing nuclear weapons into its territory should be a matter for prior consultation. However, during the negotiations to revise the treaty, it did not place explicitly on the agenda the issue of port calls by nuclear-armed ships.

    On the other hand, the U.S. was rapidly advancing the development of nuclear weapons to be mounted on submarines. After the revision of the treaty, it successfully launched a Polaris missile from an underwater nuclear submarine, and proceeded with the development of Subrocs to be mounted on submarines. Under these circumstances, in June 1961 and January 1963, it requested Japan to accept visits by its nuclear submarines.

    The development of nuclear weapons technology and the existence of public information on it are factors that are essentially outside of alliance politics. And the former was originally intended by the U.S. to maintain its superiority over the Soviet Union and increase its credibility in the eyes of the allies. The development of Polaris missiles and Subrocs, however, put the Japanese government in a difficult position in domestic politics. Opposition legislators were able to grasp the development status of new nuclear weapons from information released by the U.S. and to take up the issue in the Diet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus had to consider how to handle, under the prior consultation system, cases of visits by submarines equipped with Polaris missiles and Subrocs.

    At the time MOFA, on the basis of pre-existing official documents and government statements that had been made in the Diet, offered legal and policy interpretations of such cases. However, there were various limitations in applying to sea-based nuclear weapons past policies that presupposed those that were land-based.

    In the end, while the government could not officially allow visits by nuclear-armed ships to Japanese ports, it also fell into a situation where it could not come to an explicit agreement with the United States on how to handle such visits under the Security Treaty. In this way, the development of new nuclear weapons to increase America’s credibility in the eyes of its allies had rather the political consequence of creating, for Japan, an alliance management dilemma. In 1964, in the absence of any resolution of the dilemma, Japan made a highly political decision to allow nuclear submarines to visit its ports.

  • ――九〇年代から新「日米防衛協力のための指針」策定まで――
    三百苅 拓志
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_117-206_132
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    As a part of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) is situated at the top of the hierarchical channel for security talks. The SCC played a major role in the management of the Japan-U.S. Alliance during the post-Cold War era as it was reorganized into a “2+2” meeting structure in which two foreign ministers and two defense ministers participate. However, there have been no studies that have tracked the historical changes in the talks system or the talks process.

    This paper aims to track the historical transformations in the processes relating to how agreements are reached and to clarify the qualitative changes in these processes until the enactment of the “2+2” system. We will chronologically follow the historical transformations in the Japan-U.S. talks by focusing on the following two points: centered on the “2+2” meetings, how the consulted channels such as the Security Sub-Committee (SSC), the Mini-SSC, and the Sub-Committee on Defense Cooperation (SDC) were utilized in the process of strengthening the alliance; and how actors such as the politicians and the bureaucratic organizations in Japan and the United States spearheaded the agreement. The following became clear as a result of doing this.

    In the 1990s, the “2+2” meetings became increasingly important as a type of ceremony that demonstrated the strengthening of an alliance. They also transitioned to being a forum in which each of the channels of consultation was converted into a group of processes. The “2+2” meetings then came to play the role of controlling the deadlines for the targets to be met in each of the consultation channels and the channels themselves. In addition, the meetings were positioned as a part of a “comprehensive mechanism” through which Japan and the United States formulated operational plans during emergencies and critical situations in the areas surrounding Japan.

    In the 2000s, there was a change on the Japanese side, whereby the agreement process changed from being led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to being led by the Prime Minister’s Office. This strengthened the initiative of the cabinet ministers and expanded the role of the Ministry of Defense, in particular the uniformed members of the armed forces. As a result, the negotiations with the United States were held in the form of a joint team for foreign affairs and defense under the Prime Minister’s Office, allowing them to deal with the political issues that were difficult to coordinate. In addition, the uniformed personnel group within the Self-Defense Force (SDF) made use of it expertise to realign the bases as well as the units of the SDF and U.S. forces in Japan, thereby strengthening the military cooperation.

    In the 2010’s, the Japanese side proposed a revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation along with the consideration and coordination of the expansion of the Japan-U.S. roles, including the partial acceptance of the right to have a collective self-defense.

    It became clear that the qualitative changes in the “2+2” system as described above had gradually strengthened the framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. While “2+2” did not fully function right from the beginning, nevertheless, through the changes in the situation in East Asia post the end of Cold War and other factors, the two countries accumulated an experience of more than 20 years and qualitatively shifted towards more politically, militarily, and pragmatically important engagements.

  • ――「ハブ&スポークス」体制の変容?――
    佐竹 知彦
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_133-206_148
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    Since the end of the Cold War, the US allies in Asia such as Japan and Australia have enhanced their bilateral and trilateral security cooperation including the United States. Does it mean that, as some suggest, the US-led “hub and spokes” system—a bilateral alliance network centered on the US “hub” and regional allies as “spokes”—has transformed to a more “networked” alliance structure based on horizontal relations between the United States and regional allies?

    To answer this question, the paper first focuses on the asymmetric nature of the “hub and spokes” alliance system. Previous studies suggest that an asymmetric structure of the US alliance system in Asia—in a sense that regional allies do not assume defense obligations or burden which are equivalent to those of the United States—has prevented the emergence of the collective defense mechanism such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe. In particular, the US regional allies did not wish to establish a collective defense mechanism in Asia, so long as the United States continuously committed to regional allies’ defense bilaterally.

    This in turn suggests that, should the US security commitment become less credible, regional allies have greater incentives to enhance their mutual defense cooperation in order to prepare for the loss of security provided by the United States. Indeed, Japan and Australia began to enhance their security cooperation immediately after the Cold War, out of fear that the US military presence in the region would become weaken. In order to maintain the strong US military presence in the region, these two allies began to assume greater burden-sharing with the United States.

    Such cooperation continued after the 2000s, at which the rise of China became more prominent. In order to maintain the US strategic primacy in Asia, Japan and Australia actively contributed to the US-led global “war on terror”. Both countries also increased their roles in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster reliefs activities. As a result, the trilateral security cooperation became institutionalized in the late 2000s. As such, trilateral security cooperation between Japan, the US and Australia have enhanced as Japan and Australia assumed greater burden and responsibilities in both regional and global security.

    This ostensibly suggests the transformation of the US alliance network from an asymmetrical “hub and spokes” system to a more symmetrical alliance network. In reality, however, these regional allies enhanced their security cooperation in order to maintain the US strategic primacy, so that they can continuously enjoy the US security commitment to them through bilateral alliance relations. This means that, quite ironically, the so-called “spokes to spokes” cooperation could help to endure, rather than transform, the existing hub and spokes system by maintaining its asymmetric alliance structure.

独立論文
  • ――「文化外交」を超える思考枠組みと独日の実践――
    川村 陶子
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_149-206_164
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    In today’s world, cross-border movement of people, goods, and information causes instability of sovereign nation-state system and distrust in fundamental values. To attain security and creative development of international society, it is necessary to develop a policy which contributes to co-existence and -creation among people with different cultural backgrounds. Conventional research on cultural and public diplomacy suffers from multiplicity of terminology and difficulty in policy evaluation. A new conceptual framework is necessary, which allows comparative study across time and space, and enables analysis of broader policy process.

    This paper suggests two new concepts to meet the current needs: (1) management of international cultural relations (ICR-management), and (2) cultural relations policy (CRP). The first concept, ICR-management, refers to cultural resources management for the purpose of constructing better intercultural relations. The second concept, CRP, refers to commitment of a state to ICR-management.

    The paper consists of three parts. Part One sketches out the theoretical background of ICR-management, drawing on different approaches of IR-scholars (and also of practitioners) to cultural dimension of international relations. There are three main approaches: analytical, administrative, and combined. The combined approach explicitly pursues better cross-cultural relations by exploiting cultural resources. Researchers in other disciplines also take interest in ICR-management; recent works of Cultural Policy Research have especially a lot to offer.

    Part Two introduces the concept of CRP, i.e., a state’s policy which directly or indirectly promotes ICR-management. CRP consists of cultural policies in a broad sense with four interrelated dimensions: external (traditional cultural or public diplomacy), outward (nation branding and information), inbound (attraction of foreigners), and inland (intercultural education and diversity management). Planning and administration of CRP requires consultation and collaboration among many different actors – both public and private, domestic and foreign. Adopting the concept of CRP would make it possible to consider various “cultural policies,” which have conventionally been handled in different administrative sectors, within a single framework. The concept also enlarges the scope of policymaking in international cultural relations, thus facilitates a broader perspective in the analysis and evaluation of a cultural program.

    Part Three briefly examines the practices of CRP in Germany and Japan. Scope and content of a country’s CRP vary, according to the nation’s constitution and its history of cultural relations with internal and external “others”. While the CRPs of Germany and Japan contrast in their concepts and structures, the two countries share their historical principle of nation-building and the current issue of accepting migrant workers as a complement to aging society. For Japan, it is instructive that many German organizations with longtime experience in “external” cultural policy currently apply their know-how of ICR-management to new “inbound” and “inland” programs.

  • ――NGOと機関投資家との相互作用に焦点を当てて――
    毛利 聡子
    2022 年 2022 巻 206 号 p. 206_165-206_179
    発行日: 2022/03/25
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    At the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) in Paris in 2015, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) reached an agreement to combat climate change and set goal of holding temperature rises no more than 2°C. The Paris Agreement entered into force in 2016, and the ratified countries were expected to submit their intended nationally determined contributions. However, climate talks at COP 25 in 2019 ended with limited progress on emissions targets. The long-term climate talks among governments continue to fail to deliver commitment to cut greenhouse gases and to limit dangerous climate impacts.

    On the other hand, the global financers and investors have accelerated to shift their funds from fossil fuel industry to realize the de-carbonized economy. In practice large institutional investors and companies start to divest from the fossil fuel industry and re-invest renewable energy industry. According to the environmental NGO “Fossil Free”, over 1110 institutions have committed to policies black-listing coal, oil and gas, and assets committed to divestment have leapt from $52 billion in 2014 to more than $11 trillion in 2019. Why do the number of investors express commitment to divest their funds without international legal binding? It can be assumed that institutional investors have re-examined their thoughts through interactions with civil society actors. In order to answer to these questions, this article examines how and to what extent NGOs’proposals and strategies influence on decisions made by institutional investors in three aspects.

    First, this article explores how the small thinktank called Carbon Tracker’s Report Unburnable Carbon (especially the concept of ‘stranded assets’) could reframe the debate on climate change into financial term. Second, how do strategies taken by fossil fuel divestment movement campaigns impact and effect on finance and public discourse. A closer look is taken at the changing notions of ‘reputation risk’ and ‘fiduciary duty’ which have significant impacts on investors and companies. Third, this article analyzes how the information disclosure system, which is essential for investors to decide investment choice, has been constructed with a particular focus on the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project).

    In so doing, the article explores the process of non-state actors, particularly NGOs and institutional investors, contributing to create information-based private governance. In addition, the article addresses the conditions and lessons that empower private governance sustainable and democratic.

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