After the end of the Cold War, the United States, as the sole superpower, sought to form a world order. Although the United States still occupies a superior position in military and economic power, the world order centered on them is under pressure to change. The United States is losing its will to play an important role in maintaining international order.

American politics in recent years has been characterized by political division and intensifying conflict. It has been taken for granted among diplomatic elites to view the United States as an exceptional country that reigns as a leader of freedom and democracy. However, as suspicions of the elites who supported the Bush administration that started the Iraq War grew, and populism became widespread in domestic politics, criticism of elite diplomacy intensified. As America became increasingly inward-looking, people with little understanding of foreign policy began to occupy key positions in Congress. Today, when the power of the two major political parties is balanced, the ruling party needs to make decisions that are in line with the wishes of the extremists within the party.

There currently is bipartisan support for emphasizing domestic jobs, taking protectionist trade positions, and implementing economic sanctions without fiscal spending. Although the United States has long maintained a liberal international economic order, American public opinion has become skeptical of free trade in recent years. There is also a growing consensus within the country that economic security should be emphasized rather than achieving peace through the promotion of economic interdependence.

American diplomatic elites have consensus that spreading American ideals and principles such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law around the world is important. However, the unilateralist actions taken by the United States diverged too much from its norms, and many countries lost confidence in the United States. The Biden administration is developing diplomacy while emphasizing principles such as democracy and the rule of law. However, as a result of the United States requiring developing countries to emphasize liberal norms as a condition for providing economic aid, many countries have come closer to authoritarian countries these days.

After World War II, the United States created various international organizations in building a liberal international order. Today, when American power is considered to be in decline, whether these international organizations will continue to maintain their influence is debatable. America and the world need to build a new international order and appropriately manage it.

This article is an attempt to discuss and explore the evolution and transformation of American foreign policy over the last 120 years while illustrating the unfolding of America-led open-democratic international order.

Emerging from the Spanish-American War as a world power, the United States chose to embrace Woodrow Wilson’s conception of internationalism over Theodore Roosevelt’s internationalist perspective as the fundamental tenet of foreign policy. Wilson put forward a set of ideas which came to be called American liberal internationalism, and successfully led the US into war to make the world safe for democracy. Although Wilson failed to convince the Senate to agree on his plan for a League of Nations, he bequeathed an enduring legacy for generations to come. Next to Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt was the most pivotal figure in promoting the liberal international order. He was politically and diplomatically skillful in crafting many of the core institutions such as the UN, IMF, and the World Bank. In doing so, importantly, Roosevelt won the bipartisan cooperation. Following the end of World War II, Soviet-American rivalry gave way to the start of the cold war. This new international situation deepened the Wilsonian diplomatic impulse to construct a liberal international order. The US embarked on the containment policy of providing its allies in Europe and Asia-Pacific with massive economic aid as well as military protection, thus breaking the tradition of avoiding the foreign military entanglement. While sporadically voices were raised against containment either by prominent Republicans or Democrats, the two parties were in broad agreement on maintaining and advancing the US-led international order.

With the end of the cold war, however, the American people decisively turned inward and grew disinterested in foreign affairs; the post-cold war recession had only strengthened an isolationist inclination. Bill Clinton, prioritizing economic interests over geopolitical interests, actively pursued a policy of economic globalization, The two major wars in the Middle East which the US conducted in the wake of 9/11 turned out a costly distraction for American foreign policy; without them, the US could have harnessed more resources to confront an increasingly aggressive Russia and an assertive China. Donald Trump’s successful run in 2016 and his America First agenda exploited rising political anger and economic frustration among voters who felt disconnected with the policy elites. Although Trump was denied a second term, his foreign policy undermined the Western alliance, America’s standing abroad and the liberal international order. Before Joe Biden who assumed office in 2021 could reaffirm the international leadership, he faces an uphill battle at home in rebuilding broad support of internationalism. When the US has its hands full taking care of its own domestic problems, the prospect for the liberal international order which has relied so much on American role of global leadership is daunting.

This paper explores how “liberal internationalism” has changed in the post-Cold War period. It also investigates how this change has affected and will affect the international order in the near future. Wining the Cold War and defeating the communist Soviet Union, the United States (US) has achieved its primacy in the world. In other word, the US has enjoyed a so-called “unipolar moment” in which the U.S. possess both unparalleled economic power and invincible military might to accomplish its national interests in the post-Cold War period. American foreign policy after the Second World War has been characterized as “liberal internationalism” because the U.S. has built and has promoted liberal values and institutions in the world to make “a world safe for democracy.” Free trade has been the pillar of “liberal internationalism” in the economic dimension while democracy and liberty have been the core values in the political and social dimension for more than half a century. The number of liberal democracies accordingly increased significantly and they have enjoyed prosperity under the liberal international order. “Liberal internationalism” is, however, often said to face a crisis in recent years. The US also has been said for more than a decade to be declining. Why is “liberal internationalism” said to face a crisis? Or is the US in decline despite the fact the US has accomplished hegemony for more than three decades? What does the crisis imply about American foreign policy and the existing international order? What is the nature of the crisis? Intending to demonstrate major features of American foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, the paper also investigates each foreign policy of William Clinton, George W. Bush, Barak Obama, Donald Trump and Joseph Biden administrations. Although the US had attempted to promote free institutions universally since the end of the Cold War, the US seems to have discarded the universal promotion since the Trump administration scrapped “liberal internationalist” policy and started confronting openly China. Although Biden declared, “the US is back”, it is doubtful whether he can put “liberal internationalism” back in track. Furthermore, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine make it difficult for the Biden administration to cooperate with Russia and China. In short, the paper finds that the US has started to take more limited measures of “liberal internationalism” and more exclusive approaches, which probably intend to exclude illiberal states including China and Russia, than the previous administrations had taken. The paper finally argues that continuing a war against Russia accompanies a risk of going to the Third World War and also of urging Russia to take the Chinese side so that liberal democracies will be forced to confront formidable combination of threats for a long period.

This paper examines the ongoing crisis of the “liberal international order,” focusing on the identity crisis of its traditional leader, the United States, which has increasingly lacked the commitment and capacity to maintain it. The idea of American exceptionalism, namely that the United States is a unique, morally superior nation and thus has special responsibility in protecting the security and peace of the world, has guided U.S. foreign policy since the country’s earliest days. In its commitment to global “War on Terror” from the 2000s, however, the United States has fundamentally undermined the rules-based international order that it had contributed to establishing after the WWII so as to reflect its power, principles, and preferences. According to the “Costs of War” project conducted by the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, the total cost of the 20 year “War on Terror” amounts to $8 trillion. It is also estimated that more than 7,000 U.S. soldiers have lost their lives in the war, and the total death toll including civilian casualties amounts to around 900,000. These “costs” have significantly eroded U.S. credibility and image abroad. The 45^th President of the United States, Donald Trump’s foreign policy has developed out of the “America First” ideology, which fundamentally differs from former Presidents’ preference for the ideology of American exceptionalism. Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, which abrogates U.S. role and responsibility as a “benign hegemon,” has posed a fundamental challenge to the postwar “liberal international order.” Though Joe Biden vowed on the campaign trail to break from the paths taken by Trump, the Biden administration has not made substantial breaks. Saying it was time to end America’s longest war after two decades, Biden completed pulling the last American troops out of Afghanistan in 2021, which responded to the will of the majority of Americans, who had grown weary of two decades of war. Embracing the hegemonic role of the United States in the world, and being nostalgic for the heyday of the U.S.-led “liberal international order,” defenders of liberal internationalism have demanded and counseled Washington to restore a battered tradition, uphold economic and security commitments, and promote liberal values. However, it is important to question if the postwar U.S.-led international order has been truly liberal. “Liberal hegemon” arguments have been increasingly criticized as ahistorical as it has erased the memory of war, and violence, conducted by the United States. In order to envision a future international order, we need critical examination of the nature of the postwar international order, which has contained expansive militarism and endless war that is neither liberal nor harmonious, and reimagination toward inventing liberal internationalism ultimately worthy of its name.

The United States played the central role in the making of the liberal international order at the end of the second world war. While the current order represents universally appreciated values, it also satisfies the interests of the United States, who has been at the center of this order. Such dual nature of the current international order invites criticisms that it is outdated, as well as demands for an alternative international order.

This article questions the validity of such arguments and reevaluates the universality of the current international order by focusing on the dual nature of this order. It takes up one of the central values of the current liberal international order, namely human rights, and uses the development of international protection of refugees/asylees as a specific case study.

First, the article historically reviews the characteristics of American society, especially its origin as a refuge for those suffering in Europe. At the same time, its history exemplifies the negative attitudes toward newcomers taken by those who came to the United States a little earlier. Such attitudes, at least at the government level, made a big turn as they learned that they could make good use of refugees/asylees in the anti-Communist diplomacy.

The article covers the periods of WWII, Cold War, and the War on Terrorism, and looks at both ends of the policy development, namely the international and the domestic situations. When American public perceive refugee/asylee in their community, such elements as race/ethnicity, competition over the economic opportunities, and the security concerns constitute the borderline between “us” and “them,” namely the refugees/asylees.

The author concludes that the current liberal international order continues to uphold important values, such as human rights, which are universally appreciated. In order to protect this order from the self-interested use by the dominant power, i.e. so far the United States, however, democracies should proactively promote discussion on such values at their national political level.

The Trump and Biden administration in the US developed and pursued contrasting policies, with the former emphasizing unilateralism whereas the latter strongly emphasizing multilateralism. This widely accepted view may actually require some refinement. Both these administrations shared a common stance in maintaining economic tensions with China and implemented similar unilateral economic sanctions and trade restrictions. These measures weaponized the interdependence between the US and China and was intended to manipulate this economic relationship through political intervention. However, these actions faced resistance from the domestic industries in the US, embodying the viscosity of interdependence. Surprisingly though, the response of this government and the industries, the weaponization, and viscosity of interdependence was to create a united front further leading to the multilateralization of trade restrictions. The American unilateralism and multilateralism were not necessarily conflicting, but rather, existed on a continuum.

This paper analyzes the case of the semiconductor dispute, and reveals the aforementioned political dynamism. In this analysis, the paper utilizes the weaponized interdependence argument proposed by H. Farrell and A. Newman as an analytical framework; however, it was further modified to include the concept of viscosity.

The semiconductor dispute differed from conventional economic friction such that it was not triggered by demands for trade restrictions by American industries. It was government-driven and was derived from other economic issues. On the one hand, the Trump administration implemented an increase in semiconductor tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act to extract concessions from China in the challenging US–China economic negotiations. On the other hand, the Biden administration faced a global shortage of semiconductors, examined the issues in the global supply chain, thus confirming the US’s dependence on China and China’s growing technological capabilities.

However, the semiconductor industry of the US resisted the government policies, because they were grounded in the trade benefits with China that formed the foundation for R & D. The semiconductor industry argued that its technological leadership, supported by its R & D, was the key to the security of the US. However, the positions of the US government and industries converged over the multilateralization of restrictions against China. The government aimed to prevent regulatory loopholes with China under the framework of interdependence. Meanwhile, to ensure fairness in a competitive market amid China’s sanctioned status, industries sought the multilateralization of regulations. The above may suggest an inherent tendency that, if interdependence is weaponized, the viscosity of interdependence may surface against the backdrop of economic inconsistencies, causing a contracted equilibrium of interdependence.

The statecrafts of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson have long attracted so many scholars because they play a leading role in the rise of the United States to a great power in a transition period of world order. The conventional wisdom on Roosevelt and Wilson is marked by a contrast between realist and idealist approaches.

However, here comes a revisionist account to challenge the received wisdom on Roosevelt and Wilson. It argues that both are internationalists who don’t believe that European balance-of-power system will survive the twentieth century and do insist that the United States should lead the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of world peace and participate in it.

In order to investigate their internationalisms and their implications for American internationalisms after the Progressive Era, this paper examined their public speeches, newspaper articles, books, private letters and remarks, and then compared their ideas on the international peace-keeping organization, that is, Roosevelt’s “League of Peace” and Wilson’s League of Nations.

This research showed that the Roosevelt’s League was transformed by the First World War, from the mutual non-interference of “civilized” great powers in each sphere of influence, where they engaged in international police work not only for the great powers but also for the developing countries, into a league of “civilized” powers to defend the Atlantic World, which welcomed great and small powers in the developed and developing regions only on condition that they are “civilized.” This transformation would curtail the American sphere assumed by the Roosevelt Corollary to Monroe Doctrine dramatically so that the United States could devote herself to the defense of the “civilized” world.

This study also revealed that the Wilson’s League attempted to contain British navalism as well as German militarism and to reform the diplomatic methods and international system of modern Europe drastically by the creation of a “community of power” for the defense of the whole world, which is composed by all the democracies whether or not they are small or big, developed or developing, only if they are self-governing. This reform would commit the United States fully to the maintenance of the global territorial arrangements at the Paris Peace Conference in the entire world.

The results reveal more differences than similarities in their internationalisms. The differences are these: The Roosevelt’s League could let the United States avoid military commitments unimportant to her interests, but legitimize wars for vital interests and exclude “uncivilized” countries. The Wilson’s League might help America outlaw wars more completely and admit all the self-governing peoples as equals to the League, but involve America in territorial disputes anywhere and anytime. These differences are part of the essential questions for American internationalists in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

The purpose of this article is to reevaluate five hypotheses that have been proposed regarding the question of “why the US invaded Iraq.”

It remains, and will continue to be, important to address this question today. First, the Iraq War has had significant consequences for the US, the Middle East, and the world as a whole since its inception. Understanding the motivations behind the initiation of this war is therefore an essential task in gaining insights into today’s international security environment. Second, the war has also raised important questions about the decision-making processes that led the major powers to engage in conflict. As evident from the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which commenced in January 2022, these issues are still under debate, and an examination of the reasons for the onset of the Iraq War can further enrich such discussions.

The five hypotheses that have been proposed in prior research regarding the causes of the Iraq War are generally as follows (with some overlapping points): (1) the WMD hypothesis, (2) the petrodollar hypothesis, (3) the Israel lobby hypothesis, (4) the neo-con hypothesis, and (5) the performative war hypothesis. How valid are any of these hypotheses?

The conclusions drawn in this paper are as follows. First, the Israel lobby and neo-con hypotheses, which have often been discussed in the past, are, in fact, relatively weakly supported. Israeli security concerns were a minor factor in initiating the Iraq War, and neoconservative ideals were never adopted as fundamental policies by the Bush administration. Figures like Wolfowitz and other neo-cons both inside and outside the administration were primarily utilized to garner support for the war within Congress and public opinion. Second, Cheney and Rumsfeld had formulated the concept of the Iraq War prior to the September 11 attacks, rooted in the idea of performative war, or hegemonic realism. The opportunity to execute this concept arose on September 11. Their thinking did not revolve around liberal ideals of democratic expansion, nor did they leave room for a negotiated settlement. Third, Bush, while influenced by senior officials who were actively pushing for war in Iraq, sought a diplomatic solution until the very end. However, following the failure of the final negotiations, he turned to support the war.

It should be noted that, although there is some circumstantial evidence supporting the petrodollar hypothesis, obtaining conclusive evidence or testimony to substantiate it with a high degree of certainty was not possible. Therefore, the validity of this hypothesis must be regarded with caution in this paper, and further research is required.

The domestic situation in Myanmar is broadly acknowledged to have posed significant challenges for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Consequently, a critical question arises: upon which premises does ASEAN formulate its responses to the situations in Myanmar? The doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, long identified as central to the ASEAN principles, is now understood to be changing, albeit to varying degrees. Nonetheless, there appears to be a conspicuous absence of solid explanation frameworks, particularly in the recent context. Furthermore, the modus operandi of ASEAN is difficult to explicate in terms of normative studies involving the principle of non-interference in internal affairs based on constructivism, realism, and institutionalism. A diachronic perspective is imperative to decipher the foundational principles informing ASEAN’s approach to the Myanmar matter.

This article aims to examine ASEAN’s responses, spanning three decades, to the Myanmar matter and comprehend its actions. The Myanmar matter is categorized chronologically, encompassing debates surrounding ASEAN membership in the 1990s, the issue on ASEAN chairmanship in the 2000s, and the affair triggered by the 2021 coup d’état. These cases are united by the overarching theme of democratization/governance challenges within Myanmar’s domestic sphere. By encompassing an extensive temporal scope, this analysis facilitates an exploration of the factors shaping ASEAN’s approach. This article discusses these cases from the perspective of ASEAN’s quest for regional autonomy, a concept intermittently broached in ASEAN studies, albeit without comprehensive conceptual clarification. In this article, autonomy for ASEAN is construed as to not be controlled or constrained from outside the region and gives the ability to make its own decisions and act accordingly, with ensuing examination of ASEAN’s responses.

The points made in this article that ASEAN countries have considered extra-regional reactions towards Myanmar matters corroborates statements by member countries’ heads of state and governments and existing scholarly contributions. ASEAN has responded to these extra-regional reactions as constraints necessitating circumvention, which is related to the concept of pursuing regional autonomy. The article further highlights that it is hardly possible to comprehend ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar matters across varied temporal frames based solely on its relations with those outside of the region. Then, while reviewing the fact that ASEAN’s decision-making on the Myanmar matter involves an element that is also the basis of the term autonomy, “the ability to make decisions on one’s own,” it presents the view that this is practiced in conjunction with the intention to avoid constraints from extra-regional countries.