The study of the history of US-Japan relations has developed as a research field within political and diplomatic history of modern Japan. The United States is Japan’s only official ally and ranks second, after China, as Japan’s largest trading partner in terms of total imports and exports. Discussing relations with the United States is directly related to discussing Japanese diplomacy itself. In addition, the accessibility of historical documents in both the United States and Japan has been promoted, creating an environment that fosters empirical research and encourages ongoing studies. Moreover, the relationship with the United States continually raises questions about what national autonomy truly means.

The study of history of US-Japan relations also has been accepted as a field of international relations studies in Japan. Since the founding of the Japan Association of International Relations in 1957, the historical approach has been an established method of international relations studies in Japan. Moreover, studying the history of US-Japan relations as a field of international politics has profound significance. First, as long as sovereign states remain primary actors in international politics, specific bilateral relationships can influence the nature of international politics, and the exploration of US-Japan relations essentially constitutes an analysis of the phenomena that manifest in international relations. Second, research on the history of US-Japan relations is expected to contribute to the study of alliance theory.

The history of US-Japan relations, centered on political and diplomatic history, primarily divides periods into 10-year units for discussion. While empirical research began to partially include the period from the 1980s onward, following the further advancement of the disclosure of diplomatic records, the depiction of the 1980s as “a narrative of US-Japan cooperation in the political realm in the context of a new Cold War, and on the other hand, a narrative of US-Japan confrontation and friction in the economic realm,” has not significantly changed. What awaits further progress in empirical research is Japan’s foreign policy and US-Japan relations during the last years of the Cold War.

It is, however, difficult to analyze the 1980s as a strictly defined period between 1979 and 1989. Considering the long-term trends in international politics and the developments in US-Japan relations since the 1970s, it appears necessary to discuss the history of US-Japan relations in the 1980s within a slightly expanded timespan, encompassing the changes in economic and security relations from the 1970s to the mid-1990s. The articles that make up this special issue are intended to contribute to the study of US-Japan relations during such a “long 1970s.”

This study examines the U.S.-Japan orange dispute during the Carter-Fukuda administration in the late 1970s, focusing on the impact of Kay Sugahara’s public relations and lobbying efforts. Sugahara, a former member of the American Council on Japan during the Occupation, later led Fairfield-Maxwell Corporation in the shipping industry. Amid worsening U.S.-Japan economic relations and financial difficulties within his company, he pursued a strategy linking American orange exports to Japan with Japanese automobile exports to the United States to ease trade friction. Utilizing the Kay Sugahara Papers housed at the University of California, Los Angeles, this study explores U.S.-Japan economic relations beyond intergovernmental negotiations, highlighting how Sugahara mobilized the American citrus industry and U.S. Congress to apply pressure on Japan.

Sugahara’s strategy was twofold. First, he sought to link the citrus issue with Japan’s auto exports to the United States, using a public relations strategy that promoted U.S.-Japan orange trade expansion as a mutually beneficial opportunity for both industries. This approach aimed to counter the growing momentum of Japan-focused protectionism in the U.S. Congress by emphasizing the interconnectedness of U.S.-Japan trade and economic interdependence. Second, he worked closely with major U.S. citrus industry groups, particularly Seald-Sweet Growers in Florida, to advocate for increased market access in Japan. He pressured U.S. trade officials to push for the seasonal liberalization proposal, which allowed imports only during Japan’s off-season for domestic citrus production. This proposal sought to accommodate Japan’s political concerns regarding agricultural voters while securing a limited opening of the market for U.S. citrus exports.

A key aspect of Sugahara’s lobbying strategy involved portraying Japan’s import quota system as a source of political corruption, using this narrative to strengthen U.S. pressure on Japan. He argued that the system primarily served to enrich influential members of Japan’s ruling party rather than protect domestic farmers or consumers. To advance this claim, Sugahara disseminated this narrative not only to major U.S. citrus industry leaders and senators from key agricultural states but also to American media outlets and policymakers. By framing Japan’s restrictive trade policies as benefiting a select group of politicians rather than the broader agricultural sector, he reinforced perceptions of Japan’s closed market and fueled American frustration with Japanese trade practices.

By focusing on Sugahara’s activities, this study examines the U.S.-Japan orange dispute during the Carter-Fukuda era from multiple perspectives, including diplomacy, politics, economics, and business strategy. Moving beyond the conventional framework of intergovernmental negotiations, this research highlights the complex interplay of various actors shaping U.S.-Japan economic relations. By doing so, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of how economic conflicts were influenced not only by official diplomatic efforts but also by private-sector lobbying, targeted political messaging, and strategic narratives.

This article explores the competition and cooperation between Japan and the United States regarding trade with China from 1977 to 1982, focusing particularly on computer exports. Both countries navigated the delicate balance between economic interests and security risks in their technology export negotiations. While Japan actively promoted technology exports to China after the 1972 normalization of diplomatic relations, the United States, concerned about technology leakage during the Cold War, imposed strict export controls, particularly on “dual-use technologies.” Despite these tensions, the two countries cooperated through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to adjust export controls and protect the security of the capitalist bloc.

Existing research on U.S.-Japan economic competition in the 1970s and 1980s largely focuses on trade issues like textiles and semiconductors, with limited attention to their complex interactions in third-country markets. This article addresses that gap by analyzing their competition and cooperation in dual-use technology trade with China. In the cases of Hitachi M-180 and IBM3033 computer exports, Japan and the United States initially clashed over export controls but ultimately reached a consensus to ease restrictions in the early 1980s. During the negotiations, Japan and the United States prioritized minimizing security risks over maximizing economic gains, agreeing that China’s military development posed little threat to the capitalist bloc and could support the containment of the Soviet Union. This shift in the U.S.-Japan partnership, from rivalry to cooperation based on shared economic and security interests, marked a significant transformation.

This article highlights the complexities of U.S.-Japan economic relations in a third-country context and provides insights relevant to contemporary U.S.-China relations and Japan-U.S. cooperation, emphasizing the importance of multilateral negotiations on technology trade and export controls.

This paper identifies the reasons for the expansion of the SDF’s overseas deployments after the Gulf War. The first overseas deployment by the SDF after the Gulf War came in the form of the 1991 deployment of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. Since then, the SDF’s overseas deployments have expanded to include UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), international emergency relief operations and overseas deployments for cooperation with the US.

Why did the US request the deployment of the SDF during the Gulf crisis, and why did it expand after the deployment of the SDF overseas? This paper aims to answer these questions. To answer these questions, the paper discusses the intersection of international peace cooperation and cooperation with the US from the perspective of the policy makers of the U.S. and Japan.

Since the late 1970s, as the new Cold War intensified, US-Japan defence cooperation advanced, but policymakers pursued their policies while fearing a backlash from public opinion. It was against this background that the Gulf crisis occurred. The US urged Japan to show its support for the US as an ally. This was the dispatch of minesweepers and supply ships. It was thought that this would demonstrate the unity of the multinational force. In practical terms, the US bases in Japan supported the global operations of the US military.

However, it was a difficult issue for the Japanese Government. Policymakers recognised the difficulties in dealing with the issue of SDF participation, and the situation remained the same. They sought to avoid mentioning the use of US military bases as well as cooperation with multinational forces.

On the other hand, there was a strong opinion that the Japanese Government should make a human contribution to the multinational force, which it is unable to do. The ceasefire in the Gulf War meant a release from the biggest factor that had previously restricted the deployment of the Self-Defence Forces. When talk of deploying minesweepers surfaced again, the Japanese Government moved to dispatch them. Since it was after the ceasefire, there was no fear of touching on constitutional issues. In addition, domestic and international criticism of the Japanese Government’s handling of the post-Gulf crisis, especially from the US, encouraged the dispatch of the Self-Defence Forces. Thus, the dispatch of minesweepers was realised. The success of the minesweepers completely changed the public’s evaluation of the SDF. With the completion of the deployment of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, Japanese public opinion became more supportive of the deployment of the SDF. Subsequently, the deployment of the SDF overseas, including participation in the Cambodian PKO, became firmly established.

On June 4, 1989, the Chinese government used force to suppress students protesting for democracy in Beijing. This event, known as the Tiananmen Square Incident, led Western countries to impose economic sanctions on China for humanitarian reasons. The Japanese government joined G7 countries in imposing de facto sanctions on China by announcing the postponement of the third round of yen loans. However, as a supporter of China’s reform and opening-up policy, the Japanese government sought an early lifting of the sanctions and achieved it at the G7 summit approximately a year after the incident. Following the removal of sanctions by Japan, other Western countries gradually normalized their relations with China, allowing China to escape international isolation.

This paper focuses on the developments in U.S.-Japan relations during the process of lifting sanctions on China, and it examines how the two governments promoted cooperation to avoid China’s international isolation. Prior works on Japan’s response to the Tiananmen Square incident are generally divided into two views: those that appreciate Japan’s response as active and those that criticize Japan’s response as passive. What is missing, however, is that most studies have not focused on the policy coordination between the U.S. and Japan under the premise that the two governments had common interests in China.

Hence, this paper analyzes the two governments’ initial contacts with China and the policy consultations between leaders and diplomats, drawing on unpublished documents from the U.S. and Japan. As a result of this research and analysis, it became clear that while the Chinese government attempted to encourage the Western industrialized countries to compete with one another for the early lifting of sanctions, Japan proceeded to restore relations with China without causing friction with the U.S.

Consequently, two conclusions could be drawn from these diplomatic interactions. First, the U.S.-Japan relationship regarding China after the Tiananmen Square incident had a dual nature; it consisted of cooperation and competition. Although there were temporary fluctuations due to some Japanese business missions to China and Scowcroft’s visit to China, this competitive relationship eventually converged with the cooperative relationship through the efforts of leaders and diplomats. Second, Japanese diplomacy at that time was not merely a passive subject influenced by U.S.-Sino relations but rather an active facilitator of change in U.S.-Sino relations. Since the improvement of U.S.-Sino relations was a condition for the restoration of Japan-Sino relations, the Japanese government succeeded in creating a favorable environment for the start of the third round of yen loans by indirectly working to improve U.S.-Sino relations.

For these reasons, I consider Japan’s response to the Tiananmen Square incident one of the successful cases of Japanese diplomacy.

This article examines the impact of external pressure (foreign pressure) on Japanese companies and the processes through which it operates, particularly by comparing the U.S.-Japan semiconductor friction of the 1980s and the U.S.-Japan automobile friction of the 1990s. Previous studies on external pressure have had two main limitations: (1) a tendency to overemphasize the influence of external pressure, and (2) a lack of focus on the domestic processes in response to such pressure. This paper analyzes the “relationship” between actors that succumb to external pressure and those that resist it, demonstrating that the degree of compliance with external pressure varies even in the absence of domestic actors who actively respond to it.

Specifically, this article explores why the semiconductor industry succumbed to U.S. pressure in the 1980s, whereas the automobile industry strongly resisted and overcame such pressure in the 1990s. One key factor identified in this study is the “difference in corporate structure.” The automobile industry consisted of specialized manufacturers, meaning that when external pressure threatened their sales, the entire company resisted. In contrast, the semiconductor divisions within diversified electronics conglomerates at the time were merely one part of a broader corporate portfolio. Because these conglomerates had weaker incentives to resist U.S. pressure as a whole, they were more susceptible to external pressure.

However, this article also highlights that corporate structure alone does not determine the degree of compliance with external pressure. In the 1990s, the growing market share of foreign companies in Japan’s semiconductor market weakened U.S. pressure, leading to the eventual repeal of the U.S.-Japan agreements. Additionally, the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 allowed the Japanese automobile industry to challenge the inconsistency of U.S. demands, strengthening its ability to resist external pressure. This was another crucial factor in why the automobile industry did not succumb to external pressure.

In conclusion, Japan’s concessions during the semiconductor friction of the 1980s were influenced by both a sense of guilt over past dumping practices and the structural weakness of semiconductor divisions within large electronics conglomerates. In contrast, during the automobile friction of the 1990s, the use of WTO mechanisms and concerns about industry-wide concessions to the U.S. enabled strong resistance. This difference suggests that one of the factors behind the decline of Japan’s semiconductor industry was its organizational position as merely a division within diversified electronics manufacturers at the time.

This article argues that learning from the experiences of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima has fostered the creation of a taboo aimed at prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in dialogues between Japan and the United States. The evaluation of the bombing has been a controversial issue between the two countries. Nevertheless, postwar Japan and the United States have sought ways to heal loss experiences by learning from memories of the atomic bomb. Finding the ways was a foundation for reducing tensions between them in the nuclear age.

The foundation for healing loss experiences caused by the atomic bombing should be the spread of the nuclear taboo as a normative consciousness. According to the nuclear taboo argument, the custom of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons has been established because such use cannot be morally justified. This argument coincides with the lesson that destruction akin to that of Hiroshima must never occur again, a lesson rooted in the memories of the atomic bomb. This suggests that these memories serve as foundation for the nuclear taboo. However, the origins of this taboo remain not fully understood. The limited understanding of these origins contributes to the ambiguity surrounding the foundation of the taboo.

To explain its origins, this article argues that educational activities aimed at understanding the atomic bombing, the damage it caused, and the reactions to these activities contributed to the development of the taboo through healing loss experiences between the 1970s and the early 1980s. The notable characteristics of these activities and the reactions were that individuals who experienced the bombing shared their personal accounts and presented related materials to others. Through their experiences, these individuals learned important historical lessons and played crucial roles as advocates for addressing the taboo.

A historical analysis of the roles of these individuals focuses on the interactions between Hiroshima survivors, other Japanese citizens and officials, and Americans related to the events. One noteworthy American figure is Paul Tibbets, the captain of the atomic bomber “Enola Gay.” Japanese protested against him when he reenacted the dropping of the atomic bomb by piloting a similar bomber at an air show in 1976. This study also examines the activities of Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator Mark Hatfield. Kennedy visited Hiroshima in 1978, where he learned about the necessity of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, influenced by his visit and the testimonies of four Hiroshima survivors during a Senate hearing in 1980. Hatfield supported an atomic bomb exhibition held in the Senate Office Building in 1980. Drawing lessons from the experiences of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima, Kennedy and Hatfield led the nuclear freeze movement in the United States.

It has been pointed out that Japan was passive in the Japan-U.S. economic frictions of the 1980s, and that the alliance between the U.S. and Japan suppressed escalation and other negative developments between the two countries. However, when Japan’s responses to the Japan-U.S. economic friction and the GATT are analyzed in comparison with the U.S.-China trade friction of the 2000s and China’s responses to the WTO, the characteristics of these responses become more apparent. Japan’s response to the GATT was to reach agreements that went as far as domestic institutional reform, as seen in the Japan-U.S. Structural Impediments Talks. In the GATT, Japan, as an advanced country, was working to liberalize trade and strengthen rules, including tariff reductions, and was responding in the direction of strengthening and developing the international order.

This is in contrast to China’s reluctance to take steps to reform its domestic institutions in the U.S.-China talks. As seen in the WTO reforms, including the Doha Round and the status of developing members issue, China has been reluctant after joining the WTO to bear the burden of reducing tariffs and strengthening rules beyond the commitments made at the time of accession. As a result, it must be pointed out that the international order of the WTO itself has been weakened.

Under the alliance known as the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan and the U.S. had a common goal of maintaining and strengthening the free trade regime and developing the world economy. Japan has positioned itself as a developed country, a member of the free world, and has sought to play an active role in maintaining and strengthening the international order by bearing a share of the burden commensurate with its own rapid rise to prominence. In contrast, it can be pointed out that China did not share the same objectives with the U.S. and did not necessarily have the idea of bearing a corresponding share of the burden. For the international order to be maintained and strengthened, it is essential that the major participating countries share the same objectives and bear their fair share of the burden.

The U.S.-Japan trade friction and the U.S.-China trade friction are instructive in considering what is important for the reconstruction and development of the current chaotic international order.

During the Pacific War, many Allied POWs were abused by the Japanese military and lost their lives. Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan stipulated that, “as an expression of its desire to indemnify” these POWs, Japan would hand over the property of neutral and former enemy countries to the ICRC for distribution to these Allied POWs and their bereaved families. The purpose of this paper is to examine the diplomatic negotiations over the process of implementing Article 16 of the Peace Treaty and to shed light on how the “intergovernmental settlement” over the issue of POW compensation was formed.

After the peace treaty entered into force, the Article 16 beneficiary countries, under the leadership of the United Kingdom, decided on a policy that Japan should hand over the £6 million to the ICRC in a lump sum, and urged Japan to implement the obligation promptly. In response, the Japanese government, which had been negative to begin with about the provisions of Article 16 deviating from the “generous peace” policy of the U.S., adopted a delaying tactic and did not readily agree to negotiations with the Allies, citing difficulties in asset valuation and claims against Japan from neutral countries. Negotiations were finally settled at the Ando-Roberts talks in October-November 1954 as a result of compromise on both sides. The background to the compromise on the part of the beneficiary countries was that the political status of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, on whom the British had been relying, had declined significantly due to the political situation in Japan.

Thus, when the Japanese government handed over £4.5 million to the ICRC in May 1955, it was considered to have fulfilled its obligation to compensate Allied POWs. However, during the negotiation process, the positions of Japan and the U.S./U.K. remained at odds over the issue of the disposal of assets in Thailand, and the $2.5 million handed over by the Thai government to the ICRC under Article 16 was not specified in the final document regarding the fulfillment of obligations, the Anglo-Japanese Exchange of Notes. The lack of an accurate explanation of the final amount of compensation left the Japanese people lacking accurate knowledge of the POW compensation issue and led to a decline in interest in the issue. Considering that the inhumanity of POW by the Japanese military was the source of anti-Japanese sentiment in the post-war period, the fact that the real picture of the implementation of compensation was not widely shared among the Japanese people can be said to have resulted in a distancing of “true reconciliation” or “reconciliation among the people” between Japan and the Allied Powers.