The purpose of this paper is to discuss the problems of making moral education a special subject and to make the role of philosophy of education clear. Thus, the purpose is twofold. On the one hand, the problems of making moral education a special subject are critically considered. On the other hand, through such a consideration of moral education, the role of philosophy of education is clarified. There are, however, too many problems that should be discussed. For example, what does it mean, after all, to make moral education a special subject? Why was the course of study revised in this way? Is there any reason why moral education is treated differently between public and private schools? It is difficult to address these and other problems comprehensively. So I will focus on some important issues. The outline of this paper is as follows. First, I look at the state of discussions on educational policy about moral education as a special subject. Second, I examine how the purpose and teaching methods of moral education are described in the course of study. Third, I discuss the issues surrounding religious education in private schools as a substitute for moral education. Fourth, with respect to the content of moral education, I examine the meaning of teaching moral values. Finally, from these considerations, I argue that philosophy of education is a branch of science necessary for the examination of moral education.

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Philosophy of education can make moral education as a school subject become a hopeful subject rather than a disastrous one by critically inquiring into the possibilities of what the subject can be. In this article, I try to propose the constitutive principles of moral education as a school subject. I do so by connecting the fundamental ideas of morality and education with the basis underlying educational practice. First of all, I distinguish two kinds of morality, which I call ‘natural morality’ and ‘human morality’ respectively. ‘Natural morality’ is shared by some other animals including anthropoids. Since it is learned through every life and practice, it is impossible to learn ‘natural morality’ in a classroom lesson alone. Learning ‘human morality’ is also possible through some institutionalized practices, though it requires some language and intellectual reflection. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to teach a certain ‘human morality’ as a good one in a classroom. That is because each ‘human morality’ has its own limitations besides advantages, and because moral education in public education should not interfere with people’s pursuing their own good. On the one hand, we refuse the idea of moral education as a school subject for teaching national morality besides ‘natural morality’ and ‘human morality’. We accept, on the other hand, the idea of moral education as a school subject for responding to increasingly complicated moral problems we face. Such moral education is necessary for nation states. In conclusion, moral education as a subject can be justified to the extent that it promotes both understanding of ‘human morality’ selected as a tool for moral problem solving and intellectual reflection on how we can utilize this tool. Our proposed moral education as a subject based on the idea of plurality of morality will contribute to vitalize the public sphere and to raise politically responsible citizens.

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The purpose of this paper is to criticize the assumption about the relationship between mind and world in moral education by focusing on John McDowell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. Some researchers have taken moral formation as the gradual development of interdependent relationships between moral principles and particular cases. Nevertheless, they fail to show that one can, together with others, criticize her own perception of a moral fact or property in a particular situation because her perception may be captivated by the dichotomic picture of mind and world. In order to help these researchers break out of the dichotomic picture, I compare Saul Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations with McDowell’s. Both regard the concept of a community of rule-followers as a precondition for being able to follow rules. Kripke appeals to that concept to bridge an abysmal gap between mind and world, because he thinks the correctness of each person’s interpretation of a rule depends on its correspondence with that of other community members. By contrast, McDowell argues that we should reject the idea of the abysmal gap between mind and world. In a parallel way, McDowell takes the concept of a virtuous person as a precondition of appropriate moral actions, refusing an abysmal gap between evaluation and descriptive fact. A virtuous person’s action is caused by her perception of the salient features of a particular situation, which is accompanied by her conception of how to live. Her appreciation of the situation is an ideal one. As finite agents, we should try to see aspects of the world as she would see them. Finally, I provide a new perspective on Aristotle’s practical syllogism, according to which a perception of the salient features of a particular situation (minor premise) helps us to make sense of a moral principle (major premise) and an action (conclusion). This perspective enables us to understand how one can criticize her own perception without being dizzied by the abysmal gap between mind and world.

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Moral education as a compulsory subject will start in 2018 at elementary school, and in 2019 at junior high school in Japan. Teachers will be obliged to use authorized textbooks and to assess morality of their students. The New Courses of Study, however, attaches importance to moral development through thinking and discussion. It is possible to think that more various approaches to moral education will be allowed than before. The purpose of this article is to advocate an approach to moral education based on Theodor W. Adorno’s thought on education and morality. According to The Authoritarian Personality, the egos of current people have become weak and heteronomous due to social compulsions. In Problems of Moral Philosophy Adorno argues that we know very well what the inhuman is, and that we can associate in order to avoid heteronomy. For Adorno, moral education is the education for autonomy. Its content is as follows: first, intellectual education which mediates between social criticism and self-reflection contending against current negative social conditions and the weakness of the ego; second, emotional education which cultivates negative impulses towards the inhuman by reproving children, with reasoned words, for their barbaric statements and behavior. It is the weakness of the ego that seems to cause some social problems, including children’s problems, in Japan. Some of social problems in Japan, not only in Japanese children, seem to be caused by the weakness of the ego. Adorno’s thought suggests moral education sustained by the hope of utopia. In cooperating with peace and human rights education, such moral education can cultivate individuals’ possibilities which help to overcome the weakness of the ego, barbaric moments and issues of identity politics.

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The purpose of this article is to clarify active roles that philosophy of education can play in teacher training for moral teaching. This research is primarily based on a reading of Durkheim’s L’éducation morale (Moral Education) and on reflective thinking upon multiple other texts. Part I of this paper discusses the foundation of morality and moral education. Part Ⅱ explores the meanings and challenges of moral education in school. Part Ⅲ considers moral education as a subject and that which supports it. Regarding the foundation of morality and moral education, there have traditionally been two major perspectives. On the first perspective, morality is clearly a set of knowledge acquired through rational discussion and education. On the second perspective, morality is something like an emotion that naturally comes and goes in people’s daily lives and customs. In reality, both of these two perspectives cooperate to sustain moral education in school. In a similar way, Durkheim discussed the meanings and challenges of moral education in school. What is especially important in actual educational practices is the spirit of discipline. It is moral education lessons that play a central role in creating a “warm classroom atmosphere.” A moral education lesson provides the time for students to learn “how to use their minds.” It is also the time to nurture children’s hopes and courage for the future. This requires teachers’ educational philosophical thinking that enables them to reflect on their own moral education lessons. Such thinking is indeed the foundation of practical “techniques” of teachers. In summary, in universities that offer teacher training for moral teaching, philosophy of education is expected to ignite a spirit of inquiry into moral education and moral education lessons. Thus, it lays the foundation for teaching. Therefore, philosophy of education should be actively practiced in “moral teaching methods” in the context of this unstable and uncertain age and society. As Durkheim also argued, philosophy of education and university teachers who teach it are now expected to provide ideas that guide educational practices.

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“An assigned school hour for moral education” is going to be changed to “a special subject: moral education” from 2018 in elementary school and from 2019 in junior high school. The immediate trigger for this change is the problem of ijime (bullying). We have data that shows that the number of juvenile crimes has decreased, not increased. In many schools, however, ijime, violence, and gakkyū hōkai (classroom collapse) are serious problems. Outside of the schools, many cruel crimes are committed by young people. These facts persuade people of the claim that the major factor causing these problems is the decline of young people’s morality. Moral education in school is the center of attention. But the problem is not so simple, because a more complex and fundamental issue is involved: how should the educational act be carried out? In this paper, I will address fundamental issues in modern education that have been investigated in philosophy of education. I will also inquire into issues in school moral education, exploring possible ways to resolve them. At the end of this paper, I am going to propose a new model of moral teaching and learning.

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A moral education lesson, which is carried out once in a week in the curriculum of elementary and junior high school, has become a subject in the course of study in 2015. This is a big change in the field of moral education in Japan after the institutionalization of a moral education lesson in 1958. In this paper I try to make clear that this change responds to issues which remain unsolved after the institutionalization of a moral education lesson in 1958. While the improvement of a moral education lesson moves in the right direction, such improvement could have been effected without making a moral education lesson a subject. I also point out that citizenship education can give helpful suggestions for the improvement of moral education. 296

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“Reticence” is the best word to describe the existing character of moral education in Japan. This has, however, been partially changing since the use of authorized texbooks was ordained by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in 2015. This reform has been set up in a hurry, without proper examination of the qualities of teaching materials for children. Japanese philosophers of education are partially responsible for the change because they have simply pursued a question of Socratic essentialism in order to seek one essential value, or have criticized teaching materials as if these were adult-oriented texts. This paper argues for the need for clinical moral education lessons that focus on the consciousness of children and employ “a method of association.” Children of ages appropriate for story experience the events of a story in a triangular relationship between themselves, teaching materials, and teachers in a classroom. Moral education lessons should be organized according to the reading style of children. As long as stories serve their needs, children can grasp the essence of the stories without stumbling over difficult words. New Japanese moral textbooks will arrange stories according to about twenty-two moral values, but each value will remain isolated from each other. China has an integrated form of moral education in which moral textbooks are combined with Geography, History, and Politics. This integrated view of the world, however, is largely oriented toward the legitimization of the Chinese Communist Party. If we want to place the focus of moral education on the needs of children, and expect moral values to be integrated in the life of children, we ought to support their self-esteem. Self-esteem enhances children’s disposition to judge values for themselves. This paper takes a moral education lesson as a model. This lesson successfully dealt with one of the twenty-two moral values as an aim of the lesson. It also accomplished the purpose of enhancing self-esteem. This paper describes a method to assess a change, through the lesson, in the consciousness of children. Clinical moral education lessons serve children’s needs, offering child-supportive learning. They nurture children capable of independent judgment, who are the basis of a democratic society. 294

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The thought of Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995) has been taken as a unique theory of the Other in the field of philosophy of education. His theory is known to argue for respect for the Other, which has been neglected in traditional Western philosophy. According to Lévinas, the Other is in a privileged position which cannot be grasped by cognition nor by perception. His theory is said to describe the ethical self that respects and communicates with the Other. Recently, Lévinas’s theory of the Other has been extensively discussed in philosophy of education. As a result, a new controversy has emerged over whether the thought of Lévinas is useful in educational relationships. In this controversy, the negative side argues that Lévinas’s thought should not be applied to educational relationships, and opposes the argument that the affirmative side presents. This is because both sides interpret Lévinas’s philosophy of language differently. The negative side’s argument is partly correct because it employs some concepts about language which Lévinas introduced in his later work. Although the argument is based on Jacques Derrida’s (1930- 2004) criticism against Lévinas, it is impossible to understand Lévinas’s thought only in connection with Derrida. In order to understand his thought, it is necessary to examine the self-referential character of Lévinas’s philosophy of language in his Totality and Infinity. This paper does this, identifying three characteristics of his theory of the Other. First, his theory is capable of various interpretations. Second, his theory places concepts into concrete situations to understand their meanings clearly. Third, his theory is constructed so as to be reinterpreted over and over again. These three characteristics of Lévinas’s theory of the Other enable us to recognize positively the continuation, restatement, and development of the controversy over the usefulness of his thought in educational relationships.

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The theory of educational relationships is one of the important themes in philosophy of education. The term “relationships,” however, has become a stereotype that conceals the question of who really is the “subject/agent” of education. In 2010, China launched a new national policy of education reform, which emphasized the subjectivity/agency of both students and teachers. Since then there has been much discussion in Chinese philosophy of education of how the subjectivity of students and that of teachers should be related to each other in education. One of the interesting differences between Japanese and Chinese theories is that the Marxist concept of “subjectivity” still plays an important part in Chinese thinking. This paper reviews and analyzes three typical theories of educational relationships in contemporary Chinese philosophy of education, all of which are based on the Marxist concepts of “subjectivity” and “inter-subjectivity.” In particular, it asks how Marxism and modern Western thought are connected to each other in these three theories. Feng Jian Jun, whose theory is based exclusively on Marx’s concept of “species-subject,” argues that the relationship between student and teacher is twofold: on the one hand, students are the object of teachers’ educational activities; on the other hand, both students and teachers are subjects/agents who use the same educational materials. Liu Jian Hua interprets Marx’s concept of “commerce” through the lens of Habermas’s theory of communicative action, and mainly highlights the “subjectsubject” relationship between teacher and student who share the same objects. Yan Cong Gen compares the Marxist concept of “inter-subjectivity” with those of modern Western thinkers, elucidating that there are three types of educational relationships: “subject-object,” “subject-objectsubject,” and “subject-subject.” These three theories provide us with models of educational relationships which enable us to consider key factors in education such as practice, body, and objectivity, illustrating the potential of the Marxist concepts of “subjectivity” and “inter-subjectivity” in philosophy of education.

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Over the past twenty years, the information technology revolution has given us freedom and equality. At the same time, it has also allowed the rise of a new form of power that Deleuze calls a “control society.” As a first step to consider the relationship between techniques and education in the present age, this paper examines how this relationship is conceived by a French philosopher, Bernard Stiegler. First, this paper analyzes Leroi-Gourhan’s concept of “exteriorization” and Heidegger’s concept of “a watch.” Both are concerned with the fundamental relationship between techniques and human beings. Through such an analysis, Stiegler defines a technique as “a trace that can go back to the memory of the distant past.” Second, this paper examines Jacques Derrida’s concept of “différance.” Stiegler describes différance as the relationship between techniques and human beings, clarifying that techniques and human beings are not in opposition to each other but in “composition” with each other. Thus, Leroi-Gourhan and Heidegger are criticized for describing the opposition between techniques and human beings. For Stiegler, education is the transmission of the memory of the distant past in composition of techniques and human beings. Education is therefore essentially a “technique.”

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