It is widely assumed today that philosophical reflection in the field of education is of relatively low relevance. Under the slogan of “what works”, this assumption is strengthened by a demand for hard evidence demonstrating the relevance of educational research. This article seeks to provide a cross-cultural perspective on the relevance of philosophical reflection, especially with regard to educational policy-making. It examines, firstly, German debates on the relevance of philosophical reflection in the field of education, regarding both the field’s presumed generality, and the extent to which its usefulness is empirically demonstrable. Secondly, it discusses how philosophical reflection in the field of education affects German educational policy-making after the so-called “PISA-Shock”: while proponents of philosophical reflection played a part in setting Educational Standards in line with the prevailing educational policy consensus, they also question this consensus by warning of the risks inherent in evidencebased research as a too-narrowly empirical method. In conclusion, the article compares the impact of philosophical reflection on educational policy in Germany with its impact in Japan. The perceived relevance of philosophical reflection in Germany is comparable to Japan, but a crucial difference exists in the degree to which its proponents are willing to engage in public debate.

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This paper aims to examine the relationship between “thinking” and “society” from the point of view of Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy. If we follow the traditional definition of thinking, according to which it would be a silent dialogue of the soul with itself, it would necessarily involve its detachment from the outside world. Such a definition, however, is exactly what Levinas tries to call into question: according to him, thinking occurs precisely through its contact with the exteriority, which is embodied as the thinker’s social relation with the other. In order to demonstrate such an affinity between thinking and society in Levinas, we will firstly investigate his original concept of “enjoyment.” This concept, which denotes the fundamental mode of human life, will enable us to see that thinking cannot begin as long as everything around one is internalized into one’s enjoyment. After having clarified that the exteriority one finds intervening in one’s enjoyment is that of the other, we will secondly try to elucidate the reason why the exteriority of the other constitutes the basic condition of one’s thinking. Opened by the encounter with the exteriority, thinking is now to be redefined as calling into question the naivety of the ego by accepting the other. Thirdly, by referring to Levinas’ notion of the “third person”, we will show that the ego’s dual relationship with the other implies in itself the ego’s relationship with others, and that, consequently, thinking inevitably takes into account, not only the other person with whom it faces, but also the interpersonal pluralism of society. The paper concludes by suggesting how the type of thinking which is called “philosophy of education” could discover society.

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In discussing the theme “Educational philosophy and society”, Spinoza’s theory of politics immediately springs to mind. Envisioning the present situation, that is, we can’t but suffer from the serious conflict between the ideal of symbiosis, which estimates highly pluralistic value, and exclusive emotions, Spinoza’s conviction, that human beings are naturally envious, prefer revenge, and aim at the domination over others, comes closer to our heart beyond the temporal isolation of four hundred years. As well known, Hegel is a person who has extensively developed a mutual recognition theory to consider the way of formation of modern civil society and symbiosis there. Hegel thinks that only when people limit their own power by themselves, mutual recognition can be accomplished. And such Hegel’s thought applies to Hobbes’ state theory, that is, people transfer their own survival rights (natural rights) to the highest authority (self- limitation) in order to escape from the war of all against all. Spinoza seeks to preserve natural rights against the traditional way of thinking, that is, only self- limitation can bring about mutual recognition. Spinoza believes that by conserving their nature of self-preservation, social members can form a society. Is this possible? Although cooperativeness is necessary for survival, Spinoza confirms that people are naturally captured by envy and revenge. As such it is necessary to create a mechanism to maintain cooperativeness. How does Spinoza think of the mechanism, through which people can maintain commonality, while maintaining their nature of self-preservation as it is? In this paper, I would like to explore in Spinoza’s thought the possibility of a mutual recognition theory which is exempt from the necessity of self- limitation.

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Philosophy of education is often defined as a practice of “critique.” It follows our expectation that criticizing education allows us to call into question the one-sidedness of our framework of educational thinking. According to Michael Walzer’s Interpretation as Social Criticism, criticism is a kind of social action. If our criticism of education can be equally regarded as social action, it will play a social role and have social relevance as well as educational effects. The educator is, however, not a philosopher. Consequently, some educators would say that philosophy as criticism makes our educational situation worse rather than better. They argue criticism cannot show any relevance to our education and society, because philosophizing about education has a possibility not only to destruct the existing institutions but to demoralize educators and work against everyday educational practice in an offensive or harmful manner. In this article, I reconsider such a basic dilemma, one which educational philosophers tend to face. To measure the distance between philosophy as a criticism and its social relevance, I reread John Dewey’s logic and action of social inquiry. Dewey left a meaningful phrase in his Art as Experience, that is “criticism is judgment.” He explained that the philosophy as “a criticism of criticisms” is nothing less than “judgment” and then proposed to understand the place of “judgment” firstly to grasp the nature of “criticism.” Through interrelating the idea of criticism as judgment with his examination of factors and functions of “judgment” in social inquiry explored in his other works, I reconstruct a vision of the philosophy as “judgment” and reinterpret his life and mind as philosopher of pragmatism against two kinds of critique, which were hold by revisionists and new pragmatists respectively. I conclude that, although the Deweyan version of pragmatism had difficulties in maintaining critical distance in relation to “corporate capitalism” and “social control” and to offer epistemic legitimacy based on the truth as an “ideal limit of inquiry” as Peirce expressed, Dewey presented that we must spend time “wandering in the wilderness,” and criticism as judgment need the courage and responsibility to find a way of inquiring pragmatically in the wilderness.

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Philosophy consists in what is grasped in conception, which is a reflected thought that has developed in an age for solving problems in the society in those days. That is to say, philosophy comes late for the age. Conception essentially functions as standard for making reference when we are confronted with a new problematic situation. But once the conception is fixed its position in the system of theories of philosophy, the conception tends to be examined in its distinction compared with other conceptions in that system. So philosophy diverges from the public interests or the taking part in the social problems. In order for philosophy to recover its original function, philosophy is required to be reduced into thought. Then philosophy would provide us with intellectual instruments to solve social problems. It is necessary for us to interpret the conception and conceive the intellectual interactions between a thinker and society. Moreover, we are required to find the similarities between the past and the present situation in society. If so philosophy could recover its original function as intellectual instruments for social reconstruction. In this article, John Dewey’s philosophy of education, which is distinguished as empiricism, is reexamined. I will try to reduce his philosophy into his thought. And I will analyze how his thought is born and formed through the interactions between he and the society in those days. Finally I propose the significance of Dewey’s philosophy of education for our current times.

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This paper concentrates on arguments put forth by Heinz-Elmar Tenorth, a German scholar who offers a scheme for the systematizing the confusion of pedagogical semantics in contemporary Germany, an impact wrought by the spread of the large-scale assessmets like PISA. First, the paper outlines the basic character of the German concept of “Bildung” in relation to the situation of the “education after PISA” and the associated changes it has brought on the educational science scene (section 1). Then, the origin and characteristic features of the scheme of “Bildungstheorie (philosophy of Bildung)” vs “Bildungsforschung (empirical research on human development)” are clarified, which has been popularized as a dichotomy for the systematization of the discourse around the “education after PISA”. In parallel, the importance of the peculiar standpoint of Tenorth within this “Bildung”-debate is emphasized (section 2). Specifically, we consider the form of argument through which Tenorth is able to criticize the critic of “Bildungstheorie” against “Bildungsforschung” and interpret PISA as a kind of “Bildungstheorie” (section 3). Finally, Tenorth’s argumentation is critically reviewed, with the result that the present “Bildung”-debate in Germany points to the relevance of philosophy of “Bildung” in the context of the present discussion about the “education after PISA” in Japan too. According to the research reported here, it can be confirmed that Tenorth has prepared the stage of the “Bildung”-debate by offering the schema of “Bildungstheorie” vs “Bildungsforschung”, and has also participated in the debate himself and observed critically the whole situation of such debate at the same time. Despite his critical standpoint against the argumentatations of philosophical researchers against empirical researchers, Tenorth continually acknowledges the importance of the concept of “Bildung” as a categorial idea. To this extent, the argumentation of Tenorth for PISA can be also interpreted as a cogent strategy aimed at the rebirth of philosophical “Bildungstheorie”.

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This article explores the attitude towards the past within the field and context of education that is required for the inter-generational succession and renewal of “the world.” It does so by considering the educational thought of Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). It focuses on the temporal dimension at the base of Arendt’s criticism of modern education, which reveals the meaning of “an attitude toward the past,” one that she regards as indispensable to education. Arendt suggests that the purpose of education is to renew “the world,” which is, otherwise, inevitably ruined without the coming of the new and young. However, as she acutely points out, education today faces a crisis. According to Arendt, this crisis takes place against the following backdrop: education must proceed in a world that is neither structured by authority nor held together by tradition. The question now arises, how can we deal with the past without a tradition that is able to explain it? Arendt’s interpretation of Walter Benjamin in Men in Dark Times may be helpful in answering this question. Arendt regards Benjamin as a master of sorts, one who has discovered new ways of dealing with the past. To borrow Arendt’s phrase, Benjamin did his thinking without a banister. This article consists of three attempts. First, it attempts to examine the difficulty and possibility of education Arendt gestures towards in her educational criticism. Second, it tries to clarify the meaning of “an attitude toward the past” in terms of the unique tense at the base of Arendt’s argument. Third and last, it works to present the significance in education, as well as in politics, of the she directs us towards.

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