The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent discussions on the relation-ship between the obligation to work and the social citizenship in France. Work is one of the primary obligations of citizens since the French Revolution, and the welfare state after the Second World War is constructed on the basis of this “centrality of work.” However, since the 1970s, as the working conditions has become more unstable, the correspondence between the obligation to work and the social citizenship (or the social right) has become the central object of political and philosophical debates. Three types of arguments can be distinguished: free work from social regulations and reduce public social security; implement new policies for “inclusion” and work-sharing in order to re-balance the social right and the obligation to work; redefine the meaning of work from “salaried work” to “activity.” These arguments illustrate the new confrontations about the future possibilities of the welfare state.
One of the thinkers whom Hayek praised very highly is Tocqueville. Hayek regarded Tocqueville as one of the best liberal thinkers of the 19th century who developed most successfully the political philosophy of the Scottish thinkers such as Mandeville, Hume and Smith. And the title of Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944) was named after what Tocqueville had called the “new servitude”. Evidently Hayek's argument on tyranny or despotism in the book had many similarities with that of Tocqueville in Democracy in America. However, there were, in fact, several big differences between them. Tocqueville defined individualism in a negative way: individualism “disposes each citizen to isolate himself from mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends”. But Hayek defined it in a positive way: the essential features of individualism were, for Hayek, “the respect for the individual man qua man”. While Tocqueville considered political freedom most important as a bulwark against the majority's tyranny or a new democratic despotism, Hayek considered economic freedom most important. Tocqueville endeavored to make the best use of democracy to make people good public citizens. But Hayek had skepticism and disappointment with democracy, which seemed to make Hayek resemble Plato rather than Tocqueville. These differences between them seem to pose a significant problem for state-society relationship in the contemporary world.
The role of voluntary associations is a focus of current democratic theories including civil society argument, radical democracy, and deliberative democracy. Though it is certain that associations often perform democratic functions, they also disturb democracy by demanding narrow group interests, suppressing the opinions of group members, and lacking the interest in coordination and compromise. Whereas the associationalism developed in the United States depends on voluntary associations excessively; the one in the United Kingdom has been paying a close attention to the inadequacy of associational effects. The legacy of the pluralist theory of the state is especially important in this regard. Comparing two strands of associationalism, it is clear that something is necessary to strike an appropriate balance between the democratic and undemocratic functions of associations. The key to the problem is the new understanding of representative democracy. Contrary to the idea that associatiomalism will eventually replace the state-centered politics, a strong but flexible state which can accommodate and coordinate a variety of associations is required. Without taking such a state into consideration, associationalism would not be able to realize stabilized and impartial democratic politics.
Society-State relationship is a classical theme in modern political theory. Nonetheless its national form is challenged by phenomena of globalization. In paragraph 1, we suggest to conceive this relationship in local, national and global contexts, considering that the experiences to cross borders characterize phenomena of globalization. The moment of moving from one milieu to another takes part in reality of society-state relationship, to the extent that it relates personal experiences to a collective dynamics or narrative. In paragraph 2, we examine immigration issues in contemporary France. Contrary to images that an event like suburb riots in 2005 might let believe, the history of immigration in France does not date from the period of decolonization. It amounts to saying that postcolonial immigrants of whom the majority came from extraeuropean countries occupy a specific place in this history. In paragraph 3, we discuss a postcolonial interpretation on writings of two great philosophers, Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt, proposed by Fraçoise Vergès. She interprets their texts about “boomerang effects” from colonies to home country in relation to contemporary French politics.
Recently, there are many articles with which SDPJ is dealt. The aim of this article is to investigate the formation process of the proposition “kouzou-kaikaku” (the reform plan of SDPJ) and to verify how the plan had held place in SDPJ at that moment. Especially I will focus on the rising and fall of the faction “Eda-Ha” which was represented by Eda Saburou (one of the influential reformers in SDPJ). It would have intended to reform SDPJ in large measure in 1960's. But in spite of its passion, the reform faced the various oppositions by the major (left) factions within SDPJ. As the consequence, Eda-Ha failed to reform SDPJ. We can see many reasons why the theory “kouzou-kaikaku” has lost its position in SDPJ. Up to this time, it is said that the decline of Eda-Ha with the intention of the reform caused to the decline of SDPJ. I present other reason of the decline from the alternative points of view. By doing so, I intend to contribute further development of the studies on SDPJ.
Though the state has been the main topic in political theory, it hasn't been the case in feminism. But in recent years feminists have begun to pay attention to the state and state theory. So my research question is how feminists should theorize the state. I argue three points in order to answer this question. Firstly feminists can't see the state as essentially patriarchal, because state is constructed through discursive struggles. Secondly it is important that both civil society and mediation channels are democratic, if state is to be non-patriarchal. So feminist state theory can't be the theory focused on the state exclusively. Finally for feminists it is insufficient to think only about the relationship between state and civil society. Because feminists have criticized public/private distinction, feminist state theory must take this distinction into account. There are some qualitative differences between public realm including civil society and private realm such as family. But we should not see these boundaries as fixed. We go on deliberating whether these boundaries are appropriate or not. That is why ‘politics as public action” is significant.
This paper focuses on the “Nihon Kaika Shoshi” (or Short History of Japan's Civilization); the masterpiece of Taguchi Ukichi (1855-1905), and tries to reconstruct the appropriate context in which this text should be placed. When, in Part Five of the book, Taguchi discussed the decline and fall of Tokugawa government, one of the contexts he was attempting to address clearly was the row among his contemporaries over the institution of parliament. Unlike early Fukuzawa Yukichi before “Minjo Isshin”, Taguchi understands Parliament as one of the tools for channeling passions and interests of the people. Although he maintained that self-love is an indivisible feature of human nature, he did not think market should be the final arbiter between self-loves, not because market is imperfect, but because passions of self-love take various forms in various historical circumstances. Altruistic ideologies (such as Confucianism or Bushido) also represent transformations of self-love. These ideologies Taguchi consequently described as political passions which destroyed the Pax Tokugawa. Parliament is another kind of market, a place of exchange not only of interests but of political passions, and it is a necessary safety valve for maintaining stability and peace in government.
This paper analyzes political determinants of the pace of three dimensions of financial reforms in developing countries: privatization of banks, enhancement of banking supervision, and capital account liberalization. The pace of financial reforms refers to the degree to which a country speeds up financial reforms. I argue that the IMF conditionality programs play a role in speeding up the pace of each of the three dimensions of financial reforms. However, these IMF effects are conditioned by the number of veto players; namely, as the number of veto players increases, these IMF effects tend to decrease. Further, I predict that the stronger the influence of the manufacturing sector in a country, the quicker the pace of privatization of banks and capital account liberalization with the enhancement of banking supervision as an exception. Also, countries with a stronger influence of the banking sector tend to delay all three dimensions of financial reforms. These arguments were quantitatively assessed employing event history method. Results demonstrated that the IMF's impact on financial reforms is contingent upon the number of veto players as hypothesized. In addition, the effects of the manufacturing sector were confirmed, while the effects of the banking sector were not.
This paper examines the relationship between a democratization of party leadership selection and party organizational change in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party, the long ruling party, became used to utilizing votes by party members as a method of electing its presidents. Compared with the Democratic Party of Japan, the second largest party, LDP has a much larger number of members, but its factional linkage which holds diet members and rank and file party members together has dwindled. By contrast, the organizational support base of DPJ remains weak, so the demand of local party organizations for votes by party members does not increase. In sum, as a result of many LDP members voting individually, they are coming on the stage of party leadership selection as new actors. Both because the incentives of candidates and members change, votes by party members became popular in LDP.
This article examines the struggle for the control of the army between the army and political parties. In prewar Japan only military offices could assume the military ministers. It has commonly been accepted that this rule made it difficult for civilians to control the Army and it was the decisive power resource of the army. However, this view cannot explain why party cabinets between 1924 and 1932 failed to institutionalize civilian control over the army and how the army reacted to the establishment of party politics in this period. This paper mainly provides two new views. First, in the 1920s, the army agreed reluctantly to give up military minister posts to parties due to the rise of parties. Second, in spite of this compromise of the Army, the Army still maintained these posts because the prime ministers and the army ministers agreed to avoid a rapid rule change and control the army by their leadership. The failure of civilian control in prewar Japan did not stem solely from formal rules. Party cabinets could develop their power and control the Army by aggressively enforcing formal rules and taking their initiative. Yet, they failed to establish their political supremacy over the Army in the 1920s and it led to militarism afterward.
‘There is something troubling in this type of case, in that the desire for honour, command, power and glory usually exist in men of the greatest spirit and most brilliant intellectual talent. Therefore one must be all the more careful not to do wrong in this way,’ Cicero said in On Duties referring to Julius Caesar. Agreeing with him, John Locke tries to tame the dangerous aspect of ‘the desire for honour, command, power and glory,’ that is, human pride. However he sees this passion as indispensable to human freedom and therefore a free civil society, in contrast to Thomas Hobbes, who attributed the cause of the Civil War to this passion. In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke outlines a free civil society on the basis of human pride. In a polite and civilized society where the ‘Law of Opinion or Reputation’ prevails, human pride can be moderated and cultivated into public spirit based on individual autonomy and freedom. For Locke, civil society is not merely a counterpart to absolute monarchy, but also a basis of human civility, that is, a civilized society.
This paper examines how and how much the levels of political knowledge affect voting behavior in Japan. By adding interaction terms of political knowledge scale and other independent variables to the baseline logit model, the analysis demonstrates that the impact of party evaluation, issue attitudes, and pocketbook evaluation is conditioned by the levels of political knowledge. That is, the effect of party evaluation on voting behavior is significantly stronger among politically knowledgeable voters; political unawareness prevents voters from connecting their issue attitudes with voting decision; the politically less well-informed tend to rely on retrospective pocketbook evaluation when they vote. These findings suggest that taking account of the conditioning effect of political knowledge is critical to make sense of Japanese voting behavior.
This thesis revisits “Twenty Years’ Crisis” and considers what E. H. Carr means by “realism.” Since the 1990s, many works have challenged the stereotyped picture of a “realist Carr.” Now we know much about a “non-realist” Carr, but there still remain a lot of questions about Carr's “realism.” Contrary to the prevailing image of anti-idealism, Carr's “realism” is a “weapon” to demolish the inequalities between nations, and to rebuild a more equal order. During the 1930s, the “idealists” such as Norman Angell and Leonard Woolf abandoned their optimistic beliefs in public opinion, and advocated the League sanctions against the fascist countries. Together with the pacifists, Carr criticized the League sanctions as a superficial solution, and insisted that the fundamental problem was the inequalities between the “have” and “have-not” countries. His criticisms toward the League were not a denial of the League itself. He criticized the “Coercive League,” which was hostile to the “have-not” countries, but supported the “Consultative League,” which functioned as a forum between the “have” and “have-not.” Now we are in the long fight against terrorism. Global terrorism is, in part, a reaction to global inequalities. Carr's “realism” tells us that military actions alone never beat global terrorism.