The burden of this article is twofold. First, it is aimed to elucidate the explosion of violence observable in various regions of the world during the post-Cold War era. In this connection the author has attested the diversification of the types of violence. Violence can be correctly divided into several types today. They are, for instance, (1) structural violence emanating from the capitalist globalization, (2) genocide stemming from the intensive conflicts among ethnic groups within a country, and (3) international terrorism and counter-terrorist wars. Second, the article has wrestled with the fatal conflict between the two conceptions of politics, that is, political violence vs. nonviolent politics. The author has taken up the case of Thomas Hobbes and his political notion of “fear” and Hannah Arendt's ideas on politics as the mode of nonviolent solution for conflicts by means of speech and action. The author has elaborated on the difference between “fear” and “terror” or “terrorism.” He also has reflected on the tension, difference, and contrast between violent politics and nonviolent politics. Finally, the author has suggested that a precious and noble mission of the theory and praxis of politics today consists in the rehabilitation of transformative politics and in the long, patient and untiring undertakings for conflict resolution and peace-building as well. The author hopes that these steady efforts shall serve to put an end to the on-going conflicts and explosion of violence.
Ethnic Cleansing (EC) became a widely used expression during the Civil War in Bosnia in 1992-1995. But EC has a long history, and we can find examples of EC wherever violent conflicts happen on a large scale. We may have various kinds of images regarding EC. For example, when we received information about EC in the case of Rwanda, we may have imagined a situation where “soldiers” carried out various atrocities, and ordinary people fanatically killed others. In the case of the Holocaust carried out by the Nazis, we may have quite a different image, for example that EC was dispassionately carried out under the direction of political or military leaders. Why do we have such diverse images of EC? Firstly, EC is typically carried out by three different kinds of participants: (i)ethnonationalistic politicians, senior civil officials and military officers; (ii)individuals with lower status in the military, police, and paramilitary forces; (iii)ordinary people. Secondly, participants take part in EC for their own motive(s). Lastly, collective mentality has an influence upon the acts of participants.
Between the 1950s and 1970s the world politics was dominated by revolutionary movements in the Third World and the hero of the age was Che Guevara. The Palestinian liberation movement emerged in that era. This article analyzes the evolution and devolution of the Palestinian liberation movement by regarding it as one of the revolutionary movements in the Third World. After discussing general arguments over revolutions in the World Politics, this article treats the development of the Palestinian liberation movement and the change in its attitude toward armed struggle. Armed struggle by the Palestinian national movement and regional politics in the Middle East influenced each other. Armed struggle by Palestinian guerrilla groups stimulated the 1967 War, which resulted in changes in their attitude toward armed struggle and the shift in the agent of liberation. The Palestinian Revolution encouraged the Lebanese Civil War. The coalition group between the Palestinian liberation movement and Lebanese progressive groups was opposed to the Lebanese conservative groups. The 1982 War had a crucial effect on the fate of the Palestinian Revolution.
Indonesia is widely regarded as a hotbed of transnational violent crime in Southeast Asia. Terrorists and criminal rings have developed cross-border networks rooted in Indonesia. These ‘non-state actors’ quickly emerged as major concerns for post-Suharto governments, posing serious threats to the national security and economy. In response, various ‘wars on crimes’ have been initiated in the name of combating these threats. This article aims to elucidate the politics behind the making of these ‘wars’ by examining the ‘war on drugs’ led by the police (and the national narcotics agency) and the ‘war on terrorism’ orchestrated by the army. I argue that the threat is undoubtedly real, but war campaigns are designed to promote a political strategy of instrumentalizing the threat of transnational violent crime. With this strategy, both the police and the army were able to deflect criticism, reclaim ground lost during the democratization movement, and articulate this revanchism in the legitimizing vernacular of ‘global wars.’ In this sense these security actors are hijacking the ‘violence of non-state actors’ as a Trojan horse to regain power, build budgets, strengthen institutions and undermine reform pressures.
The Commission on Historical Clarification in Guatemala (CEH) organized by the United Nations based on the Peace Agreement signed by the Guatemalan Government and the URNG, recognized that the Army and other agents of the Guatemalan State, inspired by the Doctrine of National Security, committed acts of genocide against the Maya people. The CEH named three mutually-dependent “structural” or “historical” causes of genocide: economic exploitation, racism and political authoritarianism. In this article, the analytical framework composed by the combination of four types of violence, (1) Direct political, (2) Structural, (3) Symbolic, and (4) Everyday forms of violence, is used to find out the continuing structure of the state violence which lead to genocide, as well as the changing forms and expressions of the political violence in the aftermath of genocide, focusing on the political impact of the act of “naming genocide” and the “privatization of the violence.”
Recent internal conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have witnessed governments employing militias to complement and enhance existing national armies, or as alternative forces altogether. Use of militias in counter-insurgency operations has brought about tremendous human casualties and material damages. The paper attempts to elucidate the meaning of this particular type of violence from an empirical as well as theoretical point of view. Through four case studies of militias in Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan as well as through examination of the notion of militias within an African political context, it becomes evident that African militias are generally not regulated by formal law, and tend to be formed and supported from political leaders above. In conclusion, the paper also draws relationships between the militia phenomenon and the nature of post-colonial African states, which have assumed strong patrimonial characteristics. In recent conflicts, African political leaders have often preferred militias to weak national armies that have been personalized through long-term patrimonial rules.
Aung San Suu Kyi receives a high valuation on her contribution on leading a non-violent democratic movement under the military ruled Burma. She was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. However, her principle of non-violence is not exactly the same as M. Gandhi's moral understanding of non-violence which does not allow any violent means in the political movement. Her principle includes an aspect of political tactics. She insists that a non-violent means is especially necessary in Burma, since it will bring the end to a chain of violence in politics which has existed throughout the modern history of this country. At the same time, she says that the non-violence is not always the only means in political movements. Reflecting her principle, the Burmese political activists in Thai-Burma border possess flexible understanding of non-violence. They basically agree with the importance of non-violence in their movement for democracy, but simultaneously they think that armed struggles are necessary when they have to protect themselves from the attacks of Burmese Armed Forces. They say that this right of self-protection has ever denied by Aung San Suu Kyi. On the other hand, the activists of ethnic minorities have a tendency to explain their self-protection right as a natural one, not as a flexible understanding of non-violence principle that stems from Aung San Suu Kyi.
This article explains the fundamental change of the Indian party system at state level (Bihar) by new approach, focusing on the process of the caste/religious riots. In India, the “Competitive multi-party system” has emerged after the collapse of the “one-party dominant system” by the Congress party since 1989. In this new system, no party can hold dominant position in central parliament and every party competes for votes as equal participant. Throughout this process of political change, the caste and religious identities had become critical political issues, and simultaneously the caste/religious riots happened repeatedly. Why did this political change happen? In analyzing the detailed process of political change, the impact of violence, that is, the government's response to the caste/religious riots can be an essential explanatory variable. Previous studies of political change have treated the riots as exceptional cases or as the explained variables. On the other hand, Riots study in India concentrates on explaining the cause of the riots. My approach can make contribution not only to the study of the political change, but also to the study of the riots in India.
In the history of political thought, human pride, a feeling of excellence, linked with desire of honour and reputation, has been a cornerstone for political liberty. However, since sixteenth century many thinkers have attacked pride as vanity. The contemporary studies such as Strauss’ have claimed that Hobbes’ Leviathan used the term in this bad sense. Certainly, Hobbes emphasized equality of human kind and recognized its dangerous side as ‘vain glory’ leading to the civil war. Nevertheless, in his volume, pride can be equated with generosity or self-confidence as a virtue. The passion in a true and good sense is rather the inner feeling of one's own powers based on one's actual merits. For Hobbes, it works as motivation to help to the others, or appears as courage against ‘fear’ in his covenant theory.
In a “yes or no” type referendum, people are forced to choose “all or nothing” on a specific issue. However, voting for “yes” or “no” may not be the optimal behavior for those who have neutral attitude toward the issue. In this paper, I analyze the degree to which the choice set of “yes or no” is adequate for referendums and the degree to which referendums can work as a policy-making device for discovering the “will of the people.” The data is based on a mail survey conducted in Iwakuni City of Yamaguchi Prefecture. Although Iwakuni voters “disapproved” of transferring extra forces from an-other base to Iwakuni by an overwhelmingly large margin in the referendum, respondents were divided when I asked them a question that included a choice that considering the financial benefits brought about by presence of U.S. forces. The case of Iwakuni suggests that the “will of the people” cannot be settled with a single balloting and that using a referendum is not necessarily the most appropriate approach when an intermediate solution is available.
Harold Laski was once a popular political theorist in postwar Japanese politics. This paper examines the ‘Laski boom’ in the 1950s by comparing three Japanese political scholars: Masao Maruyama, Yoshihiko Seki, and Yasuzo Suzuki. While Maruyama depicts Laski as a consistent thinker, Seki stresses Laski's waver in his theory of state and liberty. Meanwhile, while holding a Marxist perspective, Suzuki sincerely accepts Laski's individualism and his theory of liberty. Through the comparison, we shall comprehend that Maruyama and Suzuki similarly appreciate Laski's political ambivalence between western democracy and communism. However, this paper also suggests a curious irregularity that Maruyama was attracted to Laski's gradual commitment to communism, and that Suzuki learned liberal theory of right from Laski. In conclusion, Laski's dilemma was also the shared dilemma of Maruyama and Suzuki, and this paper proves the ‘Laski boom’ in postwar Japanese politics as the intellectual cross-point where these political scholars intersected.
Clientelism affects strategies of extreme right-wing parties (ERPs) in Western Europe. In 1990s, more and more people criticized clientelisitic exchanges than before. Some ERPs could find ‘niche’ in electoral market where voters who disliked mainstream parties because of clientelism existed. But how ERPs mobilized was very different between parties. This article compares electoral market in three European countries where clientelism widely spread and analyzes how clietelism affected ERPs’ strategies. In Belgium, clietelism had endurance in spite of critics. In Italy, clientelism so suddenly broke down, that ERPs must change their strategies. In Austria, mainstream parties gradually privatized nation-owned industries which were major resources of clientelism. These differences influenced electoral market which ERPs could get into. With this comparison, we can see how ERPs adjust themselves to the ‘niche’ in electoral market, and why some parties like Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) could formed the electoral coalition between “modernization losers” and “social climbers”.