Spain, Portugal and Greece were hit by a series of sharp exogenous crises including European debt crisis in the 2010s, during which they experienced drastic changes in party systems. The purpose of this paper is to identify how the structure of competition between political parties changes during a series of crises. In this paper, the decline of cartels of mainstream parties, “crisis of representation”, and the rise of non-mainstream challenger parties are depicted, following Kenneth Roberts’ model. In these countries, the blame game between mainstream parties, the degree of de-legitimation of the existing democracies, and the degree of success of challenger parties as an “movement parties” were different. The dimensions of conflict brought about by the first crisis and the second crisis are also different, and in some cases, the sharpening of particular domestic crises was added. We need to take these deviations into account in order to explain the major variations in the current state of the party system of the three countries: the punctuated equilibrium of the two-party system in Greece, the continued open competition due to the half-destruction of the mainstream cartel in Spain, and the addition of a repertoire of government formation in Portugal.

This paper examines trends in political party support among young people in Poland. In Poland today, young men tend to favor the Confederation, Liberty and Independence (Konfederacja), which advocates anti-Europe position, while women tend to favor the left (Lewica), which values women’s positions and LGBT rights. In this regard, the fact that each party has succeeded to some extent in attracting young people who think their interests are not reflected in the government of the Law and Justice (PiS) has worked. However, one of the main reasons that has brought the gender gap in support of political parties is that eurosceptic and anti-gender attitudes are linked in the sense that they oppose the coercion from the European Union. In the future, we have to examine how this rivalry will change as the younger generation becomes the center of society.

This paper focuses on the Czech Republic, one of the new democratic states in East-Central Europe, and identifies the characteristics of the new party, ANO, which has played a central role in the post-2013 changes in Czech party politics. ANO has attracted support by appealing valence issues without taking ideological positions. ANO’s policy appeal is not limited to anti-corruption, but includes the rationality and efficiency of its policies for a better life. ANO uses public opinion polls for policy making and advertises its ability to implement policies. In terms of party organization, entrepreneur Babiš plays a major role in the establishment and decision-making of ANO. ANO’s communication with voters is conducted through political marketing using outside experts. The party structure, which also includes local branches, is centralized and operated in a top-down manner, and corporate personnel practices are employed. The success of ANO has weakened positional party rivalry, strengthened the consumer aspect of citizens’ political behavior, and brought about a change in Czech party politics.

European mainstream parties have faced decline for decades. Nevertheless, few studies have considered how mainstream parties have caused and reacted to such a decline. This paper argues that supply-side factors of party organization, i.e., organizational strength and leadership centralization, should be the keys to addressing collective action problems with the coordination between leadership and activists/supporters. Such coordination should be a driver for decline than demand-side factors like voter realignment and populist surge.

  To test this argument, this paper explores a distinct pattern of decline in Italy. In contrast to Western Europe, where the center-left has been contracting more, the center-right Go Italy/People of Freedom has declined far more than the center-left Democratic Party. The paper examines the effects of organizational strength (local and collateral organization) and leadership centralization (candidate selection and party personalization to leaders) using regression and case studies. It shows that local organizations can suppress decline, while affiliate organizations can promote it when they are strong. The centralization of candidate selection can prevent decline more than party personalization can.

  The paper finds mixed evidence for the nexus between party organizations and decline. However, it contributes to the understanding of the decline of mainstream parties in Europe beyond the Italian case.

Mexico’s political party system was remarkably stable and institutionalized compared to other new democratic countries in Latin America. However, the recent rise of Morena and its leader, López Obrador, poses signs of change in the existing system. This article examines what type of change the Mexican party system has marked in recent electoral cycles. Drawing on the literatures on party system dealignment and realignment in Latin America, I use 2018 election data from a public opinion survey to better identify the type of change and its mechanism. The evidence suggests that the Mexican case shows similarity with the dynamics of party system dealignment and collapse where the parties lose ties to large swaths of society and, as a result, people reject not just the incumbent but the entire menu of options in a party system. At the same time, the Mexican system experienced an abrupt realignment, which set the traditional parties on the right of the political spectrum, and Morena on the left. I also examine the effect of organized crime and violence on partisan support.

Estonian stable party politics experienced several changes in the late 2010s; the rise of populist radical-right party EKRE, which was unseen to the Estonian political scene, and their coalition formation with an established centre-left prominority Centre Party.

  There are several factors behind this party system change; 1) these seemingly opposite-polar parties have commonality as both have opposed the long-term government by the centre-right liberal parties, which had been in power for a long time; 2) analysis with our survey data shows that there are certain regional biases on their voter loyalties after the coalition formation; 3) A qualitative study suggests that both parties may have deployed non-programmatic strategies to build strong linkages with voters in their respective base regions.

  This study implies that political parties have been able to renew government formulas that was impossible before by strengthening their organisational linkages with the electorates. We could evaluate this as the opposite pattern of the party system change seen in advanced democracies (e.g. western Europe), where such party system change occurred with weakening the party-voters linkages and so-called ‘dealignment’.

Democrats reject epistocracy, which distributes political influence unequally according to knowledge and ability, and favor universal suffrage, which distributes political influence equally. On the other hand, most democrats accept limiting suffrage to adults because children lack the necessary skills to be voters and representatives.

  This paper argues that democrats are inconsistent in denying children’s suffrage based on ability while criticizing the unequal distribution of political influence based on ability in epistocracy. Since there can be no justification for depriving children of suffrage other than ability, democrats must choose one of two paths. The first is to support genuine universal suffrage, including for children. The other is to support universal suffrage for adults only, accepting that this is a departure from the democratic ideal. This article further shows that choosing the former and granting suffrage to children would not significantly burden democrats and points out the difficulties in choosing the latter and supporting universal adult suffrage.

This paper examines the justifiability of restrictions on the rights of foreign workers under the Temporary Labour Migration Programs (TLMPs), including Japan’s Technical Internship System and Specified Skills System. It focuses on Martin Ruhs’s argument regarding TLMPs, which systematically provides a shared rationale for TLMPs and has had a significant impact on the recent migration policy documents of international organizations. After analytically reformulating his arguments as the “Voluntary Consent Argument” and “Resource Scarcity Argument”, this study critically examines both arguments, respectively. TLMPs are often regarded as transactions or contracts between foreign workers and the people of the receiving country. Therefore, as a criterion for judging the appropriateness of Ruhs’s arguments, the author adopts the notion of retributivity, which has been widely used to evaluate the appropriateness of transactions. On this notion, the appropriateness of TLMPs is judged in terms of whether the share earned by foreign workers under these programs is not “too small”. The paper concludes by showing that even in light of the most compelling rationale offered by the Resource Scarcity Argument, the share enjoyed by foreign workers under the TLMPs is too small to justify the restrictions on the workers’ rights.

This paper examines the factors behind the formation and fluctuation of macro-level Cabinet support using public opinion poll data from Jiji Press. Applying Stimson’s dyad ratios algorism to the reasons of cabinet support, I extract two moods: “valence support” mood and “vague support” mood. The vague support mood was higher during the 1955 system, and the valence support mood was higher after the collapse of 1955 system, implying cabinet support became more based on the evaluation of competence after the end of the LDP dominance and institutional reform. The combination of the two moods explains 93% of the cabinet approval rate. Then I analyse the relationship between the economic indicators and moods using the Vector Autoregression Model. Results show the Nikkei Stock Average is associated with the valence support mood, while the GDP growth rate is associated with the vague support mood. Voters have used the economic situation as a factor to decide cabinet support. However, the vague support mood, which was higher under the 1955 system, was based on economic growth, while the valence support mood, which became important after the 1955 system, was influenced by the Nikkei Stock Average.

When is it possible for intervening states to decide on the withdrawal from armed peace operation? According to previous studies that focus on the withdrawal of countries that contribute troops, the decision is taken when governments anticipate that their voters in the upcoming national election will blame them for the increase in casualties of their troops. However, this immediate blame avoidance model fails to explain the withdrawal of the operation leading country because the leading country aims to avoid not only immediate blame but also future blame. If the security of intervened state deteriorates after the withdrawal, the leading country will be blamed for the failure to promote lasting peace. This study argues that it is possible for the operation leading country to decide on withdrawal when it can shift the responsibility of the deterioration of local security to other actors. The target domestic actor tends to be the previous administration that decided on the intervention while the target foreign actors tend to be international organizations and the intervened state itself. Here, the focus is on whether they can shift the responsibility to foreign actors, because it is more important to obtain as much support from the international community as possible to justify the withdrawal. This study tests this new future blame avoidance model through the case studies of U.S. led interventions in Somalia and Iraq.

The abuse of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution during the late presidency of Hindenburg has been criticized in many previous studies as one of the key factors of the collapse of the Weimar Republic that led to the establishment of the Third Reich, resulting from the lack of understanding of the parliamentary democracy. Whereas those criticisms have arisen primarily from the analysis of the consequences, this paper analyzes the issue of the executed presidential emergency powers with an integrative approach by comparing the arguments by Preuß, the drafter of Article 48, and Schmitt, taking into account the perspectives of members of the constitutional assembly as well as their contemporaneous intellectuals. While Preuß and Schmitt may appear generally contrastive in their beliefs and theories, some implicit logical agreements are observed, such as those on their interpretations of the relation between the first and the second sentences in Article 48, paragraph 2, and their thoughts regarding the handling of the law of the Reich that should be in Article 48, paragraph 5. With the findings of their commonalities and others in their theories, this paper attempts to contribute to refining the current systems of law and democracy for emergency situations in various contexts.

This article examines the establishment and functioning of the Central Cooperation Council (CCC) of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. We analyze the extent and degree to which the CCC succeeded in fulfilling its function of gathering public opinion and communicating it to the government; further, we examine whether this grassroot-level information obtained from the CCC influenced the administration and policymaking process. Our objective is to reevaluate the role of the CCC and thoroughly elucidate the expression and consideration of public opinion in Fascist Japan. The article presents some interesting findings. People who were denied the right to vote, such as women, were also appointed as CCC members. Several concerns were raised to the CCC, including those pertaining to people’s lives, and the government took action to resolve a considerable number of them through administrative orders and policies. Based on the findings, we conclude that, through the CCC, people’s opinions were expressed and delivered to the government, and to a certain degree they were reflected in the administration and policymaking process. In addition, this study shows that examining the role of the CCC enables a more accurate understanding of the expression and consideration of public opinion in Fascist Japan.

This paper shows that Machiavelli (1496–1527) keeps warm the people (il popolo) from the 1510s–1520s, and the people cannot occupy the prestigious position in the state in Machiavelli’s thought. Whereas The Discourses on Livy highlights the accusation of the tribune of plebs, its abuse and aggressive expansion is the pestilence to be corrected. Thus, the tribune of the plebs is never the ultimate solution to keep the balance between the competing entities. This affair stems from the evils of the plebs. For example, there is no assumption of infallibility in Machiavelli’s plebs, and the plebs are no less ferocious than the nobles. In this case, Machiavelli depends on the plebs because the plebs are less inclined to fall into error than the others (the nobles / the princes). Therefore, the creation of the tribunes of the plebs and the expansion of the plebs’ power cannot guarantee the equilibrium between the adversaries in Machiavelli’s thought. Besides, he follows this negative position from the 1520s.

The aim of this article is to provide an answer to the following question: in response to the present situation where the prosperity of some people is conditioned on the victimization of other people and non-human species, these non-human species are sending various signals, but how can we learn to hear them not just as signals, but as ‘voices’? The article also answers the question of how we can imagine agents of democracy that go beyond humanity. By so doing, it strives to achieve substantial results in preventing environmental destruction. The article is premised on the understanding that non-human challenges, such as the climate crisis and COVID-19, have appeared because of the burdens that human beings place on ecosystems and, indeed, the whole planet.

  In that regard, the first two sections identify the limitations of liberal democracy. With the purpose of going beyond liberal democracy, section three focuses on deliberative democracy for non-human beings, while section four focuses on agonistic democracy through a discussion of a ‘parliament of things’. Section five introduces a way to apply political agency to non-human beings by referring to Jane Bennett’s political theory. Section six discusses a new development of constitutional democracy for non-human beings in the present age. The final section concludes with some points about how the richness of life can be reflected as the richness of democracy and how to transform the relationship between humans and non-humans from one of war to one of politics.

It is becoming a politically urgent task to respond to the crisis in solidarity caused by negative impacts of globalization. Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory tackles such a challenge endorsing the universalistic ideal of guaranteeing equal rights for citizens with diversified ways of life, and develops its argument on EU and ‘constitutionalization of international law’, which has substantial implications for the conception of transborder citizenship. However, under such theoretical construction it remains unclear how citizens, assuming the universalistic viewpoints, can and should position the roles of nation states for coping with the problems caused by globalization. This article argues that it can be helpful to ‘deepen’ the idea of constitutional patriotism, which is posed by discourse theory as a form of national self-understanding based on universalistic constitutional principles, by (1) situating ideals and accomplishments of welfare state in it more positively and reflectively, and (2) resituating it into the context of overcoming global injustice. These steps can encourage citizens to affirm each state’s options and responsibilities for taking active measures against negative impacts caused by globalization, as well as to promote each state’s constructive engagement in the process of ‘constitutionalization’ beyond national borders as a continuation of its domestic constitutional project.

This paper discusses the issue of exclusion of people with disability that is inherent in the Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness. Both the orthodox view of justice as fairness (represented by Samuel Freeman, Cynthia Stark and Stuart White) and some feminist reinterpretation of it (represented by Sophia Wong and Christie Hartley) fail to provide robust theoretical basis for substantial measures that support people with atypical natural endowments (i.e., disability) to participate in social cooperation. I propose a new view of justice as fairness that reconceptualizes social cooperation as inherently dependent on external support of various kinds. At the same time, my view maintains the central tenet of justice as fairness about reciprocal social cooperation, which I articulate as four conditions of social cooperation and institutional account of reciprocity. I argue that, as a part of just institutional arrangement, society must provide citizens, including those with atypical endowments, with fair assistance for productive contribution.

This paper approaches the issue of citizens living abroad from the perspective of representative democracy. It addresses two questions. First, do external citizens have a moral right to participate in the political process in their countries of origin? Second, how should their interests be represented in the policy-making process? In addressing these questions, it examines the cases of legislative representation through external voting and special representation by emigrant councils, which are state-level advisory bodies composed of emigrant representatives. It argues that external voting is conditionally legitimate, and that neither assimilated nor discrete legislative representation through external voting is appropriate to represent the special interests of external citizens. Instead, emigrant councils should be adopted to represent their special interests. This system, which operates democratically outside the regular parliamentary system, can be recommended to complement representation deficits in external voting and fairly represent the interests of external citizens. It also points out that the council system has high applicability to other groups and theoretical implications of complementing parliamentary democracy with a parliamentary system.