This paper provides an overview of Baumgarten's philosophy from the perspective of Kant's evaluation and critique. The first section explores Kant's characterization of　Baumgarten as the "vortreffliche Analyst," highlighting the praise for the richness and precision of his Metaphysics. The second section delves into Kant's consistent criticism of Baumgarten’s ontology, particularly challenging the idea that "substance is power." Kant asserts that substance possesses power, pointing out a crucial distinction. By examining Kant's evolving views on substance, the section further elucidates how these criticisms contributed　to the development of Kant's critical philosophy. The third section introduces Baumgarten's ontology, evaluating Kant's critiques and the success of interpreting Baumgarten's Metaphysics.

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In diesem Beitrag habe ich versucht zu zeigen, dass Kant sich im Laufe seiner Lehrtätigkeit gründlich mit dem Kompendium seiner Vorlesung der praktischen Philosophie Initia philosophiae practicae primae Baumgartens auseinandersetzt. Liest man die Vorlesungsnachschrift Moralphilosophie Collins, so lässt sich feststellen, dass Kant ethisch-elementare Grundsätze, wie den ‚moralischen Imperativ’, sowie Grundbegriffe wie ‚Vollkommenheit’ u.a.　durch das Studium von Initia erworben hat. Das in seiner Ethik wichtige Begriffspaar ‚Zweck’ und ‚Mittel’ hat Kant ebenfalls u.a. durch die Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Kompendium entfaltet, wobei er Baumgartens Begriff von ‚Mittel’ gründlich kritisiert und m.E. dadurch zu der Einsicht gelangt, dass man den Menschen durchaus als Zweck und niemals bloß al Mittel zu sehen hat.

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In his Critique of Judgment, Kant rejected the wolffian aesthetic theory, asserting that it incorrectly equates beauty with perfection. Baumgarten is recognized as the representative of the objectivistic “aesthetics of perfection” overcome by Kant. This study examines Kant's refutation, contending it is grounded in the concept of “formal perfection,” presumably derived from “formal objective purposiveness” or “formal aesthetic perfection” in Jäsche Logic. Their fundamental disparity stems from the divergent roles of beauty within their respective philosophies. Baumgarten's aesthetics of perfection, perfecting lower cognitive faculties, retains significance despite Kant's objections.

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This paper scrutinizes Kant's theoretical paradigm pertaining to the formation of concepts, with a central emphasis on the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, a cornerstone tenet of transcendental logic. Utilizing Kant's theory of "definition" as a guiding thread, it elucidates the dynamic processes through which concepts are acquired, modified, and expanded by analytic and synthetic judgments through experience. Moreover, the paper propounds a conceptual model that illuminates the intricate interplay between empirical concepts and regulative ideals, underscoring its implications for comprehending the process of concept formation.

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In recent years, Kant scholars have extensively debated Kant's reform of Baumgarten's metaphysics. This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate by examining the connection between the theory of transcendental ideas and transcendental philosophy. Initially, I prove that integrating the theory of transcendental ideas into transcendental philosophy offers a plausible and fascinating way to reform Baumgarten's ontology. Furthermore, I investigate whether Kant pursued this path through a comparative analysis of his lectures on metaphysics. I conclude that Kant found it difficult to determine the proper place for the theory of transcendental ideas within his metaphysical system.

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Kant's Lectures on Physical Geography, which lasted 40 years from 1756, have not yet been much studied. This is due to the complicated history of the compilation and publication of the lecture notes. This paper focuses on the possibility of "extending" [erweitern] (Ⅸ159) [the concept of] cognition, which appears in the introduction to the lecture notes of Physische Geographie (1802), to depict the unique significance of geographical cognition. In doing so, we draw on the method of the Critique of Reason, which sought the "system" and the "limits and origin" of the possibility of cognitive extension of reason (cf. A11/B25). We use this method to depict the unique possibility of geographical cognition, which is neither a mere set of empirical knowledge nor a rational cognition. This attempt is called the "geographical model of the critique of reason".

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This paper investigates the essential content and purpose of Kant's physical geography, through examining the concept of a ‘world’ in physical geography, in contrast to other ‘worlds’ in pre-critical, critical philosophical and moral considerations. The world in physical geography is regarded as the actual world with the metaphor of a theatrical stage, where the negative and ugly sides of human beings, things and matters are especially exposed. Through his investigation of physical geography, Kant leads us to explore an actual world of human evil in order to overcome it and construct cosmopolitan peace as the highest good. In this sense, Kant's physical geography provides the fundamental basis for his philosophy.

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In this paper, my objective is to present a novel reading of "Threefold Synthesis" in A-Deduction as a theory of mnemonic processes. In Chapter 1, admist three interpretations of the synthesis of recognition, I advocate for the correctness interpretation, proposed by Kemp Smith and Henrich. Building upon this interpretation, in Chapter 2 and 3, the Kantian framework about episodic remembering is reconstructed from "Threefold Synthesis." I posit that the three syntheses--apprehension, reproduction, and recognition—comprise one mental act of remembering, and moreover, transcendental apperception serves as self-regulating rationality, which all self-conscious subjects must have, and which subpersonally operates in reproducing mental imagery.

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Die vorliegende Abhandlung legt die Entwicklung und den Wendepunkt von Kants Begriff des Ich dar. Zu diesem Zweck vergleiche ich einige Texte, die die zentrale Hinweise auf den Entwicklungshintergrund des Ich-Begriffs in den 1770ern geben. Zu Beginn der 1770 erscheint Kant beispielsweise in der Anthropologie-Vorlesung (1772/73), das „Ich” substantiell aufzufassen. Auch im Duisburg’schen Nachlass (1775), wo Kant zum erstmal die Apperzeption einführt, liegt das Ich als Substrat den Funktionen der Apperzeption zu Grunde. Trotzdem weisen Reflexionen etwa zwischen 1778 und 1780 auf, dass Kant schon nicht mehr jene Ich-Auffassung teilt. In dieser Abhandlung wird diese wesentlichen Veränderung besonders im Zusammenhang mit Kants kritischer Beschäftigung mit den Philosopischen Versuchen (1778) von Nicolas Tetens erörtert.

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The purpose of this paper is to address "The Canon Problem" by exploring the differences between two standpoints presented in the first Critique and the second Critique. The Canon Problem revolve around understanding the relationship between transcendental freedom and practical freedom as discussed in the first Critique. However, the concept of "practical" is only clarified after an examination of pure practical reason is made in the second Critique, and from a practical standpoint. The theoretical standpoint adopted in the first Critique is limited about its analysis of the practical freedom, leading to the emergence of The Canon Problem.

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This paper aims to point out that while moral life in Kantian ethics is demanding in which emotions and desires must be restricted to comply with duties, there are several opportunities for progressing in this striving. One is "hope," which assures us that we are progressing toward moral perfection as an ideal. The other is the "cheerfulness "one feels in striving for virtue, overcoming sensible temptations through the power of reason. In this paper, I will show that compliance with duties requires us to exert our powers of reason and continue to strive constantly, but that several factors are provided to prevent us from being discouraged in the process of that striving.

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