Land-related investment (e.g. soil dressing, deep plowing) is necessary for efficient agricultural production. This is particularly true for upland farming in which land improvement is essential. If farmers are freely able to invest in leased land, they will invest in order to obtain efficient production levels. However, if influential factors prevent farmers from investing, the underinvestment problem in leased land becomes apparent. Such circumstances appear in oral contracts, which are a type of ‘incomplete contract' in the sense that the contract length is not predetermined. Because of incomplete contracts, farmers are unwilling to invest since they cannot predict if they will recoup their investment value while being open to eviction threats (i.e. holdup problem).
　The purpose of this paper is to discuss the empirical determinants on contract type (i.e. oral versus written) and the farmers' investment choice in land improvement, using original data from Atsumi-cho, Aichi Prefecture. Atsumi-cho was chosen as a suitable representative of upland farming in Japan.
　The main findings are as follows. First, written contracts encourage farmers to invest in leased land. It was proven that the type of contract influences the incentive for land investment. Second, it was also found that the degree of trust (e.g. kinship and proximity) between the landowner and the farmer positively influences land investment. The third finding was that the degree of opportunity cost regarding the landowner's flexibility to engage in farming also influences contract choice. Landowners not likely to engage in farming were highly inclined to opt for written contracts.
　These findings call for encouragement of written contracts by local governments, and a compensation scheme for investment value in order to provide farmers with incentives for land improvement.

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　This paper aims to empirically examine the determinant factors of the participation in risk sharing between households in rural Cambodia. This study would give us important information and ideas for the designing of policy for poverty reduction.
　In rural Cambodia, where our study site is located, although many households face unexpected income fluctuations and poverty, a formal credit market has not been well developed and no insurance market exists. However, we often observe gift exchanges and informal credit transactions between households, which might serve as informal risk sharing in rural Cambodia.
　In this paper, using the household data collected in rural Cambodia, we empirically test the following five hypotheses. (1)The existence of informal credit has a positive effect on the participation in risk sharing by gifts and/or informal credit;(2)The existence of formal credit has a positive effect on the participation in risk sharing by gifts, informal credit and/or formal credit;(3)Households with more social capital are more likely to participate in risk sharing;(4)Households which have suffered unexpected shocks and/or which have more variable income tend to participate in risk sharing; and(5)Households with more assets are less willing to participate in risk sharing, since they are sufficiently insured by themselves.
　We found evidence that, in rural Cambodia, the existence of informal credit and/or formal credit, and the endowment of social capital have significantly positive effects on the participation in risk sharing through gift exchanges and/or credit transactions between households, whereas the level of household asset holdings has significantly negative effects on it.

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