According to standard economic theory, the income effect on the level of local public expenditure of a grant from the central government to a local government is not superior to that of a transfer payment to the residents in the local area, given the amounts of total money the same in the both cases. This is well known as an equivalent theorem asserted by Bradford and Oates. However, empirical evidences have had devided views on this theorem. Some of them support it. But, some others observe that intergovernmental grants increase expenditure on local public goods more than transfer payments do. They call this“the flypaper effect”.
Thus, considerably large efforts by economists working in public finance have been devoted to give economically rational explanations to this discrepancy between theory and practice. Economists, however, have seldom made reference to the communicative aspect of political process. The political messages involved in a grant would generally differ from those in a transfer.
Suppose a parent giving a kid money in two cases. In the first, he or she says, “I'll give you some money, if you buy books”. In the second, “I'll give you money. You may buy anything you like”. Whether would the parent be successful or not in educating the kid and in raising its level of expenditure on books more than inthe second case? It would much depend on their communication. The kid might buy more books, or the same, or even less if their relationship is a very bad one. The influence of communication is often very unpredictable. Nevertheless, there are no grounds in general on which we can believe in the neutrality of communication.
A typical collective decision making in a democratic political process has two stages, that is, the first stage of political argument and the following second stage of voting. The first stage is a set-up for making individual frames of reference adjusted to each other. This is a process groping for a consensus. In this phase of collective decision making, it is quite natural and reasonable to suppose that there is some room in each individual frame of reference for social adjustment by communication. If there is no such room, communication would be no more than mere exchange of signs and political argument would be almost of nouse. However, this communicative aspect of political process remains out of economic postulate where each individual preference system is supposed to be given.
When we take a different point of view on preference formation, especially preference formation as for public issues, it will leads us to quite different understandings of public choice. This paper is an example of such attempt, giving a different explanation to the flypaper effect.

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Japanese political opinions and voting behavior have greatly changed since the unification of conservative parties in 1955. But Japanese electoral institutions and party systems have not yet so changed fundamentally.
One of the remarkable characteristics in Japan politics is that there has been no alternatives in party organization; the LDP (LiberalDemocratic Party) has been always No. 1 dominant party continuously. Why has the alternation of government party not been occurred?
I would make clear the reason for this in my article from the standing point of the voting mechanism of“the loyalty to government party”.
Now let's retrospect and summarize the characteristics of voting behavior, especially the loyalty to the political parties. First, I can indicate the voting behavior has not gradually based on the loyalty to the political parties since 1970s. Independent voters have emerged and have fixed effectively. It is said that electorates in industrial liberal democracies are more volatile. Also in Japan so many electorates voting for the LDP have not based on the loyalty to the LDP itself but to‘government party’.
Secondly, I can also indicate the amounts of vote for the LDP have been dependent upon the degree of vote allocation to government party since 1980s. This is called“the supporting system of vote allocation to the government party” in my theory. But political energy of this allocation to the government party has been gradually transformed since the latter half of 1980s and new political energy supporting the another party, the JSP (the Japan Socialist Party) has appeared since 1989.
Finally, my another purpose is to analyze the limitation of the loyalty to existing two dominant parties.
Mainly using data is the results of the survey of personal interviews of about 1600 eligible voters through random sampling in 1987.

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The main purpose of this paper is to illustrate clearly how the distribution is determined on the assumption that the private ownership is not regarded as absolute truth.
Under this assumption, members in society settle into a natural distribution after struggle. I show it is effective to divide two cases, CASE 1 and CASE 2 on the basis of the utility of members of a society at the natural distribution.
In CASE 1, redistribution does not occur. In this case, private ownership will be established if an effective law can be prepared. If the effective law can not be prepared, the distribution becomes unstable.
In CASE 2, redistribution occurs.In this case, the distribution of goods is determined through a political process. This case leads a society to public ownership. But, even in this case, if members in a society value goods highly relative to the state without struggle, the society approaches private ownership.

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