After the Cold War period, a role of the United Nations (UN), especially the Security Council, is hoped establishing World Order. This is a hope that UN is not an authority but a system to get a cooperation between great powers. The existence of World Order is regarded as the international public good. So, it is a construction of a mechanism for provision of the international public good. The world system now is a cooperative multi-polar system. In this system, the international public good is voluntary provided by great powers. But it brings about a problem which is as follows. Assuming the Nash-behavior for great powers, the equilibrium provision of the international public good is a Nash equilibrium. And this is less than a Parato optimal level. Then, we need to construct a mechanism which attains Parato optimal provision.
We show the Two Stage Game to solve the problem. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game becomes a Lindahl equilibrium as a result of an announcement of Lindahl price at the first stage. And we also investigate how to work this mechanism in the context of international security issues, especially the Gulf War, from the normative point of view.

抄録全体を表示

All the political parties have agreed to pushing deregulation. However, politicians have supported “the iron triangle”. They hold great vested interests accompanied with regulations. Therefore, it is impossible to believe that all political parties and politicians are actually going to push deregulation. Some politicians agreed to deregulation officially, but actually they seem to oppose and to disturb pushing deregulation. At least, the agenda on deregulation seems to be controlled by the politicians who is negative against deregulation.
In this paper, the goal of politicians are assumed to carry out their election pledges, though Downs supposed politicians select their pledges to win elections. In this paper, politicians pursue the wins in elections to carry out their election pledge. Under this assumption, politicians don't change their pledge, but change agenda to arrange conditions to win the election. In addition to the previous assumption, there assumed two candidates; one is positive for deregulation and the other is negative against deregulation. These two candidates compete in a small electoral district.
As a conclusion, to win the election and to carry out their pledges, both candidates want to control the agenda in the election. The positive candidate wants to set more limited and specific agenda, but the negative candidate wants to set more large and general agenda in the election.

抄録全体を表示