In spite of significant innovations in information technologies, e-government remains at an early stage of implementation. A large number of studies have been made on e-government. In recent years, there has been renewal of interest in e-democracy. Although most e-government resources reside in the administrative side of government, the online activities of representative institutions have to be accelerated as well, i.e., parliaments, legislatures, and local councils are compelled to take up the IT challenge in order to remain politically relevant.
What seems to be lacking, however, is to speculate on conceptual frameworks, theories, and methods. I have examined e-government and e-democracy from the viewpoint of Public Choice which can be defined as the economic study of non-market decision making. The basic behavioral postulate of public choice is that man is egoistic and rational. I should like to explore a further possibility, which to the best of my knowledge has never been examined.

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本稿では, 民主主義制度が社会的見て非効率な政策選択をもたらすいわゆる「民主主義の失敗」が生じる新たなメカニズムを提示する.メカニズムの背景にある基本仮定は, 投票者は政策がもたらす経済的利得に最も関心があるという意味において殆ど合理的であるが, ごくわずかに政策それ自体, いいかえればイデオロギーにも選好を有し自らが選好しない政策を支持することにコストを感じるというものである.このとき, 個々の投票者のイデオロギー選好が殆どないに等しい無視しうるものであっても, それが選挙という集計装置を通じると社会全体としての政治的選択に大きな影響を与え, 投票者の政策選択を投票者の効用を大きく下げるという意味で完全に非合理なものとする可能性があることを示す.また, 各投票者の行動が他の投票者の行動に対する予想によって左右されるという投票行動の相互依存関係が生じ, 選挙結果に予見不可能性が持ち込まれることも示す.

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Now, the Japanese public pension system operates the principle of intergenerational support. In this system, it is susceptible to uncertainties such as changers in a nation's demographics and economical conditions, it may cause future generations to bear a disproportionately high share of the burden of such support, causing intergenerational disparity in contributions.
In addition to this intergenerational support, there is an “inner” generational support system in the Japanese pension system. Though all working generation (includes to students and unemployed workers) have to pay contributions, full-time housewives of salaried worker are exempt from contributions. Other all workers share the contributions of them. This structure of public pension's financial system causes working generations to making feel unfair.
In this paper, I discuss to be inequity by an income transfer through those Japanese public pension systems. Using the basic model that calculates the 1999the actuarial valuations presented by the ministry of welfare and labor, conduct various policy simulations. I'd like to think about a sustainable and an equity public pension's system through this research.
Even under the same assumption as Ministry of Labor and Welfare, what the intergenerational equity pension system exist became clear from result of analysis. If the baby boomers retire, the cost of the system reform is large. The reform in 2004 is the last chance of a drastic reform.

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