The purpose of this paper is to clarify the historical significance of "global capitalism" which emerged in the 1980s and gained momentum since the 1990s. If the globalization of capitalism means simply the expansion of the domain of market economy, we can almost always recognize such a tendency since the beginning of capitalism in the 16th century. The new feature of the contemporary globalization is that it was accompanied by the neo-liberalist policy and the market fundamentalist policy. These policies replaced the welfare state policy which was the ideal model of the post-war capitalist world until the early 1970s. British Thatcher government originally started these new policies. Then the United States took strong initiative throughout the recent two decades. Therefore, substance of globalization is Americanization in brief. Although the Americanization extends not only in economic field but also political and cultural fields, its main sphere is the financial market including money, capital and foreign exchange markets. To say nothing of euro-currency market, most of financial markets in the world have been deregulated more or less under the pressure of the US government and its de facto confederate, the IMF. The main actors of the deregulation are various kinds of the US financial institutions, which manipulate huge amount of surplus US dollars. What kind of circumstances brought about such a situation? In my opinion, one of them is the change of the US-Japan relation. In the late 1970s, UK and US economies suffered from serious difficulties such as stagflation and absenteeism. Neo-liberalist policy was introduced as a booster shot to revive market discipline for the economic recovery. However, the stagnation of the US economy lasted until the end of 1980s with twin deficit of budget and current balance. On the other hand, Japanese economy was the height of her prosperity in the late 1980s and her manufacturing competitiveness exceeded that of the US. Japanese production and management system were highly admired in the world. Japan had no reasons to introduce neo-liberalist policy. Under such circumstances, the US, which had comparative advantage in the financial sector, forced Japan to deregulate her financial markets. The critical Japan-US economic conflict forced Japan to compromise with the US. Then Japanese economy fell into long stagnation with serious financial crisis. Thus, the financial deregulation played an important roll for the US to recover her economic hegemony. IT revolution and the collapse of the USSR type of socialist economies supported the US recovery, and the global financial market surrendered to the US financial hegemony.

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The advanced capitalist countries in the world economy commonly underwent a substantial transition in the early 1980s, in which their profit rates, after suffering from a tendency toward long-term decline, began to pick up again. We had entered the era of neo-liberalism. Their profit rates, with the exception of that in Japan, gradually and steadily strengthened the rising tendency toward the so-called 'Information Technology' bubble in the second half of the 1990s. The present paper at first in the Introduction categorizes surplus capital into the three concepts: i.e., absolute, relative, and absolute and relative surplus capital. Absolute surplus capital takes place in the period of an economic crisis and depression; relative surplus capital manifests itself, due to a series of absolute surplus capital, as the long-term declining tendency of profit rate; and absolute and relative surplus capital, combining the former two, takes a form of an expansion of fictitious capital. Corresponding to these forms of domestic surplus capital, international surplus capital also takes three forms and manifests itself as temporary trade surplus, a long-term accumulation of trade surplus and net capital export, and international circulation of securities capital, respectively (Section II). Section I empirically deals with the historic turning point in 1981 of the US capitalism, in which its long-term declining tendency of profit rate, beginning in 1965, was drastically turned over owing to the peak-out of the improvement of real wage rate. The end of the relative surplus of industrial capital also marked the beginning of the relative surplus of loan capital in 1981, when the unprecedented high interest rate policy of FRB began to ease. The combination of these opposite forms of surplus capital contributed to an expansion of fictitious capital and an economic bubble after the second half of the 1980s. Section III empirically discusses the relationship between trade imbalance and international surplus capital, and analyses its historical development in US, Japan and Germany by introducing a new concept of 'private surplus savings', defined as trade balance minus fiscal balance. Section IV describes the historical development of international surplus capital in three stages: i.e., bank loan in the 1970s, which led to the dramatic debt crisis of developing countries after 1982 onward; bond investment in the 1980s, which was strongly facilitated by the so-called 'twin deficit' of the US economy, being financed by a massive inflow of foreign capital into the Treasury securities; and finally, equity investment after the middle of the 1990s. International surplus capital established its final and complete form in equity capital with the help of some historical events such as the 'Big Bang' in the UK in 1986 and the reunification of Germany in 1990. It is the complete form in the sense that it combines bank loan and bond investment as its complementary elements. It has been globally circulating among advanced capitalist countries, developing countries, 'emerging markets', and 'economies in transition'. It is expected, however, to dissolve sooner or later thanks to the enormous accumulation of US international debt, which is not to be sustainable forever due to ever increasing leakage of income deficit in US international balance of payments. The world economy after the establishment of global securities capital would be more and more vulnerable to the fluctuation in investors' expectations regarding capital gains and losses. The fear is that the stock value of equity capital could easily shrink catastrophically without even a small amount of capital outflow. A massive capital flight follows a collapse of stock value, depending on investors' moody expectations. A strict foreign exchange control or proactive monetary policy could not effectively prevent that from taking place.

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The Nixon administration decided to end the dollar's convertibility into gold in 1971. The U.S. external deficit has been increasing from year to year after that. The huge U.S. external deficit caused the changeable rate of foreign exchange and interest, and consequently the short-term capital movement for the sake of hedge, arbitrage and speculation increased. In early 1980s, the portfolio investment toward U.S. by private investors of Japan and FRG increased markedly, because they could not find out the favorable investment opportunity in the domestic markets under the depression. The Dollar glut which was brought about by the huge U.S. external deficit was the source of this international investment. Thus the international money game came to be remarkable in early 1980s. Susan Strange called this situation "Casino Capitalism". In the latter half of 1990s "Casino Capitalism" entered the new stage. The most important constituent of this stage has been a marked increase of U.S. current account deficit, external debt. On the international capital markets in late 1990s, it is the popular view that "the United States is playing the role of a global intermediary; it attracts international capital by providing relatively safe, liquid instruments at relatively high returns and then reinvests them through international markets in less liquid vehicles for higher returns." But this view makes mistakes. U.S. capital inflow has the characteristics which other countries never have. Generally speaking the volumes of foreign capital export toward U.S. are limited by the volumes of U.S. external deficit itself. The significance of current account deficit for U.S. has changed drastically since late 1990s. The current account deficit has shifted its role for U.S. economic growth from the brake to the accelerator. But it is still true that the current account deficit means the leak of purchasing power from U.S. to foreign countries. Therefore U.S. can accept the current account deficit under the specific conditions that the rate of growth of domestic demand in U.S. is larger than the rate of growth of foreign demand. Now U.S. is the only country that can leave the huge current account deficit, cumulative external debt if the domestic demand growth could absorb the pressure of the current account deficit. Moreover U.S. is the only country that can increase the investment abroad in spite of the growing current account deficit. If the international money flow were favorable for U.S., it would maintain these privileges. Since late 1990s, the global casino games have been favorable for U.S. real economy. But the powerful domestic demand growth can't continue forever. That is the very limitations of U.S. growing current account deficit, i.e., cumulative external debt and "casino capitalism".

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In this paper "American globalism" is defined as the U.S. power and thought to execute American globalization. Economic globalization is the most fundamental among various dimensions of globalization. Included in the U.S. power for American globalization are diplomatic politics, global reach of multinational corporations and multinational banks, global investment by institutional investors and so on. This paper focuses on the economic aspect and the center piece of globalization. This paper deals with the following some questions about American globalism. First, how does the U.S. presidency regard the current globalization. Second, what are driving forces behind Uruguay round? What is basic conflict built in WTO regime? Third, how American regionalism is related with American globalism? NAFTA, APEC and FTAA are analyzed here.Fourth,what are impacts of American globalism on the U.S. domestic economy, in particular on labor market. The paper is divided to five sections excluding the first section as an introduction. The second section examines when and in what meaning the U.S. presidency used the term "globalization" in the Economic Report of the President together with The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. This report has been published every year since 1947 and explains economic conditions and economic policy under the current presidency. An independent chapter noticing globalization was first seen in the report of 1997. The title of the chapter was "American Leadership in the Emerging Global Economy". The chapter six of the report of 2000 analyzed globalization in more detail than the report of 1997. According to the report of 2000, globalization is "the world wide integration of national economies through trade, capital flows, and operational linkages among firms" and the report raised technological development and the role of policy as the forces behind globalization. With critical analysis about these reports, we think that American globalism began from so-called Nixon shock on 15 August 1971. President Richard Nixon suspended the U.S. responsibility to bind the U.S. dollar with gold, and as the result of that he abolished capital export control. Since this policy change, U.S. multinational corporations have expanded their investment abroad rapidly. In this sense, the year of 1971 was pivotal for American globalism. The third section traces the process of Uruguay round. Like GATT negotiations, multilateralism in liberalization of international trade is of essence for American globalism. This section also analyzes conflict of WTO regime established in 1995 which was successful result of Uruguay round. The fourth section and the fifth section deal with American regionalism such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), FTAA (Free Trade Area of the America) which have emerged since the latter half of the 1980s. The U.S. presidency says it is engaging in "competitive liberalization", or working to open markets bilaterally through FTA (Free Trade Agreements), regionally through NAFTA, APEC and FTAA, and globally through WTO talks. To be sure, NAFTA provided a good example of smaller free trade agreements leading to larger accords. NAFTA set a precedent for the rest of Latin America to pursue sub-regional free trade accords, finally resulting in FTAA in 1994. On the other hand, since 1993 the U.S. presidency has committed positively APEC and has tried to make binding rules towards APEC members. However, so far both APEC and FTAA have not proceeded as the U.S. presidency acted. Therefore in the case of APEC and FTAA, things didn't work as "competitive liberalization" said, because of various antagonisms to American globalism. Last, changing labor market and changing public opinion towards globalization in the U.S. are analyzed. There is a sway of

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The Toyota Production System was considered to have achieved high competitiveness through the multi-production to accommodate the maturation of market, and the system of team production and job rotation to improve worker skill levels. The improvement of worker skill levels under the Toyota Production System was argued to contribute to a recombination of conception and execution in ways different from the deskilling and simplification of work in the Taylor-Ford system of production. However, it is an open question whether the Toyota Production System can be characterized as a recombination of conception and execution. Braverman saw the skill formation of workers as the combination of conception and execution, and the process of deskilling in the Taylor system of production as the separation of conception and execution. The establishment of management authority is crucial to his distinction between the separation and the combination of conception and execution. This paper critically examines the argument that the Toyota Production System can be characterized by a recombination of conception and execution. Section 1 shows that the Taylor-Ford system of production is designed to deprive workers of their decision on work pace and work method, leading to the separation of conception and execution. Section 2 investigates the nature of skill formation in the Toyota Production System, in order to show that multi-skilled workers, their quick responses to unexpected happenings and the quality control or kaizen activities provide no evidence for a recombination of conception and execution, and to disprove the argument of Koike and the Regulation school for a recombination of conception and execution. Section 3 shows that the decisions on the pace, method and layout of work for the whole factory are controlled by the management, and concludes that the Toyota Production System separated conception and execution in the most perfect fashion. Who controls the pace and schedule of work is critical in evaluating whether the production system can be characterized by the separation or recombination of conception and execution. The separation of conception and execution in the Toyota Production System is evidenced by the fact that the pace and method of work are controlled exclusively by the management.

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Unemployment rate of some OECD countries have been still high since the mid 1970s following the oil shocks and concomitant fall in productivity growth. Yet, as the 1980s progressed, unemployment rate in the USA and some European countries (UK, NL, IR) fell back to earlier levels with deregulation of product and labor markets. As is well known, these countries eliminated obstacles from the product and labor markets, which were often blamed for the relatively poor performance. Since too much rigidity is detrimental to employment, the obvious policy recommendations are to remove obstacles: deregulations of product and labor markets. However, the employed would oppose the deregulation of labor market which might cause their real wages down. Therefore we should pay much attention to the product market deregulation which makes the wages recovered. When these two deregulations are taken at the same time, and if the employed have enough information about the effect of the deregulations to the wages, then they would not oppose these deregulation policies. In this case, the product market deregulation and labor market deregulation are "Policy complementarity"(hereafter PC); it can supplement labor market reforms in combating unemployment. The product market deregulation is important for the point of PC. This paper reviews the effects of these deregulations in a model with capital adjustment monopolistic competition and a non-homogeneous production function, where wages are determined according to an efficiency bargaining model. The availability of these deregulations as a long-term PC is evaluated. We find that the deregulation of product market may have markedly different effects than in the previous works. Our findings stem mainly from the fact each firm usually adjusts not only labor but also capital to survive in response to changes in the competition environment in the long run. Some firms which do not stand a high-competition exit from the market; it leads to shift to the high degree of monopoly, and the deregulation policy becomes less effective as Blanchard and Giavatti (2003). The central results of this paper can be summarized as follows. The results in the long run depend critically on the scale effects of production function. The effects of the deregulation in product market on the employment and wages are as follows: the wages and employment increase if α>1, they are constant if α=1, and they decrease if α<1 although the degree of monopoly is constant in the long run. From the point of PC, the combinations of the product market regulation deregulation (regulation) and labor market deregulation are PC if α>1 (α<1).

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This paper studies about the theory of value forms, which is in Marx 'Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Okonomie' (4^<th>ed., 1890) vol.1, chap.1. Value appears only in a relation of commodities, so commodities express the value by the relative value form. However, a commodity has to turn into the equivalent form, which makes a direct exchange possible. A commodity shifts from left to right in the value formula. Expressing value of a commodity includes the purpose of satisfying one's needs in the reverse relation, the equivalent form. Especially a commodity is able to prove the full ability by the general equivalent form. The total and developed value form becomes the general value form at the reverse relation. Any commodity can get the general equivalent form, because commodities have the value. However, the only one commodity can get the form in actuality. Therefore some of past scholars have denied the reverse relation of expressing value. If you deny the reverse relation, too, you will pay no attention to a commodity requiring a possibility of direct exchange. Of course, all the commodities are not monies, but, as Marx said, "a commodity is money" in essence. I think it is the commodity-money theory. The theory of value forms chases the development of a commodity, for example, linens, expressing value, because any commodities contain the general equivalent form by nature. In reality, the only one commodity becomes the general equivalent form, so the theory of exchange process (chap.2) explains it. On the other hand, the monetary form is that gold has won the position from among all equivalents. Gold has carried through the nature of commodities to the end. But there is no difference in the ability of value between gold and all the other commodities. Why has gold got the position of the general equivalent form? The theory of value forms can't explain it. It doesn't show the genesis of money.

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