The financial crisis that originated in the United States has developed into a serious 'once-in-a century' global crisis. A recurrence of the 1930s-type Great Depression seems to be structurally imminent. Simple 'Bubble and Burst' accounts are prevailing to explain the cause and the whole process of the crisis. Such simple arguments are not sufficient to elucidate the real dimensions of the current global crisis. It is true that structured financing contained serious institutional and systemic deficiencies, and that the collapse of the vast expansion of risk-taking financing through an unregulated and extremely high leveraged labyrinthine structured finance mechanism constituted a crucial aspect of the current global crisis. It incorporates complicated risk aversion and diversification schemes. The pricing systems are based on false assumptions that ignore Frank Knight's uncertainty about the market economy. Anyhow, it provided a major mechanism of the rapid expansion of subprime financing and "predatory" lending in the U.S. housing markets particularly in the late 2000s on the basis of historical improvements of housing and other credit segregation after the Civil Right Act and especially after the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act. Moreover, it boosted the speculative expansion of CDOs and other various type of securitized product markets in general, together with relating leveraged financing. Exacerbating sub-prime mortgage failures spreading from the early 2007 triggered the overall collapse of "risk assets" markets and led to the cumulative global financial crisis. However, one salient feature of the current crisis should be noted. The financial crisis ignited by the U.S. sub-prime crisis has proliferated quite rapidly in the global financial system and brought about a very serious interrelated contraction of the U. S and global real economy. The whole process should be grasped as the crisis of the U.S. -centered global capital accumulation regime that emerged through the global capitalism-ization of the U.S. in these two decades in response to the breakdown of the postwar Pax Americana system in the mid-1970s. The key nexus is the conjunction of the multi-layered Global City functions and the Neo-imperial circuits of global capital flow centered in the U. S., which are combined through the financial facilities in the global financial center New York, based on the US dollar as the key international currency. Globalization of business, finance and information constituted the major dynamics. Major neo-liberal re-organization of the postwar corporate system started, especially in the 1980s. Increasing volatility and instability in the currency and financial markets induced notable financial innovations and globalization, making full use of IT, under neo-liberal deregulations from the early 1980s, which has brought about Financialization of capital accumulation and Casinoization of financial markets. The process has been promoted by the neo-liberal inversion of government roles typified in the "Washington Consensus" and the parallel neo-liberal shifts of the roles of international institutions including the IMF and other international arrangements. It should be noted that this U.S. centered capital accumulation nexus has provided the major global economic growth framework not only for the U.S. but also for the rest of the world so far. The recent notable growth of the emerging economies like China or BRICs has been achieved while closely related to such key nexus. In the United States, it provided the major dynamics for the 1990s "longest" economic expansion and the conspicuous IT boom in the late 1990s. Largescale speculative risk money flooded into IT venture business, actively intermediated by New York financial markets. Typical Global City situations developed in Southern California, which provided the

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(1) After 1990', "financial glut" and/or "excess money capital" have emerged as the most remarkable phenomenon in the world economy where financial markets swing wildly real economy. The adjective 'excess' in this context implies the difficulty for money capital to discover desirable destinies where it can be invested with satisfactory return. In other word, in the contemporary global economy, money capital has been accumulated much faster than industrial and commercial capital with ensuing bottleneck of profitable investment outlet. Because of this aggravating bottleneck, the excess money capital piles up in the financial market and moves around as speculative capital. Thus far, major borrowers of bank loan have shifted from industrial sector to unproductive sector including LBOs, hedge funds, and household and/or consumers. In relation to this shift of borrowers, the increasing part of bank profit has been generated in the form of fees and commission for varieties of financial services rather than interest margin in the traditional commercial lending. The trend of banking being disconnected from industries and ever larger part of their profit being generated in activities such as M&A deals, asset securitizations, and consumer loans demonstrates the defunctness of the traditional commercial banking model and its transformation into a new originate-to-distribute (OTD) banking model. In reflection on these structural changes in contemporary capitalist economy and the transformation of banking model, we are required to reconsider the viability of the classical concept of "Finance Capital" advocated by Lenin and Hilferding in the early stage of 20th century. As well known, Lenin's definition of Finance Capital is "concentration of production and from which emerged monopoly, consolidation and/or adhesion of banks and industries-this is the rising history of finance capital and its concept" (Imperialism). In the same vein, Hilferding wrote "banks could not help but anchor increasing part of their capital in industries. Therefore banks more and more transformed themselves into industrial capitalists. I name the bank capital i.e. money capital which is virtually transformed into industrial capital a finance capital (Finance Capital). Are their conceptualizations of finance capital as 'consolidation and/or adhesion of banks and industries' or 'money capital which is virtually transformed into industrial capital' still applicable to contemporary capitalism? With regard to the striking phenomenon of excess liquidity and/or excess money capital in the modern capitalist economy, I prefer to thematize in this presentation the viability of the concept of 'Casino-Style Finance Capital' as an alternative for the classical concept of 'Finance Capital' (2) In thematizing the Casino-Style Finance Capital, my basic points of view are as followings. (1)Financial bubble denotes assets inflation uncoupled from real economy, therefore its eventual bursting is unavoidable. (2)Financial transactions in securities and real estate markets do not generate new economic value and/or value added. The economic function of financial markets resides only in the redistribution of existent economic value. (3)Derivative schemes and loan securitizations can transfer financial risk between market players but neither of them reduces financial risk much less extinguish it. (4)Every fees, commissions, and capital gains obtained by financial institutions from loan securitizations and any other mortgage related transactions come from repayments by mortgage borrowers. (5)In deciphering the macro-economic effects of financial bubble, we need to consider two conflicting effects generated by both asset inflation and asset deflation. (6)Even if the subprime loan-related financial crisis may be successfully contained

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the root of the subprime crisis from the perspective of household budgets and consumer spending. As indicated below, several factors compounded and ultimately led to the outbreak of crisis. First is the fact that the root of the subprime problem lies in "overproduction" and that the process where the "evasion of depression" is "deepening the likelihood of depression" is under way. The second is comprehension of the characteristics of the subprime income bracket. Through the examination of the foregoing, the author seeks to clarify the true reasons as to why the American people spend beyond their means as they accumulate debts. An analysis of the first issue leads to the following two conclusions: (1) The root of this problem lies primarily in "overproduction," which is an issue universal to the capitalist economy. That is, "consumption boosting" measures for expanding credit and ultimately realizing values are indispensable in order to defer the possibility of depression intrinsic to capitalist economies. The root of the subprime problem lies primarily in this universal structural problem faced by all capitalist economies, including the United States. (2) A particularity of the United States is the privilege it enjoys, due to seigniorage, which gives the country the ability to defer the occurrence of depression, resulting in the further aggravation of the internal contradictions of a capitalist economy. It is this same privilege that renders it possible for the United States to break through the limitations inherent to capitalistic production. However, even that cannot be achieved without expanded final consumption. With wages remaining stagnant, U.S. consumers have no choice but to increase their household debt, in order to accept the products that would otherwise become overstocked. Another factor that led to this subprime crisis is the fact that U.S. household budgets are no longer able to withstand the overall accumulation of debt. An analysis of the second issue leads to the following conclusions: (1) The increase in debt-based consumer spending is a result of the following capital needs. First, capital requires, as a means of avoiding overproduction, increases in credit in order to promote the ultimate realization of value in final consumption. At the same time, capital requires consumer credit as a "wage alternative" which renders possible the enhancement of competitive power through wage control amid global competition. This is made possible by the fact that the United States is able to promote loans to households, due to seigniorage. (2) A detailed analysis of U.S. household budgets reveals that the spending beyond means is due more to stagnant wages, employment instability, and lack of social support under neo-liberalism, rather than to extravagance. Further, it is highly likely that the subprime income bracket refers not to a special low-income bracket but encompasses the second to fourth quintiles; that is, it includes a large middle income group. Hence, the current subprime problem should be viewed not as a poverty issue specific to the low income group, but as a revelation of the fragility of the basis of life of "ordinary Americans."

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Within regulation theory the process of financialisation is defined by the hierarchical position of the financial system with respect to the other institutional forms, especially the wage labor nexus, inherited from the demise and crisis of fordism. Actually, financial liberalization, both at the domestic and international level, has triggered a cumulative flow of financial innovations, so powerful that they seemed to construct an unprecedented accumulation regime, finance led and directed towards households credit. Clearly financial innovations display quite distinctive features: they are the outcome of private profit strategies and they diffuse quite quickly since they are largely immaterial. Therefore financial innovations can have major consequences upon macroeconomic stability, due to the externalities in direction of the banking and monetary system. This has been occurring in the United States and United Kingdom that are the two main countries to explore the systemic crisis of a finance led accumulation regime. This crisis is then diffusing to the rest of the world due to the pervasiveness and overlapping of the new financial products, especially mortgage credit derivatives. This framework explains why so many experts should not have been caught by surprise when the subprime crisis burst out. They had argued that financial sophisticated products could overcome any obstacle to growth whatsoever: financing education, insuring against exchange rate crises, overcoming underdevelopment, fighting poverty at home and abroad. This dream of an omnipotent finance has been applied to the financing of real estate for the poorest fraction of the American population... in the context of a speculative bubble. The securitization of these mortgage loans has transferred the default risk to the entire financial system since the remuneration of financiers created strong incentives to overextend the volume of low grade credit, i.e. the subprimes. Consequently their crisis was the logical outcome this speculation and many previous episodes (the October 1987 stock market crash, the LTCM collapse, the Enron scandal, the internet bubble..) had made explicit all the ingredients of the collapse of the entire American financial system on September 2008. From a regulationnist point of view, this is an unprecedented mix a three crises. First a typical over accumulation in the real estate sector, that calls for a readjustment of price of houses. Second, the securitization has destroyed the very possibility of a correct valuation of risk and consequently of pricing highly complex derivatives: this is the novelty of the 2008 financial systemic crisis. Thirdly, the related freeze of the credit is putting an end to the very engine of American growth since the mid 80s, i.e. the permanent extension of credit to households as an alternative to income increases. Thus it is a major structural crisis, the unfolding of which remains quite uncertain: everything is up to the political strategies that will shape the interventions of public authorities. It is finally argued that it is possible and crucial to institute a social control over finance and especially an ex ante supervision of financial innovations. Until 2008, only the domination and arrogance of financiers were preventing such an aggornamiento, but the collapse of the naive belief about the superiority and viability of free markets opens a new epoch concerning the mutual relations between State, democracy and capitalism.

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Using the factor decomposition of micro data of the Employment Status Survey for 1997 and 2002 and the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure for 1999 and 2004, in this paper we examine the validity of the SBTC (skill-biased technological change) and the outsourcing hypotheses regarding the continued rise in wage inequality that first emerged within each age group at the end of the 1990s in Japan. We conclude that these hypotheses are invalid. In Japan, the labour market liquidity is low and wages are chiefly determined on the basis of the wage system of each enterprise; although the demand shifts towards skilled labour owing to information technology (IT) and globalisation, this shift is not likely to directly lead to the wage increase of skilled workers. The influence of IT and globalisation on wages is mainly reflected in the institutional reactions of enterprises. These institutional reactions are influenced not only by IT and globalisation, but also by various internal and external changes in the enterprise, such as ageing of the employees and deregulation. We present the following institutional hypothesis to explain the cause of the rising income inequality since the end of the 1990s in Japan. The most important cause is the reforms in the wage system, such as the introduction of a performance-based wage system and the weakening of the spring labour offensive system. We examine the validity of this 'wage institution view' using the factor decomposition of micro data. Furthermore, we examine and criticise the 'population ageing view', the most popular view in Japan, and the view that emphasises the effect of non-regularization of employment on wage inequality.

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Recently, the discussions-for example, reconstruction of Mandan Economics from the view of evolutionary thinking, or placing Marx in the stream of modern evolutionary economics- is becoming active. The purpose of this paper is considering where we should look for the basis of those ideas. The past discussion about letters between Marx and Darwin had been concluded that both were not on scientifically friendly terms. But we can confirm that Marx was surely influenced from Darwinism and the other theories about biological evolution. In particular, we should turn our attention to that Marx thought highly of P. Tremor's achievement about the interaction between evolution of species and fluctuation of geological features. Subsequently, J. A. Schumpeter thought highly of Marx's vision of "economic evolution" and also criticized it severely. Both have one point in common that they consider "economic evolution" theoretically based on historical evidences. On the other hand, both are different in two points. One is their ways of thinking about human attitude and human behavior. Marx regarded human factors as accidental ones, but Schumpeter regarded them as engines of "economic evolution". The other one is their point of views about "endogenous mechanism". Marx considered the source of endogenous change as growth of production capacity. but Schumpeter considered it as Entrepreneurship. We recognize that Marx' opinion is superior to Schumpeter's one. But the idea of Schumpeter and T. Veblen about human factors complements Marx's materialistic view of history. So their harmony is useful for development of the argument about "economic evolution". Finally, the original view of "economic evolution" meets the prerequisite of "evolutionary" at modern evolutionary economics? At modern evolutionary economics, there are two standpoints: one is that they use the ideas of biological evolution as analogy. The other one is that they emphasis the originality of economic evolution which is different from biological evolution. From the view point of the latter, we conclude the view of Marx and Schumpeter should be placed in the theoretical stream of modern evolutionary economics.

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This paper reports about the workshop called "Agrarian Questions: Lineages and Prospects" which was organized by the Journal of Agrarian Change (JAC) at the School of Oriental and African Studies of University of London from May 1st through the 3rd of 2008. JAC was established in 2001 by Terry Byres and Henry Bernstein who had edited the Journal of Peasant Studies (JPS) for more than 15 years. This workshop was held to celebrate the handover of the editorship from Bernstein and Byres to a new editorial team of Deborah Johnston, Cristobal Kay, Jens Lerche, and Carlos Oya and to discuss the journal's past achievements and future agendas. This paper first explains JPS's main interests and characteristics of its approaches which are inherited in JAC to understand well about JAC, second, it summarizes the content of this workshop, and third, it remarks what implication I get from participating in this workshop. JPS's main characteristics is that it concerns not only the classic peasant problems in transition to capitalism in Europe, but also the agrarian transformations and peasant movements in other parts of the world as the revolutionary force, while emphasizing elaborated theoretical problematization based on Marxism. These intellectual features were also present at the workshop. Now that the counter movements to corporate globalization and backlashes from nature are increasing, the "externalist problematic" (Bernstein) which approaches agrarian changes focusing on external forces such as agribusinesses is under criticism. I believe that the tradition of JPS and JAC, which have long committed to the "internalist problematic" (Bernstein) represented by the classic agrarian question, but have also committed to comparative analysis of broad historical realities instead of addressing abstract general law of the agrarian question, can give a hint for today's agrarian studies in a new phase of globalization.

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