哲学

指向性と感覚

黒田亘

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 1-21
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2010/01/20

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.1

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Most of the discussions concerning the nature of perception take for granted the distinction between perception and sensation, and regard the latter as a part or a necessary condition of the former. This assumption will take two different forms in its application, in accordance with the qualifications which may be given to 'sensation'. According to one version of the doctrine, perception involves some direct awareness, i. e. some non-inferential and incorrigible apprehension of particular matter of fact. In the other interpretation, sensation as 'event' or 'occurrence' comes to the fore instead of 'sensing' or its objective correlate ('sensedatum'). Sensation occurs, they contend, as an internal event caused by some physical or physiological processes, irrespective of its becoming an object of direct apprehension.
Despite its apparent conspicuity, the official doctrine of perception gives rise to many philosophical perplexities. The present paper is an attempt to expose the difficulties contained in its two versions, and, through this criticism, to reach another theory exempted from those difficulties. In the second part of this paper, I tried to outline a theory of perception based on the notion of 'intentionality'. Perceiving should be regarded as a kind of knowing, on account of its propositional claim. I discussed there on the nature of 'perceptual evidence' and of 'descriptive content in perception' at some length, because these are, I believe, the very points concerning which my position may be clearly marked off from the two rival theories-Phenomenalism and Causal Theory.

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社会科学と哲学

マルクスとウェ-バ-を中心として

上山春平

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 22-39
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2010/01/20

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.22

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In the first place, I tried to make the meaning of the word social “sciences” clear. It seems to me there are three usages of that term. The first, the sciences that are not the natural sciences. The second, the non-natural-sciences that are not the humanities. The third, the Marxist theory of society.
In my opinion, the field of the non-natural-sciences or the sciences of man is consisted of two subfields, that is the field of the social sciences and the mental sciences. The object of the one is the inter-personal communication process, and that of the other is the intra-personal communication process.
As to the methodology of the social sciences, I took the cases of Karl Marx and Max Weber, and analysed the relation between their philosophical viewpoints and their social theories. The reason for my selecting them is that they represent dialectic and analytic method of social sciences respectively.

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概念形成過程のメカニズム

篠崎武

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 40-58
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.40

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It is my principal purpose in this article to consider how we can get true, scientific concepts and what the determining element in concept formation is.
As everybody knows, the process of concept formation should be treated in whole thinking processes, and 'thinking' or 'thinking process' is the very core of mental activities based on our physiological structure and its function.
From the viewpoint above mentioned, I attend to the process of conditioned reflex formation to seek whether so-called 'association'; the mechanism of conditioned reflex, may also be affectively applied to these mental processes, then to some psychological inquiries, in which there are valuable experimental researches for 'concept formation', especially performed by Hanfmann & Kasanin and Vygotsky. Particularly, I owe much of my concluding remarks to Vygotsky, in spite of his some haults on methodology.
My conclusion in this study is : Concept formation would be reduced not only to 'association' of psychological elements, but also the mechanism of concept formation might rather be found in our functional use of words as the symbol.

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歴史法則の概念

秋間実

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 59-80
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.59

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Unter Determinismus versteht man oft Praedeterminismus, eine Lehre, nach welcher soziale und Naturerscheinungen durch Gott oder Gesetze vorherbestim mt waeren. Man nimmt an, dass historischer Materialismus in diesem Sinne von der Herrschaft historischer Gesetze bzw. historischer Notwendigkeit predigt, die keinen Raum fuer freie menschliche Handlungen offen laesst.
Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung stellt jedoch keinen Praedeterminismus dar. Sie behauptet zwar die Determiniertheit der Grundrichtung der Geschichte, aber diese bedeutet keineswegs Vorherbestimmtheit der Ereignisse durch sog. historische Gesetze. In der Geschichte herrscht keine solche geheimnisvolle Macht, die sich mit eherner Notwendigkeit durchsetzte. Historischer Materialismus betont, dass es eben Menschen sind, die Geschichte schaffen, weist aber zugleich darauf hin, dass sie es nicht willkuerlich tun koennen, sondern nur auf Grund der objektiv gegebenen materiellen Bedingungen. Die Richtung der Entwicklung einer Gesellschaftsformation wird naemlich in letzter Instanz durch die Entwicklung ihrer Produktionsweise selbst bestimmt. Die Menschen duerfen zwar alles versuchen, um diese zu beeinflussen, sie mit der sog. Sozialtechnik einzelner Probleme ganz abstoppen koennen sie jedoch nicht. Der sich vorbereitende Wechsel der oekonomischen Gesellschaftsformation wird frueher oder spaeter durch unzaehlige Zufaelle hindurch, also mit statistischer Notwendigkeit, verwirklicht. Hiermit hat sich dos Gesetz der Geschichte erst durchgesetzt.
Der Verfasser versucht diesen Gesetzesbegriff wissenschaftstheoretisch zu begruenden.

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平和の思想と階級闘争のイデオロギー

湯川和夫

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 81-97
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.81

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1. The axiom of peace and the pacifism
“The peaceful co-existence and the peaceful settlement of international disputes” is something common among Marxists and non-Marxists, i. e., some sort of axiom. But the axiom itself should be distinguished from the idea of pacifism.Pacifists insist that nuclear weapons themselves threaten peace and that the peaceful settlement of international disputes should be unconditionally applied in all cases. Such an idea of pacifists is closely related to the idea of non-alignment in peace movement, distinguished from the non-alignment policy of some newly independent countries.
2. Peaceful co-existence and class struggle
Marxists insist that “?the co-existence of states with different social systems is a classs truggle between socialism and capitalism”. What is the relationship between peaceful co-existence and class struggle? That is the question, especially because peaceful co-existence is said to include even co-operation. This problem is related to the differences among Marxists concerning the under standing of that sentence.
3. Peace movement and national liberation movement
Peace movement has two aspects: one is campaign for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the complete disarmament and the other is struggle against imperialism. How to unite these two aspects is one of the main issues in peace movement. It is closely connected with the problem of difference and unity of ideas among peace-loving people. Another important issue is the combination of peace movement with national liberation movement. The democratic principle of respect for independence and sovereignty is something common between them and it is also the ideological key to bringing the combination into being. The peoples of oppressed countries and the peace-loving forces have common interest against imperialism. This is the objective base of solidarity between them. The victory of world peace movement depends on how to combine national liberation movement with peaceful co-existence policy of socialist states and peace movement in capitalist countries, including struggle.

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哲学史における人間の問題

玉井茂

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 98-116
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2010/01/20

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.98

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The history of philosophy was raised by Hegel to an independent science from a mere collection of opinions, his history of philosophy being written as the philosophy itself. The 19th century showed a tendency of setting aside Hegelian panlogism in favour of historical accuracy and critical attitude and his development view-point was succeeded, though of course on the materialistic interpretation, by Marxism, whose standard book on the history of philosophy is “A World Hsitory of Philosophy” 5 vols. edited by the Philosophical Institute of Soviet Science Academy. This book indeed merits attention in criticizing Europeanism or Westernalization of history, bringing to light manyunderrnineel philosophies of so-called under-developed A. A. countries; but it is not without defects, the most striking of which, I think, is its unreadableness and dehumanization, lacking the eiving individual personalities in the description. Philosopher's life-history including his peculiarities deserves attention, for this is a determining factor in the formation of his theory. In this respect Sartre's criticism of to-day's Marxism would be pointed. Intending however, notto construct an existentialized materialism, but to humanize Marxist interpretation of history of philosophy, I am putting forward a few problems in this paper.

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時間における人間

樫山欽四郎

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 117-136
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2010/01/20

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.117

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Die Zeit heisst eine Synthesis. Die sogenannte Unumkehrbarkeit der Zeit gründet sich darauf, dass die Gegenwart als solche schon im Gesichtspunkt der Gagenwart selbst überschritten worden ist. Die Gegenwart ist gerade die, wenn sie als sie selbst überschritten wird. In diesem Sinne kann man sagen, dass die Gegenwart die Identität in der Nicht-Identität und zugleich die Nicht-Identität in der Identität ist. Mit anderen Worten : die Gegenwart besteht darin, dass ihr, um sie selbst zu sein, das sie überschreitende begegnen muss. Die Gegenwart ist deshalb eine Synthesis, und in diesem Wesen der Gegenwart zeigt sich die Zeit. Deswegen ist die Zeit eine Synthesis.
Die Zeit ist nur da, wo der Mensch da ist. Dementsprechend hätte der Titel “der Mensch in der Zeit” eigentlich “die Zeit im Menschen” heissen sollen. Denn der synthetische Charakter der Zeit beruht aut dem synthetischen Charakter des Menschen : der synthetische Charakter des Menschen offenbart sich schlechthin wesentlich in demselben der Zeit.
Meines Erachtens handeln fast alle bisherigen Lehren von der Zeit dieses Verhältnis. In diesem Aufsatz habe ich versucht, die Zeit als die Form der Anschauung, die phänomenologische Zeit, die Zeit als die reine Dauer, die dialektische Zeit und die existenziale Zeit in dieser Hinsicht zu erörtern und meine eigene Einstellung dazu zu nehmen.

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テオゴニア・コスモゴニア・アントロポゴニア

古代ギリシア人の哲学の起源について

村治能就

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 137-155
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.137

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Problems of origins of ancient Greek philosophy can not be sufficiently solv ed only by following the lineal development from mythos to logos.
In mythos gods and nature were originally united and then they became separated from each other by the invasion of humanized logos, according as social conditions changed.
Mythos and logos were gradually exchanging their meaning and position; Hesiod and other theologoi stood at the transitory stage. Their theogoniai and kosmogoniai, being rationalized, became genealogical, aitiological and allegorical, and yet rested under the will of Zeus.
The first philosophers also endeavoured to take off the anthropomorphic disguise of Olympian gods, bringing them back to physis or natural archai, but, on the other hand, they prepared the way to natural theology which was based upon the idea of harmony and circular motion of nature.
Orpheus and orphikoi were always active behind Hellenic society, from primitive to civilized. They took no small part in the fomation of theogonia and kosmogonia. But they are keenly interested in the destiny of human soul. Their religious aud philosophical merits may be found in their anthropogonia, as hieros logos. The birth of anthropos through the death of Titanes, so-called ancestors of human race, and the resurrection of Dionysus will suggest the contradictory or dialectical character of Orphic anthropogonia.

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研究発表要旨

佐々木敏二, 津村寛二, 半田秀男, 平林康之, 常俊宗三郎, 長沼真澄

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 156-166
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.156

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スピノザの直観知思想の発展について

工藤喜作

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 167-174
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.167

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Spinoza erklärt scientia intuitiva zum Beispiel der Erkenntnis der mathematischen Proportion. Insofern würde bei ihm keine Entwicklung des Gedankens von lntuition gedacht. Wenn man aber den Inhalt der Erkenntnis sorgfältig betrachtet, so wirdes klar, daß ihre Bedeutung in seinen Werken nicht immer dasselbe ist, sondern verschieden von einander. In dem Kurzen Traktat besteht sie in derEinheit mit Gott als Gegenstande. Insofern es sich hier um die Einheit handelt, so ist sie selbst mystisch. Wenn Spinoza auch diese Einheit metaphysisch begreift, so kann doch der mystische Charakter dieser Erkenntnis nicht vermieden werden. Dagegen in den Traktat der Verbesserung des Intellekts begründet Spinoza diese Erkenntnis auf dem logisch-mathematischen Grunde. Sie ist die Erkenntnis des Wesens durch die nächste Ursache. In der Ethik wird scientiaintuitiva als Synthese der beiden oben erwähnten Intuition angesehen. Sic ist nicht nur logisch-mathematisch, sondern mystisch, insofern sie die Erkenntni sdes Wesens als deus guatenus ist.

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スピノザに於ける自由と自己認識

斎藤博

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 175-183
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.175

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What I have attempted here is to demonstrate the meaning of human freedom if, as Spinoza insists, freedom does not lie in free decision, but in free necessity.
According to Spinoza, a thing is free which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature. Thus God is free and His freedom lies in free necessity. Human existence, however, is not considered free, as far as it exists in submission to the common order of nature. This is the origin of our imagining that we have free will, therefore we are free. Thus the problem of freedom faces us with the question of how it is possible to transcend the conscious self.
Spinoza says that while Descartes begins his philosophy from his “cogito”, he himself starts from God. God is the indwelling and not the transcient cause of all things. In this respect the freedom of a human being consists in nothing but a return to his own essence which has been given from God's necessity. Thus we realize the part of God's existence dwelling in our own nature by breaking through the surface of the self. This is the understanding of the self in the depth of being. Spinoza calls this the intellectual love of God where with man as an individual loves God and enjoys his freedom through the eternal essence of human mind.

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意識と実存

湯本和男

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 183-191
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.183

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The notion of intentionality implies that human consciousness is essentially an openness towards what is other than itself. In the pure phenomenology of Husserl, however, the conscious ego is taken to be the absolute source of its own being, and then regarded as the self-sufficient source of the world.
While thus to Husserl ego's subjectivity is assumed to be an interiority closed on itself, Heidegger undertakes to shift the center of gravity of phenomenology by making human being its hinge. Heidegger's reason for replacing consciousness by humanDa “sein” consists in unhinging the selfsufficiency of conscious ego with his emphasis on the notion of existence. But his concept of “Erschlossenheit” does not refer to the unlockedness for the other who is different from myself, though certainly so for “my” world arranged around myself. Both Heidegger and Husserl fail to grasp the meaning of the other-as-other.

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畏敬

その哲学的意義について

伴博

1964 年 1964 巻 14 号 p. 191-199
発行日: 1964/03/31
公開日: 2010/01/20

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.1964.191

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Das Problem der Ehrfurcht ist ein verschüttetes Problem. Es ist die Absicht dieser Abhandlung, den Problemsinhalt zu entfalten, einen Versuch der Erklärung darzustellen und die philosophische Bedeutung dieses Gemüts zu erörtern.
Man meint, dass die Ehrfurcht ein nur spezielles Gefühl für eine andere Person ist. Doch ist sie noch mehr als solches. Wir haben viele vortreffliche Denker und Dichter als die Vorgänger, die die Höhe und die Tiefe dieses Gemüts zeigten : Kant, J. Martineau, Goethe, A. Schweizer, O. F. Bollnow, R. Otto, Kierkegaard, Rilke usw. Wir finden eine merkwürdige Zweideutigkeit oder Doppelheit in diesem Gemüt : “Ehr-furcht od”. “reverence or awe”. Was bedeutet diese Erscheinung? Wohin führt sie uns, wenn wir die verborgene Wesenseinheit hinter ihr verfolgen? Ich versuche hier eigentliche Art der Ehrfurcht darzustellen. Während die Existenzphilosophen die wahre menschliche Existenz in der “Angs” sehen, glaube ich, dass man die wesentlichste “Befindlichkeit” des Menschen, das “in-der-reinen-Transzendenz-sein”, in der eigentlichen Ehrfurcht finden kann.

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