Philosophy (Tetsugaku)

Diverse Questions about Technology

Hisatake KATO

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 2-17,242
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: December 08, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.2

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1. Technology doesn't furnish herself with self-control.
2. Marketsystem economy doesn't function effectively as control systems of Technology fixed from outside.
3. We cannot prognosticate final and intrinsic limit of technological developements so long as atom level sumilations of possible conbinations of atoms are not yet adopted so many fields of technological developements.
4. Technological developements must supply demands of those who want necessities of minimal human life.
5. We should establish reasonable standpoint of view to control technological developements.

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Why Should We Regulate Techno-science?

From the Institutional Point of View

Tadashi KOBAYASHI

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 18-37,242
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: March 05, 2010

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.18

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This paper deals with the problem, “On what reason should we regulate technology ? ” from the institutional point of view. First, I argue that this problem is not an eternal one but a historical one. To show this, historical transition of the relation between technoscience and society since the World War II is sketched and it is argued that a serious change of the relation occurred in 1970's.
Secondly, it is argued that because techno-science after 1970's has become increasingly “trans-scientific” (Weinberg) and knowledge produced by it has fundamentally tentative and uncertain character, the present techno-science cannot play the role of neutral arbiter of the social problems but should be regulated by the expectation of the society through public scrutiny. Traditionally, the social regulation of research has been said to conflict with the academic freedom. However, the academic freedom guaranteed by article 23 of the Constitution of Japan should be reconsidered because the present techno-science is working as not a transcendent but a constructive power in our society.
Thirdly, “not harm others” as the liberal principle is not enough for the regulation of the present techno-science, but a minimum requisite for this. We need some positive principle which orients the present techno-science to public needs.

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Ethical Issues in Engineering Practice and Engineering Ethics Education

Jun FUDANO

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 38-54,241
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: December 09, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.38

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This paper responds to the theme of the symposium by examining several ethical issues in engineering practice and by proposing the construction of engineering ethics programs. First, the author gives his definition of "engineering ethics, " based on the definition of "engineering" by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology. Then, a number of aspects of the central role played by "values" in ethical decisions in engineering practice are discussed . The author introduces the concept of an "engineering ethics program" through which the members of the engineering profession can share values with their fellow members as well as with the public.
The paper also points out the importance of engineering ethics education, as a part of the engineering ethics program, in order to "control technology, " with emphasis on the importance of helping individual engineers develop their moral autonomy. The discussion then turns to a brief description of the history and current state of engineering ethics education. The relationship between learned professions and codes of ethics is discussed with emphasis on the functions of a code in an engineering ethics program. The paper concludes by pointing out foreseeable problems in introducing ethics education into engineering curriculam and by providing possible solutions to them. A call for transdisciplinary collaboration among engineers, philosophers, and experts from various fields is made, so as to design and develop engineering ethics programs in Japan.

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Naturalistic Epistemology and Scepticism

Hume's Case

Kunitake ITO

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 55-70,240
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: December 08, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.55

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Naturalistic epistemology is generally considered to be a strong antidote to the traditional foundational epistemology, and it is believed to be able to evade the sceptical challenge to the traditional foundational project. This belief, however, should be thought again. Naturalistic epietemology and philosophical scepticism can coexist and mutually sustain each other. This is at least the case in the arguments of Hume's Treatise, which is widely recognized as a precursor of current naturalistic epistemology. According to Hume, sceptical argument against reason suggests the validity of naturalism in the theory of knowledge, but naturalism, in turn, encourages the adoption of further sceptical stance to the claim of reason. We can see the novelty of Hume's argument against classical scepticism in this complex combination of scepticism and naturalism.

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Knowledge and Skepticism, Ancient and Modern

What Socrates and Hume Observed in Each of Their Own Minds

Yasuhira KANAYAMA

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 71-91,239
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: December 09, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.71

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Ancient and modern skepticism are said to be different in that (1) ancient skeptics attacked beliefs, while modern skeptics are challenging knowledge (justified true belief); (2) ancient skeptics considered it possible to live without beliefs, following 'appearances', while modern philosophers consider it impossible, as is typically represented by Hume's judgement; (3) ancient skeptics took skepticism to be the best way to attain happiness, while such a demand may be incredible to philosophers today. But are these differences really substantial? As to (1), the state of mind to which justified true belief corresponds in Greek philosophy is doxa (belief) rather than episteme (knowledge); modern skeptics may be regarded by ancient skeptics as challenging belief rather than knowledge. As to (2), when e.g. a car rushes toward them, Pyrrhonists and Humeans will both evade the car, with the processes in their minds being almost the same, and different only in names ('appearances' and 'beliefs'). However, there is at least one substantial difference: if ancient skeptics' claim in (3) is true, Pyrrhonists can lead a better life than Humeans, by following appearances of moral virtues and also suspending judgement about the sufferings their moral activities may cause to them. To Humeans, who hold that reason is the slave of the passions, Pyrrhonists' claim to achieve happiness by rationally suspending judgement may appear to be the result of neglecting observation. But the reason's power that enables men to lead a good life, in which ancient skeptics believed, was what Socrates actually observed in his own mind and handed down to posterity.

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The Modern Nation State and "Nationalism and War"

Masatoshi YOSHIDA

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 92-110,238
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: December 09, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.92

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This paper tries to show the relationship between the critical situation of "Nationalism and War"in the present world and the modern nation state formed in the name of Sovereignty with the people.
First, the modern nation state, as H.Arendt pointed out, could not have integrated all major or minor nations. For example, the "tribal nationalism" advocated by Naztism meant "the conquest of a state by (major) nation" and the separation of others from the political community. And the nation state still now remains the cause of nationalism and war.
Second, the modern philosophy has thought of the nation state in relation to civil society and showed the direction of "World History" for nations. In Kantism, it is the "Eternal Peace" regulating civil society by a nation state. In Hegelism, it is the "War" among nations as an extension of "war of everyone against everyone" in civil society. In Marxism, it is the formation of "Community absorbing nationstate by (civil) society". But until now these programs have not been realized except in Hegel's case.
Third, M.Maruyama who considered the problems of modern Japan, criticized the prewar Japanese nation and brought up "Democracy as eternal revolution" which means the transformation of the nation to civil society. But now, this project also faces some difficulties with the rise of political and ideological nationalism.

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Nation-State and Sacrifice

Tetsuya TAKAHASHI

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 111-128,238
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: December 08, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.111

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The Yasukuni Shrine has been a privileged device of wars and nationalism inmodern Japan and as such it remains today a focus of both national and international conflicts. The problems of this shrine are, on the one hand, to be considered as those of national worship of fallen soldiers which is common to modern nationstates in general, but on the other hand, they have particular Japanese features which are concerned with State-Shintoism.
In this article, I examin these problems successively from four points of view. That is, (1) the worship of Japanese war criminals, (2) the constitutional principle of the separation of religion and politics, (3) the enshrining of the fallen soldiers who were mobilized from Korea and Taiwan by the Imperial Japan, and (4) the alternative idea of the new secular momument for national mourning of fallen soldiers.
Finally, I would like to question the system of a nation-state which requires the sacrifices of its members, that is, the nation-state as civil religion.

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[title in Japanese]

[in Japanese]

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 131-141
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.131

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Royce's Absolute Pragmatism

A Kantian-pragmatistic Approach to Reality

Masato ISIDA

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 142-153,237
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.142

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Royce's place in the history of American thought is unique. His philosophy is a synthesis of absolutism and a voluntaristic type of pragmatism. It is important to bear in mind, however, that Kant always remained influential in his thought. Thus the core of Royce's absolute pragmatism exhibits a version of apriorism with a constructive epistemology.
His epistemology in turn extends further to comprehending his theory of reality, by which he intends to supplement Kant's philosophy with a new ontological framework. This is what he calls the "Fourth Conception of Being." It states that his approach to reality depends not on the fact that the world is mental, but on insisting that the being of the world consists in the truth of the propositions about it. In this regard his view is opposed to metaphysical realism, and to traditional idealism as well, which takes the world to be mental.
Despite the modern rebellion against such a form of thought, Royce's philosophy still seems to represent an important part of the pragmatistic-idealistic heritage of western thought. The present paper tries to appreciate some aspects of this heritage and to show the close connection between pragmatism and the broadly Kantian approach to truth and reality.

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On Hekaston (Each Thing) in Aristotle's Theory of Essence

Keiichi IWATA

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 154-166,236
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.154

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The aim of this paper is to clarify what the word hekaston signifies in Aristotle's theory of essence, as it is developed in his Metaphysics Z4-6 and 10-12. In Z4, Aristotle refers to "you, " an individual substance, as an example of hekaston, in order to explain the essence of hekaston. However, if we interpret the word hekaston to signify individual substance, it becomes difficult to understand the claim in Z6 that hekaston is to be identified with its essence. For the individual substance has essence as its essential aspect and accidents as its non-essential aspects. The alternative interpretation is that the word hekaston signifies form. But this interpretation is not appropriate to the context of Z4-6, where Aristotle does not take hylomorphism into consideration. So I suggest a third interpretation, according to which the word hekaston signifies an individual substance that is tentatively treated as that which has no accident. The advantage of this interpretation is that the word signifies such an individual substance throughout Z4-6. Furthermore, this interpretation helps us to understand the difference between the viewpoint of the first half of the theory of essence and that of the latter half.

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Die Aufklärung der Grundlage der Dingapperzeption in der

Phanomenologie Husserls vom Standpunkt der Motivation aus

Hiroshi UTA

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 167-179,235
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.167

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In der Phänomenologie Husserls ist die Dingapperzeption das System von intentionalen Strahlen, das üiber das eigentlich Gegebene hinaus auf den Horizont uneigentlich gegebener Erscheinungen verweist. In dieser Abhandlung versuche ich die Grundlage dieser Dingapperzeption freizulegen. Zu diesem Zweck soll der Begriff Motivation eine wichtige Rolle spielen.
Zunächst ist die Dingapperzeption als ein System von Erwartungsintentionen von der assoziativen Motivation bestimmt. Die impressional gegebenen Daten fließen in die Vergangenheiten ab und werden doch retentional behalten. Wenn ein neues Moment ähnlichen Inhalts gegeben ist, dann weckt es assoziativ diese Vergangenheiten, und diese, sich in die Zukunft projizierend, motivieren die Erwartungen gleichen Stiles. In dieser Weise ist die Dingapperzeption als ein System von Erwartungen assoziativ ausgebildet.
Dadurch ist aber die fundamentale Schicht der Apperzeption noch nicht freigelegt. Denn sie ist in ihrem Fundament durch Kinästhese motiviert. Kinästhese ist das System meiner Bewegungsempfindungen, meiner Bewegungsmöglichkeiten. Diesem System entspricht ein Horizont moglicher Erscheinungsreihen in meiner Wahrnehmung. Hier steht ein inniger Motivationszusammenhang zwischen dem kinästhetischen System und dem Horizont möglicher Erscheinungen. Die Dingapperzeption, die auf den Gesamthorizont möglicher Erscheinungen verweist, ist also ursprünglich durch diese kinästhetische Motivation bestimmt. Erst durch die Zusammenarbeit beider Motivationen, der kinästhetischen und assoziativen, kann sie ein einheitliches System von intentionalen Strahlen ausbilden.

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The Reference of a Proper Name and the Chain of Communication

Toshihiro OHISHI

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 180-191,234
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.180

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What we are concerned with is the question of how we can refer to something with a proper name. Descriptive theorists believe a description to be an essential factor. Causal theorists claim that a community plays a leading role. In this paper I have showed three points. First, against the causal theory, a parasitic description is essentially related to the reference of a name. A parasitic description is a description that includes a reference to another's reference to the particular in question. When we intend to refer to something with a proper name, we must be ready to show a parasitic description as a minimum condition. Secondly, when we use a proper name, we postulate that the proper name has been successfully passed down from link to link in a community, and we are on the far end of this chain of communication. Thirdly, for the time being, the fact that we have a parasitic description shows that we are on this far end of the chain of communication. From these three points we can derive the argument that it is beside the point to ask the question whether the major factor in determining the reference of a proper name is a description or a chain of communication. The conflict between the descriptivist theory and the causal theory is superficial.

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Das Zeichen und die "primitive" Welt

Das Problem des Zeichens in der existenzialen Analytik bei Heidegger

Keisuke KATO

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 192-203,234
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.192

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In "Sein und Zeit" ist das Zeichen nur als eine Art des Zeugs bestimmt. Dabei ist die Sprache nicht im Zeichen eingeschlossen. Nach Heidegger hat das Zeichen keine andere ontologische Struktur als die des Zeugs überhaupt.
Aber das Zeichen hat die Eigentümlichkeit, daß es nicht nur andere Dinge zeigt, sondern es auch die ontologische Struktur der Weltlichkeit anzeigt. Bei all dem bestimmt Heidegger das Zeichen nur als eine Art des Zeugs, weil er nach der griechischen Überlieferung die nächsten dem Menschen begegnenden Dinge als Zeug bestimmt.
Auf der anderen Seite ist seiner Ansicht nach in der "primitiven Welt" das Zeichen noch nicht als Zeug gefunden. Dies macht eine wesentliche Differenz zwischen den ontologischen Strukturen der "unseren" Welt and der "primitiven" Welt aus. Dann bedarf es der formalen Idee von Weltlichkeit, die beiden Welten gemeinsam ist, und diese Idee wäre nicht der Zusammenhang des Zeuges, sondern der Zusammenhang des Zeichens, den Heidegger vermeidet. Dies veranlaßt uns, zu fragen, welche Voraussetzungen der existenzialen Analytik des Daseins bei Heidegger zu Grunde liegen.

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Thomas Aquinas on the Semantics of Being

Masato KATO

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 204-214,233
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.204

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Esse (ens) dupliciter dicitur. What does Aquinas mean by this distinction? T. Veres, who first indicated the fundamental importance of this distinction in the metaphysical thought of Aquinas, interpreted it as eine fundamentale ontologische Dichotomie. On the other hand, H.Weidemann regarded it as two semantically different uses of the verb “be. ” In this paper, I intend to argue against both Veres and Weidemann and attempt a more sophisticated interpretation.
The view presented by Veres faces two serious difficulties, which are necessarily caused by his ontological interpretation. Weidemann's semantic explanation of Aquinas' dichotomy of being in accordance with Fregean trichotomy fails because the Fregean distinction of the 'is' of existence, of predication, and of identity doesn't seem to be consistently applicable to Aquinas.
I interpret Aquinas' distinction between esse ut actus essendi and esse ut verum from a semantic viewpoint as being the distinction between two aspects of significare, i.e. res significata and significatum. Significare means not only to refer to things (res significata), but also to make conceptions understood (significatum) by expressing them. Thus esse (ens) dupliciter dicitur means, on the one hand, that esse refers to reality, and, on the other, that esse, combining a predicate with a subject as a copula, expresses an affirmative proposition as known to mind and asserts its truth.

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An Essay Concerning Intuition and the Symbol in Kant

Ayano TANAKA

2003 Volume 2003 Issue 54 Pages 215-226,232
Published: April 01, 2003
Released on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2003.215

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This essay treats of Kant's concept of intuition. Intuition shown as the key subject in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is mainly sensible intuition.
Kant's argument, however, was not understood at that time. Traditionally, intuition meant intellectual intuition. Therefore, conforming to this tradition, Kant's concept of intuition was regarded as a degradation from a high degree of "intellectuality" to a lower degree of "sensibility", which was criticized.
But I think the opposite, that is to say, that neither intellectuality nor sensibility is necessarily the property of intuition itself. In this essay, I try to show that the original property of intuition is "immediacy", and examine the case of Kant.
In addition, I aim at the idea that the symbol is identified as intuitive cognition in Critique of Judgment, and I try to clarify the important role of intuition in Kant's philosophy.

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