哲学
Online ISSN : 1884-2380
Print ISSN : 0387-3358
ISSN-L : 0387-3358
2004 巻, 55 号
選択された号の論文の21件中1~21を表示しています
  • Naoki SAKAI
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 1-18
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 哲学に突きつけられた課題
    平子 友長
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 4-19,en19
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper consists of the following four chapters:
    In the first chapter the author describes how money speculation goes beyond any governmental control and devastates the economy in many developing countries, referring to the financial crisis in Asian countries in 1997. In the second chapter he treats the political economy of global migration : how global capitalism mobilizes and destabilizes world population. In the third chapter he summarizes the ambiguous impact of globalization upon nation states in their role and status : denationalization or/and renationalization. The last chapter is dedicated to the actual problems : how we are to cope with negative consequences caused by global capitalism. Taking an important role of international law system for human rights into consideration, the author lays special emphasis on the legal concept of the right to life as the most fundamental human right which should be given priority to other fundamental human rights such as freedom of any sort.
    The whole constellation of wealth and poverty is, in principle, structurally determined by global capitalism. The fact that poverty, environmental destruction, epidemic diseases, chronic civil wars and high death rates and other dangers to human life are, on the whole, accumulated in developing countries should not be ascribed to the disability of the people living there because they are through structural violence forced to them. Ethics should widen its perspective and, in correspondence with globalization of sufferings caused by global capitalism, respond to the silenced voices of sufferers in any corner of the world.
  • 主権を制限し合う諸国民国家からなる地域共同体
    別所 良美
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 20-38,en20
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    In den Diskussionen fiber die Globalisierung streiten unterschiedliche Positionen miteinander. Trotz der vielfaltigen Dimensionen uber die Globalisierung geht es im Grande darum, wie man in der heutigen fief miteinander verflochtenen Welt die herkommlichen National-Staaten an ihrem richtigen Platz situieren kann. Das Ideal des globalen and friedlichen Zusammenlebens der Menschen, die heute in unterschiedlichen Staaten and mit vielfaltigen Kulturen and Traditionen leben, kann nur dann verwirklicht werden, wenn jeder Staat, and besonders die letzte Super-Macht, auf seine absolute Souveranitat verzichtet and mit einem neuen Begriff der begrenzten Souveranitat ein System der gemeinsamen Regulierung der Gewalt zu schaffen trachtet. Eine regionale Staatengemeinschaft kann der erste Schritt dazu sein.
    In diesem Beitrag wird das oben gennante Thema anhand der Habermasschen Kritik am Iraq-Krieg der USA analysiert. Der Unilateralismus der Bush-Regierung wird eben deshalb kritisiert, weil das Ideal des offen-universalistischen Zusammenlebens der Staaten gerade geschadigt and betrogen wird.
  • 牧野 英二
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 41-55,21
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    Man mag sich nun immer noch fragen, was die reine Vernunft in Kants drei Kritiken bedeutet.Die meisten Forscher interpretieren diesen Begriff der reinen Vernunft bei Kant als eine inhaltsleere, d. h. formale and abstrakte, gefühlsarme, allgemeine Vernunft.
    Wilhelm Dilthey witft zum Beispiel Kant vor, "In den Adern des erkennenden Subjekts, das Locke, Hume and Kant konstruierten, rinnt nicht wirkliches Blut, sondern der verdünnte Saft vonVernunft als blosser Denktäfigkeit."
    Ich möchte vorschlagen, dass der Begriff der reinen Vernunft "das Gefühl des der Vernunft eigenen Bedürfnisses" enthielt, and dass "das Bedürfnis der Vernunft" den Lebenshorizont der menschlichen Vernunft erfüllt.
  • 前批判期から『遺稿』へ
    福谷 茂
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 56-73,22
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2010/03/05
    ジャーナル フリー
    Where the core of Kantian philosophy must be located? The author of this paper argues that, facing almost inscrutable breadth and complexities of Kant's Werke, we should rather identify it by singling out the basso continuo of his thinking.
    In this respect, the author emphasizes the importance of a short paper written in 1768 on Concerning the ultimate ground of directions in space. According to the accepted view, Kant gave reasons in favor of the Newtonian absolute space in sharp contrast to the space-as-pure intuition theory of Dissertatio (1770). But notwithsatndig the formal differences there lies a continuous line between these two. The author points out that a deep metaphysical concern of Kant surfaces here in relation to the problem of the whole and the parts. Old type metaphysics is based on the assumption that the whole can be made up from the parts : an assumption repudiated by the Newtonian absolutist view of space and effectively illustrated by Kant's own counter-example of the incongruent counterparts.
    The critical philosophy of Kant is an attempt at reconstruction of metaphysics by integrating a reversal of the ontological relation between the whole and the parts. The Critique of Pure Reason is a culmination of this enterprise in its concept of “one possible experience” or “one single all-embracing experience” (A582=B610) as the ultimate condition of possibility of paticular experiences.
    Finally the author corroborates his view by citations from the Opus postumum, which he regards as the formal, synthetic statement of the Kantian philosophy in close relationship with The Critique of Pure Reason.
  • 横山 輝雄
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 74-89,22
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    Origin of Species by Charles Darwin was published in 1859. Darwininan Revolution took place in the 19th century. Ernst Mayr says that now almost everyone is Darwinian and that the only excepton is "creationst" in the US. But the statement about evolution by Pope John Paul II was issued in 1986. Darwin's Dangerous Idea by Danieil Dennett was pubulished the same year.Why Darwinian Revoluiton is contemporary issue in the 21st century.
    Until 1970s Darwinian Revolution was restrictede within natural science. Darwin, Huxley and other evolutionalisits were not materialist or naturalist about philosophical or ethical problems. After the Meiji Restoration Japanese society accepted theory of evolution in natural science but did not accepted philosophical materialism or naturalism.
    After "life science turn" in 1970s Darwinian Revolution is taken seriously by philosophers. The central question of Darwinian Revolution is about naturalism or materialism. The concept of natural selection is also the critical issue. The anthropic principle or observation selection effect is discussed in philosophy of cosmology. That concept is also significant in philosophy of biology.
  • 松本 俊吉
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 90-112,23
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    The objective of this article is to clarify the nature of the methodological position called adaptationism in evolutionary biology (that is, a position holding natural selection to be ubiquitous and the most powerful as a mechanism of the evolution of life) and to discuss the problems that relate to it. To this end, I will first set forth the controversy having been waged on the legitimacy of adaptationism, originally initiated by Gould and Lewontin in 1978 and having been joined by mainstream neo-Darwinists ever since. Then I will put forward some framework for evaluating this controversy, namely, the idea of taking adaptationism to be a research program in Lakatos' sense. In the second section, I will review, somewhat critically, how adaptationistic thinking is exemplified in the sociobiological research program advocated by E. O. Wilson and his followers. In the third section, I will give some considerations on the possibility of the model of cultural evolution (memetics) as a complement to the one-sidedness of the genetically-biased sociobiological explanation of human culture.
  • ベルクソンにおける知覚と存在の錯節をめぐって
    荒谷 大輔
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 115-129,24
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    La notion de l'image bergsonienne est complexe. Il a introduit cette notion en disant:«l'esprit [qui ignorerait les discussions entre philosopher] croirait naturellement que la matière existe telle qu'il la percoit.» Cependant, malgré la simplicité de cette introduction, sa portée est très large.
    L'image est percipi dans la conscience.«it n'y a pas de perception qui ne soit imprégnée de souvenir».Afin de percevoire quelque chose, it faut avoir par avance des images dans la conscience. D'autre part, Bergson dit en même temps:«une image peut etre sans être percue ».«il n'y a pas une image inextensive qui se formerait dans la conscience et se projetterait ensuite en P». Mais quel est le statut d'une telle image conservée dans la conscience bien qu'elle en existe indépendamment? Sur ce point, le rapport entre l'esse et le percipi de l'image devient compliqué.
    Pour résoudre cette complication, Bergson dit« il y a pour les images une simple différence de degré, et non pas de nature, entre être et être consciemment percues. »Ainsi la cohérence de la philosophie bergsonienne est gardée provisoirement. En admettant que cette conception soit possible dans son système, est-elle toujours valable en réalité? Il serait difficile d'y croire pour« L'esprit qui ignorerait les discussions entre philosophes ».
    Dans cet article, nous aimerions mettre en question la détermination de ce concept bergsonien de l'image et constater sa validité. De cette facon, nous trouverons le point d'intersection de l'épistémologie (percipi) et de l'ontologie (esse) dans le discours de Bergson.
  • 伊藤 淑子
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 130-141,25
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    Bergson nous a laissé quatre oeuvres principales dont chacune a un thème différent et c'est dans l'Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience seulement qu'il a traite "le moi" de front.
    Nous éclairerons d'abord «l'essence du moi» suivant l'Essai, puis, à partir d'une lecture de Matière et mémoire, qui traite de la relation de l'âme et du corps, nous expliquerons la structure correcte du «moi vivant» par un certain nombre de considerations sur la mémoire. En élucidant ensuite la relation de la vie et du moi dans L'Évolution créatrice, nous comprendrons la cosmologie de Bergson comme une théorie fondée sur «l'élargissement du moi». Enfin, nous montrerons, par un examen des Deux sources de la Morale et de la Religion, ouvrage qui traite de la socialité du moi, que l'ame du mystique peut être atteinte au moyen de «l'approfondissement du moi».
    Ayant considéré ainsi ses quatre oeuvres comme «la découverte du vrai moi», « l'éclaircissement du moi vivant", "la théorie de la vie et celle du cosmos saisies par l'élargissement du moi» et «le mysticisme regardé comme l'approfondissement du moi", nous conclurons en affirmant que le bergsonisme est bien, du commencement a la fin, «1a philosophie du moi ».
  • デカルトにおける永遠真理の創造と形而上学的懐疑
    井原 健一郎
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 142-154,26
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    Cet essai examine un problème bien connu concernant la relation entre deux thèses (ou hypothèses) cartésiennes qui dérivent de la toute-puissance de Dieu:la thèse sur la libre création des vérités éternelles par Dieu, et l'hypothése du Dieu trompeur comme raison de douter des vérités mathématiques. Pour aborder ce problème, nous nous demandons : (1) comment il est possible d'être toujours trompé dans les vérités mathématiques qui nous semblent extrêmement claires et distinctes; (2) si Dieu, créateur des vérités éternelles, peut nous tromper en exercant sa propre faculté de créer ou instituer librement des vérités éternelles ; (3) si est possible que Dieu nést pas en mesure de nous tromper à moins qu'il ne puisse pas créer ou instituter des vérités éternelles.
    Les considérations sur ces trios questions nous conduiront à une conclusion inattendue : on ne peut pas savoir si le Dieu trompeur est le créateur des vérités éternelles. Parce qu'existent deux facons de nous tromper (nous les appelons respectivement la «tromperie ontologique»et la «tromperie épistémologique») et que, de plus, it est presque impossible de dire, laquelle de ces deux tromperies, Dieu emploie pour nous tromper.
  • 川谷 茂樹
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 155-166,27
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    Was fur eine Tätigkeit ist es, die Formen in der Philosophie zu erforschen? Welche Eigentümlichkeit haben die Formen, die durch eine solche Erforschungen entdeckt werden? Was fur eine Tätigkeit ist die transzendentale Philosophie über-haupt?
    In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich eine adäquate Antwort auf die diese Fragen zu geben, indem ich Kants Argumente in seinen metaphysisch und transzendental genannten zwei "Deduktionen der Kategorien" interpretiere.
    In der metaphysischen Deduktion kann Kant das Programm seiner Argumentation eigentlich nicht ausfuhren, ohne abhängig von der blossen Tatsache zu sein, dass wir stets durch die zwölf Urteilsformen (Kategorien) urteilen (denken). Fol-glich wird unseren Kategorien ein Merkmal des Faktizität zugefügt. Auch kann die transzendentale Deduktion eine "Alternativenlosigkeit" nicht beweisen. Aber mit diesen Dedktionen können wir argumentieren, dass unsere Kategorien transzendental sind.
    Letztlich kann man sagen, dass die transzendentale Faktizität unserer Kategorien in Kants zwei "Deduktionen der Kategorien" eine ultimative Grenze erreicht hat. Aber der problematische Begriff dieser Faktizität deutet auf die "unmögliche Moglichkeit" (Th. M. Seebohm) hin, dass unsere Kategorien, die als transzendentale Formen festgestellt werden, entstehen, sich verändern und auch verschwinden können.
    Die transzendentale Philosophie ist (1) die Tätigkeit, die den ursprünglichen Widerspruch aufweist, die transzendentale Formen, die die Fakta möglich machen, als das Faktum zu setzen, (2) die Bewegung, die schon vom Widerspruch (Aporie) als einem negativen Ursprung ausgeht.
  • トマス・アクィナスの天体論
    小林 剛
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 167-178,27
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the ancient and medieval history of ideas, there seem to have been two main points of view concerning the character of astronomy. Some people believed that astronomy was a kind of geometry. Their position is, as it were, non-realistic. Others argued that astronomy had to be based on physical principles. Their position is, as it were, realistic. Thomas Aquinas seems to belong to the latter position. But his originality is to ground the hypothetical character of astronomy on the incorruptibility of celestial bodies. According to Thomas, astronomy is hypothetical because the human cognition of celestial bodies is uncertain. This uncertainty is caused by the incorruptibility of celestial bodies : celestial bodies are more perfect than sublunary bodies, which are the proper object of human cognition. In this way, Thomas grounds the limits of some human cognitions of nature on other human cognitions of nature, that is, on the human cognition of the metaphysical hierarchy in nature, for example, the distinctions between sublunary bodies and celestial bodies, celestial bodies and angels, and, angels and God. This metaphysical cognition is regarded as certain and grounds all other human cognitions of nature.
  • 菅沼 聡
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 179-192,28
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    Being a highly traditional question of metaphysics, the so-called “Ultimate Why-Question” still interests some contemporary philosophers. To ask this question amounts to asking where, if anywhere, “why-chains” can stop.
    Whereas the most traditional approach to the Ultimate Why-Question has been to try to answer it by “God”, i. e., “Necessary Existence/Being”; the most usual ap-proach in contemporary analytical philosophy has been to dismiss it as a nonsense pseudo-problem because it is “logically unanswerable”. I call the former tradition as a whole the “old tradition” and the latter the “new tradition”.
    In this article, I propose a “third alternative”, by suggesting that the Ultimate Why-Question is not necessarily unanswerable but can be answered by a kind of “Necessary Existence/Being”, which cannot be anything in particular at all (in-cluding even “God”) but only the “Absolute Totality of Reality”.
    The following three procedures would be required to make the above sugges-tions assertions:
    (1) to show whether the “Absolute Totality of Reality” exists at all,
    (2) to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be the “Nec-essary Existence/Being” that would stop all possible why-chains,
    (3) to decide whether only the “Absolute Totality of Reality” satisfies the above conditions.
  • 鈴木 貴之
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 193-205,29
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    Some anti-physicalists claim that the conceivability of zombies itself shows in an a priori way that physicalism about consciousness cannot be true. We have to see if this argument is successful before we start to build a physicalistic theory of con-sciousness. There are two popular physicalist objections to the argument. The ob-jection based on necessity a posteriori does not succeed because of the equivocality of the statements in question.Another objection, based on non-ascriptivism about meaning, fails because non-ascriptivism mistakenly thinks that conceivability is a quite empty notion. Despite the failure of these objections, we can object to the con-ceivability argument by emphasizing the possible inappropriateness of concepts. Our present concepts do not necessarily depict reality in an appropriate way. So, conceivability based on our present concepts has no consequences for metaphysical possibility if the concepts used are inappropriate ones. We have reason to think that our current concept of consciousness is inconsistent, so the conceivability of zom-bies is not a reliable guide to their metaphysical possibility. We may see that physi-calism about consciousness is true and zombies are inconceivable when we have the appropriate concept of consciousness.
  • パティキュラリストの動機付けの理論
    田村 圭一
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 206-217,30
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    Cognitivism in ethics can be divided into two branches. One is naturalism and the other is intuitionism. Intuitionism is cognitivist internalism, that is, the claim that cognitive states, i. e., beliefs, can motivate an agent to action without the assistance of desires. But cognitivist internalism faces two kinds of problems, i. e., weakness of will and accidie. In order to clear cognitivist internalism of these difficulties, we have to revise Humean motivational theory. Humeanism is the claim that beliefs cannot motivate an agent without the assistance of relevant desires. Only desires can motivate in their own right and their motivation is necessary. T. Nagel's cognitiv-ist internalism and J. McDowell's are partially committed to Humeanism, because they tacitly admit that cognitive states should necessarily motivate. J. Dancy tries to revise Humeanism. According to him, cognitive states can motivate in their own right, but their motivation is contingent.
    Dancy's cognitivist internalism accepts particularism, which adopts a holistic un-derstanding of the behaviour of moral reasons.Particularists reject the generalist as-sumption that a cognitive state which behaves in a given case in favour of an action should behave similarly in every case. Cognitivist internalists, therefore, can escape their traditional difficulties when they adopt particularism.
  • 茶谷 直人
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 218-230,30
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the Metaphysics Θ Aristotle introduces two types of dynamis (dynamis as ability (DA) and dynamis as potentiality (DP)). It has been often pointed out that his distinction between DA and DP is confusing. In this paper, I examine the difference between them and the significance of his detailed explanation of DA in the first half of Θ (ch.1-5), and thereby I show the following.
    In the first half of Θ, Aristotle basically understands DA as an external (objective) principle of motion. This characterization is neutral with regard to the framework of hylomorphism and whether relevant motion happens or not. But in his criticism against the Megarians who deny dynamis, he indicates that dynamis can be regarded as potentiality. This criticism serves as a point of contact between of ability and potentiality. On the other hand, in the latter half of Θ, the notion of potentiality implies that dynamis is only conceivable as energeia (actuality). However, DA and DP are not exclusive kinds, the difference consists in that of perspective and there is no genuine confusion.
    Further, DA plays an important role in introducing DP by analogy. In Θ6, DA functions as the starting point of an analogical argument. That is, there is an analogical progression which proceeds from the scheme of <ability-motion> to that of <matter-substance (form)>. In this respect DA has a methodological significance in Aristotle's potentiality-actuality theory.
  • 『思想と動くもの』緒論第二部を中心に
    中根 弘之
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 231-242,31
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    Dans La Pensée et le mouvant, Bergson a remarqué qué la précision manquait aux systèmes philosophiques. Car, les systèmes avaient été construits par les concepts, et ses contours étaient si larges qu'ils embrassaient non seulement le réel, mais encore le possible. Bergson exigeait que la philosophie s'applique à notre expérience et procède par l'intuition. L'intuition nous amène au point où notre connaissance coïncide avec la réalité spirituelle. Nous ne pouvons pas substituer le mot à l'intuition, mais c'est bien par le langage que les philosophes nous conduisent à l'intuition. Bergson nous faisait remarquer que «une frange d'image» entourait les idèes plus concrètes de l'intuition. L'image suggère sous la forme de l'expression comparative ou métaphorique ce que les concepts abstraits n'arrivent pas à exprimer. Il faut donc que la suggestion de l'intuition soit vérifiée par les faits de la conscience, quand il s'agit de la précision sur les arguments de la philosophie intuitive. Bergson veut que la philosophie réforme les termes des problèmes dans les divers connaissances et soit examinée exactement par la science positive. Et, par cela, la philosophie, la science aussi, devient de plus en plus précise et certaine.
  • プラトン『パイドン』における等しさそのもの
    松井 貴英
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 243-255,32
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/12/09
    ジャーナル フリー
    In Plato's Phaedo 74b2-3, at one stage of the argument for the theory of recollection, Socrates and Simmias agree that they have knowledge of equality itself. The aim of this paper is to answer the following two questions concerning this agree-ment : (1) What is equality itself, which they claim to know, the Platonic Form of Equality or some mathematical object different from Platonic Forms?(2) Is recollection a form of ordinary learning accessible to ordinary people or some kind of higher learning?
    In our approach to question (1), we deal first with 76b10-12. This passage suggests that only Socrates is capable of giving an account of Forms, including the Form of Equality, and this can be taken to imply that Simmias does not know this Form. The knowledge he has attained so far concerns only mathematical objects. This conclusion may be supported by 74c1-3, where the equality itself which Sim-mias is said to know is represented in the plural.
    As to question (2), Socrates says that whenever we recollect something through something like it, we necessarily recognize that the latter is defective in its similarity to the former (74a5-7), and this statement suggests that recollection is not simple concept formation, but rather a kind of higher learning, which requires reflective thought.
    Now in this process of recollection, where does Simmias, who doesn't have knowledge of Forms, stand? The 'Divided Line' in the Republic and the comparison with the slave boy in the Meno help us to answer this question : his state of mind corresponds to 'dianoia' in the 'Divided Line', but is nearer to 'noesis' than the slave boy in the Meno, who is supposed to have just begun his attempt to reach 'dianoia' starting from 'pistis'. Recollection is supposed to be a long and arduous process of learning in the journey toward 'dianoia' and 'noesis', starting from 'pistis'.
  • 松本 大理
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 256-267,33
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    "Der Mensch und überhaupt jedes vernünftige Wesen existiert als Zweck an sich selbst" (GMS. 428). Mit dieser berühmten Formulierung gibt uns Immanuel Kant einen Begriff seiner Vorstellung von der würdevollen Existenz sowohl des Men-schen wie jedes vernünftigen Wesens überhaupt.Die Existenz des Menschen wie jedes vernünftigen Wesens ist gekennzeichnet durch das Verhältnis zwischen den vernünftigen Wesen, von denen eines der Mensch ist, und der Bestimmung derselben, Zweck an sich selbst zu sein. Aber Kants Erklärung, wie und warum beide Begriffe miteinander verbunden werden können, reicht nicht aus. So wurde in Folge der Kantschen Bestimmung immer wieder versucht, den Begriff des Zwecks an sich selbst aus dem Begriff der Person, (deren Begriff auf ein Wesen mit einem absoluten Wert, wie es vernünftige Wesen und Menschen sind, hinweist) abzuleiten, oder umgekehrt. Aber alle diese Versuche sind unzureichend. Denn, während der Begriff der Person die Idee des guten Willens meint, impliziert Zweck an sich selbst den Begriff des durch blo(βe Vernunft bestimmten Willens. Da also diese beiden Begriffe von Willen sich von einander unterscheiden, ist es unmöglich, beide Begriffe miteinander unmittelbar zu verbinden. DarÜuberhinaus ist die Verbindung der Person mit dem Zweck nicht analytisch, sondern "synthetisch". Beide Begriffe kÖnnen meines Erachtens erst durch die Verknüpfung mit einem dritten, d. h. dem positiven Begriff der Freiheit, miteinander verbunden werden.
  • フッサールにおける感性的性質の問題
    吉川 孝
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 268-279,34
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    In die Sphäre der Phänomenologie gehört nur Sinn and Wesen.Husserl hat zwar ein solches Selbstverständnis, aber seine “Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung” uberschreitet in der Tat den Bereich der “Wahrnehmungs-Noema”. In einem Text von 1907, der sinnliche Qualitaten wie Farbe and Ton behandelt, entwirft er die Phanomenologie der empirischen Vermittlung, die sich nicht als die reine Phänomenologie, die Wissenschaft von Sinn and Wesen versteht.
    Die Phänomenologie der empirischen Vermittlung wird in “Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907” und “Ideen II” entwickelt.Husserl klassifiziert die sinnlichen Qualitaten in materia prima und materia secunda. In die erstere Kategorie fallen visuelle oder taktile Eigenschaften, durch die die Gestalt von Dingen unmittelbar bestimmt wird. Die Farbe ist also nach Husserl die materia prima. Die materia secunda (Ton, Geruch, Gewicht and Widerstand) bedeckt dagegen nicht die dingliche Gestalt, aber sie ist keineswegs eine subjektive Empfindung, sondern erfullt den leeren Raum, der nicht als ein Korper bezeichnet werden kann. Dieselbe Qualitaten, die diesen Raum selbst qualifizieren, kann man “Welt-Materie” nennen. Auf Grund dieser Analysen, betrachtet Husserl in seinem spateren Manuskript die Welt-Materie (das Gestaltiose, das nicht als ein Ding erfahrbar ist) als das apeiron.
  • 渡辺 大地
    2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 280-292,35
    発行日: 2004/04/01
    公開日: 2009/07/23
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, I want to discuss the so-called "Autonomy of Logic" (Logic must take care of itself)" in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein says that this remark is a very deep and fundamental insight, and a right interpretation of this insight will clarify what Wittgenstein means by "Logic" in the Tractatus. However, the remark's implications are very obscure, so some clarifications are necessary.
    The remark involves two points : in the whole theory of things, properties are superfluous, and we cannot make mistakes in logic. So I discuss these points and then interpret some remarks about the "Autonomy of Logic".
    Firstly, I discuss Peter Hacker's interpretation of these remarks and related points. I indicate some problems of his interpretation are due to his neglect of the view of nonsense in the Tractatus and I consider this problem on the basis of a new approach to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (especially the view of Cora Diamond and that of James Conant) and I then present an interpretation of the Autonomy of Logic.
    Secondly I deal with "the theory of correct symbolism" in Wittgenstein's early remarks, and clarify what he means by "Logic".
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